Air defense systems deployed in Syria. The Economist: What does Russia's modernization of Syrian air defense mean for Israel Syrian air defense
Syrian air defenses intercepted 71 missiles out of 103 fired from US-led coalition aircraft and ships. Without exaggeration, this result can be called fantastic. Although the officially listed air defense systems have high performance, but their potential is not so wide. How did the Syrian missilemen manage to show such an impressive result? And what is Russia's role in this success?
Western countries used 103 missiles in Syria, including Tomahawk cruise missiles. The head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, announced this on Saturday. According to the General Staff, Syrian air defense intercepted 71 Western coalition cruise missiles, which indicates the high level of training of the local military.
According to Rudsky, Russian systems Air defense at the Khmeimim and Tartus bases monitored the launches cruise missiles both from sea and air carriers of the USA and Great Britain. " Russian forces air defense systems were transferred to combat mode. Fighter aircraft are on duty in the air,” Rudskoy said, adding that, according to preliminary data, casualties among civilians and military personnel Syrian army no, now the situation in Damascus and other settlements in Syria is assessed as calm.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, S-125, S-200, Buk and Kvadrat air defense systems, produced more than 30 years ago in the USSR, were used to repulse the attack. However, the effectiveness of destroying enemy missiles indicates that the Syrians also used more modern means of destruction.
Former deputy commander of the air defense forces of the Russian Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Alexander Luzan, who has visited Syria several times, knows firsthand about the capabilities of the local air defense and is well acquainted with its structure. He especially emphasized that Russian air defense systems as part of the Aerospace Forces did not participate in repelling the night rocket attack, because “the raid did not go through the affected area of the S-400, S-300V4 and Pantsir, which are stationed in Khmeimim and Tartus.”
“Syrian air defense took part in repelling the raid. Two types of air attack weapons were used: aeroballistic missiles, which were launched from aircraft, and cruise missiles. Tomahawk missiles, which were launched from aircraft, including B-1B bombers, and from ships. Both were shot down,” Luzan told the Vzglyad newspaper.
He noted that Syrian air defense is quite powerful. The main striking force was the newest multi-channel anti-aircraft missile system Buk-M2, which Syria managed to buy from Russia shortly before the start of the war. civil war. Before this, Damascus had the Buk-M1 complex.
Also, before the start of the civil war, Syria acquired Pantsir-S1 from Russia. This complex does not have a highly raised antenna, but has a short reaction time, so it manages to effectively fire at a cruise missile at close range. According to the expert, it was the Pantsir and Buki-M2 that became the main means of destroying enemy missiles.
Older air defense systems also should not be written off, Luzan believes. “The great-grandfather of the Buk-M2, Kvadrat, is the export name for the Soviet anti-aircraft missile system Kub. It was released over 30 years ago. But it was used very successfully in the Middle East, especially in Egypt. During the Arab-Israeli war, it was the “Square”, when it was first delivered there, that destroyed 78% of Israeli aircraft. The Americans were forced to fly the Phantoms to Israel with in-flight refueling in order to somehow increase its potential. Therefore, this time “Square” could be used,” says Luzan.
In turn, the ex-commander of the 4th Air Force of the Air Force and Air Defense, Hero of Russia, Lieutenant General Valery Gorbenko, agrees that
The number of missiles intercepted by the Syrian defenders showed not just a high, but a fantastic result.
“The effectiveness of the strike (of the Western coalition) turns out to be low,” Gorbenko told the VZGLYAD newspaper, adding that Syrian Buks, as well as S-75 and S-200 systems, were working on distant approaches, “and closer to the targets, the Pantsirs were the most effective "
Luzan emphasized that an air defense system is considered strong if more than 60% of targets are hit, so the result deserves all praise. At the same time, Gorbenko noted that such a high efficiency rate was achieved solely thanks to Russia, which helped Syria restore anti-aircraft missile systems. The training programs for Syrian missilemen have brought no less benefit. “Or maybe we helped them somewhere during the launches. Don't know. But they probably suggested it,” suggested the lieutenant general.
Regarding the use of the S-200, Luzan recalled that in Syria there were two groups of divisions with these weapons. “But a cruise missile is not a target for the S-200. And the carriers of cruise missiles did not enter the zone of its destruction, so if the S-200 shot down something there, then it was one or two targets,” said the former deputy commander of the air defense forces of the Russian Ground Forces.
Let us note that air defense systems were not considered a target by the Western coalition, although in a real conflict these systems become the number one target. According to Alexander Luzan, in this way the United States and its allies only created “big noise,” and not for the first time. “There was already a strike on the Syrian airfield. Then they launched 58 Tomahawks. Of these, 38 were shot down, and those that flew to the airfield did not cause any significant damage, because the next day planes began to take off from this airfield. Therefore, this time too, the propaganda goal is being pursued,” he said.Luzan emphasized that air defense systems can be hit by anti-radar missiles of the AGM-88 HARM type with a launch range of about 50–60 kilometers. “The carrier, that is, the F-15 or F-16, needs to reach this range. This means exposing the carrier to air defense attacks. So they went on their own the simple way: used long-range cruise missiles, the launch of which does not require entering the affected area missile defense. And then whatever happens,” explained Alexander Luzan.
