The main features of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. Features of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations and the formation of a new political map of the world after the Second World War. See what the Yalta-Potsdam system is

The Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations is a designation accepted in historiography for the system of international relations enshrined in treaties and agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam Conference.

For the first time, the issue of post-war settlement top level was raised during the Tehran Conference of 1943, where even then the strengthening of the position of two powers, the USSR and the USA, was already quite clearly evident, to which the decisive role in determining the parameters of the post-war world was increasingly being transferred. That is, even during the war, the prerequisites for the formation of the foundations of a future bipolar world are born. This trend was fully evident already in Yalta ((February 4–11, 1945) - the second multilateral meeting of leaders three great powers of the anti-Hitler coalition - USSR, USA and Great Britain)And Potsdam(from July 17 to August 2, 1945) conferences when main role In solving the key problems associated with the formation of a new model of defense, two, now superpowers, the USSR and the USA, played a role.

The Potsdam era became a historical precedent, since never before had the entire world been artificially divided into spheres of influence between two states. The bipolar balance of power quickly led to the beginning of a confrontation between the capitalist and socialist camps, called in history the Cold War.

The Potsdam era was characterized by extreme ideologization of international relations, as well as the constant threat of direct military confrontation between the USSR and the USA.

The end of the Potsdam era was marked by the collapse of the world socialist camp, following a failed attempt to reform the economy of the Soviet Union, and was consolidated by the Belovezhskaya Agreement of 1991.



Peculiarities:

1. The multipolar organization of the structure of international relations was eliminated, and a bipolar structure of post-war international relations emerged, in which the leading role was played by two superstates - the USSR and the USA. The significant separation of the military-power, political, economic and cultural-ideological capabilities of these two powers from other countries of the world led to the formation of two main, dominant “centers of power” that had a system-forming influence on the structure and character of the entire international system.

2. Confrontational character - a systemic, complex confrontation in the economic, political, military, ideological and other spheres, a confrontation that from time to time acquired the character of an acute conflict, crisis interaction. This type of confrontation in the format of mutual threats to use force, balancing on the brink real war, called the “Cold War”.

3. Post-war bipolarity took shape during the era nuclear weapons, which led to a revolution in both military and political strategies.

4. The distribution of the world into the sphere of influence of two superstates both in Europe and on the periphery, the emergence of “divided” countries (Germany, Korea, Vietnam, China) and the formation of military-political blocs under the leadership of the USSR and the USA led to globalization and deepened geopolitical structuring systemic opposition and confrontation.

5. Post-war bipolarity took the form of a political-ideological confrontation, an ideological confrontation between the “free world” of Western democracies led by the USA and the “socialist world” led by the USSR. The USA wanted to establish American hegemony in the world under the slogan “Pax Americana”, the USSR argued about the inevitability of the victory of socialism on a global scale. The Soviet-American confrontation looked primarily as a rivalry between a system of political and ethical ideals, social and moral principles.

6. The post-war world has ceased to be predominantly Eurocentric, international system has turned into a global one. The destruction of colonial systems and the formation of regional and subregional subsystems of international relations were carried out under the dominant influence of the horizontal spread of systemic bipolar confrontation and trends of economic and political globalization.

7. The Yalta-Potsdam order did not have a strong legal basis. The agreements that formed the basis of the post-war order were either oral, not officially recorded, or were secured primarily in declarative form, or their full implementation was blocked as a result of the severity of contradictions and confrontation between the main subjects of post-war international relations.

8. The UN, one of the central elements of the Yalta-Potsdam system, became the main mechanism for coordinating efforts to eliminate wars and conflicts from international life by harmonizing relations between states and creating a global system collective security. Post-war realities and the intransigence of confrontational relations between the USSR and the USA significantly limited the ability of the UN to realize its statutory functions and goals. The main task of the UN was primarily focused on preventing an armed conflict between the USSR and the USA at both the global and regional levels, that is, maintaining the stability of Soviet-American relations as the main prerequisite for international security and peace in the post-war period.

Theoretical schools in international studies. Real-Political School of International Relations Studies (realism and neorealism)

Realism

The main principles of classical realism are as follows:

· International relations are

interaction of states that are homogeneous in essence, are unitary participants and, as people,

selfish in their aspirations.

· Interaction between states is carried out chaotically, since

there is no “supranational center of power”. As a result international relations are "anarchic".

· The quest for power, in particular to military superiority

which guarantees the security of states is the main

tive of their activities.

· States primarily proceed from their own interests. At

In this they can take into account moral considerations, but none

of them does not have the right to determine “what is good,

abuses of speculation on morality.

· Political reality differs from economic reality: for

For politics, the main thing is power; for the economy, it’s wealth.

· In the world of international relations, where power dominates

factor, states must always be on full alert.

Six principles of political realism according to Morgenthau:

1. the probabilistic nature of political activity in the field of international relations.

2. the principle of national interests, understood in terms of power and might.

3. Foreign policy cannot be viewed through psychological phenomena.

4. political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action

5. Political realism denies the identity of the morality of a specific nation and universal moral laws.

6. The political sphere is autonomous;

The following key provisions are common to representatives of political realism:

1. The main participants in international relationsare sovereign states. Realists believe What strong states do what they can, and weak states do what the strong allow them.
2 . “National interests” - main category theories of political realism, the main motive and key incentive of the state's policy on international arena.

As for the state of peace between states, it is ideal, because it is always temporary.
3 . The main goal of a state in international politics is to ensure its own security. However, they can never feel safe and constantly strive to increase their own resources and improve their quality.

4. The power of the state is inseparable from its strength, serving as one of the decisive means of ensuring national security in the international arena

The most famous representatives- Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schumann, George Kennan, George Schwarzenberger, Kenneth Thompson, Henry Kissinger, Edward Carr, Arnold Wolfers and others - determined the path of the science of international relations for a long time. The undisputed leaders of this trend were Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron.

5. Is it possible to change the nature of international relations? Realists consider this question central to the study of international politics. However, in their opinion, as long as states exist, they will remain the main participants in international politics, functioning according to their own unchanging laws.

6. In other words, according to supporters of political realism, it is possible to change the configuration of political forces, mitigate the consequences of international anarchy, establish more stable and more secure interstate relations, but the nature of international relations cannot be changed.

Neorealism

Basic principles of neorealism:

§ International relations are considered as an integral system, functioning in accordance with certain laws. Only systemic analysis can reveal the nature of international relations.

§ Neorealism shifts the focus of explanation of international behavior to the level of the international system. Relations between great powers and other states are not uniquely anarchic, since they depend mainly on the will of the great powers.

§ In addition, Waltz identified three basic principles of the structure of international relations (“structural triad”). First, states are primarily driven by the motive of survival. Secondly, only states remain participants in international relations, since other actors have not caught up or surpassed the leading powers in terms of authority and power capabilities. Thirdly, states are heterogeneous and differ in capabilities and potential.

§ Neorealism seeks to find and isolate economic relations from political ones.

§ striving for methodological rigor.

§ The main actors are states and their unions.

§ Their main goals - protection of national interests, state security and maintaining the status quo in international relations.

§ The main means of achieving these goals are force and alliances.

§ Driving force international relations - in the harsh, restraining impact of the structural limitations of the international system.

Similarities between neorealism and political realism:

§ Both realists and neorealists believe that since the nature of international relations has not changed for thousands of years, there is no reason to believe that they will acquire any different character in the future.

§ Both theories believe that all attempts to change the international system based on liberal-idealistic foundations are doomed to failure.


