On the problems of using airborne troops in peacekeeping operations. Russia in Yugoslavia 32 post 554 OPB Yugoslavia reading

Recently, a dispute has flared up in Russian society between the leadership of the Airborne Forces and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces about the directions for reforming the Air Force. airborne troops. On November 21, the head of the Main Operations Directorate - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Colonel General Yuri Baluevsky, announced that in order to increase combat readiness, the airborne troops will be freed from peacekeeping functions that are unusual for them. The Airborne Forces headquarters confirmed this information and reported that the number of troops would be reduced by 5.5 thousand military personnel. Already this year, the 10th parachute regiment in Gudauta (Abkhazia), the 237th airborne division of the 76th airborne division (Pskov) and the 283rd Podolsk aviation squadron will be disbanded.

Meanwhile, the final decision on deprivation Airborne troops peacekeeping functions have not been accepted, since the President of the Russian Federation has not yet signed a document on the directions of further military development in Russia. As reported by a number of means mass media, the Airborne Forces headquarters agrees with the reduction of some units and subunits, but the leadership of the troops is categorically against depriving the Airborne Forces of peacekeeping functions. The Airborne Forces headquarters associates its arguments on this matter with the following circumstances:

Firstly, there is an instruction from the President of the Russian Federation dated May 17, 1997, which states that the Airborne Forces in peacetime should form the basis of the troops participating in peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, airborne troops are mobile. The peculiarities of their training, the tactics of their actions, the transportability of weapons and equipment allow short time transfer airborne units over long distances. According to paratroopers, this circumstance became one of the main reasons for attracting in 1998-2000 year of the Airborne Forces to participate in more than 30 operations to resolve interethnic conflicts, eliminate the consequences of emergency situations, maintain or restore international peace and safety. Transnistria and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Armenia (liquidation of the consequences of the earthquake). Central Asia and Chechnya are not a complete list of regions of action Airborne troops.

Thirdly, the Airborne Forces headquarters believes that the Airborne Forces have developed a coherent system for training and replacing peacekeeping units. Since January 1, 2000, the 245th The educational center peacekeeping forces (Ryazan), on the basis of which training and rotation of personnel is carried out peacekeeping contingents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Abkhazia.

Fourthly, over the eight-year period of participation in peacekeeping operations, the Airborne Forces have developed friendly and respectful relations between the command of peacekeeping units and personnel with the local administration and residents of the conflicting parties, close interaction has been organized with military contingents of other states, representatives of various international organizations (UN , OSCE, etc.).

Fifthly, repurposing the Airborne Forces for purely combat missions is unprofitable in material terms. According to calculations by the Airborne Forces headquarters, the total financial costs for transporting peacekeeping units from the areas of deployment will be about 900 million rubles:

a) according to the conclusion:

– by rail– 138-150 million rubles;

– by air transport – 254-280 million rubles.

Total: 392-430 million rubles.

b) by input:

– by rail – 168-180 million rubles;

– by air transport – 288-300 million rubles.

Total: 456-480 million rubles.

In addition, officers believe that this could lead to disruption in the implementation of peacekeeping missions, disruption of the management of units and subunits, disruption of a well-functioning system of interaction and comprehensive support.

Reference

The participation of units and units of the Russian Airborne Forces in peacekeeping operations began in March 1992, when the Russian 554th separate UN infantry battalion, numbering 900 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces, was sent to the former Yugoslavia.

In February 1994, in accordance with a political decision Russian leadership Part of the forces of the 554th FSB was redeployed to the Sarajevo area and, after appropriate reinforcement, was transformed into the 629th UN FSB with operational subordination to the Sarajevo sector and the task of separating the warring parties and monitoring compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

After the transfer of powers from the UN to NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 629th UN FSB in January 1996 stopped carrying out peacekeeping tasks and was withdrawn to Russian territory.

Based on the decision of the UN Security Council on the gradual reduction of the military component of the UN mission in Eastern Slavonia in October 1997, the 554th Regiment was transformed into a Security Group and reduced to 203 people. In June 1998, the Security Group was withdrawn to Russian territory.

Since May 1994, on the basis of the Agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia on a ceasefire and separation of forces, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) were created. The main task is to separate the conflicting parties, maintain law and order, create conditions for a return to normal life in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, prevent the resumption of the armed conflict, and protect important facilities and communications.

The parachute battalion of the 10th separate airborne regiment of the Airborne Forces operates as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces.

Units of the 10th Special Operations Division are deployed as follows to carry out peacekeeping missions:

– one parachute battalion in the Gali region,

– one parachute platoon in the Kadori Gorge,

– one parachute platoon performs security and defense tasks at the KPM Headquarters in Sukhumi. The service is organized at one control post and six observation posts: in the Gali district - 6, in the Kadori gorge - 1.

In January 1996, a separate airborne brigade of 1,500 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces, was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the peacekeeping operation of the multinational forces.

The brigade's area of ​​responsibility is 1,750 square meters. km, the total length of the controlled line of separation of the parties is 75 km.

Tasks performed by the Russian brigade:

– separation of warring parties;

– maintaining law and order, returning to conditions of normal life in the assigned area of ​​responsibility;

– participation in the provision of humanitarian assistance;

– assistance in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of December 14, 1996.

The tasks are carried out by serving at four control posts and patrolling routes in the area of ​​​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects and planned targets. The brigade's units are deployed in the base areas of Uglevik, Priboi, Simin-Khan and Vukosavtsi.

The number of Russian military personnel in 1999 was reduced and currently amounts to 1,150 people, armored vehicles - 90 units, automotive vehicles - 232 units.

In June 1999, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution N 1244, on the basis of a decree of the President of the Russian Federation, and in accordance with the “Agreed Points of Russian Participation in the KFOR Forces” signed by the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation and the United States on June 18, 1999 in Helsinki, a decision was made on sending to Kosovo (FRY) a military contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation numbering 3,616 people, of which about 2,500 are paratroopers.

