SA. Were stormtroopers real men? Well, what can I tell you, my friend? There are still contrasts in life: There are so many girls around, And you and I are homosexuals. The harsh truth of life as presented by Joseph Raskin - Comrade commander, appeared in our company

Airborne assault troops USSR

"... The nature of war can have a significant impact on the ratio of different types of troops."
K. Clausewitz, "On War"

From the author
In this article, the author tried to summarize his knowledge on the airborne assault units of the Soviet Army and, briefly formulating it, lay it out for public viewing and study. Let me make a reservation right away that this study is not conclusive. First of all, this is due to the fact that there is still not a single official open (i.e., not secret) publication on the history of the DShV, their combat personnel, not to mention their organizational structures, methods and methods of combat use, etc. Everything you read here was collected bit by bit, from many different sources - the vast majority of the work is based on surveys of DShV veterans, people who came into contact with them by line of service, as well as a number of official documents.
Therefore, I ask you to judge me strictly, but with justice, for “... wherever in this book my rudeness or carelessness has been written, I pray you: do not begrudge me my wretchedness, do not curse, but correct me, for it was not an angel of God who wrote, but a sinful man and very full of ignorance..."

The author expresses his deep gratitude to everyone who helped him by providing their memory and took the time to answer.
The author will be grateful to everyone who will express their opinion about the article, point out inaccuracies, incorrectness, or vice versa, who will be able to confirm the author’s analysis (which could not be done without).

ABOUT THE ESSENCE OF AIR LANDINGS

It is not known when the idea of ​​airborne assaults, the sending of military formations behind enemy lines by air, appeared. However, for a long time it was strictly fantastic in nature and only during the First World War was it able to receive at least some material basis in the form of the creation of an airborne vehicle- an airplane. And if at first the idea was exclusively of a sabotage and reconnaissance nature, then soon, in connection with the rapid development of aviation during the war, with the creation of sufficiently reliable and capacious aircraft, it began to take on a larger-scale logical form, leading to Mitchell’s idea of ​​landing in the rear of German troops first division, and then an entire “airborne” army. However, we can only guess whether this project would have been realized, whether the war would have lasted another year or two, or not. In any case, after the end of the war, although this idea did not receive serious material embodiment, it continued to hover in the air, exciting minds. The “positional nightmare” of the Western Front was in plain sight for everyone, and many military theorists with a passion for innovation (or who considered themselves such) persistently searched for innovative ways that could prevent such a situation in the future.

Thus, for the airborne troops (Airborne Forces), the main, defining goal immediately emerged - to assist the advancing groupings of ground forces. Almost the entire subsequent history of the use of airborne assault forces confirms this thesis*.

* Special provisions occupy airspace to the islands. As a rule, they are carried out as part of facilitating an amphibious assault or, in general, as part of multi-scale military operations at sea. That is, the role of the Ground Forces in this case is played by the Navy.
An absolute exception is the scandalous Cretan airborne operation (VDO), which did not have a strict link with the actions of either ground or naval forces; thus having a strictly independent character. However, if the connection with the Ground Forces was not possible for completely understandable and objective reasons, then the weak connection with the fleet was forced.
Within the framework of this goal, the Airborne Forces were also given the task, which consisted, as a rule, of capturing a certain section of terrain (usually behind the line of contact between the parties) and then holding it for some time (for example, until the approach of advancing ground forces).

Specific combat mission determines the methods and methods of action of the Airborne Forces, consisting of landing (dropping, disembarking), offensive (attack, assault) and defense.

It leads to general definition combat capabilities of the airborne forces formation, which are:
1. in the ability to grab certain territory(terrain area, object), incl. attack and destroy (knock out) the enemy located there;
2. the ability to organize an effective defense of the captured territory (object) for a certain period;
3. but, all this is subject to the condition of having the ability to be transported by air.

I needed such a lengthy introduction so that the reader (perhaps a complete outsider, but interested in the issue) would immediately grasp the essence of the combat use of airborne assault forces.

BACKGROUND

The appearance of airborne helicopters is strictly linked to the appearance of helicopters, or more precisely, to the creation of models with the necessary set of properties. This has already happened in military history, when technological progress brought new branches and types of armed forces into the battle arena. However, there was another forerunner, which consisted in the peculiarities of the forms of combat use of airborne forces, expressed in their use as an integral part of operations on an operational-tactical scale.

... Alas, it seems worth recognizing that the first airborne assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landing forces were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is a list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Emael (Belgium, 1940), bridges over the Albert Canal (Belgium, 1940), complex of bridges over the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges via Zap. Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them fully fall under the definition of airborne assault operations, although they were carried out by German airborne forces and special forces. All of them were carried out within the framework of a macro goal - to ensure the fastest possible advance of one’s ground troops, to block (detain) enemy troops in their positions, etc. The methods of landing were very different: parachute, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of the war, such landings were actually not used. The warring parties became interested in larger-scale VDOs, which, in themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational-strategic situation at the front. Post-war development continued in the same direction, incl. and Soviet theory of the use of airborne forces.