Introduction

Chapter 1. Creation of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system

Crimean (Yalta) Conference of Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain

Potsdam Three Power Conference

Chapter 2. Development of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system. System stability and nuclear factor

Chapter 3. The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, causes, results

Conclusion

Bibliography


Introduction


Beginning in 1648, the Westphalian system of international relations underwent a number of modifications, each of which was the result of major military upheavals. After the Thirty Years' War, the first of these shocks, much larger and bloodier, were the Napoleonic Wars. They ended with the defeat of Napoleon by a coalition of European powers with a dominant role Russian Empire, which made the main contribution to the victory of the coalition. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 consolidated another redivision of the world and formed the “Holy Alliance” under the actual leadership of Russia. In 1830, the Union collapsed - not least as a result of anti-Russian intrigues by Austria and England.

The next shock to the Westphalian world order was the Crimean War of 1854-56, which ended with the defeat of Russia and the Congress of Paris in 1856. The Congress consolidated a new redistribution of the world in the Balkans and in the Black Sea not in favor of Russia: it was forced to return Kars, agree to the neutralization of the Black Sea and cede Bessarabia. However, Russia quite quickly - within 13-15 years - restored the geopolitical status quo.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, which ended with the defeat of France and the triumphant victory of Bismarck's Germany, led to the establishment of the short-lived Peace of Frankfurt.

This modification was destroyed by the First World War of 1914-18, in which Turkey and Germany were defeated. The result was the fragile Peace of Versailles, in which, for the first time in history, a serious attempt was made to create a universal international organization- at least on the scale of the European continent - responsible for peace and security in Europe: the League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles was based on a broad and ramified legal framework and included a well-functioning mechanism for making and implementing collective decisions. This, however, did not save him from complete collapse on the eve of the Second World War. In addition, the Treaty of Versailles was not universal enough: it did not include not only such large Asian countries as China, India and Japan, but also the USA, which, as we know, never joined the League of Nations and did not ratify Treaty of Versailles. The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations after the invasion of Finland.

Second World War also involved in hostilities those countries that were not part of the Treaty of Versailles. This is the most terrible war in world history, which ended total defeat Germany, Japan and their allies, created another modification of the Westphalian system of international relations - the Yalta-Potsdam world order, which was both its heyday and the beginning of its decline as an international system of united national sovereignties.

The main difference between the Yalta-Potsdam world order and the Versailles one was the formation - instead of the collapsed multipolar - bipolar world order, in which two superpowers - the USSR and the USA - dominated and competed with each other. And since they were carriers of two different projects world development (and even two different historical projects) - communist and capitalist - their rivalry from the very beginning acquired an acute ideological character of confrontation.

Immediately after World War II, this confrontation was called the Cold War. At the same time, the USA and the USSR acquired nuclear weapons, and such a confrontation developed into a very specific and hitherto unknown in world politics regime of interaction between two subjects of confrontation - the regime of “mutual nuclear deterrence” or “mutual assured destruction”. The peak of the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the USSR and the USA were on the brink of nuclear war. This crisis, however, marked the beginning nuclear disarmament and the easing of international tension.

Thus, the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations was clearly confrontational in nature, although the successful cooperation of the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War gave certain reasons to believe that the post-war world order would become cooperative.

The dominance and significant military-force separation of the two superpowers from all other countries of the world, the ideological nature of the confrontation, its totality (in all parts of the globe), the confrontational type of interaction, the competition of two projects of world order and historical development forced all other countries of the world to make a tough choice between the two world poles.

Although the Yalta-Potsdam world order did not have a strong legal basis, the level of stability and controllability of the international system was very high. Stability was ensured by the mutual nuclear deterrence regime, which, among other things, made strategic dialogue on limiting the arms race and disarmament and some others vitally important for the two superpowers global problems security. And controllability was achieved by the fact that in order to resolve complex international issues, it was sufficient to coordinate the positions of only two main actors - the USSR and the USA.

The bipolar world collapsed in 1991, immediately after the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, the erosion of the Yalta-Potsdam world order began. It was from this time that the decline of the Westphalian system, eroded by globalization processes, became especially noticeable. These processes are delivering increasingly crushing blows to the foundations of the Westphalian system - national state sovereignty.

Chapter 1. Creation of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system, its essence and content


. Crimean (Yalta) Conference of Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain


After the end of the Tehran Conference, many important events took place on the war fronts. The Red Army completed the expulsion of the Nazis from the territory of the Eastern European states and created a springboard for the attack on Berlin. The hour of victory of the anti-Hitler coalition was approaching, in which the Soviet Union played an exceptional role, having bore the brunt of the war. The problems of the post-war system came to the fore more and more. In this environment special meaning acquired by the meeting of the “Big Three”.

The goals of the Allied powers at the conference were to coordinate plans for the defeat of Hitler's Germany and establish the foundations of the post-war world. Specifically, the conference was supposed to discuss issues related to the final defeat of Nazi Germany, its unconditional surrender and the future structure. The reparations issue also had to be resolved; determine the general line of policy of the allied states towards the liberated countries of Europe; resolve the issue of Poland's borders and its place in the post-war system of international relations. At the conference it was necessary to resolve issues related to the creation of an international organization for the security and cooperation of peoples that had not been resolved at Dumbarton Oaks. In addition, the USA and Great Britain wanted to agree on the terms and conditions for the USSR to enter the war against militaristic Japan.

Held from February 7 to 11, 1945. Yalta Conference occupied an important place in the diplomatic history of the Second World War. This was the second meeting of the leaders of the three great powers of the anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR, the USA and England, and it, like the Tehran Conference, was marked by the predominance of a tendency to develop agreed decisions both in organizing the final victory and in the field of the post-war system. According to US Secretary of State E. Stettinius, the Yalta Conference “was the most important meeting of the leaders of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States during the war,” during which “for the first time, the three leaders reached fundamental agreements on post-war problems, as opposed to the usual statements of goals and intentions.” "

Reports on the situation on the fronts heard at the Crimean Conference, made by the Chief of the USSR General Staff, Army General A.I. Antonov and the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General J. Marshall, confirmed the army’s readiness to launch “strikes from the east, west, north and south” against Germany. The conference participants confirmed that hostilities would cease only after the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.

The main place at the conference was occupied by political problems of the post-war settlement, and the Soviet side considered it advisable to start it with a discussion of the issue of Germany. In the statement adopted by the heads of government relating to Germany, the goals of the Allied occupation were clearly defined - “the destruction of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of guarantees that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the whole world.” In addition, methods for achieving these goals were discussed - the liquidation of the Wehrmacht, the military industry, taking control of the rest of Germany's industrial potential, punishing war criminals, compensating victims of aggression, destroying the Nazi party and its institutions, Nazi and militaristic ideology.

The agreement on zones of occupation and on the management of “Greater Berlin” decided that the Soviet Union would occupy the eastern part of Germany, England the northwestern part, and the United States the southwestern part. The Allied Powers invited France to take part in the occupation of Germany and was allocated part of the British and American zones. “Greater Berlin” was part of the Soviet zone of occupation, but as a place of residence Control Commission, which has the functions supreme power in Germany, was subject to occupation by the troops of the three powers, but the admission of their troops to Berlin was not provided for.

At the Crimean Conference, England and the United States again put forward plans for the dismemberment of Germany. Roosevelt said that breaking up Germany into five or even seven states was a good idea and that he saw no other way out.

Churchill was not so categorical. Nevertheless, as follows from the minutes, he generally agreed with the idea expressed by Roosevelt, although he declined to support any specific plans. His position was that unconditional surrender gave the Allied powers the right to “determine the fate of Germany” themselves. In addition, at the suggestion of Churchill, supported by Roosevelt, it was decided to create a special committee on post-war issues in Germany, which was supposed to discuss the issue of dismemberment.