The main objectives are:

– creating security conditions for the return and residence of refugees and displaced persons;

– ensuring public safety;

– carrying out work to clear mines and destroy unexploded ordnance and explosive objects;

– fulfillment of border control duties;

– joint activities with KFOR forces to operate the Pristina (Slatina) airfield;

– ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of its forces, the international civilian presence and the personnel of other international organizations.

The tasks are carried out by serving in base areas and at control and observation posts by a security and maintenance group, patrolling routes in the area of ​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects. Units of the Russian military contingent (RMC) are deployed in the base areas - Slatina airfield, Banja, Velika Hoca, Kosovska Kamenica, Donje Karmenjane, Srbica and Kosovo Polje.

Tasks are carried out at 15 control posts and 14 observation posts. 13 guard posts, patrolling 23 routes, traveling patrol in 3 settlements. 19 reserve groups and 4 helicopters are in constant readiness. To ensure their own safety, 10 guards are appointed, patrol groups - 15, checkpoints - 8, and 3-6 columns are escorted daily. Number airborne units as part of the RVC in Kosovo:

– personnel – 2445 people,

– armored vehicles – 131 units,

– automotive equipment – ​​387 units.

Thus, at present, the Airborne Forces in three peacekeeping operations - in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo together with NATO, in Abkhazia as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces involve: - personnel - about 5,600 people; – armored vehicles – more than 320 units; – automotive equipment – ​​more than 950 units.

Farewell Eastern Slavonia!

Paratroopers of the 554th separate battalion of "blue helmets" successfully completed a peacekeeping mission as part of the UN forces on the Balkan soil.

The peacekeeping operation UNTAES - the UN Interim Administration in Western Sirmium, Baranja and Eastern Slavonia has entered its final phase. Since October 1997, the phased withdrawal of the main mission forces - Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Czechs, Belgians - has continued by air, rail and the Danube River...
On October 26, in a solemn atmosphere, the flags of Russia and the UN were lowered at the airfield near Klisa, where the headquarters of the 554th Russian Regiment was located for five long years. separate battalion"blue helmets" Now the leadership of Croatia, which “integrated” with the help of the United Nations the ancestral Serbian lands of Western and Eastern Slavonia, is rushing the military to leave. And only the Serbian population looks doomedly at the backs of the “blue helmets” who deceived their aspirations and hopes.

To the sound of the anthem, the flags of Russia and the UN are slowly lowered down the flagpoles. This unusual event took place at 16.30 on October 26, 1997 at the Klisa airfield, where the headquarters of the 554th Russian UN battalion is located. The honorable mission of delivering these banners to their homeland is entrusted to paratroopers Captain Vitaly Starikov, deputy company commander for educational work, and Lieutenant Sergei Sergeev, commander of the best platoon.
No matter how laconic and strict this ceremony was, I noticed: from the faces of the officers and soldiers standing in last time In general, in the battalion formation before leaving for their homeland, a chill seemed to run through. I looked at the battalion commander, Colonel Vladimir Osipenko, and his deputies, Colonel Yuri Yakush. Hero of Russia, Lieutenant Colonel Svyatoslav Golubyatnikov, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Rybalko, Alexey Badeev, company commanders - Majors Sergei Selivanov and Alexey Ragozin, contract sergeants - Yuri Klimenko, Vladislav Baev, Andrey Aktaev... And other, painfully familiar faces of those , who for five and a half years carried out difficult peacekeeping tasks with dignity and honor as part of a battalion in Eastern Slavonia, increased the glory of RUSBAT-1.

There is not enough space to name all the names, because over the years there were 11 rotations in the battalion, 15 thousand soldiers and officers of the Airborne Forces passed through it. I will only mention the names of battalion commanders and colonels:
- Viktor Loginov,
- Leonid Arshinov,
- Sergei Voznesensky,
- Alexandra Kobyleva,
- Alexandra Nizhegorodova,
- Mikhail Zhdanenu,
- Vladimir Osipenko.
Each of them, to the best of their ability and ability, together with the headquarters and all personnel, contributed to the peacekeeping activities of the Russian UN battalion, striving to ensure that Russian peacekeepers worthily represented our Armed Forces in the most major operation"blue helmets", received in 1992 official name UNPROFOR - "UN Peace Force".
And although the Russians had no experience at all in such international missions, our “RUSBAT” eventually became known in all four sectors into which the territory was divided former Yugoslavia. I had the opportunity to visit our UN battalion more than once and I can say with full responsibility: the 554th battalion was the first to enter its zone of responsibility in the East sector, where until recently there were fierce battles and more than 50 percent of the cities and villages of Eastern Slavonia, including the notorious Vukovar, stood in ruins: he was the first to set up his “check points” here - control posts between Serbs and Croats on a front line 110 kilometers long: he was the first in the sector to ensure that the former opponents began to stockpile heavy weapons, went to the first negotiations " .

Not once during the numerous armed conflicts that broke out between the Serbs and Croats, did our battalion retreat, did not surrender the occupied lines, did not abandon the local population to the mercy of fate, as the vaunted French and British repeatedly did, not to mention the Kenyans, Jordanians, Argentines ... Moreover, when the situation in Sarajevo sharply deteriorated in February 1994, two companies of the battalion made a rapid march through the mountains of Bosnia and, with their decisive actions, actually prevented the bombing of Serbian positions by NATO aircraft, for which they received gratitude from the then Secretary General UN Boutros Thali. Our paratroopers-peacekeepers did not flinch even at the most dramatic moment of Operation UNPROFOR - in the summer of 1995, when the Croatian army, violating all international agreements, seized Krajina and Western Slavonia by force. In a matter of days, three sectors where UN forces were located fell. Only the East sector survived. It survived mainly because there were positions of a Russian battalion here, and the Airborne Forces headquarters planned a parachute landing operation to support it from the air in case of an attack by Croatian troops.
During the peacekeeping mission on Serbian soil, our paratroopers paid a heavy price - 21 officers and contract soldiers were killed and 48 wounded. The first on this woeful list is Sergeant Alexander Butorin, who was blown up anti-tank mine January 20, 1993. The last one is senior lieutenant Dmitry Moiseev, who died on October 7 this year as a result of multiple hemorrhages in the lungs.
I repeat: the Russian UN military contingent successfully passed the first test peacekeeping activities in the Balkans. Belgian Lieutenant General Hanseth, commander of the UN forces in Eastern Slavonia, confirmed this in a conversation with a Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said about our politicians and the foreign policy line they pursue in the Balkans in general and in the Serbian region in particular. Alas, for many years, especially when Andrei Kozyrev was the head of the Foreign Ministry, it was carried out inconsistently, with an eye to the West. More than once I witnessed when, at negotiations in Belgrade and Sarajevo, our high representatives curried favor with the envoys of the United States and Western Europe, thinking more about their careers than caring about Russian interests in the Balkans.