During the night shelling, the Russian Aerospace Forces also gained invaluable experience. Russian S-300 and S-400 located in Syria detected and escorted Western missiles, collecting information for analysis and study.
“Trainings, and even more so real combat operations, always bring educational benefits. From this we can conclude that it is necessary to improve the reconnaissance system for air attack weapons. Cruise missiles fly into the combat zone at extremely low altitudes, so the detection range is insignificant. There are intelligence systems, but they are not integrated into unified system. It is necessary to create a unified information and management space. Then no surprises will be scary. The weapon can always be brought to a state of combat readiness on time, and then, as in that fairy tale: the orchestra does its job,” the lieutenant general urged.
He explained that there was an A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft in Syria, but neither the S-400 nor the S-300B4 have the means to receive information via non-directional communication channels from this flying radar. “And Rudskoy himself should know about this and draw certain conclusions,” believes Alexander Luzan.
Let us remind you that on Saturday night, US President Donald Trump ordered a strike on Syria. He stated this in a special address to the nation. Great Britain and France joined the military operation. The strikes, as French President Emmanuel Macron assured, were carried out at Syrian government facilities for the creation of chemical weapons.
The first coalition strikes began at four o'clock in the morning (Syrian time, coinciding with Moscow time). They were launched from two US Navy ships from the Red Sea, tactical aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea, as well as American B-1B strategic bombers from the al-Tanf area.
The United States did not notify Russia about this strike, and NATO countries were informed several hours before the start of the operation. As the Pentagon said, the United States chose targets in such a way as to minimize the likelihood of Russian military involvement in the situation. As Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, the first strike was aimed at a research center in which “the Syrian authorities researched, tested and produced chemical and biological weapons" The other two sites are a chemical weapons storage facility west of Homs and a nearby equipment storage facility. chemical weapons. Objects were seriously damaged.
The political reaction to what is happening in Syria was expected. Russian Ambassador in the United States, Anatoly Antonov said that the strike would not remain without consequences. “The worst fears have come true. Our warnings were not heeded. A pre-planned scenario is being implemented. They are threatening us again. We warned that such actions will not remain without consequences. All responsibility for them lies with Washington, London and Paris,” the diplomat said.
The US Congress also expressed their disagreement with what happened. Senator Tim Kaine called Washington's actions illegal because Trump did not receive permission to conduct a military operation. And Senator Jack Reed called Trump driven into a corner in the current situation.
According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, a “chain of tragic accidental circumstances” led to Syria shooting down a Russian spy plane on September 17. These words from Mr. Putin seem to indicate that he considers this episode to be accidental and does not make any accusations against Israel. Israeli fighter jets have previously carried out air strikes on Syrian territory and, apparently, they were likely targets of its air defense. However, time passed, and Russia became more and more militant. Its generals said Israeli fighters used the Russian plane as cover (Israel denies this). Then, on September 24, Russia announced its intention to supply the Syrians with more advanced S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, signaling a change in its regional strategy.
Since Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015 on the side of that country's dictator, Bashar al-Assad, it has sought to avoid clashes with Israel. Over the past 18 months, Israel has carried out more than 200 airstrikes against Iran-linked targets inside Syria. " Hotline", connecting the headquarters of the Israeli air force in Tel Aviv with the Russian command center in Khmeimim in western Syria, helped prevent incidents in the air. Military procedures were supported by a tacit agreement between Mr. Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister. Israel will not interfere with the implementation Russian operation to save Mr. Assad, and Russia will not stop Israel from attacking Iranian targets in Syria.
Russian plans to modernize Syria's air defense system complicate this agreement. S-300 is formidable anti-aircraft missile system, which is equipped with a radar capable of tracking more than 100 targets simultaneously at a distance of up to 300 kilometers. Its presence will make Israeli operations riskier, which is why Mr. Netanyahu has long opposed the transfer of these weapons to the Syrian government (Russia has already stationed S-300 systems in Syria, but it is not using them against Israel). However, Israel says it will continue attacks on targets in Syria. Its stealthy F-35 fighter-bombers are capable of penetrating the defenses of S-300 systems and destroying them. But if Russian operators work alongside poorly trained Syrian troops, there is a risk of escalation.
Russian minister Defense Sergei Shoigu said that the S-300 systems will be transferred to the Syrian army within two weeks. Some analysts doubt this will happen. Due to pressure from America and Israel, it took Russia 9 years to deliver the promised S-300 systems to Iran. Moscow may view the threat of supplying these systems as a way to put pressure on Israel to limit its intervention in Syria.
Russia has tried to find a balance between Israel and its enemies in the Middle East. Mr. Putin became the first Russian leader made an official visit to Israel (he did so twice), and Mr Netanyahu stood shoulder to shoulder with Mr Putin during a Russian military parade this year. However, this friendship did not prevent Russia from inviting Hamas to Moscow, helping Iran implement its nuclear program and arming Syria.