The Soviet delegation resolutely opposed the dismemberment of Germany and for the creation of a single democratic, peace-loving German state. It should be noted that this position was defended both before and after the Yalta Conference. In Stalin’s order, published on February 23, 1942, dedicated to Red Army Day, it was noted: “It would be ridiculous to identify the Hitler clique with the German people, with the German state.” The same order emphasized that Soviet people and the Red Army “there is not and cannot be racial hatred towards other peoples, including the German people.” The same idea was present in Stalin's address to the people on May 9, 1945 in connection with the surrender of Nazi Germany. “The Soviet Union,” said this address, “is celebrating victory, although it has no intention of either dismembering or destroying Germany.”

As a result, the question of the future of Germany was transferred for study to a special commission.

The next pressing issue was the issue of reparations: the British generally refused to talk about specific figures, and the Americans agreed to accept the amount proposed by the Soviet side of 20 billion dollars (half of which was in favor of the USSR).

Of particular importance was the “Declaration on a Liberated Europe” adopted at the conference, which established the agreed principles of the policy of the three powers towards the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and its former allies. The Declaration confirmed the right of all peoples liberated from fascism to destroy the last traces of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice, to freely choose their form of government.

The Polish problem occupied an important place at the Crimean Conference. At meetings of heads of government, significant disagreements arose on the issue of the future of Poland. Regarding the problem of the formation of the Polish government, the demarcation of positions was quite clear: Stalin sought recognition of the government of the “Warsaw Poles” (shortly before the conference, the provisional government moved to the capital of Poland liberated by the Red Army), Churchill and Roosevelt - its practical liquidation and restoration of the powers of the London exile government with the possible inclusion of “Warsovians” in it. After lengthy disputes, a compromise agreement was reached, which provided for the “reorganization” of the Polish government to include figures from Poland itself and Poles from abroad, that is, representatives of “Londoners”.

At the same time, the issue of the borders of Poland was considered. Roosevelt and Churchill wanted to force Stalin to change the “Curzon Line” in important areas in favor of Poland. Thus, the US President proposed leaving the city of Lviv and part of the oil fields in the southern part of Eastern Poland to Poland. Churchill first repeated British agreement with the new Russian western border: "The Soviet Union's claim to this area is based not on violence, but on right." After that, he began to lead Stalin to adjust the borders in the spirit of the proposals of the US President. The Prime Minister said that if the Soviet Union made a magnanimous gesture towards a weaker power, then England would admire the Soviet behavior and would welcome it.

Stalin demonstrated complete inflexibility and uncompromisingness by stating: - The “Curzon Line” was determined by Curzon, Clemenceau and those Americans who took part in the peace conference from 1918 to 1919. The Russians were not invited there and therefore did not participate. Lenin did not accept the “Curzon Line”. Now, according to some people, we have become less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau were. We should be ashamed now. What will Ukrainians and Belarusians say about this? They will say that Stalin and Molotov defend Russia worse than Curzon and Clemenceau.”

As for the western borders of Poland, no final decision was made, but the heads of the three governments recognized that “Poland should receive significant increases in territory in the north and west.” At the same time, the need was recognized to include East Prussia to the west and south of Königsberg, Danzig and the “Polish corridor”, the Baltic coast between Danzig and Stettin, the lands east of the Oder and Upper Silesia into the Polish state.

At the Yalta Conference, agreement was reached on a key issue in the creation of the United Nations - the voting procedure in the Security Council. The Soviet delegation met the American proposals halfway and allowed deviations from the principle of unanimity in the peaceful settlement of disputes. This was an important concession on the Soviet side. The Soviet delegation also withdrew its proposal for the participation of all union republics in the UN and limited itself to two of them - Ukraine and Belarus.

At the same time, a decision was made to convene on April 25, 1945. United Nations conference in San Francisco to prepare and adopt the UN Charter.

At the conference in Crimea, an agreement between the three great powers on issues of the Far East was discussed in detail and signed. It provided for the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan, since this created decisive preconditions for the defeat of their dangerous enemy in the Far East. US Secretary of State E. Stettinius writes “about the enormous pressure exerted on the president by military leaders in order to achieve Russia’s entry into the war in the Far East. At that time, the atomic bomb was still an unknown quantity, and our defeat at the Battle of the Bulge was fresh in everyone's minds. We still haven't crossed the Rhine. No one knew how long the European war would last, nor how great the losses would be.”

In an effort to reduce American losses in the operation, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum addressed to the President and dated January 23, 1945, stated: “Russia's entry (in the war against Japan) ... is absolutely necessary to ensure maximum assistance to our efforts in Pacific Ocean. The United States will provide the greatest possible support that our main efforts against Japan will allow. The goals of Russia's military efforts against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan itself in cooperation with air force United States based in Eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese shipping between Japan and the Asian continent."

The USSR, agreeing to enter into a war with Japan, pursued the goal of destroying the most dangerous source of aggression in the Far East, eliminating the consequences of Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 -1905, and providing assistance to the peoples of Asia, primarily the Chinese people, in their struggle against Japanese aggressors, as well as fulfill allied duty towards the USA and Great Britain. The Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against imperialist Japan two to three months after the end of the war in Europe on the terms:

1.Preservation of the status quo of Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic).

2.Recovery belonging to Russia rights violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904, namely:

a) return to the USSR of the southern part of the island. Sakhalin and all adjacent islands;

b) internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen, ensuring the priority interests of the Soviet Union in this port and the restoration of the lease on Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR;

c) joint exploitation with China of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways, giving access to Dairen, while maintaining Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

Transfers of the Kuril Islands to the USSR

The document further stated that an agreement regarding Outer Mongolia of the above ports and railways would require the consent of the Chinese side and that "the claims of the Soviet Union should certainly be satisfied after the victory over Japan."

Thus, at the Crimean Conference, the allies coordinated not only their policies, but also their military plans, successfully resolved the most important issues of waging war and the post-war structure of the world, which contributed to strengthening the anti-fascist coalition at the final stage of the war and achieving victory over Hitler's Germany.


2. Potsdam Conference of the Three Powers


After the signing of the Act of Unconditional Surrender, Germany did not exist for some time. state power. The four powers recognized the need to jointly govern Germany. To this end, on June 5, 1945, representatives of the USSR, USA and France signed in Berlin the “Declaration of the Defeat of Germany” and the assumption of supreme power in relation to Germany by the governments of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and the Provisional Government of the French Republic. The Declaration required Germany, in accordance with its unconditional surrender, to completely cease hostilities, surrender its weapons, hand over Nazi leaders and war criminals, and return all prisoners of war. The Declaration of Defeat of Germany served as a legal document for the legislative and administrative activities carried out by the occupation authorities on German territory during the first post-war years.

To maintain universal peace and security of peoples and develop cooperation between states in various areas From April 25 to June 26, 1945, the founding conference to create the United Nations (UN) was held in San Francisco. The conference was attended by 50 states; the only issue on the agenda of the conference was the development of the Charter of the United Nations. A sharp struggle developed mainly over questions of the purposes and principles of the UN; about the role and place of the Security Council and the General Assembly in the UN system; about their rights and the procedure for making decisions; O International Court; about the system international guardianship.

June the conference in San Francisco concluded its work with the adoption of the UN Charter. Thus, she established an international organization to maintain peace and security of nations. The UN Charter recognizes the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two states social systems; equality and self-determination of peoples; principles of international cooperation and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; resolution of international disputes by peaceful means; refraining from the threat of force and the use of force. The creation of the UN became possible as a result of the victory of the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition in the war against the fascist bloc and was the most important international event.

The last conference of the heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain during the war took place on July 17 - August 2, 1945 at the Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam (a suburb of Berlin). The USSR delegation was headed by I.V. Stalin, USA - G. Truman, Great Britain - W. Churchill (from July 28 - K. Attlee). The task of the Berlin Conference was to consolidate in its decisions the historical victory of the Soviet Union and other allied countries over Nazi Germany, to solve the main problems of the post-war settlement, to develop a program for a fair and lasting peace in Europe, to prevent new aggression from Germany and to consider issues related to the war against Japan.