I will refer to just one, in my opinion, very eloquent example. Now on Smolenskaya Square they apparently prefer not to remember how in the spring of 1995, on the initiative of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs A non-aggression peace treaty was concluded between Croatia and the Serbian Land. While carrying out this task, Russian peacekeepers were forced to move control posts several kilometers, and several people were blown up by mines. But less than a year had passed before Croatian troops, in collusion with the United States and Western European countries, forcibly captured the Serbian Krajina along with its capital, Knin. More than 10 thousand Serbs died, and about 200 thousand became refugees. And what about Russia, a member of the UN Security Council? Our Foreign Ministry did not even dare to declare an official protest against the barbarity of the Croats. What else can we talk about?
And there were many such examples. If behind the Russian contingent in Eastern Slavonia, like, for example, behind the Belgian one, there is not a state that knows what it wants, a logical question arises: was it even worth getting involved here in such a way?
Summing up the UN peacekeeping operation in the Balkans, the role that the Russians played in it, the Yugoslav media and ordinary people always divide it into its component parts: official politicians and the “laborers” of this peacekeeping mission - soldiers and officers of the military contingent, our military UN observers, representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs... It is not difficult, I think, to guess at whose address there is a silent reproach, and at whose address there are words of sincere gratitude.
This is what Dragoljub Jvkovic, secretary of the Ten community for relations with UNTAES, said at the farewell meeting of the Russian “blue helmets”:
- In this difficult hour of parting, on behalf of the entire Serbian people, I express gratitude to the officers and soldiers of Russia for your humane mission, for reliable protection and Slavic kindness. I won’t hide the fact that we say goodbye to the “blue helmets”, especially the Russians, with bitterness. The decision of the UN Security Council to withdraw the military contingent of the mission is difficult for our people. But bad world- better than any war."

I won’t lie, the Croats say it differently:
“Our people have always perceived Russian soldiers as defenders of the Serbian aggressors,” elderly railway worker Jovan Petrakovic told me angrily at the loading station in the Croatian town of Vinkovci. - You only prevented us from defending our lands and homes...
Of course, every resident of local communities, Croatian and Serbian, has his own view on the presence of the “blue helmets,” including Russian ones.
...By November 1, the 554th UN battalion had already removed all control posts in the 120-kilometer area of ​​responsibility and was engaged in the planned transfer of people and military equipment from Eastern Slavonia to Russia.
- The main forces of our battalion are already 50 percent in on the way home, - Colonel Vladimir Osipenko told me at the battalion headquarters. - Others are completing the preparation of cargo and equipment for shipment. Since October 20, the remaining Russian military contingent has been assigned the following tasks: guarding the residence of the Head of the Interim Administration in the town of Bobota, ensuring the safety of UN civilian personnel and protecting property at the Klisa airfield, as well as monitoring the general situation in the area of ​​​​responsibility...
To the above, I will add that in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the Russian battalion, the transfer of powers for the implementation of the Erdut Agreement to the transitional police under the leadership of the UN civilian police has successfully taken place. Now Slovak sappers, under the cover of Russians, are demining the front-line territories of Eastern Slavonia. Our doctors continue to treat the local population. Every day 30-40 people come to the battalion medical center local residents for inspection and consultation. And, perhaps, dentist Captain Valery Germanov of the medical service is especially popular among our military doctors. Him kind soul and golden hands, no one knows refusal - neither Serbs, nor Croats.

In the 90s, Yugoslavia demonstrated to the whole world what, under a slightly different set of political circumstances, the collapse of the former Soviet Union: in the territory components In the former Yugoslavia, protracted and bloody civil wars broke out with the collapse of the vertical state power, the acute problem of refugees and the forced intervention of the world community.

In various territories and lands (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, adjacent Adriatic waters, etc.) since 1992, a whole range of operations has unfolded, in which the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU took part , WEU, as well as a number of countries as participants in coalitions to conduct individual operations.

At the same time, a number of operations were in the nature of coercive actions (sea and air blockade of part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, individual components of the operation in Albania, air pressure operation on the FRY, etc.). The other part of the operations was of a precautionary nature (Macedonia). There were operations and their individual components that corresponded to the classical understanding of peacekeeping (for example, the post-Dayton organization of elections in Bosnia under international control, etc.). Not all of these operations were carried out by the UN itself (see Chapter 1 on the role of the OSCE, NATO and WEU in individual operations), and some (the air operation to put pressure on the authorities of the FRY) did not have a UN mandate at all. In general, the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Albania introduced many innovations and changes into the practice of UN peacekeeping.

The scale and strength of the Russian contingent involved in operations in this region (varying from 900 troops in 1992 to a maximum of 1,500 in 1994 and slightly exceeding 1,000 currently) is, let's say, significant. in comparison with operations in Moldova and South Ossetia (in 2000, 460 and 462 Russian peacekeepers were deployed there, respectively), but far from decisive. For comparison, it is enough to mention that only the ground component of the forces of the SFOR operation amounted to 33,400 troops different countries, not counting civilians.