The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensive of 1944-45. are not clear. There are likely three main factors at play here.

Firstly, the failures of large-scale airborne operations somewhat undermined faith in the effectiveness of landings in general (in any case, given the existing material and technical base and the general level of organization).

Secondly, the very idea of ​​small landings probably seemed incorrect; their possible results were not seen as effective (although such were provided for in the “Instructions for the Combat Use of Airborne Forces” of 1943*).

Third, the command simply did not consider it necessary to use them - i.e. believed that it was better to use proven and verified purely ground-based methods.

But these are all just assumptions. Personally, to the author, it seems quite possible to single out several dozen vehicles from the many hundreds (in 1945 more than 1000 units) of excellent military transport aircraft Li-2 and S-47 that already existed by 1944 and throw several dozen vehicles along the parachute battalion on the same routes supplies or to capture river bridgeheads - this could in some cases significantly facilitate actions ground troops. But - what happened, happened.

...In the late 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters burst onto the scene - a new class of aircraft. The helicopters (which by this time had reached a level of technical sophistication sufficient for combat use) had successfully proven themselves in the Incheon Naval Landing Operation (MAO) and in the subsequent operations of American troops in Korea. The domestic designers who came to the rescue present a rather successful car - the Mi-4 - which began in 1953. enlist en masse into the troops.
Already in 1954, the first large experimental landing was carried out from 36 infantry helicopters with vehicles and artillery. A number of experimental exercises were also carried out (including with the actual use of nuclear weapons) to land battalion- and regimental-scale helicopter landings behind enemy lines... However, that’s where the matter stalled. That is, no organizational measures for the creation of specialized formations were adopted.
The reasons for this seem to be the following:

Firstly, the “Khrushchev-missile” factor played a negative role.

Secondly, oversize of the Airborne Forces - they were in the first half of the 1950s. number as many as 15 divisions; and to have any more airborne units is already arrogance, especially since the “Khrushchev-era” general reduction of the armed forces began.

Third, the nuclear paranoia that had finally struck the world by this time did not leave any place in the battle formations for pure infantry shooters (without the protection of armored personnel carrier armor); the helicopter was seen as too “fragile” compared to the armored personnel carrier.

Fourthly, in addition to parachute airborne units There were plenty of them until 1957, and rifle divisions, units of both, could, if such a task was set, be dropped from helicopters behind enemy lines.

And finally, fifthly, brought up on the power of tank armored fists, Soviet military commanders, clumsy, slow and poorly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on the top of their heads (this is in the age of “jet speeds” and fast, sleek aerodynamics!) did not seem to be a means that could give the troops new, hitherto unseen capabilities.

TEST STEP

The capitalists

In general, the Americans had a similar situation with the VDO theory. The best illustration is the following phrase by American Airborne General James Gavin from his book “Airborne War”: “...<воздушно-десантные>troops should be used in masses and not in small groups. and only where their actions can have a decisive impact, and not in many points where they are able to achieve only local tactical successes." However, their experience of war in what later became known as a "poorly equipped theater of operations", i.e. e. on the Korean Peninsula, forced the American command to think about it and act more flexibly. The helicopter showed itself to be a very promising means of transportation in mountainous, wooded areas and the absence of roads. The number of helicopters jumped significantly - by the end of the war in the composition army aviation there were already 1140 units, whereas at the beginning there were only 56 units. The American command is also creating an experimental unit - the 11th Air Assault Division. At its base and at the base of two more formations (10th air transport brigade and 2nd infantry division) in July 1965, the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was created (more precisely, reorganized from the existing one). A significant innovation was that helicopters were first introduced into its combat units as transport and weapon with a total number of up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was transferred to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of proper theoretical study of airmobile (helicopter landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, it showed its best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters. So if in mid. 1967 was approx. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!

Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were quite vague, then the Vietnam War elevated the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until this time, they were still perceived rather as some kind of exotic purely auxiliary purpose. Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to argue about the decline of parachute (from airplanes) landing as such.

We have

So active and so successful application helicopters made an impression on Soviet command. The idea is being revived - during the strategic exercises "Dnepr-67" mainly on the basis of the 51st Guards. PDP is forming an experimental consolidated 1st airborne brigade under the command of the beginning. Combat Training Department of the Airborne Forces Directorate, Major General Kobzar. It is used to seize a bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion with attached self-propelled guns, transported by helicopters, also participates. Theoretical developments and experiments are carried out in a specially created working group under the General Staff. And so, based on the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades (air assault brigades). Based on the General Staff directive of May 22, 1968. in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (DVO) brigades began. By mid-July, the brigades had already been formed. (According to other sources, the 13th brigade was finally formed only in July-August 1970). In 1973, a third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (WKVO).