The conference in Potsdam took place against the backdrop of a new balance of power in the international arena, which was characterized, on the one hand, by the growing prestige and influence of the USSR as the main winner in the war with Nazi Germany, and on the other, by a qualitative leap in strengthening the military potential of the United States as a result acquisition of atomic weapons, which, however, was somewhat compensated by the situation in the sphere of ideology: socialist tendencies were strong in Europe, and the American model of free enterprise was not popular. In the policies of the ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain, anti-Soviet tendencies noticeably intensified, which was caused by the growing international authority of the USSR, but, ultimately, the tendency towards a reasonable compromise prevailed at the conference.

For the Soviet side, the most important thing was to achieve coordinated and clear decisions on the German problem, to make up for what was lost in this regard in Yalta. It was about fixing the eastern border of Germany, reparations, punishing the leaders of the defeated Reich, and concretizing the program for restructuring the political system of Germany. The easiest way to achieve unity of views was on the last point.

At Potsdam, political and economic principles were adopted aimed at implementing the demilitarization, denazification, democratization and decartelization of Germany. This program, called “4D,” gave fairly clear guidelines for eliminating the “German threat” in the future. First of all, it provided for the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, the liquidation of all German industry that could be used for military production, the abolition of all its land, sea and air forces, the SS, SA, SD, Gestapo, General Staff and all other military organizations.

The Potsdam Agreements also proclaimed the need for denazification and democratization of Germany. The agreement provided for the destruction of the National Socialist Party, the dissolution of all Nazi institutions and organizations, the punishment of war criminals, the prevention of Nazi and militaristic propaganda and the provision of conditions precluding the revival of fascism in any form.

Provision was made for the reorganization of the German political life on a democratic basis in order to prepare the country for peaceful international cooperation. The agreement provided for measures to democratize Germany: the abolition of all racial and discriminatory laws issued by the Nazi government, the restoration of local self-government, the activities of all democratic parties, trade unions and others public organizations, preparation for the final reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and peaceful cooperation between Germany and other states.

As for decartelization, the Allies decided to liquidate the German monopolies, which were the bearers of militarism and revanchism, and all German industry should be transferred to peaceful lines. The representatives of the three powers agreed that during the period of occupation Germany should be treated as a single economic entity.

Important points related to the creation of an International Tribunal to try the main Nazi war criminals were agreed upon relatively easily in Potsdam. The solution to this problem was prepared by extensive preliminary work by representatives of the four powers, which began back in 1942.

The Potsdam Conference considered a number of territorial issues related to the end of the war in Europe, including the transfer of Konigsberg and the surrounding area to the USSR, which was enshrined in the decisions of the conference. In accordance with the proposal of the Soviet delegation, the issue of establishing the western border of Poland along the river line was resolved. Oder - r. Western Neisse. Part of the territory was included in Poland East Prussia, as well as the city of Danzig (Gdansk). Thus, according to the implementation of the decisions of the Yalta Conference, Poland received “a significant increase in territory in the north and west.”

The conference reached an agreement on reparations with Germany, which established that Soviet reparation claims would be satisfied through withdrawals from the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany and from corresponding German investments abroad. In addition, it was decided that the USSR should receive from the western zones 25% of industrial capital equipment seized for reparation purposes. At the conference, it was also decided to divide the German navy and merchant fleet equally between the three powers (most of the submarines, according to England’s proposal, were to be sunk). As a result of the division of the German fleet, the USSR received 155 warships, including the cruiser Nuremberg, four destroyers, six destroyers and several submarines.

At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union confirmed the commitment made at the Yalta Conference to enter the war with Japan. The extreme interest of the United States in helping the USSR in the war against militaristic Japan undoubtedly contributed to a more successful solution to the complex problems that arose in Potsdam.

Despite serious disagreements on a number of issues, the conference showed the possibility of positive solutions to complex international problems. In this regard, the testimony of I. Berlin, who was appointed in August 1945 to work at the US Embassy in Moscow, is very indicative. “The Potsdam Conference,” he wrote, “did not lead to an open break between the allies. Despite the gloomy forecasts in some circles in the West, the general mood in official Washington and London was optimistic: the exceptional courage and heavy sacrifices of the Soviet people in the war against Hitler gave rise to a powerful wave of sympathy for their country, which in the second half of 1945 overwhelmed many critics of the Soviet system and its methods; there was a broad and ardent desire for cooperation and understanding at all levels.”

It should be noted that the Potsdam Conference went down in history as a huge event international importance, its decisions formed the basis of the post-war peace order in Europe. They have full legal force in terms of international law. Their implementation is mandatory for all participants in the conference, as well as those countries that are directly or indirectly affected by its decisions.


Chapter 2. Development of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system. System stability and nuclear factor


The post-war world order was supposed to be based on the idea of ​​​​cooperation between the victorious powers and maintaining their consent in the interests of such cooperation. The role of the mechanism for developing this consent was assigned to the United Nations, whose Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 and came into force in October of the same year. He declared the goals of the UN not only to maintain international peace, but also to promote the realization of the rights of countries and peoples to self-determination and free development, encouragement of equal economic and cultural cooperation, and instilling respect for human rights and fundamental individual freedoms. The UN was destined to play the role of a global center for coordinating efforts in the interests of eliminating wars and conflicts from international relations by harmonizing relations between states.

But the UN was faced with the impossibility of ensuring the compatibility of the interests of its leading members - the USSR and the USA due to the severity of the contradictions that arose between them. That is why, in fact, the main function of the UN, which it successfully accomplished within the framework of the Yalta-Potsdam order, was not to improve international reality and promote the spread of morality and justice, but to prevent a military clash between the USSR and the USA, stability between which was the main condition for international peace in throughout the second half of the 20th century.

By the beginning of the 50s, the bipolar confrontation had only just begun to spread to the periphery of the international system. It was not felt at all in Latin America and little in the Middle East, where the USSR and the USA acted more often in parallel than against each other. The Korean War played a key role in the “export of bipolarity,” that is, in its spread from Europe to other parts of the world. This created the preconditions for the emergence of pockets of Soviet-American confrontation on the periphery of the international system.

In the mid-50s, the world military-strategic situation radically changed. The Soviet Union has largely eliminated its gap with the United States in the field of defense. There was a change in the correlation of geopolitical positions in the world between the old colonial powers (Britain, France, the Netherlands) and both superpowers. There has actually been an equalization of the importance of European and non-European issues in international relations and dialogue between the two superpowers.

By the fall of 1962, tensions in the postwar international system had reached their peak. The world actually found itself on the brink of an all-out nuclear war. The world was kept from the “third world war” only by the fear of the use of super-powerful atomic weapons. The Cuban missile crisis has become highest point military-strategic instability in international relations throughout the second half of the 20th century.

The late 60s and early 70s were generally characterized by a weakening of international tensions at the global level and in the European direction of world politics. In fact, for the first time in international relations of the 20th century, the principle of the status quo gained universal acceptance, despite the ideological differences between East and West. This trend is called détente or simply détente.

The bipolarity of the Yalta-Potsdam system provided it with a certain stability. The two poles, the guarantors of the system, balanced each other, maintained its overall balance, controlled the allies, and to one degree or another regulated the conflicts that arose. Both powers, despite all the deepest contradictions, were interested in preserving the “rules of the game” inherent in the existing system.

Characteristic feature The Yalta-Potsdam system became an unspoken mutual recognition of the superpowers' spheres of influence. More precisely, it was about the West recognizing the sphere of influence of the USSR, because outside it, Western influence prevailed in one form or another. Discussing with G. Dimitrov in August 1945 the decisions of the Potsdam Conference regarding Bulgaria and the Balkans in general, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov noted: “Basically, these decisions are beneficial to us. In fact, this sphere of influence is recognized for us.” The definition of the boundaries of the Soviet sphere of influence took place in a tense struggle, through a series of foreign policy clashes. However, after the completion of the split in Europe, the West did not interfere in events in the “socialist commonwealth” even during periods of acute political crises (Hungary - 1956, Czechoslovakia - 1968, etc.). The situation was more complicated in the “third world”, in the countries of the intermediate zone. It was anti-colonialism, combined with the USSR’s desire to assert its influence in a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that gave rise to a number of serious international conflicts since the mid-50s.