However, in many respects, Russia's involvement in operations in the former Yugoslavia was and remains unique.

Firstly, this is an atypical situation in which the Russian military and not only Western military “observers”, but also NATO combat units, who have been training for decades for a “big war,” acted together in solving the tasks set by the UN.

Second, the level of military force used in these operations as a whole was extremely high, on average much higher than in most all other operations of previous decades, with the exception of Desert Storm. As a result, there were increased demands on military professionalism and the ability of real combat interaction between the Russian military and the military of other countries, and not only those that were previously allies under the Warsaw Pact.

Thirdly, in conditions of ethnic and historical proximity or the relationship of individual countries with certain warring forces, it was particularly difficult to maintain an unbiased, equidistant attitude of peacekeepers towards the parties to the conflicts. Although the unofficial “pro-Serbian” orientation of Russian peacekeepers only balanced the unofficial “pro-Croatian”, “pro-Muslim” or “anti-Serbian” orientation of some Western countries participating in the coalitions, in general Russia is not playing the nationalist “card” in this complex of conflicts ” and takes the position of a relatively unbiased mediator.

Fourthly, Russia’s cooperation with other countries and organizations in conducting operations in the former Yugoslavia was significantly affected by the Russia-NATO contradictions in connection with NATO expansion and NATO’s actions without a UN mandate in the FRY in 1999. More broadly, peacekeeping cooperation in Yugoslavia was and remains influenced by the intersection and clash of interests of the great powers in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.

Units and formations of Russian airborne troops were first involved in the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia already in 1992. At that time, there were no specially trained peacekeeping contingents in Russia (with the exception of a small group of military observers from previous UN operations, which had experience only of non-combat operations “under the banner” of the UN). A special Russian motorized rifle battalion for landing in Yugoslavia was formed from airborne units on the basis of the Presidential Decree “On sending the Russian contingent to Yugoslavia to participate in UN peacekeeping operations” and the order of the Commander of the United Armed Forces of the CIS[i]. The size of the contingent was determined to be 900 people, armed with small arms, and equipped with 150 vehicles and 15 armored personnel carriers. The battalion was formed and underwent reduced training and instruction in 6 weeks.

Both the simple structure of the contingent (headquarters, headquarters company, five motorized rifle companies), and light weapons and the lack of communications, intelligence, and reinforcement units indicated that Russia did not have adequate experience in participating in military peacekeeping operations and was preparing for “classical” peacekeeping, in which weapons are used only for “showing force.” But the real situation civil war in Yugoslavia forced during the UNPROFOR operation, even before the transition to SFOR, to change the rules of combat contact and strengthen the combat power of the contingent. The battalion requested and received from Russia another 54 modern BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, 82 mm artillery guns, mobile missile launchers for fighting tanks and portable anti-aircraft systems. “Separating” the warring parties required action according to the rules of a serious war.

In 1994, the 554th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion was reinforced by the 629th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion, and the total number of Russian military personnel in Yugoslavia reached 1,500 people. on 95 armored combat vehicles.

When on December 15, 1995, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1031 on the former Yugoslavia, the Russian contingent received a new status and changed its structure (brigade) and scale. First of all, in connection with the adoption in the Russian Federation in the same year of a new law on the participation of Russian contingents in peacekeeping operations, the issue of the participation of Russian peacekeepers in the UN operation was brought up for discussion in the Russian parliament. The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation confirmed the decision on Russia's participation in the operation, and in mid-February 1996. The President of the Russian Federation by his decree increased the permitted number of troops to 1,600 people.

The Russian brigade received an area of ​​responsibility in Yugoslavia of 1,750 square kilometers, which included a line of separation of the warring parties 275 kilometers long. An American brigade, a Turkish brigade, and a joint brigade “North”, consisting of peacekeeping contingents from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland, served in close proximity to the Russian peacekeepers.

The tasks carried out in Bosnia by the Russian contingent also included control at five checkpoints, patrolling of numerous roads and territories, reconnaissance, search and inspection of facilities. During its participation in SFOR/IFOR operations in 1997-1999, in which NATO forces played a leading role in agreement with the UN, the Russian brigade was not involved in mass battles. The losses of 4 people killed and 11 wounded occurred mainly as a result of mine explosions.

A matter of political significance was the establishment of a chain of command. For “ideological” reasons, it was considered wrong to agree to the direct subordination of the Russian contingent to the command of NATO structures, although it was the NATO command, in accordance with the UN mandate, that carried out the overall coordination of operations. Through diplomatic channels, a military-political special condition was agreed upon: the commander of the Russian brigade, General L. Shevtsov, received the status of Deputy Commander of the entire operation in the former Yugoslavia and reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO ground forces in Central Europe.

The Russian command group at NATO's Supreme Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) solved problems not only of a military, but also of a political and diplomatic nature. Among them, in particular, coordination of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements with the Bosnian military-political leadership, as well as the organization and holding of meetings of joint reconciliation commissions, in which representatives of Bosnian political forces and military leadership SFOR operations.

By March 1999, when the NATO air operation in the FRY, which began without UN Security Council authorization, led to the freezing of Russia-NATO relations and the formal withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, the overall result of cooperation between Russian peacekeepers and the military of the coalition countries was generally positive. The crisis was not caused internal factors development of the operation itself in Bosnia, but became a projection into the sphere of peacekeeping of “macropolitical” tension in Russia-NATO relations.