The brigades were formed, as they say, with " clean slate". Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the positions of specialists in the airborne service (Airborne Service) and to the positions of brigade commanders (for example, the commander of the 11th Airborne Brigade was appointed former commander 51st Guards PDP Colonel Reznikov).

But even here, a number of subjective factors of the characteristics of Soviet military thought played a role. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry and underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough for operations in the Eurotheater of Operations. That is why they were deployed in directions with less threat, compared to the western one - it was considered advisable to have them only for operations in mountainous, wooded (taiga) terrain, difficult for ground vehicles, where the focal nature of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were intended not so much to carry out landings behind enemy lines according to the usual pattern, but to cover a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a visual propaganda poster with a somewhat surreal inscription: “Assault paratrooper – hourly border.”) The aviation component of each brigade was represented by an air group consisting of two full-time helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Ground Forces, and the air component - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in organizing interaction.

To carry out airborne operational-tactical and tactical landings at EuroTV, it was planned to attract conventional parachute or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions), pulling them out of the airborne and combined arms divisions.

Here we should say a little about terminology. It is not appropriate to use terms created by capitalists, and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were selected; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed air assault. Thus, the American terms “air assault” and “airmobile” gradually ceased to apply to Soviet airborne units and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.

By the end of 1971, all existing brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staffing structure (OSS).

THE IDEA MAKES A WAY FOR ITSELF

"Volumenik"

In the 70s behind the thick walls of the buildings of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense and research institutions, a scientific discussion, clearly serious in intensity and extremely important in its consequences, unfolded, combined with a covert and undercover struggle of opinions, calculations and ambitions...

In 1975, a working group led by Lieutenant General I. Yurkovsky put forward the idea of ​​​​creating a new type of operation - the so-called. "volume operation" in place of, as they argued, the outdated concept of "deep operation". Its essence was not to “gnaw through” the enemy’s defenses, but to “jump” over them, bypassing infection zones and defense nodes - thus sharply increasing the pace of the offensive. The idea was supported by some military leaders (Lieutenant Generals I. Dzhordzhadze and G. Demidkov) and deepened. The question was raised about a global change in the entire theory of operations; the creation of a fundamentally new “air echelon” of ground troops.

The implementation of such an idea required a radical change in priorities in military development and fundamentally pressed against the positions of the dominant supporters of armored armadas in the military leadership. However, instead of an objective assessment of the military perspective, instead of understanding the dialectics of development, departmentalism and inflexibility prevailed, and the “volumeists” were defeated...
New wave

And yet, the “traditionalists” had to make room a little - very interesting arguments were presented by the “volumeists”. In mid-1978 The new Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, decided to form, in addition to the already existing three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st), a second wave of airborne assault units of two types.
Firstly, eight separate air assault brigades of district (group) subordination:

11 Odshbr July 1968 Transbaikal Military District. Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)*
13 October July 1968 Far Eastern Military District, Magdagachi (Amur Region)*
21 Odshbr 1973 Transcaucasian Military District. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)
35th Guards odshbr December 1979 Group Soviet troops in Germany, Cottbus (GDR)**
36 Oshbr December 1979 Leningrad Military District town. Garbolovo (Leningrad region)
37 Odshbr December 1979 Baltic Military District, Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region)
38th Guards Vienna December 1979 Belarusian Military District, Brest (Belarus)
odshbr
39 Odshbr December 1979 Carpathian Military District, Khyrov (Ukraine)
40 Odshbr December 1979 Odessa Military District s. Great Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine)
56th Guards odshbr December 1979 Turkestan Military District village. Azadbash (district of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) ***
57 Oshbr December 1979 Central Asian Military District village. Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan)

Notes:
* Elements of the air groups of these brigades could be deployed separately.
** Literally ok. month, the brigade was initially called the 14th Guards, and only in January 1980 received the 35th number.
*** Formally, the 56th Guards. The brigade is considered formed in Chirchik on the basis of the 351st Guards. pdp. However, de facto, its deployment for entry into Afghanistan was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagai, Fergana, Yolotan), and was brought together into a single whole just before the entry into Afghanistan itself in Termez. The brigade headquarters (or officer cadre), as its formal cadre, was initially stationed in Chirchik.

Secondly, twenty separate infantry battalions:

48 Odshb December 1979 Turkestan Military District,
1st AK / 40th OA (*) location unknown

139 odshb December 1979 Baltic Military District,
11th Guards OA Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region)
145 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
5th OA village Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory)
899 ODSB December 1979 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
20th Guards OA Burg (GDR)
900 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
8th Guards OA Leipzig - Schinau (GDR)
901 odshb December 1979 Central group of troops in the region of the settlement. Riečki (Czechoslovakia)
902 odshb December 1979 Southern group troops of Kecskemét (Hungary)
903 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
28th OA Brest (South), from 1986 – Grodno (Belarus)
904 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
13th OA, Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine)
905 odshb December 1979 Odessa Military District,
14th OA Bendery (Moldova)
906 odshb December 1979 Transbaikal Military District,
36th OA village. Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya)
907 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
43rd AK / 47th OA, Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region)
908 odshb December 1979 Kyiv Military District,
1st Guards OA Konotop, since 1984 – town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernigov region)
1011 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
5th Guards TA st. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus)
1044 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
1st Guards TA Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück)
1156 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
8th TA Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region)
1179 odshb December 1979 Leningrad Military District,
6th OA Petrozavodsk (Karelia)
1151 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
7th TA Polotsk (Belarus)
1185 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
2nd Guards TA Ravensbrück (GDR)
1604 odshb December 1979 Transbaikal Military District,
29th OA of Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug)