The nuclear factor played an important role in the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. The United States was the first to possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union became the owner of the atomic bomb in August 1949, this was announced in September. Great Britain - 1952, France - I960, and the People's Republic of China - 1964 also became members of the “atomic club”.

Thus, the United States had a nuclear monopoly from 1945 to 1949. But even during this period the American atomic weapons in combination with the available means of delivery (strategic bombers) did not create a real possibility for a US victory in a new world war. Therefore, even then, the atomic bomb rather strengthened American foreign policy, making it tougher and more assertive. At the same time, the Stalinist leadership sought to demonstrate the absence of excessive compliance in the face of American atomic pressure, which made Soviet foreign policy less prone to compromise. Atomic weapons contributed to the genesis of the confrontation between the USA and the USSR, to the formation of the bipolar system. A strategic arms race developed, becoming an integral element of the post-war international order.

The situation changed noticeably after 1949, when both the USA and the USSR became the owners of nuclear arsenals. Significant new elements have appeared in the situation since 1957, with the successful launch of the first Soviet artificial satellite Earth when the Soviet Union began production of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting US territory. Nuclear weapons have become a tool of “deterrence.” Neither of the two superpowers could risk a large-scale conflict before the threat of a retaliatory strike that could cause unacceptable damage. The USSR and the USA seemed to block each other, both powers tried to prevent great war.

Nuclear weapons have introduced qualitatively new elements into international relations. Its use threatened the destruction of a huge number of people and colossal destruction. In addition, its impact on the atmosphere and radioactive contamination of the area could have a disastrous effect on large regions of the globe and on the planet as a whole.

The possibility of using nuclear weapons forced us to reconsider the classic formula of the 19th century German military theorist. K. Clausewitz: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” Achieving the set political goals through war turned out to be impossible. Nuclear potentials had a stabilizing effect on the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. They helped prevent the dangerous escalation of conflicts that previously often led to war. Nuclear weapons had a sobering effect on politicians of different scales and varying degrees of responsibility. It forced the leaders of the most powerful states to weigh their actions against the threat of a global catastrophe that would not spare anyone living on Earth.

At the same time, stability within the Yalta-Potsdam system was unstable and fragile. It was based on the balance of fear and was achieved through conflicts, crises, local wars, through a ruinous arms race. This was the undoubted danger of the nuclear missile arms race. And yet, the Yalta-Potsdam system turned out to be more stable than the Versailles-Washington system, and did not give rise to a major war.

Yalta Potsdam nuclear deterrence

Chapter 3. The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, causes, results


December 8<#"justify">1.In Western political science literature one can often find the statement that the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by its defeat in the Cold War. Such views are especially common in countries Western Europe, and most of all in the United States, where they replaced the initial amazement caused by the rapid collapse of communist regimes. In such a belief system, the main thing is the desire to take advantage of the “fruits of victory.” It is not surprising that the United States and its NATO allies are increasingly acting like winners. IN politically this trend is extremely dangerous. In scientific terms, it is untenable, because it reduces the whole problem to an external factor.

2.Of great interest are the points of view expressed at the major international conference “Causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact on Europe”, held in May 2000 in Beijing by the Chinese Academy social sciences. The convening of such a conference in China was not accidental. The Chinese leadership, which began its “perestroika” back in 1979 and achieved impressive economic success, was deeply puzzled by the socio-political upheavals in Eastern Europe, and then in the Soviet Union. It was then that Chinese scientists began to implement the “Russian project” in order to find out the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the socialist community, as well as to assess their impact on Europe and the world. Chinese scientists believe that the collapse of the USSR was a tragedy for all of humanity, which was thrown back an entire era in its development. Moreover, such an assessment is given not from the standpoint of classical Marxism, but based on an analysis of the consequences of the changes that have taken place. In their opinion, it was the largest cataclysm of the twentieth century.

.There is also an opinion that the collapse of the Union did not take place in December 1991, but much earlier. So, according to Sergei Shakhrai, “Three doctors - not surgeons, but pathologists - simply gathered at the bedside of the deceased to record his death. Someone had to do this, because otherwise it was impossible to obtain an official certificate or enter into inheritance rights ". Sergei Shakhrai names three factors as the reasons for the destruction of the “Indestructible Union”. The first “time bomb,” according to him, lay dormant for decades in that article Soviet Constitution, which gave the union republics the right to freely secede from the USSR. The second reason is the “information virus” of envy, which manifested itself in full force in the late 80s and early 90s: in conditions of a severe crisis in Tbilisi and Vilnius they said: “Stop working for Moscow,” in the Urals they demanded to stop “feeding” the republics Central Asia, and Moscow blamed the outskirts for the fact that “everything goes into them, like into a black hole.” The third reason, according to Shakhrai, was the processes of so-called autonomization. By the beginning of the 90s, perestroika had run out of steam. The political weakening of the center, the flow of power to the “lower levels,” the competition between Yeltsin and Gorbachev for political leadership - all this was fraught with the transformation of the map of the RSFSR into a “piece of cheese” with huge holes, the loss of 51 percent of Russia’s territory and almost 20 million of its population. The monolith of the CPSU began to crack: the last straw was the August 1991 putsch. From August to December 1991, 13 of the 15 union republics declared their independence.

The Yalta-Potsdam order, which was based on the regulated confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the status quo in the military-political and political-diplomatic fields, began to collapse. Both powers - for opposite reasons - moved to revise it. The issue of coordinated reform of the Yalta-Potsdam order arose on the agenda, the participants of which, however, were no longer equal in power and influence.

The Russian Federation, which became the successor state and legal successor of the USSR, could not fulfill the functions inherent in the Soviet Union as one of the pillars of bipolarity, because it did not have the necessary resources for this.

In international relations, trends towards unification and rapprochement of former socialist and capitalist countries began to develop, and the international system as a whole began to develop the features of “ global society" This process was fraught with new acute problems and contradictions.


Conclusion


The destruction of the Soviet Union completely changed the nature of international interaction. The divide between the two opposing blocks disappeared. The subsystem of international relations, the basis of which was the “socialist camp,” ceased to exist. The peculiarity of this grandiose transformation was its predominantly peaceful nature. The collapse of the USSR was accompanied by conflicts, but none of them resulted in a major war that could threaten general peace in Europe or Asia. Global stability has been maintained. Universal peace and overcoming the half-century split in the international system were ensured at the cost of destruction multinational states.

The democratization of a large group of former socialist countries became the most important feature of international relations for almost a decade. But another characteristic of them was the decline in the controllability of the international system, which resulted in a crisis of world-system regulation in the first half of the 90s. The old mechanisms of international governance were based on “confrontation according to the rules” between the USSR and the USA and the observance by their allies of “bloc discipline” - rules of behavior based on the principle of “equalization to the elder” within the framework of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The cessation of confrontation and the collapse of the Department of Internal Affairs undermined the effectiveness of such a system. 1

Regulation based on the UN, which had previously been ineffective, coped with the tasks of ensuring peace even less successfully in the new conditions. The UN, as it was formed, was designed primarily to prevent war between the great powers.