Political complaints about NATO's actions in the FRY can be summarized as follows:

• The alliance violated the UN Charter by launching a coercive operation in the territory sovereign state contrary to the will of the legally elected government of the country and without a mandate from the UN Security Council;
• The operation was carried out outside NATO's area of ​​direct responsibility, limited, in accordance with the Washington Treaty of 1949, to the territory of member countries;
• The operation was exceeding the limits of necessary use of force, since not all channels of political influence have been exhausted;
• Operation violates prerogatives regional organizations , because, firstly, the OSCE as the leading regional organization collective security was pushed aside by NATO and the OSCE mandate was also absent, secondly, NATO itself never recognized itself (and was not recognized by the UN) as a regional security organization and, thirdly, operations with elements of coercive action (bombing and blockade) fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UN Security Council rather than regional organizations and agreements;
• The operation is controversial from the point of view of being categorized as a “humanitarian motivated intervention”, since the fact of genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo (which could be the basis for such an intervention) was not recorded and confirmed by the UN or OSCE, and the flow of refugees from Kosovo after the start of the intervention (bombing) the flow of refugees significantly exceeded before the operation;
• Finally, NATO and Western powers have set a dangerous precedent by openly ignoring Russian protests and the position of powers such as China and India, which, among others, have spoken out at the UN against forceful intervention.

At the same time, it is obvious that Russia was reacting not only and not so much to the events in the former Yugoslavia itself (although opposition to the bombing was consistent and supported by public opinion within Russia), but to ousting Russia from the process of making fundamental decisions on problems of pan-European security (which, undoubtedly, , related to the decision to bomb Yugoslav territory).

It should be realistically realized that the Russian leadership did not shy away from the use of military force in the Yugoslav conflict in general, and the recognition of the need for coercive actions, including in relation to the government of S. Milosevic, in particular. The political problem consisted primarily of the violation by the North Atlantic Alliance (and the leadership of a number of Western powers) of the rules and procedures for decision-making on the use of force in the international community. As soon as 11 weeks after the start of the bombing, the UN Security Council managed to adopt an agreed resolution regarding the international operation in Kosovo and the FRY, the Russian military-political leadership persistently returned the Russian contingent to the international intervention force (the famous paratrooper raid led by General Zavarzin from Bosnia to Pristina airport in Kosovo). Cooperation between Russia and NATO in peacekeeping was immediately unfrozen. At the same time, although the bombing as a type of influence on the government of S. Milosevic was stopped, other coercive elements in the operation (for example, a strictly controlled embargo on the supply of weapons to the parties to the conflict) remained.

The allocation of a zone of responsibility to the Russian contingent in Kosovo in the predominantly Albanian sector led to difficulties in carrying out peacekeeping functions and partial blocking of elements of the contingent by the local population. However, Russia has returned to the number of countries actively participating in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Some lessons from the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia can be summarized as follows:

• There has been a certain “specialization” of various international organizations in conducting operations in conflict regions. The UN is failing modern conditions with the organization of force operations to establish peace (enforce peace), if the conflict has the scale of a real civil war. This requires a “working” integrated military organization. The involvement of NATO is generally assessed in UN circles as effective and, apparently, will continue to be practiced if there is consensus within the ranks of NATO itself. The WEU was unable to effectively establish itself even in the “hothouse” conditions of conducting elements of operations “under the wing” of NATO. The OSCE skillfully carries out activities to restore political infrastructure and hold free elections in conflict regions. The UN ensures general political coordination of the interests of powers regarding the conflict and intervention in it, and this function (coordination of the interests of major powers regarding the conflict) is becoming increasingly important.
• Yugoslavia demonstrated the stages of deterioration in interaction between organizations of the international community (UN. OSCE) and the great powers (the first such disarray occurred during the conclusion of the Dayton Agreements on Bosnia outside the UN and the OSCE, the second during the deployment of NATO actions in the FRY contrary to the position of a number of great powers) , and the stages of their coordinated interaction. Experience shows that, as before, in the international community, the positive involvement of the UN, OSCE, and other multilateral mechanisms in the peacekeeping process cannot be replaced by the will and strength of individual powers. International community still considers joint action of “great powers” ​​and “great organizations” to be the norm, and not their opposition of their efforts to each other.
• At the same time, as a relatively new formula of interaction is developing (and, apparently, will expand in the future), the practice of transferring operations by the United Nations to created adhoc coalitions of powers. It is advisable for Russia to develop the practice of participating in such coalitions and apply it to the development of coalition participation in peacekeeping in the CIS.

Operations in the former Yugoslavia showed the need (and possibility) of close political interaction between broad groups of powers in real time of the unfolding conflict (we are talking not only about the relatively successful maintenance of consensus in ambiguous conditions by NATO countries, but also about the practice of agreeing on decisions in adhoc coalitions of countries that carried out operations in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo). This is an important example for Russia, which needs to use the mechanisms of political consultations and maintaining consensus among the CSTO countries.

[i] Order dated February 26, 1992. Strictly speaking, due to well-known hopes for preserving a unified military infrastructure of the CIS, the contingent was not “Russian” at first; it represented the entire former Soviet Union, all CIS countries, and only later in Yugoslavia began to talk about separate Russian and separate Ukrainian contingents.

A year later, the “ceiling” was lowered to 1,400 people, and the real number in the late 90s. did not exceed 1340 people.

To successfully complete tasks logistics support When conducting peacekeeping operations, the following influence factors: conditions for conducting peacekeeping operations; the scale of the conflict between the warring parties; tasks of the UN Security Council, unified command, General Staff Sun; constructing a line of demarcation between warring parties; depth of the area of ​​responsibility; military-political situation in the area of ​​responsibility; physical and geographical features of the area; the order of logistics support for peacekeeping forces established by the UN mission, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Logistics Headquarters.

The Russian Armed Forces were used on the largest scale during peacekeeping operations during the Yugoslav conflict. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation participated in the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia from April 1992 to February 1994 on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution No. 743 of 02/26/1992 and Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation of 03/06/1992 No. 2462, initially as part of the 554th separate infantry battalion ( "Rusbat-1") in the amount of 420 people.