Notes:

* Literally a few months after its formation, the 48th Airborne Brigade (or, presumably, the 148th) was merged into the 66th Separate Infantry Brigade (OMSBR) in Afghanistan. In general, as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCSV) in Afghanistan there were two brigades of a special organization known “popularly” as the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle (and in reality bearing the name “detachment combined arms brigade” - oovbr.) . They included one odshb each.

During August-December 1979 these units were basically created.

In 1984, 83 airborne brigades were formed and two individual shelf– 1318th and 1319th airborne regiments for regular Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG) – they are also the so-called. Separate Army Corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.

23 Odshbr 1986 High Command of the South-Western Direction (GC YuZN) Kremenchug (Ukraine)
58 Odshbr 1986 (presumed) Kiev Military District, Kremenchug (Ukraine)
83rd Airborne Brigade 1984 Northern Group of Forces, Bialogyard (Poland)
128 odshbr 1986 (presumed) High Command of the Southern Direction (GC YUN) Stavropol (Stavropol AK)
130 airborne brigade 1986 (presumed) High Command of the Far East Forces (GK Airborne Forces) Abakan (Khakassian Autonomous Okrug)
1318 odshp 1984 Belarusian Military District, 5th Guards. UAC Borovukha-1 – Borogla (Polotsk district, Belarus)
1319 odshp 1984 Transbaikal Military District, Nth UAC, Kyakhta (Chita region)

Thus, at the end of 1986 there were 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 divisions in the Soviet Army. battalions. The total staffing level of the DShCH is war time was 65-70 thousand people. However, in Peaceful time, the units were kept in a greatly reduced composition - on average approx. 31-34 thousand people. At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only personnel for mobilization deployment.

I do not know the principle by which the numbering of brigades and regiments was carried out. But, it can be stated with a certain accuracy that it was the same for the odshbr, obrspn and omsbr - i.e. within all SV. The differences in the numbering of the odshb are due to the three consecutive orders according to which they were formed. However, these explanations I have heard seem insufficient.
Subordination

Many people are interested in the question: were the DShCh part of the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they were not included. The DShCh were part of the High Command of the Ground Forces (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the DShCh military personnel are not airborne paratroopers? Does not mean. The organizational and administrative affiliation of the DShCh to the Ground Forces Civil Code is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the Civil Code of the Army, the DShCh were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation repeated with them as with the special forces units - there were such combat units, but there were no such troops. There was a command for the commander of tank forces and motorized rifle forces, but there was no command for the commander of the airborne assault forces. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one hand, the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, the Civil Code of the North. The “second-class” (this was especially true in the first years of its existence) position in the unspoken intra-army hierarchy also led to corresponding unpleasant consequences: worse attention to problems, worse supplies, less attention to recruitment and training, etc. In the minds of officers of both the Airborne Forces and the Ground Forces, their assignment to the Airborne Forces was often considered a “exile” (perhaps except for units in groups of forces - there, of course, all places were valued higher).

In operational terms (combat use), DShV units were subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of forces). The development of methods and forms for their combat use of airborne troops units and their training was managed by the combat training department of the Ground Forces Civil Code together with the BP department of the Airborne Forces Command. General principles The combat use of DShVs lay on the conscience of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the airborne units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces command.

This had two consequences of opposite importance.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that the children’s children thus found a “natural father” instead of a suspicious stepfather and an evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a “legitimate” appearance.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of the DShCh with the previously superior, but now unknown how related, headquarters of combined arms formations was disrupted. The airborne units intended to act in the interests of combined arms formations ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, sharply reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a scheme of subordination: administratively - to the commander of the Airborne Forces (recruitment, development of methods and forms of action, weapons and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operationally (combat use) - to the commanders of operational and operational-strategic formations in the interests of which this formation intended to be used.
However, when it began in 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces, all this already played little role. But that is another story…