The role of force began to increase again in international relations. Its importance increased for two reasons. Firstly, the collapse of bipolarity gave rise to a number of relatively small but numerous armed conflicts - primarily on the territory of former multinational states. Secondly, the United States and NATO countries, without fear of opposition from the Soviet Union, began to make wider use of force to defend their interests in regional and local conflicts, doing this under the slogans of supporting democracy and protecting human rights. In international relations, by the mid-90s, it began to occupy great place peacekeeping, which meant the use by countries of the international community of various measures, including force, to stop bloodshed in individual conflicts.

The first half of the 90s of the XX century became the final phase of the collapse of the bipolar system, in other words, the Yalta- Potsdam system international relations. Despite the outbreak of dispersed conflict, a new world war did not arise, and the threat of its outbreak was not visible during any of the most tense moments of international development in 1991-1996. This was the first time in many centuries that a radical change in the configuration of the international system was not associated with extensive armed conflict.1

By the end of the period under review, it became obvious that the Russian Federation does not have the resources to confront the United States and does not show any intentions to oppose the West in international relations. On the contrary, she sought to cooperate with him, even if the conditions were not in line with her national interests. At the same time, it was obvious that China, which the United States began to consider as the main competitor in international politics, had not accumulated the potential that would allow it to play the role in international relations that it did in 1945-1991. occupied by the Soviet Union - the role of a counterweight to the United States.

The second half of the 90s was marked by an increase in the interdependence of the world's states as a result of a sharp increase in the intensity of international financial, economic, trade and related political ties between them, a gigantic increase in the volume of global information flows, and colossal progress in the means of communication. The elimination of the global political split during the bipolar period gave these ties a truly global character. All these trends, which led to the emergence of a new state of the international system, began to be described using the term “globalization.”


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Occurred within two international orders– first bipolar (1945-1991), then unipolar, which began to form after collapse of the USSR. The first is known in the literature as the Yalta-Potsdam conference - after the names of two key international conferences (in Yalta February 4-11, 1945 and on Potsdam July 17 – August 2, 1945), at which the leaders of the three main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition (USSR, USA and Great Britain) formed the post-war world order.

The Yalta-Potsdam system had a number of important features.

1) It did not have a strong legal framework. The agreements underlying it were either oral, not officially recorded and remained secret for a long time, or declarative. Unlike Versailles Conference, which formed a powerful contractual-legal system, neither the Yalta Conference nor the Potsdam Conference led to the signing of international treaties.

This made the Yalta-Potsdam principles vulnerable to criticism and dependent on the ability of interested parties to ensure their actual implementation using methods of economic and military-political pressure. The element of regulating international relations by force or its threat was more pronounced in the post-war decades than in the 1920s. Nevertheless, the Yalta-Potsdam order lasted (unlike Versailles And Washington) for more than half a century and collapsed with the collapse of the USSR.

2) The Yalta-Potsdam system was bipolar. After World War II, the USSR and the USA sharply separated in power and influence from all other states. The multipolarity of the world has disappeared.

3) The post-war order was confrontational– the main characteristic of this era was Cold War. Only in 1985-1991, in the years “ new political thinking» M. S. Gorbacheva, he began to transform into cooperative bipolarity, but it did not strengthen due to the destruction of the USSR.

In conditions confrontation Relations between the USSR and the USA sometimes reached acute conflicts that even threatened nuclear war. This gave rise in the second half of the 20th century. an arms race of unprecedented proportions.

4) Post-war bipolarity took the form of an ideological confrontation between the “free world” led by the United States and the “socialist camp” led by the Soviet Union. It looked like a confrontation between ideals and moral values: equality and equalizing justice, on the one hand, and freedom, competition and democracy, on the other.

Soviet propaganda attributed to the United States the dream of destroying the socialist system, and American propaganda attributed to Moscow the intention to spread communism throughout the world. However, the ideological confrontation softened over time, increasingly being replaced in practice by geopolitical arguments.

5) The Yalta-Potsdam system took shape in the era of nuclear weapons, which contributed to the emergence in the second half of the 1960s of a mechanism for preventing world nuclear war - the “confrontational stability” model. The USSR and the USA began to avoid situations that could provoke an armed conflict between them. The concept of mutual nuclear force deterrence and the doctrines of strategic stability based on it based on the “balance of fear” have emerged.

6) The Yalta-Potsdam system was distinguished by a high degree of controllability of international processes. As a bipolar system, it was built on the coordination of the opinions of only two powers, which simplified negotiations. The USA and the USSR acted not only as individual states, but also as group leaders - NATO And Warsaw Pact, which they managed to subjugate quite harshly.


The post-war world order was supposed to be based on the idea of ​​​​cooperation between the victorious powers and maintaining their consent in the interests of such cooperation. The role of the mechanism for developing this consent was assigned to the United Nations, whose Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 and came into force in October of the same year. He declared the goals of the UN not only to maintain international peace, but also to promote the realization of the rights of countries and peoples to self-determination and free development, encouragement of equal economic and cultural cooperation, and instilling respect for human rights and fundamental individual freedoms. The UN was destined to play the role of a global center for coordinating efforts in the interests of eliminating wars and conflicts from international relations by harmonizing relations between states.

But the UN was faced with the impossibility of ensuring the compatibility of the interests of its leading members - the USSR and the USA due to the severity of the contradictions that arose between them. That is why, in fact, the main function of the UN, which it successfully accomplished within the framework of the Yalta-Potsdam order, was not to improve international reality and promote the spread of morality and justice, but to prevent a military clash between the USSR and the USA, stability between which was the main condition for international peace in throughout the second half of the 20th century.

By the beginning of the 50s, the bipolar confrontation had only just begun to spread to the periphery of the international system. It was not felt at all in Latin America and little in the Middle East, where the USSR and the USA acted more often in parallel than against each other. The Korean War played a key role in the “export of bipolarity,” that is, in its spread from Europe to other parts of the world. This created the preconditions for the emergence of pockets of Soviet-American confrontation on the periphery of the international system.

In the mid-50s, the world military-strategic situation radically changed. The Soviet Union has largely eliminated its gap with the United States in the field of defense. There was a change in the correlation of geopolitical positions in the world between the old colonial powers (Britain, France, the Netherlands) and both superpowers. There has actually been an equalization of the importance of European and non-European issues in international relations and dialogue between the two superpowers.

By the fall of 1962, tensions in the postwar international system had reached their peak. The world actually found itself on the brink of an all-out nuclear war. The world was kept from the “third world war” only by the fear of the use of super-powerful atomic weapons. The Caribbean crisis became the highest point of military-strategic instability in international relations throughout the second half of the 20th century.

The late 60s and early 70s were generally characterized by a weakening of international tensions at the global level and in the European direction of world politics. In fact, for the first time in international relations of the 20th century, the principle of the status quo gained universal acceptance, despite the ideological differences between East and West. This trend is called détente or simply détente.

The bipolarity of the Yalta-Potsdam system provided it with a certain stability. The two poles, the guarantors of the system, balanced each other, maintained its overall balance, controlled the allies, and to one degree or another regulated the conflicts that arose. Both powers, despite all the deepest contradictions, were interested in preserving the “rules of the game” inherent in the existing system.

A characteristic feature of the Yalta-Potsdam system was the tacit mutual recognition of the superpowers' spheres of influence. More precisely, it was about the West recognizing the sphere of influence of the USSR, because outside it, Western influence prevailed in one form or another. Discussing with G. Dimitrov in August 1945 the decisions of the Potsdam Conference regarding Bulgaria and the Balkans in general, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov noted: “Basically, these decisions are beneficial to us. In fact, this sphere of influence is recognized for us.” The definition of the boundaries of the Soviet sphere of influence took place in a tense struggle, through a series of foreign policy clashes. However, after the completion of the split in Europe, the West did not interfere in events in the “socialist commonwealth” even during periods of acute political crises (Hungary - 1956, Czechoslovakia - 1968, etc.). The situation was more complicated in the “third world”, in the countries of the intermediate zone. It was anti-colonialism, combined with the USSR’s desire to assert its influence in a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that gave rise to a number of serious international conflicts since the mid-50s.