The tasks of the 554th separate infantry battalion, prescribed by the UN mandate, were: delimitation of the warring parties; monitoring compliance with the terms of the truce; monitoring compliance with the conditions for the withdrawal of heavy weapons beyond the 30-kilometer zone from the line of contact of the parties; escorting convoys with humanitarian aid; patrolling areas of responsibility; assistance to the civilian population (protection, medical assistance, evacuation) in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. The main task was to prevent the resumption of hostilities and the disengagement of the Serbian Yugoslav troops People's Army and Croatian-Muslim confederation in the area settlements Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci, Klisa, Tenja, Orolik, where armed clashes between the parties took place due to territorial disputes. The battalion command post was located on the territory of the airfield in the Croatian city of Osijek, the remaining combat units were stationed 20-25 km from the command post along the line of the battalion’s zone of responsibility.

The battalion was subordinate to the command of the UN sector headquarters and interacted with the French, Norwegian, Danish, English and Ukrainian battalions.

The 554th separate infantry battalion consisted of two infantry companies (each company had three infantry platoons and a utility department) and a headquarters company, which included a reconnaissance platoon, an anti-aircraft missile platoon, a communications department, a repair platoon and a utility platoon (Fig. 30.1).

Fig. 30.1 Organizational and staffing structure 554 OPB

The utility department of the infantry company consisted of two units of refueling trucks (AC-5.5-4320 - 1 unit; ATMZ-5-4320 - 1 unit) and an ambulance UAZ-452A. He supervised the work of the rear of the infantry company - the deputy company commander for logistics. This composition of the rear increased the autonomy of the infantry company in logistics terms when performing peacekeeping missions in the areas of responsibility.

The rear of a separate infantry battalion included the following officials: deputy battalion commander for logistics (officer); head of the fuel and lubricants service (officer), head of the fuel warehouse (warrant officer); head of the clothing service (officer), head of the clothing warehouse (ensign); the head of the food service (officer), the head of the food warehouse (ensign) and the head of the canteen (ensign). The utility platoon of the headquarters company had functions similar to the platoon material support motorized rifle battalion.

At the beginning of 1994, the situation in the area of ​​the city of Sarajevo worsened, and in February an additional 629 separate infantry battalion (Rusbat-2) was sent there with the task of stabilizing the situation in this sector and providing humanitarian aid refugees and ensure their safety. To carry out this task, the battalion was assigned a zone of responsibility with an area of ​​40 km 2 (the distance between 554 opb and 629 OPB was about 200 km).

The provision of fuel, oils and lubricants was carried out through a fuel depot deployed by the French battalion in the area of ​​Sarajevo airport. The fuel service staff includes 629 OPB in addition to 8 units of fuel tankers (2 units in each infantry company and 2 units in the headquarters company), there were: an MNUG-20 motor pump unit, domestically produced R-4 and R-8 tanks, as well as French-made R-5 tanks, which were a battalion fuel warehouse with a capacity of 65 m 3 is equipped. In total, the battalion warehouse contained 2.0 filling stations of motor gasoline and 1.8 filling stations diesel fuel. A battalion refueling point was equipped, where equipment was refueled and the storage and distribution of oils and lubricants was organized. In order to organize the protection of the warehouse, the tanks were placed on the ground and lined with sandbags. An earthen parapet was placed around the perimeter of the warehouse.

The battalions were supplied with high-quality fuel, oils and lubricants of Slovenian production, A-95 gasoline, highly purified paraffin-free diesel fuel, seven grades of gear oils, and three grades of gun oil. A peculiarity of accounting and reporting on the fuel service was that UN specialists from the sector headquarters required daily faxing of data on the consumption and availability of fuel in the battalion as of 15.00. Based on these fax reports, they wrote off fuel from the battalion. Receipt of fuel was carried out after the head of the battalion fuel service showed in the report the presence of free containers. The battalion received an invoice by fax for receiving fuel and lubricants from the sector warehouse; according to this document, fuel, oils and lubricants were received.

To the features of logistics support 554 and 629 OPB The following can be attributed: the supply of battalion personnel was carried out according to UN standards, the same for all battalions; personnel were given televisions, refrigerators, video equipment, audio equipment, microwave ovens, fans, heaters, washing machines as equipment; badges of belonging to the UN troops were issued: berets blue color, blue ceremonial scarves, UN sleeve insignia, UN flags; The battalion personnel had their own uniform (uniform) - domestic; washing of personnel was carried out in shower modules of battalions (French production); underwear was washed in units (each platoon had a washing machine), bed linen was washed in city laundries; food was obtained from a warehouse set up by the French near the Sarajevo airport, the range of products is very wide (fruits, juices, mineral water, cheeses, seasonings, etc.); food for personnel was provided in the officers' and soldiers' canteens (staff from the local population worked in the officers' canteen); the battalion was provided with dry rations made in France; storage perishable products produced in container-type refrigerated chambers; to improve nutrition on the battalions' territory, smokehouses were built with their own resources and resources for smoking chickens and fresh fish; Meals at checkpoints were organized using small-sized kitchens, which necessitated the training of additional freelance cooks.

The attitude of the local population (Bosniaks and Muslims) towards the presence Russian battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely negative, which significantly complicated the work of the rear.

In 1995, the Russian leadership decided to withdraw battalions from Sarajevo, as provocations became more frequent and the continued presence of Russian troops in this region became dangerous. The region has resumed fighting Using heavy equipment, in August-September 1995, UN coalition forces made attempts to stabilize the situation; NATO aircraft bombed the positions of the Yugoslav People's Army, but no significant success was achieved. A refugee problem arose; Serbs fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina and settled along the border with Serbia, proclaiming the formation of a state not recognized in the world - the Republic of Srpska.

In connection with the current situation, the Government of the Russian Federation, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1031 of December 15, 1995 and Federation Council Resolution No. 772 of January 5, 1996, decided to increase its presence in the conflict zone. In accordance with the directive of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, on the basis of two airborne divisions, a separate airborne brigade was formed to participate in the peacekeeping operation and subsequently introduced into the conflict zone (Fig. 30.2).