Differences between Airborne Forces and DShV

If the Airborne Forces, according to the established opinion, are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (VDO) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature at great depths (up to 100-150 km or more) , then the idea of ​​​​using DShV lies in the area of ​​​​rather purely tactical or, at most, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the issue of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (GF) is not strictly considered - they are thrown out in the interests of no less than the front (group of fronts), and even the Supreme High Command (SHC), then for the Airborne Forces this is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCh do not even have their own goals, but only a task. (They act within the framework of the goal set by their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This “macro goal” determines the “micro goal” of the landing forces, also determines the task, the composition of the forces, and the method of use.) Thus, we can highlight the main all-determining feature of the airborne assault forces - their use is carried out in accordance with the goals and objectives of the ground combined arms command authority, as a rule, at the army-corps level, or, in some cases, even at the division level. The lower the command level is hierarchically, the smaller, as a rule, is the scale of the forces involved. If the Airborne Forces operate in divisions, then the Airborne Forces operate in companies and battalions, less often in a brigade/regiment.
Acquisition

To create and staff the “second wave” of the DShCh, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards. Airborne Division and 80th Guards. PDP 104th Airborne Division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for additional staffing. Thus, the 36th Airborne Brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th Guards. PDP (he was framed) who allocated the officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the headquarters officers of the 105th Guards. Airborne Division, as well as officers and soldiers of the Belarusian Military Unit.

In the DShCh of the military districts, most of the officers were from the military units of the districts: for the airborne battalions, only commanders were selected from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb of groups of forces, the battalion commander was supplemented with a deputy battalion commander, and also, partially, company commanders. To staff the newly created units, in 1979. in military schools training officers for the Airborne Forces, enrollment was increased, and from 1983-84. Most of the officers already went to the Airborne Forces having been trained under the Airborne Forces program. Mostly they were appointed to groups of troops in the Oshbr, less often - in the OshBR of districts, and even less often in the Odshb. In 1984-85. a reshuffling of officers in groups of troops was carried out - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most trained graduates of military schools and academies were always assigned to the Airborne Forces. True, they could not do without patronage, but this only concerned the distribution into groups of troops - there was a war in Afghanistan, the Airborne Forces officers went there on the second round, and the temptation to place one of their own further away was great.

With regard to the recruitment of conscript soldiers, the Airborne Forces were subject to the same medical requirements and other selection rules as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed conscript contingent was selected. High selection requirements (height - not lower than 173 cm; physical development - not lower than average; education - not lower than average, absence of medical restrictions, etc.) determined fairly high capabilities during combat training.

Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large “Gaizhyunay training” - the 44th Airborne Forces; The DShV were staffed by junior commanders and specialists, mostly those who had graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, Gaizhunai students.
Uniforms and equipment

Due to the fact that the DShV were organizationally part of Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowance standards almost completely corresponded to those in the motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the discrepancy between a number of elements of the combined arms uniform and equipment and the landing specifics, and it did not take into account the moral factor. In general, until mid. 1983, the entire DShV l/s wore the usual motorized rifle uniform - however, due to a very obvious discrepancy, the standard duffel bags were replaced with RD-54 airborne backpacks. However, at the same time, there were also “non-statutory” deviations from this rule. Thus, one could see Airborne “birds” on red buttonholes, and those leaving active service tried to get a “normal” landing uniform - with a vest and beret - and in this form go “for demobilization”. To perform parachute jumps, they were issued so-called. "jumping" jumpsuits of the Airborne Forces.

In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the CPSU Secretary General L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the DShV to supply standards and Airborne uniform, which was done almost everywhere by the spring of next year. Both soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests, quickly getting rid of the disgusted and despised “red color”.

For a combat situation, you can describe the standard appearance of a Soviet paratrooper like this. Underwear incl. and a vest (a T-shirt, with long sleeves and a double-knit vest, i.e. insulated); so-called "jumping" jumpsuit in greenish-olive color; a cloth helmet that fits the head (in winter - insulated with lining), boots with side lacing (or, less commonly, with belts); finally - a camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit consisting of a short jacket and trousers was worn; everything is khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. A must for everyone is the RD-54 paratrooper backpack. In addition to this, there could be: additional general-purpose pouches for AK magazines, a pouch for SVD sniper rifle magazines, backpacks for carrying RPG shots, etc. For parachute jumps, special cases for small arms and a GK-30 cargo container were used.

Also, in mid. In the 80s, to supply airborne assault vehicles, a BVD transport and unloading vest was developed, structurally reminiscent of the GeDeeR landing vest. However, he never entered the army en masse.
ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT

Speaking about the organizational structure (OSS) and the supply of weapons and equipment (WME) of units and units of the DShV, the following reservations should immediately be made. Firstly, the DShV is subject to the same rules and features that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the general equipment and equipment of weapons and military equipment from unit to unit. Secondly, changes over time - the OShS and the equipment of weapons and military equipment gradually changed. This applied to both lower divisions and the general structure of units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the ORS with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local characteristics; which is connected with the notorious secrecy regime in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OSH DShV quite problematic and requires separate serious research. Below, I present only the fundamental structure of the ODSB and ODSB.