The nuclear factor played an important role in the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. The United States was the first to possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union became the owner of the atomic bomb in August 1949, this was announced in September. Great Britain - 1952, France - I960, and the People's Republic of China - 1964 also became members of the “atomic club”.

Thus, the United States had a nuclear monopoly from 1945 to 1949. But even during this period, American atomic weapons in combination with the available means of delivery (strategic bombers) did not create a real possibility for a US victory in a new world war. Therefore, even then, the atomic bomb rather strengthened American foreign policy, making it tougher and more assertive. At the same time, the Stalinist leadership sought to demonstrate the absence of excessive compliance in the face of American atomic pressure, which made Soviet foreign policy less prone to compromise. Atomic weapons contributed to the genesis of the confrontation between the USA and the USSR, to the formation of the bipolar system. A strategic arms race developed, becoming an integral element of the post-war international order.

The situation changed noticeably after 1949, when both the USA and the USSR became the owners of nuclear arsenals. Significant new elements have appeared in the situation since 1957, with the successful launch of the first Soviet artificial Earth satellite, when the Soviet Union began production of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting US territory. Nuclear weapons have become a tool of “deterrence.” Neither of the two superpowers could risk a large-scale conflict before the threat of a retaliatory strike that could cause unacceptable damage. The USSR and the USA seemed to block each other, both powers sought to prevent a major war.

Nuclear weapons have introduced qualitatively new elements into international relations. Its use threatened the destruction of a huge number of people and colossal destruction. In addition, its impact on the atmosphere and radioactive contamination of the area could have a disastrous effect on large regions of the globe and on the planet as a whole.

The possibility of using nuclear weapons forced us to reconsider the classic formula of the 19th century German military theorist. K. Clausewitz: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” Achieving the set political goals through war turned out to be impossible. Nuclear potentials had a stabilizing effect on the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. They helped prevent the dangerous escalation of conflicts that previously often led to war. Nuclear weapons have had a sobering effect on political figures of varying sizes and varying degrees of responsibility. It forced the leaders of the most powerful states to weigh their actions against the threat of a global catastrophe that would not spare anyone living on Earth.

At the same time, stability within the Yalta-Potsdam system was unstable and fragile. It was based on the balance of fear and was achieved through conflicts, crises, local wars, and through a ruinous arms race. This was the undoubted danger of the nuclear missile arms race. And yet, the Yalta-Potsdam system turned out to be more stable than the Versailles-Washington system, and did not give rise to a major war.

The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, causes, results

On December 8, 1991, the heads of 3 republics - Belarus, Russia and Ukraine - at a meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha(Belarus) announced that the USSR was ceasing to exist and signed the Agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The signing of the agreements caused a negative reaction from the population. On December 11, the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee issued a statement condemning the Belovezhskaya Agreement, but this statement had no practical consequences.

On December 12, the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, chaired by R.I. Khasbulatov, ratified the Belovezhsky Accords and decided to denounce the RSFSR Union Treaty of 1922 (a number of lawyers believe that the denunciation of this treaty was meaningless, since it lost force in 1936 with the adoption of the USSR Constitution) and on the recall of Russian deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (without convening a Congress, which can be regarded as a violation of the Constitution of the RSFSR in force at that time). Due to the recall of deputies, the Council of the Union lost its quorum.

On December 16, the last republic of the USSR - Kazakhstan - declared its independence. Thus, in the last 10 days of its existence, the USSR, which had not yet been legally abolished, was actually a state without territory.

On December 17, the Chairman of the Council of the Union, K. D. Lubenchenko, stated that there was no quorum at the meeting. The Council of the Union, having renamed itself the Conference of Deputies, turned to the Supreme Soviet of Russia with a request to at least temporarily cancel the decision to recall Russian deputies so that the Council of the Union could resign. This appeal was ignored.

On December 21, 1991, at a meeting of presidents in Almaty, Kazakhstan, 8 more republics joined the CIS: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the so-called Almaty Agreement was signed, which became the basis of the CIS.

The CIS was founded not as a confederation, but as an international (interstate) organization, which is still characterized by weak integration and a lack of real power among the coordinating supranational bodies. However, membership even in such an organization was rejected by the Baltic republics, as well as initially by Georgia (it joined the CIS only in October 1993 during a power struggle between supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze).

The authorities of the USSR and the USSR as a subject of international law ceased to exist on December 25-26, 1991. Russia declared itself a continuator of the USSR's membership (and not a legal successor, as is often erroneously indicated) in international institutions, assumed the debts and assets of the USSR and declared itself the owner of everything USSR property abroad. According to data provided by the Russian Federation, at the end of 1991, the liabilities of the former Union were estimated at 93.7 billion dollars, and assets at 110.1 billion. Vnesheconombank's deposits amounted to about $700 million. The so-called “zero option,” according to which the Russian Federation became the legal successor of the former Soviet Union in terms of external debt and assets, including foreign property, was not ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

On December 25, USSR President M. S. Gorbachev announced the termination of his activities as President of the USSR “for reasons of principle,” signed a decree resigning as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces and transferred control of strategic nuclear weapons to Russian President B. Yeltsin.

On December 26, the session of the upper chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which retained the quorum of the Council of Republics, from which at that time only representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were not recalled, adopted, under the chairmanship of A. Alimzhanov, a declaration on the termination of the existence of the USSR, as well as a number of others documents (resolution on the dismissal of judges of the Supreme and Higher Arbitration Courts of the USSR and the collegium of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, resolutions on the dismissal of the Chairman of the State Bank V.V. Gerashchenko and his first deputy V.N. Kulikov). December 26, 1991 is considered the day the USSR ceased to exist, although some institutions and organizations of the USSR (for example, Gosstandart of the USSR) still continued to function for several months, and, for example, the Committee for Constitutional Supervision of the USSR was not officially dissolved at all.

There are different opinions of various political scientists about the reasons for the breakdown of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations: the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the military-strategic bloc of the Warsaw Pact Organization, fundamental changes in the countries of Eastern Europe and the states of the former USSR, the formation of a number of independent states in these territories, the unification of Germany, as well as the end of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA.

According to the author of this course work, the main reason for the breakdown of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations is the collapse of the USSR, since this system of international relations was called “bipolar”, that is, the world was actually split into two blocks formed on the basis of military-political superiority two superpowers - the USSR and the USA over other countries, which was determined, first of all, by the presence of nuclear weapons, which guaranteed multiple mutual destruction. The cessation of the existence of one of the superpowers, in this case the USSR, caused the breakdown of the system of international relations that was formed after the end of the Second World War.

As for the collapse of the USSR, in this case, as in the case of the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system, there is a diversity of opinions:

1. In Western political science literature one can often find the statement that the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by its defeat in the Cold War. Such views are especially common in Western Europe, and most of all in the United States, where they replaced the initial amazement caused by the rapid collapse of communist regimes. In such a belief system, the main thing is the desire to take advantage of the “fruits of victory.” It is not surprising that the United States and its NATO allies are increasingly acting like winners. Politically, this trend is extremely dangerous. In scientific terms, it is untenable, because it reduces the whole problem to an external factor.

2. Of great interest are the points of view expressed at the major international conference “The Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union and Its Impact on Europe,” held in May 2000 in Beijing by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The convening of such a conference in China was not accidental. The Chinese leadership, which began its “perestroika” back in 1979 and achieved impressive economic success, was deeply puzzled by the socio-political upheavals in Eastern Europe, and then in the Soviet Union. It was then that Chinese scientists began to implement the “Russian project” in order to find out the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the socialist community, as well as to assess their impact on Europe and the world. Chinese scientists believe that the collapse of the USSR was a tragedy for all of humanity, which was thrown back an entire era in its development. Moreover, such an assessment is given not from the standpoint of classical Marxism, but based on an analysis of the consequences of the changes that have taken place. In their opinion, it was the largest cataclysm of the twentieth century.