As Russia became increasingly isolated from the West, Israel's importance as a source of technology and political support increased. The Kremlin has carefully avoided anti-Israel rhetoric in its accusations against the West. After the incident with its plane in Syria, Russia spoke about betrayal of trust and expressed regret about this; Russia did everything to help Israel and assist it, but in return received betrayal, Russian commentators emphasize. Mr Netanyahu has called Mr Putin twice and also dispatched the Israeli air force commander to Moscow, but the Kremlin may be expecting more courtesy from Israel to defuse the current situation.
InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.
IN Lately continues to be haunted by a series of “fatal and fantastic coincidences,” in the words of tourists Boshirov and Petrov. The defeat of the Russian Il-20 aircraft by the Syrian crew of the S-200 air defense system, as in the case of Salisbury, gave rise to many versions of what happened - from a mistake by the Syrian military to a deliberate provocation on the part of Damascus, aimed at disrupting Russian-Israeli interaction. In any case, experts note, the tragedy indicates the low level of training of Syrian air defense troops, which is not in Moscow’s interests to correct now.
“The problem is the mediocre combat training and combat training of the fighters of the Syrian Arab Army in general and the crews of air defense systems in particular: after Israel strikes at them, they usually respond with indiscriminate mass missile launches along the entire perimeter - this is their usual tactic. Sometimes even they end up somewhere.”
In order to change the situation, Semenov believes, Russia would need to completely retrain the Syrian air defense forces and reform their command and control system: otherwise there is no point in supplying new weapons.
At the same time, according to the expert, the Russian Federation should not take such steps. If Moscow strengthens the Syrian air defense forces and increases their effectiveness, the Iranians will immediately take advantage of this and further increase their already strong presence in Syria.
“This will cause an even more active reaction from Israel, for which the Iranian presence in Syria is unacceptable.”
The Russian Federation needs to think, first of all, not about how to improve Syrian air defense or supply Damascus with some new types of weapons, but for this it needs clearer agreements with Israel.
“The Ministry of Defense rightly noted that Israel gave only a minute's warning of a strike on Syria, and this is simply dishonest. At the same time, if the message from the head of the Russian military department that Israeli fighters “covered themselves” with a Russian plane is true, in such a situation this could not have been avoided with any air defense system,” the News.ru expert points out.
Finding a consensus with Israel, Zolotarev believes, will be difficult, but the existence of agreements on Idlib with Turkey, with which Moscow also previously had many problems, demonstrates that the Kremlin knows how to negotiate if desired.
Syrian air defense: salvation or illusion?
Bashar al-Assad needs to try very hard to thwart Western plans to “reformat” his country
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In April 2012, National Defense published an article by Anatoly Gavrilov on Iranian air defense. At the beginning of the year, the information war against Iran was at its peak, and it seemed that it was about to enter a hot stage. However, passions soon subsided, and the wave of information preparation was transferred to Syria. Recent statements by Assad's Western opponents indicate that the option of escalating events in this country according to the Libyan scenario - with the introduction of a no-fly zone and air support for the rebels' actions is quite likely. Unlike the late Muammar Gaddafi, Bashar al-Assad in recent years has made active efforts to update the weapons of the country's armed forces, in particular, serious attention was paid to air defense technology. In the new material, the author analyzes Syria's capabilities to counter the aerospace offensive of the NATO coalition and its allies. |
Anatoly GAVRILOV
For more than a year now, the world's attention has been focused on the Middle East region, where the fate of many nations is once again being decided Muslim countries. A new object of direct state interests of the United States and its NATO allies is Syria with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which is undesirable to the West. The country is teetering on the brink of a real civil war with numerous human and material losses. The civilian population is dying, and the warring parties, as usual, mutually blame each other for this. Opposition units supported by the West acquire an organized structure, unified management, and receive support with weapons, ammunition, food, etc. from the territory of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, since the land and air borders of Syria are practically open. Government troops hold cities and major population centers, while the opposition controls about half the country, including almost all of the countryside.
Preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity Syria is of great geopolitical importance. The stability and power of Syria is also extremely important for Russia, which seeks to maintain its influence in the Middle East region. It is quite obvious that the military intervention of the West and the overthrow of the legitimate government of Syria will open a direct path of aggression against Iran, which will ultimately pose a certain threat to Russia itself.
The geopolitical position of Syria is extremely unenviable. The country is in a hostile environment: from the south - Israel, burning Lebanon, in the east - unstable Palestine, Iraq, from the north - hostile Turkey.
Syria's military doctrine is based on the principle of defense sufficiency, which determines the development of the armed forces. Damascus sees Israel as the main enemy, not excluding the threat of military conflicts with Iraq and Turkey.