Unfortunately, I don’t know the details of the initial organization of the air assault brigades. Therefore, you will have to limit yourself to only the general structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (bvp) and transport-combat (tbvp), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three parachute landing battalions (standard for the Airborne Forces OShS) and one air assault battalion (the VShB had the original OSHS reinforced compared to the airborne battalion) battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, which was generally not typical for Soviet airborne units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical unit - i.e. was equal to the division.

Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st airborne brigade in the 1970s:

brigade management
- three air assault companies (SPG-9D, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS, AKMS)
- anti-tank battery (SPG-9MD)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-2M), communications, support, first aid post.
- air group (until 1977, from this year - only a helicopter regiment), consisting of:
- combat helicopter regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8)
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6)
- a separate battalion of airfield technical support (two communications and RT support companies, two fuel and energy units, a security company)
- mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38)
- anti-tank battery (12 ATGM "Malyutka", later - "Fagot")
- rocket battery (140-mm MLRS RPU-16) - soon disbanded
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company

- repair company

- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
1. Battalions, air group and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in the 11th airborne brigade: 617, 618 and 619 departments. air assault battalions; 211 air group consisting of 307 and 329 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 329 helicopter regiments).
- in the 13th Oshbr: ..., ... and ... dept. air assault battalions, ... air group consisting of 825 and ... helicopter regiments (until 1977).
- in the 21st airborne brigade: 802, 803 and 804 departments. air assault battalions, 1171 air group consisting of 292 and 325 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 325 helicopter regiments).
2. In addition to those indicated, the brigade also had the following units: a company of young soldiers (RMS), a club, a special KGB department with a security platoon, and economic structures.

Organizational structure of the 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th Airborne Brigades for 1979-88. :

brigade management
- three parachute companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)

- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M/-3), communications, support, first aid post.
- one (4th) air assault (armored) battalion:
- three air assault companies (BMD-1/-1P, BTRD, 82-mm M, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- since 1981 - a mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38) is added, and from the beginning. 1983 it is replaced by a self-propelled artillery battery (120-mm SAO 2S9 Nona)*
- platoons: grenade launcher (AGS-17), anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M/-3), communications, support, first aid post.

- rocket battery (122 mm MLRS BM-21V Grad-V)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile division (in some brigades since 1982)**:
- two anti-aircraft missile batteries (SZRK Strela-10M)
- anti-aircraft missile battery(MANPADS Strela-3)
- platoons: control, support.
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3) - until 1982.
- anti-tank battery (BTR-RD, Fagot)
- reconnaissance company (BMD-1, BTRD, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- airborne support company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- transport and economic company (since 1986)
- a radiochemical reconnaissance platoon, and since 1984, in part of the brigades - a radiochemical and biological protection company
- platoon of the artillery chief's control
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
* Initially (1979-81), there was no minbatr in the DSB.
** The anti-aircraft division has been in the majority of airborne assault brigades since 1983. For some time, the 35th Guards airborne assault brigade also included ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”.

The total number of brigades deployed in wartime states reached 2.8-3.0 thousand people.

Some brigades had a structure different from that presented above. Thus, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two parachute (1st and 2nd) and one airborne assault (3rd) battalions. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigade that fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, was distinguished by the presence of three air assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one parachute (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization that also changed over time.

Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st airborne brigade for 1979-88:

brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) separate air assault (foot) battalions:
- three air assault companies (82-mm M, ATGM Fagot, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS-74, AKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-3), communications, support, first aid post.
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6) - until 1988.
- howitzer artillery battery (122 mm G D-30)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- mountain cannon battery (76 mm GP 2A2 model 1958)
- anti-aircraft battery (23-mm ZU-23, Strela-2M MANPADS)
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- airborne support company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- transport and economic company
- radiochemical reconnaissance platoon
- platoon of the artillery chief's control
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
* Battalions and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
in the 11th airborne brigade: 617, 618 and 619 departments. air assault battalions; 329 Helicopter Regiment (removed from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
in the 13th Oshbr: ..., ... and ... dept. air assault battalions, ... helicopter regiment (at the beginning of 1988 it was withdrawn from the brigade).
in 21 Oshbr: 802, 803 and 804 departments. air assault battalions, 325th helicopter regiment (removed from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
For some time there were no airborne forces in the battalions - the airborne forces were part of the military forces.
The 802nd (1st) Oshb 21 Oshb had a different organization from the standard one.

The organizational structure of the airborne assault forces differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: the 1st paratrooper battalion (on foot) and the 2nd air assault battalion (on BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the regimental units. The total strength of the regiment deployed in wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.

The organizational structure of the air assault battalion in the European theater of operations and the Far Eastern theater of operations was generally similar to the OShS of the pdb brigades, but also included a fourth company - an air assault (on a BMD) and a razed platoon (either with a BMD or on a UAZ-469), and in a mortar battery the number of trunks increased to 8 units. The total strength of the battalion deployed throughout the wartime states reached 650-670 people.