The brigade's task was to prevent the resumption of hostile actions and ensure the security of the situation. 20 days were allotted for the formation and immediate training of the brigade. A special feature of the training was the correct determination and creation of the optimal organizational and staffing structure of rear units with the appropriate technical equipment, which makes it possible to increase the autonomy, adaptability and flexibility of the brigade’s tactical actions.

Rice. 30.2. Organizational and staffing structure of a separate

airborne brigade

The special features of the brigade rear staffing structure were: in addition to the head of the service, the food service staff included an auditor officer, a catering officer, a veterinarian, a food service technician (ensign), the head of the officers' canteen, the head of the soldiers' canteen, a cook-instructor, a mobile mechanized bakery (the head of the bakery is an officer, the bakery technician is a warrant officer); In addition to the head of the service, the fuel service staff included an inspector officer, a warehouse manager, and a warehouse mechanic; the staff of the clothing service consisted of the head of the service, the head of the warehouse, the head of the clothing repair shop, the head of the field bathhouse, and the head of the field laundry; the apartment maintenance service was headed by the head of the service, the service staff was partially staffed by military personnel rmo(electrician, plumber, driver of a garbage collection vehicle, driver of a cleaning and watering vehicle), part of the staff was recruited seasonally from local residents (Serbian refugees) for the positions of stokers in the boiler room of the brigade.

20 days before the brigade’s departure, in early 1996, a reconnaissance group led by the brigade commander was sent to the area of ​​the peacekeeping operation. The deputy brigade commander for logistics took part in the work of the reconnaissance group. The group's tasks were: selection and preparation of unloading sites; selection of base areas for the deployment of brigade headquarters, battalions, special forces and support units; determining the location of checkpoints; studying the situation on the ground and making decisions on further actions in the conflict zone. Simultaneously with the arrival of the reconnaissance group at the Tuzla airfield from the cities of Ivanovo, where the headquarters and most of the combat, rear and technical support brigades (signal company, rmo, repair company, medrota, isr, vrhr), Kostroma, where 1 pdb, commandant company, military police platoon, sabatre; was trained reconnaissance group special purpose 45 ORP Airborne Forces, and from Pskov, where 2 were formed pdb And sabatre, the railway trains set off towards Yugoslavia. At the end of January 1996, the trains, having completed a 3,200-kilometer journey through Ukraine, Hungary, and Serbia, arrived at the Bijeljina railway station.

Upon arrival of the trains at their destination, practice has confirmed the difficulties of organizing the unloading of materiel, logistics equipment, their delivery to base areas and placement. There was a lack of means for mechanizing loading and unloading operations.

In addition to peacekeeping tasks to disarm the conflicting parties and clear mines, the brigade monitored the condition of combat equipment and the movement of military equipment, as well as residents and monitored the situation. The brigade solved problems of ensuring the delivery of food and other humanitarian supplies, assisting in organizing and holding elections, monitoring the observance of human rights, assisting in the restoration of administrative systems and infrastructure, solving problems of its own logistical support, interacting with the command of the 1st MD of the US Army , with local suppliers and service organizations. The Russian military contingent was ready to assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other international organizations in carrying out humanitarian assistance.

The most difficult tasks for the rear were: establishing connections and concluding contracts for the replacement and washing of linen, the supply of food, fuel, fuel from local suppliers; organizing bread baking; organization of electricity and water supply; evacuation of the wounded and sick.

In Yugoslavia it was fundamentally changed material supply scheme. A mixed method was used, in which support was carried out both by the forces and means of the joint command of the peacekeeping forces, and by the forces and means of the Center (Moscow Military District, airborne rear services). There was no delivery by rail or river (sea) transport. Part of the cargo (standard and camp tents, uniforms and shoes, engineering equipment, oils and special liquids, logistics equipment, repair kits for technical equipment for logistics services) was transported by air transport, airplanes military transport aviation(Il-76) from the Chkalovsky military airfield near Moscow and the Severny Ivanovo military airfield to the airfield of the Bosnian city of Tuzla.

The deputy brigade commander for logistics sent a request for the necessary material to the airborne logistics headquarters. Within a month, the property specified in the application was received at the bases of the center and district, prepared for shipment (by separate regiment Airborne Forces communications) and was transported by plane to Yugoslavia. The decision to deliver cargo was made by the Airborne Forces Commander in agreement with the VTA command. The cargo was delivered by landing by Il-76 aircraft in VAK-5 containers. The organization of the reception of material resources was as follows: in the brigade, by order of the commander, an officer was appointed in charge of receiving cargo at the airfield of the city of Tuzla; a team was allocated in advance to work on unloading material, equipment and combat guards for automobile convoys were allocated; with the departure of the plane from Moscow, the automobile convoy assigned to receive cargo was sent to the airfield of the city of Tuzla, located 80 km from the base area of ​​the brigade; with the arrival of the plane, the delivered material was accepted according to act f.4 and delivered to the brigade; After receiving the material, a report f.200 about the received cargo was sent to the Airborne Forces rear headquarters. Subsequently, the first copy of the acceptance certificate f.4 was sent to the Airborne Forces logistics headquarters.

Economic calculations showed that delivery of one 5-ton container to the territory of Yugoslavia costs 50 thousand US dollars, so it was decided to procure part of the material resources locally. Practically, for all rear services, contracts were concluded for the purchase of material resources and implementation certain types services. A peculiarity of the financial support of the peacekeeping operation was that for all material resources and all types of services received locally under contracts it was necessary to pay in foreign currency not through a bank, but in cash immediately as the service was provided. The head of the rear service, as part of the commission, accepted material resources from local suppliers (fuel, food, laundry), upon application for an advance payment, received money from the brigade cash desk (from 2 to 5 thousand US dollars) and, having issued invoices, paid with suppliers. Then he filled out an advance report with attached documents for receiving material resources, and the amount previously received at the brigade cash desk after the report was approved by the brigade commander was written off from the report.