The Syrian Armed Forces developed based on these tasks and today are one of the strongest among the armed forces of countries. Arab world. Powerful ground forces (3 army corps, 12 divisions, 7 of them tank, 12 separate brigades, 10 special forces regiments, a separate tank regiment) are in dire need of cover from air strikes. The combat capabilities of Israeli and Turkish aviation are an order of magnitude greater than those of the Syrian Air Force. Undoubtedly, Syria, like any country, is unable to withstand the actions of the joint air force group of the NATO coalition if they conduct air operations. Therefore, the Syrians have long been concerned about the development of an air defense system, acquiring modern air defense systems in Russia, Belarus, and China. According to experts, Syrian air defense today represents a rather formidable force.
The destruction of a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft on June 22, 2012 by Syrian air defenses clearly confirms this. According to many political scientists, the downed Phantom was almost a guarantee of preventing the impending NATO armed intervention, rushing to the aid of the opposition. The effectiveness of Syrian air defense cannot be compared with the air defense of Libya, which was unable to withstand in any way modern grouping NATO Air Force.
Let's take a closer look at the state of the heroic air defense, consider some of the design features of its components, and try to give an objective assessment of the combat capabilities of the guarantor of sovereignty and the preservation of Syrian statehood.
What does the Syrian air defense force have in its arsenal?
The Syrian air defense forces are armed with anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems and complexes of both modern and obsolete types that survived the Arab-Israeli war 40 years ago. In due time truly invaluable help($13.4 billion debt remained unpaid!) in arms supplies, training personnel the Soviet Union provided the country, therefore almost all weapons (not only anti-aircraft) are Soviet and Russian origin. Today, the Syrian air defense includes about 900 air defense systems and more than 4,000 anti-aircraft guns various modifications. The S-200 “Angara” and S-200V “Vega” air defense systems (about 50 launchers), S-75 “Dvina” have the greatest range in terms of range; S-75M "Volga". Modern air defense systems are of extreme concern to Israel medium range– S-300 early modifications (48 air defense systems), which at the end of 2011 were allegedly supplied by Russia (according to other sources, by Belarus and China). The largest representation in the Syrian air defense system are air defense systems and medium-range air defense systems, among which there are modern complexes“Buk-M1-2”, “Buk-M2E” (36 SOU, 12 ROM), as well as outdated air defense systems C-125 “Neva”, S-125M “Pechora” (140 PU), 200 SPU “Kub” (“Kvadrat”) "), 14 batteries of the Osa air defense system (60 BM). In addition, in 2006, a contract was signed to supply Syria with 50 of the most modern Pantsir-S1E air defense missile systems, some of which are already in service. The ground forces include the Strela-1 air defense missile launcher, the Strela-10 combat vehicle (35 units), about 4,000 Strela-2/2M and Strela-3 MANPADS, more than 2,000 ZU-23 anti-aircraft artillery systems -2, ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” (400 units). Anti-aircraft guns are in long-term storage artillery pieces calibers 37 mm and 57 mm, as well as 100 mm KS-19 guns.
As we can see, the bulk of air defense systems and air defense systems (about 80%) are represented by outdated weapons and military equipment. However, over the past years, all complexes have undergone (or are undergoing) deep modernization and, to one degree or another, meet modern requirements.
Radar reconnaissance equipment is represented by P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 locators, PRV-13, PRV-16 radio altimeters, the development ideology of which dates back to the second half of the last century. 30–40 years ago, in the Arab-Israeli wars, this equipment could still somehow resist the then air enemy, using the available modes of tuning out various types of interference, changing operating frequencies, etc. Today, these samples, firstly, have developed a technical resource, - secondly, they are hopelessly behind the potential enemy’s capabilities in delivering “electronic strikes.” At best, an air defense group can use these radars in Peaceful time when on combat duty in order to detect intruder aircraft, detect the start of an air attack attack, control air traffic and so on.
In order for an air defense system to work effectively, it is necessary that all its components fulfill their functional purpose, making their contribution to solving air defense problems. It is impossible to judge the power of an air defense system based on the fact that one intruding aircraft was shot down in peacetime. The situation during hostilities will be completely different. Massive use of small-sized air targets - elements of high-tech weapons (such as UAVs, cruise missiles, UAB, guided missiles, etc.), the use of intensive fire and electronic countermeasures against air defense fire weapons, the disabling of control and reconnaissance systems, the widespread use of false and distracting goals - in such incredible difficult conditions The air defense system will function. Reflecting attacks from modern air defense systems, combined into a complex, highly organized system, is only possible if it is countered with an adequate, highly effective air defense system. Here, the state and capabilities of control systems, reconnaissance of enemy air and warning about him, a carefully organized and constructed system of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover (ZRAP), as well as fighter-aviation cover (IAP) are of particular importance.
CONTROL SYSTEM
The system for controlling the combat operations of Syrian air defense force groups is built according to the usual classical scheme, combining the directorates and headquarters of the air defense zones (North and South), command posts (control points) of anti-aircraft missile (artillery) formations, units and subunits, radio technical units and subunits. The communication system is represented by traditional tropospheric, relay, and shortwave radio communication channels; wired communication is also widely used.
To control air defense forces and assets, there are three fully computerized command posts. They make it possible, before the start of an anti-aircraft battle, to ensure the operation of control bodies in organizing air defense, planning combat operations, and exchanging operational and tactical information. The capabilities of centralized automated control of combat operations of the entire air defense group are very low due to a number of reasons.