In the winter-spring of 1988, organizational changes began and were completed by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time the brigades were renamed airborne and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly lightened by removing all armored vehicles from there and removing the airborne assault battalion on the BMD/BTRD from its composition.

Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th, 21st, 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 40th, 56th Guards, 83rd Airborne Brigade for 1990-91:

brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) parachute (foot) battalions:
- three parachute companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-7D, GP-25, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-3/Igla), communications, support, first aid post.
- howitzer artillery division:
- three howitzer batteries (122 mm G D-30)
- platoons: control, support.
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM "Fagot")
- anti-aircraft battery (23-mm ZU-23, Strela-2M MANPADS)
- reconnaissance company (UAZ-3151, PK, RPG-7D, GP-25, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- airborne support company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- logistics company
- radiochemical and biological protection company
- platoon of the artillery chief's control
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Organizational structure of 224 TC for 1990-91:

brigade management
- 1st training parachute battalion:
- three training parachute companies (RPG-7D, GP-25, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- training reconnaissance company (PK, AKS-74, SVD)
- 2nd training parachute battalion:
- 1st training automobile company (for Ural-4320)
- 2nd training automobile company (for GAZ-66)
- educational medical company
- communications training company
- training artillery division:
- training howitzer battery (122 mm G D-30)
- training mortar battery (120 mm M)
- training anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- training anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- company of training vehicles (Ural-4320, GAZ-66)
- communications company
- medical company
- repair company
- logistics company
- airborne support platoon
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

HELICOPTERS ARE THE MAIN PROBLEM

Domestic airborne vehicles had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the airborne assault forces was the provision of their aviation component, in other words, helicopters.

The “second wave” airborne units formed en masse in 1979 consisted only of a ground component – ​​i.e. Unlike their older brothers - the “first wave” brigades - they did not have helicopter regiments. This situation can be explained by several theses.

Firstly, this contradicted the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they must be part of them for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts to use them in the chosen direction. Theoretically, the apparently correct desire to give each formation helicopter forces, in reality led to the dispersion of helicopters among very numerous formations in view of the overall enormity of the SA. Here it was necessary to either liquidate unnecessary (or not unnecessary?) formations, or deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or speed up the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.

Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapons, depends on the prevailing this moment doctrines. As mentioned above, the “volumeists” who advocated for the creation of the lifting of part of the ground forces into the air, and therefore for a sharp increase in the number of air transport vehicles necessary for this, were defeated in the fight against supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was rather a consequence of objective preconditions, the objective course of development of the country’s armed forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.

Third, the very fact of combining air and ground components in a tactical formation apparently raised objections among many military leaders - and not only subjective, but also well-founded. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, being “tied” exclusively to supporting the operations of the airborne units. As it seems to the author of the article, the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it similar to the support of airborne forces by military aviation aircraft, without paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and obligatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the first decreases. Moreover, according to operational calculations and exercise experience, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the ADS/DSD?

Finally, fourthly, as is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient to, like, for example, the Americans, equip all the formations with which they could be useful, and even have a reserve. However, it seems to me that there is a lot that is unclear here. Namely. Let's look at the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official data, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the author’s calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 vehicles with exhausted service life be disabled, but where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.

So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with the focal (non-linear) nature of combat operations, due to the lack of an aviation component in their composition that imparts maneuverability, sharply reduced their potential capabilities, becoming, in fact, units of light infantry. A fundamental way out of this situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinated to front-line commands in wartime. This formation would include a ground component (a ground combat unit from the ground forces or airborne forces) and an airborne helicopter component (from the airborne forces). Such a construction scheme would allow achieving high combat effectiveness and at the same time all interested departments “staying with their sheep.”

Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for the airborne helicopters. We take standard conditions as initial conditions - a front-line offensive operation of four armies. The group consists of one transport combat helicopter regiment (tbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one department. air assault brigade (3 battalion) and three departments. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions there is one motorized rifle battalion trained to act as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks typical for airborne assaults during it show that within the framework of the airborne assault forces, in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne assault brigade as a tactical airborne assault force and eight to ten airborne assault forces as part of an airborne infantry assault battalion and reinforced small and medium infantry fighting forces.
The average standards for the allocation of transport and landing helicopters are: airborne assault helicopters - up to four regimental sorties (regimental sorties) airborne assault helicopters *; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p/v otbvp; reinforced SME - one p/v otbvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a squad of combat escort helicopters is required.
Crew composition: air defense - 40 Mi-8T/MT, 20 Mi-6A; air defense - 40 Mi-24V/P and 20 Mi-8T/MT.

* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions with armored vehicles in the airborne brigade sharply increased the required number of helicopters for transportation, especially heavy Mi-6A. Transport approx. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share of the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties, and in reality the Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of carrying 2 units. The BMD/BTRD class BTT (only 1 unit for the Mi-6A) changed the situation for the better. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire armored personnel carrier of the DShB by Mi-6A helicopters.