Delivery of materials included a number of sequential activities: obtaining material resources from local suppliers; receiving cargo delivered by military transport aircraft; preparation of materiel for transfer to battalions; loading and delivery of materiel to the base areas of the battalions, transferring them to recipients in the base areas of the battalions or directly to outposts and checkpoints (Milijas, Spasojevici, Čelich, Bare, Vukasavtsi) with subsequent registration of transfer through the battalion. The order of delivery was planned by the deputy brigade commander for logistics in coordination with the brigade chief of staff and depended on the importance of the task being performed or on the direction of concentration of the main efforts, the location of the battalion's base area.

Yes, CP 1 pdb was 30 km from the brigade CP, and CP 2 pdb 70 km away, in addition, the base area of ​​the 2nd battalion, outposts, and checkpoints were entirely located on the territory of an aggressive population (Bosnians), so the first delivery was carried out by 2 pdb. For this purpose, as a rule, transport was used rmo teams, in exceptional cases empty transport WMO battalions. The frequency of delivery and the range of material resources depended on the intensity of their consumption in different situations. The supply of fuel and food was carried out once a week, bread - once every two days, linen was changed - 2 times a week.

Main vehicles The brigade's supply vehicles were all-terrain vehicles of the Ural-4320 type, which were used in the mountainous and wooded areas of the conflict zone. On the flat part, KAMAZ-5310 type vehicles were used. In winter, wheeled tractors of the TK-6M type were included in the rear columns to cross mountain passes. The work of supply transport became especially intense when the situation became more complicated. The consumption of material resources increased, and the departure of rear columns to areas of responsibility was reduced to a minimum in order to prevent the occurrence of provocations and attacks on our military personnel. In such cases, a reliable military guard was created, 2-3 units of BTR-80, R-142 N were included in the automobile columns, and also, in the most difficult situations, Black Hawk helicopters from the 1st MD Squadron of the US Army were involved, which accompanied our convoys to the areas where materiel was transferred.

Features of the organization of rear management during the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, it turned out that in units and subunits, command posts and rear control points were, as a rule, located together. This made it possible to use the command post controls in the interests of the rear, and to increase the reliability of the rear control system, since standard rear communications equipment provided only the minimum required level of control.

Features in organizing the work of rear services brigades in carrying out the tasks of peacekeeping operations became as follows.

1. For food service. Agreements were concluded for the supply of food (bread, meat, vegetables, fruits, mineral water, cookies, dairy products, etc.) from local suppliers; food preparation was carried out in the base area of ​​the brigade in the PAK-200 kitchens and subsequently on stationary equipment in the dining room; in the base areas of battalions and companies, food was prepared in the kitchens of KP-125, KP-130, at outposts and checkpoints - in the kitchens of KP-20, MK-30, KO-75, and therefore the need for spare parts for the above equipment increased due to intensive operation, there was also a need to train freelance cooks-gunners at the rate of 2 cooks per platoon; food provision was carried out in accordance with Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of 1994 No. 395 according to a special norm with the provision of additional food (per day: mineral water - 1.5 l, cookies - 50 g, milk - 100 ml, meat - 100 g, cheese - 30 g , fruits – 100 g). When accepting products from local suppliers, special attention was paid to checking the quality of meat - a task carried out by the team’s veterinarian; storage of perishable products was carried out in the brigade food warehouse in an ALKA refrigerated trailer; storage of perishable products in battalion food warehouses was organized in adapted premises using refrigeration equipment of the ShKh-0.5 type; storage of perishable products at checkpoints and outposts was carried out in specially adapted rooms and devices.

2. For clothing service. At first, laundry was washed in a brigade laundry station equipped with an MPP-2.0. However, later, due to difficulties in maintaining and repairing technical equipment, as well as as a result of assessing the economic feasibility of completing the task, an agreement was concluded with a local laundry company in the suburbs of Bijeljina. Upon replacement, personnel arrived at the brigade fully equipped with clothing; in the brigade, property was not issued according to supply plans, with the exception of the issuance of items that had become unusable. Washing was carried out in the base area of ​​the brigade in a room adapted for washing personnel, using disinfection-shower units DDA-66 and DDP-2, according to a schedule for six days a week. In the base areas of the battalions, washing is carried out in premises adapted for washing personnel using DDP-2 and DDA-66. At outposts and checkpoints, washing was carried out using simple devices equipped in the form of showers. Due to the intensive use of technical means of washing (DDP-2, DDA-66), the wear of equipment (rubber-fabric, Rubber products, nozzles, injectors, boilers), which necessitated the provision of spare parts, as well as increased requirements for the technical training of operating personnel. Some units were housed in standardized tents of the UST-56, USB-56, UZ-68 type (2 pdb, isr, management units 1 pdb) which increases the wear and tear of tents and especially rigging.

3. For fuel service. Fuel was obtained from local suppliers on the basis of a contract. From Hungary through Vojvodina and Serbia, diesel fuel and motor gasoline were supplied to the brigade by the supplier's transport. In the base area of ​​the brigade, after quality control, fuel was pumped from the supplier’s transport into the brigade’s transport; The tanks in the fuel depot were not buried; to increase their protective properties, they were dug in and lined with sandbags.

4. For medical service. The brigade's medical center was staffed by a reduced staff of the division's separate medical battalion and had a full complement of medical specialists capable of providing qualified medical care.

5. For apartment maintenance service. Furniture, equipment and property of the IES were brought in trains at the beginning of the operation for the entire duration of the operation. Firewood was collected from local sources, under agreements with local administration authorities. Payment for electricity, water and other utilities was made on the basis of contracts in currency, through a brigade, in cash.

A feature of the work of the rear was that officials and rear management bodies, commanders of rear units had to make appropriate decisions not only on issues of logistical support, but also on organizing combat, performing peacekeeping functions, planning in detail and providing for measures for protection, defense, protection and camouflage of rear facilities. Logistics officers were required to know the capabilities of the standard weapons of the units entrusted to them, the ability to use them, and to have appropriate operational-tactical and tactical-special training.