Firstly, the degree of equipment of air defense formations and units with modern automation equipment is extremely low. The anti-aircraft combat control system is represented by samples of automated control systems from the anti-aircraft missile systems and systems, moreover, the old park. For example, to control the S-75, S-125 and S-200 air defense systems, ASURK-1M(1MA), Vector-2, Almaz, Senezh-M1E, Proton, and Baikal KSAUs are used. were put into service in the middle of the last century. The ideology of combat control of air defense systems, implemented in these systems, is completely unsuitable for modern conditions and is hopelessly outdated. Available samples of automated control systems make it possible to solve in an automated way the tasks of collecting, processing, displaying and transmitting radar information in relation to command posts of individual homogeneous air defense formations (divisions, regiments, brigades). Centralized control of combat operations of mixed air defense groups, both in zones and in formations, has not been implemented due to the lack of automated control systems to solve these problems.
On the one hand, it is known that decentralization of control significantly reduces the overall effectiveness of the air defense system due to lack of interaction, missed air targets, excessive concentration of fire, etc. Although, on the other hand, in conditions of repelling high-density air strikes, in strong (suppressive) conditions interference, powerful fire countermeasures, independent fire actions anti-aircraft weapons may be the only effective way to solve air defense problems. The development before the battle of detailed instructions for firing and interaction with the distribution of responsible space between fire units in the group and between groups can significantly bring the effectiveness of the air defense system closer to its potential. In these circumstances, decentralized control may be preferable. A striking example of the disadvantages of excessive centralization of control is the unpunished landing on Red Square of a light aircraft, which occurred 25 years ago, which flew through a fairly strong air defense group in the western USSR, uselessly waiting from Moscow for a command to open fire and defeat the detected and accompanied air target.
Secondly, things are far from good with the state of the automated control system for combat operations not only at the command posts (PU) of air defense groups, but also in the anti-aircraft weapons themselves. For example, the PU-12 battery command post for the Osa air defense system automatically solves only a narrow range of tasks of establishing and tracking routes according to its own radar data, and recalculating radar image coordinates from a “digital” source. Moreover, target designation for combat vehicles has to be issued in a non-automated way, by voice with the issuance of target coordinates, which also reduces control efficiency. Considering that the Osa complexes currently cover S-200 brigades, for the destruction of which cruise missiles, UAB and other small-sized, high-speed targets can be used, the use of PU-12 in conditions of extreme time pressure becomes practically useless.
To control the Kvadrat air defense system, the K-1 (“Crab”) control complex, created in 1957-1960, is used. The complex allows you to visually display the air situation on the brigade commander’s console on the spot and on the move using information from the associated radar of the old fleet. Operators have to manually simultaneously process up to 10 targets, issue target designations for them with forced pointing of the antennas of the guidance stations. To detect an enemy aircraft and issue target designation to a division, taking into account the distribution of targets and transfer of fire, it takes 25-30 seconds, which is unacceptably long in the conditions of modern short-lived anti-aircraft combat. The range of radio links is limited and is only 15–20 km.
The automated fire control system of modern air defense systems and air defense systems Buk-M2E, S-300 and Pantsir-S1E has higher capabilities (if they are supplied fully equipped with combat control points). These automated control systems solve the problems of automated development of decisions to repel air strikes (firing), setting fire missions, monitoring their implementation, regulating the consumption of missiles (ammunition), organizing interaction, documenting combat work, etc.
However, along with the high level of automation of fire control processes among the component elements of the complex, the problem of interaction with external air defense systems remains unresolved. With such a variety of means of a mixed air defense group, the problem of organizing centralized automated control of it comes to the fore.
Thirdly, the problem is also aggravated by the impossibility of information and technical interaction between various CACS. The system for collecting and processing radar information with such ACS equipment can only be non-automated using tablets. Radar information obtained using radars of the P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80, PRV-13 and PRV-16 types (possibly also radars of the new fleet) can be processed and used using automated radar information processing posts (PORI-1, PORI-2), but Syria has no information about their availability. As a result, the reconnaissance and warning system about enemy air will operate with a large delay in radar information.
Thus, in conditions of intense fire and electronic countermeasures, centralized control of air defense systems when equipped with outdated models of automated control systems will undoubtedly be lost, which will reduce the potential capabilities of the group to destroy air targets.
RADIO EQUIPMENT
The combat use of groups of radio technical troops (RTV) of Syria has a number of characteristic features. The increased role of radio engineering troops in the air defense system in armed conflicts of recent decades is quite obvious, the effectiveness of which mainly determines the quality of control, and therefore the success of the fight against enemy aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. However, one of the weak points of the Syrian air defense is the radio technical troops, equipped with outdated radars that have completely exhausted their service life. About 50% of the radars in service with radio engineering companies, battalions and brigades require major repairs, 20-30% are not ready for combat. The P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 radars are well known to American military experts and their NATO colleagues from Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars and the Gulf Wars.