There is no need to prove that disembarking OTTV on three flights, let alone four, is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer of no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without removing transport and combat helicopters from the air defense forces for the period of its operations (in total by 1-2 military units), i.e. they will have to be left without the Mi-8T/MT aircraft.

The duration of an OTTV disembarkation in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of the helicopters, only after a day can we count on their repeated actions (in Afghanistan, for example, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense forces remain without Mi-8 aircraft and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is necessary to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then almost all airborne assault forces are left without transport and landing helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the time it takes to restore the combat effectiveness of the airborne assault brigade, a repeated landing of the airborne assault forces is practically impossible.
In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the odshb/us.msb. However, modern experience shows that up to 30% of the flight life of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving problems not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landing forces. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TAC.
Although not entirely. Nevertheless, it was also necessary to attract transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force - mainly An-12 - to land the DShV. This created additional inconvenience. Thus, the infantry fighting vehicle on the BTT had to independently follow to the initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.
Quality

A certain problem was the adaptability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 families to airborne assault operations and, more broadly, to airborne landings in general. In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.

RESULTS

As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of airborne units to the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); At the same time, several brigades are disbanded (57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th Airborne Training Center. It was decided to disband all of the individual air assault battalions. In the summer of 1990, all major transformations had already been completed. The brigades were reorganized, and most of the battalions were disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former ones.
The general picture of the transformations can be seen from the data presented below:

11th Airborne Brigade, Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)* In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from service. And by Aug. 1. 1990 transferred to air-des. states. brigades.
13th Airborne Brigade, Magdagachi (Amur Region)* In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from service. In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.
21st Airborne Brigade in Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from service. In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.
23rd Airborne Brigade, Kremenchug (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990, transferred to the airborne states. brigades.
35th Guards odshbr city of Cottbus (GDR)** In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states of air-des. brigades.
36 airborne brigade in the town of Garbolovo (Leningrad region) In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to the air-desert states. brigades.
37 airborne brigade in Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region) In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to the air-desert states. brigades.
38th Guards Vienna, Brest (Belarus) In the summer of 1990, transferred to air-desert states. brigades.
odshbr
39 Airborne Brigade, Khyrov (Ukraine) In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 Airborne Troops Training Center.
40 odshbr s. Velikaya Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to the air-desert staff. brigades. And completely redeployed to Nikolaev.
56th Guards odshbr village Azadbash (district of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** In the winter of 1989, withdrawn from Afghanistan to the city of Yolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to the states
air - des. brigades.
57 odshbr town. Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan) Transferred to the village. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region. (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989.
58th Airborne Brigade, Kremenchug (Ukraine) Disbanded in December 1989.
83rd Specialized Brigade, Bialogyard (Poland) Transferred to Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states
air-des. brigades.
128th Airborne Brigade, Stavropol (Stavropol AK) Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.
130th Airborne Brigade, Abakan (Khakassian Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.
1318 airborne regiment Borovukha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk district, Belarus) Disbanded in August 1989.
1319 odshp Kyakhta (Chita region) Disbanded in March 1988.

The individual battalions were dealt with as follows: in 1989 (maximum, early 1990) all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded, simultaneously redeploying those in groups of troops in Europe to the USSR. Then, before the beginning. 1991 they were disbanded too. Only the 901st battalion survived.

139 odshb Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
145 odshb village Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory) Disbanded no later than 1989.
899 odshb Burg (GDR) In 1989 transferred to the town. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991.
900 odshb Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) Transferred to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded.
901 odshb in the district of the village Riečki (Czechoslovakia) In 1989 he was transferred to Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. 1991 disbandment began, but,
soon, the battalion was redeployed* and in May 1991 transferred to Abkhazia (Gudauta).
902 odshb Kecskemet (Hungary) In 1989 transferred to Grodno (Belarus).
903 odshb Grodno (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
904 odshb Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) Disbanded no later than 1989.
905 odshb Bendery (Moldova) Disbanded no later than 1989.
906 odshb village Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya) Disbanded no later than 1989.
907 odshb Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
908 odshb town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernigov region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1011 odshb art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1044 odshb Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the Königsbrück region) Transferred in 1989 to Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1156 odshb Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhitomir region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1179 odshb Petrozavodsk (Karelia) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1151 odshb Polotsk (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1185 odshb Ravensbrück (GDR) Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1604 odshb Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded no later than 1989

Notes:

* By this time it was already called a separate parachute battalion.

Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former air assault units in as part of the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.

In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the Army and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thereby neutralizing the formation of army aviation, which was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act was disrupted. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarities in recruitment and training do not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military issues. The inattention of the Airborne Forces command to the development of the doctrine of using helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of “envy” of the “competitor”; Moreover, the successes of the “helicopter landing” doctrine were evident both for us and for the NATO members. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of airborne forces on helicopter support, considering it similar to the support of airborne forces by military air transport aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of landing forces with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing force drops sharply.

Abbreviations and abbreviations

VDV - airborne troops
NE ̵