3. There is also an opinion that the collapse of the Union did not take place in December 1991, but much earlier. So, according to Sergei Shakhrai, “Three doctors - not surgeons, but pathologists - simply gathered at the bedside of the deceased to record his death. Someone had to do this, because otherwise it was impossible to obtain an official certificate or enter into inheritance rights ". Sergei Shakhrai names three factors as the reasons for the destruction of the “Indestructible Union”. The first “time bomb,” in his words, lay dormant for decades in that article of the Soviet Constitution that gave the union republics the right to freely secede from the USSR. The second reason is the “information virus” of envy, which manifested itself in full force in the late 80s and early 90s: in conditions of a severe crisis in Tbilisi and Vilnius they said: “Stop working for Moscow,” in the Urals they demanded to stop “feeding” the republics Central Asia, and Moscow blamed the outskirts for the fact that “everything goes into them, like into a black hole.” The third reason, according to Shakhrai, was the processes of so-called autonomization. By the beginning of the 90s, perestroika had run out of steam. The political weakening of the center, the flow of power to the “lower levels,” the competition between Yeltsin and Gorbachev for political leadership - all this was fraught with the transformation of the map of the RSFSR into a “piece of cheese” with huge holes, the loss of 51 percent of Russia’s territory and almost 20 million of its population. The monolith of the CPSU began to crack: the last straw was the August 1991 putsch. From August to December 1991, 13 of the 15 union republics declared their independence.

The Yalta-Potsdam order, which was based on the regulated confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the status quo in the military-political and political-diplomatic fields, began to collapse. Both powers - for opposite reasons - moved to revise it. The issue of coordinated reform of the Yalta-Potsdam order arose on the agenda, the participants of which, however, were no longer equal in power and influence.

The Russian Federation, which became the successor state and legal successor of the USSR, could not fulfill the functions inherent in the Soviet Union as one of the pillars of bipolarity, because it did not have the necessary resources for this.

In international relations, trends towards unification and rapprochement of former socialist and capitalist countries began to develop, and the international system as a whole began to develop the features of a “global society”. This process was fraught with new acute problems and contradictions.



Yalta-Potsdam system
Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945) and Potsdam (July 17-August 2, 1945)
The main feature of this system was “bipolarity” based on the military-political superiority of the two superpowers (SuperPower) - the USSR and the USA, which was determined mainly by the presence of nuclear weapons. Military-political blocs formed around them. The UN was created, the goals of which were (and remain) the following points:
"support international peace and safety...
develop friendly relations between nations based on respect for the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples...
to carry out international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian nature and in promoting and developing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion...
to be a center for coordinating the actions of nations and achieving these common goals."

The concept of “balance of power” (in the Cold War, in particular) became one of the key elements of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations.
In general, the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, according to the estimates of domestic researcher A.D. Bogaturov, is characterized by:
the absence (unlike, for example, the Versailles-Washington system) of a powerful legal framework, which made it very vulnerable to criticism;
bipolarity based on the military-political superiority of the two superpowers (USSR and USA)
confrontation, which meant that the parties constantly contrasted their actions with each other. Competition, rivalry, and not cooperation between blocs were the leading characteristics of relations;
presence of nuclear weapons
political and ideological confrontation between West and East
a relatively high degree of controllability of international processes due to the fact that coordination of the positions of virtually only two superpowers was required.
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, as M. M. Narinsky notes, “the bipolarity of the Yalta-Potsdam system was not absolute; the USSR and the USA could not control all subjects and events of international life.”

For the first time, the issue of a post-war settlement was raised at the highest level during the Tehran Conference of 1943, where even then the strengthening of the position of the two powers - the USSR and the USA - was clearly evident, to which the decisive role in determining the parameters of the post-war world was increasingly being transferred. That is, even during the war, the prerequisites for the formation of the foundations of a future bipolar world are born. This trend has already fully manifested itself in Yalta and Potsdam conferences, when the main role in solving key problems associated with the formation of a new model of defense was played by two, now superpowers, the USSR and the USA.

The Potsdam era became a historical precedent, since never before had the entire world been artificially divided into spheres of influence between two states. The bipolar balance of power quickly led to the beginning of a confrontation between the capitalist and socialist camps, called in history the Cold War.

The Potsdam era was characterized by extreme ideologization of international relations, as well as the constant threat of direct military confrontation between the USSR and the USA.

The end of the Potsdam era was marked by the collapse of the world socialist camp, following a failed attempt to reform the economy of the Soviet Union, and was consolidated by the Bialowieza Accords of 1991.

Peculiarities

The multipolar organization of the structure of international relations was eliminated, and a bipolar structure of post-war international relations emerged, in which the leading role was played by two superstates - the USSR and the USA. The significant separation of the military-power, political, economic and cultural-ideological capabilities of these two powers from other countries of the world led to the formation of two main, dominant “centers of power” that had a system-forming influence on the structure and character of the entire international system.

confrontational character - a systemic, complex confrontation in the economic, political, military, ideological and other spheres, a confrontation that from time to time acquired the character of an acute conflict, crisis interaction. This type of confrontation in the format of mutual threats to use force, balancing on the brink of a real war, was called the “cold war.”

Post-war bipolarity took shape during the era of nuclear weapons, which led to a revolution in both military and political strategies.

The distribution of the world into the sphere of influence of two superstates both in Europe and on the periphery, the emergence of “divided” countries (Germany, Korea, Vietnam, China) and the formation of military-political blocs under the leadership of the USSR and the USA led to globalization and in-depth geopolitical structuring of the systemic opposition and confrontation.

Post-war bipolarity took the form of a political-ideological confrontation, an ideological confrontation between the “free world” of Western democracies led by the USA and the “socialist world” led by the USSR. The USA wanted to establish American hegemony in the world under the slogan “Pax Americana”, the USSR argued about the inevitability of the victory of socialism on a global scale. Ideological confrontation, the “struggle of ideas,” led to mutual demonization opposite side and remained an important feature post-war system MO. The Soviet-American confrontation looked primarily as a rivalry between a system of political and ethical ideals, social and moral principles.

The post-war world ceased to be predominantly Eurocentric, the international system turned into a global, worldwide one. The destruction of colonial systems and the formation of regional and subregional subsystems of international relations were carried out under the dominant influence of the horizontal spread of systemic bipolar confrontation and trends of economic and political globalization.

The Yalta-Potsdam order did not have a strong legal basis. The agreements that formed the basis of the post-war order were either oral, not officially recorded, or were secured primarily in declarative form, or their full implementation was blocked as a result of the severity of contradictions and confrontation between the main subjects of post-war international relations.

The UN, one of the central elements of the Yalta-Potsdam system, became the main mechanism for coordinating efforts with the aim of eliminating wars and conflicts from international life by harmonizing relations between states and creating a global system of collective security. Post-war realities and the intransigence of confrontational relations between the USSR and the USA significantly limited the ability of the UN to realize its statutory functions and goals. The main task of the UN was primarily focused on preventing an armed conflict between the USSR and the USA at both the global and regional levels, that is, maintaining the stability of Soviet-American relations as the main prerequisite for international security and peace in the post-war period.

15 International processes (minimum 5 out of 8).

1. 1.internationalization

2. 2.globalization

3. 3.regionalization

4. 4.migration

5. 5.revolution

6. 6.economic crisis

7. 7.national self-determination

16 Russian publications of documents from the pre-revolutionary period on the history of Russian foreign policy and international relations.

Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1861-1916):

Internal international documents

Composition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Composition of diplomatic departments

Clergy

Foreign exchange rates

Collection of treatises and conventions concluded by Russia with other states



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