At the same time, a significant qualitative breakthrough has occurred in the development and combat use of Western high-tech weapons over the past few decades. It is quite obvious that Syrian (read: Soviet) RTV weapons are not able to effectively counteract modern means air attack for a number of reasons:
1. Low noise immunity of the RTV group. Radar samples designed in the middle of the last century, as well as the RTV group created on their basis, were capable of ensuring the performance of combat missions in the conditions of the use of low-intensity active noise interference (up to 5–10 W/MHz), and in certain sectors (in certain directions ) – under conditions of active noise interference of medium intensity (30–40 W/MHz). In the 2003 Operation Shock and Awe against Iraq, forces and electronic warfare equipment coalitions of NATO countries created interference densities two orders of magnitude higher - up to 2-3 kW/MHz in the barrage mode and up to 30-75 kW/MHz in the targeted mode. At the same time, the RTV RES and the S-75 and S-125 air defense systems, which are in service with the Iraqi air defense, were suppressed at 10-25 W/MHz.
2. Low level automation of control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance. The radar reconnaissance assets available in the Syrian RTV are not capable of functioning in a single information space due to the lack of a single automated center for collecting and processing information. Collecting and processing information in a non-automated way leads to large inaccuracies and delays in the transfer of data air targets up to 4–10 min.
3. Impossibility of creating a radar field with the required parameters. A fragmented radar field allows one to assess only the particular air situation and make individual decisions on the conduct of combat operations based on it. When creating a RTV grouping, it is necessary to take into account geographical features area of upcoming combat operations, its limited size, the presence of large zones of airspace uncontrolled by the group of radio technical troops. Mountainous areas are not suitable for the deployment of RTV units, therefore the creation of a continuous radar field is extremely problematic. The maneuver capabilities of RTV units and units are also extremely limited.
Features of the complex terrain make it possible to create a tri-band radar field with the following parameters:
The height of the lower boundary of a continuous radar field: above the territory of Syria, in the coastal area and along the line of separation of troops from Israel - 500 m; along the border with Lebanon – 500m; over the territory of Lebanon – 2000 m;
Along the border with Turkey – 1000 – 3000 m; along the border with Iraq – 3000 m;
The height of the upper boundary of the continuous radar field over the territory of Syria is 25,000 m;
The depth of the radar field (removal of detection lines) beyond the Syrian-Israeli border can be 50 - 150 km;
Radar field overlap is two to three times;
At altitudes of 100–200 m, the radar field is only focal in nature at almost all important areas.
Of course, the ongoing modernization of the obsolete radars in service contributes to increasing the effectiveness of the Syrian RTV group Soviet made. Thus, at the beginning of 2012, the Russian radar station deployed on Mount Jabal al-Harra south of Damascus and the Syrian radar station located in Lebanon on Mount Sanin were modernized. This led to the ability to quickly receive warning information about possible air attacks from Israel. However, to solve the problem, it is necessary to radically re-equip the RTV with modern effective radars. This partly occurs during the supply of air defense and air defense systems, which include modern radars with high energy and noise immunity.
Taking into account the peculiarities of RTV equipment, terrain, experience combat use forces and means of reconnaissance of Syria's air enemy, a number of basic organizational and tactical recommendations can be offered.
It is advisable to introduce corner reflectors and simulators of radar emission from stations (IRIS) as standard elements of the battle formation in radar reconnaissance units. portable type. Corner reflectors should be installed at decoy and combat (spare) positions in groups or individually at a distance of up to 300 m from the radar (SURN, SOC BM). Portable IRIS should be installed at a distance from several hundred meters to several kilometers from the antenna post or SURN of the air defense system.
Use radars that are disabled, but with working transmitting systems, as false (distracting) ones. The deployment of such radars should be carried out at combat positions at a distance of 300–500 m from command posts(control points), switching on radiation should be carried out with the beginning of an enemy air attack.
At all command posts (PU) and in the directions of probable enemy air defense operations, deploy a network of air surveillance posts, equipping them with surveillance, communication and data transmission means. For prompt notification of overflights, organize special operational channels for transmitting particularly important information.
A set of organizational measures is important for increasing the secrecy of elements of an enemy air reconnaissance system. Each radar position should be thoroughly camouflaged and engineered immediately after deployment. Trenches for reconnaissance stations should be torn off in such a way that the lower emitter of the antenna is at ground level. All cable facilities must be carefully covered to a depth of 30-60 cm. Near each radar station, trenches and crevices should be equipped to shelter personnel. The positions of radar reconnaissance units should be changed immediately following the overflights of reconnaissance aircraft, after working on radiation, even for a short time, when staying in position for more than four hours.
To reduce the visibility of the radar in the visible and IR ranges against the surrounding background, carry out camouflage and deforming coloring, create false thermal targets using improvised means (by making fires, lighting torches, etc.). False thermal targets must be placed on the ground at real distances corresponding to the distances between elements of combat formations. It is advisable to use false thermal targets in combination with corner reflectors, covering them with camouflage nets.
In conditions where the enemy uses high-tech weapons, create radar fields in standby and combat modes. The standby radar field should be created on the basis of the standby radar of the meter wave range, which will be deployed at temporary positions. The combat mode radar field should be created covertly on the basis of modern combat mode radars from the air defense systems (SAMs) entering service. In missile-hazardous areas, create warning strips based on low-altitude radars, as well as visual observation posts. When choosing positions for their deployment, ensure that the closing angles in the sectors of probable detection of cruise missiles do not exceed 4-6 minutes. Reconnaissance of the air enemy before the start of active air strike operations should be carried out using locators of predominantly meter wavelengths from temporary positions. Turn off these radars and maneuver to reserve positions immediately after turning on the combat mode radar at combat positions.
In order to organize the protection of radars from attacks by anti-radar missiles (ARMs), the following activities must be carried out in radar reconnaissance units:
Purposefully conduct psychological training of personnel and training combat crews in combat work when the enemy uses PRR;
Conduct an early and thorough analysis of the expected directions, areas, hidden routes for the launch of launch vehicles to missile launch sites;
Carry out timely detection of the beginning of an enemy air strike and detection of the approach of its carrier aircraft to the launch zones of the PRR;
Implement strict regulation of the operation of electronic radio stations for radiation (mainly to use meter wave radars and radars for detecting and tracking targets);
At the stage of organizing combat operations, implement the maximum separation of frequencies of the same type of electronic distribution systems in units, provide for periodic frequency maneuvers;
Immediately turn off the centimeter and decimeter wavelength radars after the PRR launches.
These and a number of other events are undoubtedly known to the radar combat crews who have studied the experience of combat operations and are preparing for modern warfare. Despite their apparent simplicity and accessibility, their implementation, as practice shows, can significantly increase the survivability of elements of an enemy air reconnaissance system in conditions of strong fire and electronic countermeasures.
THERE IS POTENTIAL, BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH
With the available number of air defense systems and air defense systems, as well as numerous anti-aircraft artillery systems, the Syrian air defense system of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover (ZRAP) is capable of creating sufficiently high densities of fire over the country’s main targets and military groups.
The presence of different types of air defense systems, air defense systems and air defense systems in the air defense system makes it possible to build a multi-layered fire system of anti-aircraft weapons with the concentration of their efforts on covering the most important objects. Thus, the S-200 system will allow you to destroy the most important targets at ranges of 140 - 150 km from the borders sea coast, at distances of up to 100 km from large industrial centers and in mountainous areas adjacent to Lebanon and Turkey. The S-75, S-300 systems have a reach of up to 50-70 km over covered objects (taking into account the values of closure angles and the impact of interference). Fire capabilities modern air defense systems and the Buk-M1-2, 2E and Pantsir-S1E air defense systems will provide high density of fire at medium altitudes and ranges of up to 20-25 km. The ZRAP system at low and extremely low altitudes is complemented by the fire of numerous Shilka, S-60, KS-19 type ZAKs.
An analysis of the fire system shows that between the Northern and Southern air defense zones of Syria there is a gap in the integral damage zone, primarily at extremely low, low and medium altitudes. Although the gap in the affected zone is covered by two or three S-200 air defense systems from the side of each zone, it is likely that the position of their starting positions has long been explored and known to the enemy. With the start of active hostilities, these launch positions will be the first to be attacked by cruise missiles, so it is advisable in this direction in the Northern and Southern air defense groups to keep the S-300P air defense system and the Buk-M2E air defense system in a hidden reserve to restore the damaged fire system.
In addition, there is a hidden approach from the northwestern direction at extremely low and low altitudes in the Northern Air Defense Zone, covered by three S-200 divisions, three S-75 divisions and two S-125 divisions, whose positions have also undoubtedly been reconnoitered. These positions will be attacked by cruise missiles with the start of active operations by enemy aviation, and the air defense missile systems will be exposed to active interference, from which these types of complexes are actually not protected. In this case, in this direction it is necessary to keep the S-300P air defense system and the Buk-M2E air defense system in a hidden reserve to strengthen the fire system and restore it.
To repel air strikes from Ar-Rakan (northern), Al-Hasan (north-eastern), Daur-Azzaur directions, which remain uncovered in common system Air defense, it is advisable to organize several air defense groups to operate from ambushes and as nomads. Such groups should include the Buk-M2E air defense system, the Pantsir-S1E air defense system, MANPADS, 23-mm and 57-mm anti-aircraft guns.
A preliminary, superficial assessment of the fire system shows that the main efforts of the air defense troops are concentrated on covering two directions: the southwest (border with Lebanon and Israel) and north-west (border with Turkey). The strongest air defense umbrella has been created over the cities of Damascus, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo (the capital, large industrial and administrative centers). In addition, these cities are home to the main airfields for both civil and military aviation, and also concentrated large groups of government troops. It is positive that long-range air defense systems cover the main territory of the country, while ensuring that the affected area extends far to the approaches to the main administrative and industrial centers, seaports, airfields, and troop groups. The exception is an uncovered area of territory in northeastern Syria bordering Iraq.
The stationary anti-aircraft missile defense system is the basis for covering ground force groups, which is supplemented by cannon anti-aircraft fire mobile complexes Air defense. As already noted, there are up to 4,000 units of these assets in the regular structures of tank (mechanized) divisions and brigades (there are about 400 Shilka self-propelled guns alone). These weapons are quite effective in the fight against low-flying aircraft and helicopters; they are agile, mobile and, together with other weapons, represent a rather formidable force.
The air defense group is capable of combating all types of air targets in the entire altitude range; the potential capabilities of the air defense group make it possible to destroy up to 800 air defense systems of a potential enemy before the missiles and ammunition are used up in simple, interference-free conditions. The overlap ratio of the affected zones is 8 - 12 and allows you to: concentrate the fire of several complexes (mostly of different types) to hit the most dangerous and important targets, maintain a sufficient number of air defense forces and means in reserve, if necessary, carry out a maneuver to restore the damaged fire system of the air defense group, carry out fire maneuver while repelling enemy air strikes.
As we can see, the potential capabilities of the Syrian air defense system are quite high. The coastal Mediterranean zone of Syria is covered with greater reliability by air defense systems, especially in the area of the seaports of Tartus, Baniyas, and Latakia. In addition to the existing stationary air defense systems, the Buk-M2E air defense system, which recently entered service with the Syrian air defense system, is presumably deployed in these areas. A Turkish reconnaissance plane shot down in this area flew along the coast of Syria, undoubtedly to open it up national system air defense, “get acquainted” with the new weapons that have appeared, provoke air defense locators to work in active mode, identify their location, detect uncovered areas in air defense zones, evaluate the capabilities of the entire system. Well, to some extent the reconnaissance plane succeeded. The destruction of the Turkish intelligence officer demonstrated that Syria has an air defense system and is capable of carrying out combat missions.
However, it is very premature to talk about its effectiveness in excellent terms. The air defense system, like other components of the Syrian air defense system, is far from perfect. The optimistic picture is darkened by the fact that the bulk of anti-aircraft missile weapons are outdated and do not meet today's high requirements. Weapons and equipment - ideas and production of the middle of the last century - are unable to withstand a highly organized, technically equipped air enemy, which has the most modern systems reconnaissance, control, fire and electronic countermeasures.
The main types of air defense systems of the old fleet (air defense systems S-200, S-75, S-125, “Osa”, “Kvadrat”) are poorly protected from passive interference, are practically not protected from active interference, and do not have special operating modes when using high-tech elements (PRR, UR, UAB). Experience local wars and conflicts indicates that the enemy will make every effort to reduce the fire capabilities of the air defense group, counter the fire of air defense forces and reduce their effectiveness to a minimum. Practice shows that the air defense system will be the primary target of destruction, when powerful fire strikes from cruise missiles and “electronic strikes” will suppress and destroy reconnaissance, control systems, and fire weapons of the air defense system within 3-4 days. There are plenty of examples of this. In conditions of strong fire and electronic countermeasures from the air enemy, the capabilities of the Syrian air defense group in the initial period of the war can be reduced by 85-95%.
Of course, the full implementation of the potential fire capabilities of an air defense group is very problematic and practically impossible. However, by applying a set of organizational and tactical measures, it is possible to significantly increase the survivability of the system, and with it the effectiveness of air defense.
First of all, it is necessary to take organizational measures:
1. Particular attention should be paid to the development of advance instructions for firing and interaction, which is extremely important in the absence of centralized control of combat operations in the course of repelling air strikes. The distribution of responsible space, determination of the order and sequence of destruction of air targets will make it possible to effectively implement interaction between various independent air defense groups in the course of repelling an attack.
2. Create mixed air defense groups with different types of air defense systems and air defense systems (brigades, regiments, divisions, air defense groups), using them to solve specific problems of covering important objects in various directions. In this case, it is important to carefully build a fire system without failures (taking into account the mountainous terrain) in all altitude ranges, especially at low and extremely low altitudes.
3. For self-covering, use not only MANPADS, ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”, but also air defense systems “Osa”, “Kvadrat”, “Pantsir-S1E”, 37-mm AZP, 57-mm AZP, 100-mm ZP, especially for self-covering the S-200 and S-300P air defense systems.
4. Create a duty air defense group, maintained in temporary positions and conducting reconnaissance of enemy air at peacetime frequencies.
5. Build a false fire system with a demonstration of its functioning by the operation of mobile, mobile air defense systems.
6. Launching and firing positions should be carefully equipped in engineering terms and camouflaged; equip false ones, prepare 2-3 reserve positions.
7. On probable hidden approaches of enemy aviation, provide for and plan the use of mobile air defense groups to act as roamers and from ambushes.
With the start of active enemy aviation operations, it is advisable to apply the following recommendations:
1. The S-200, S-300P divisions should be used only to destroy the most dangerous and most important targets, taking into account the possibility of firing at them.
2. To concentrate fire, use different types of air defense systems.
3. To restore the damaged fire system, use the Buk-M2E mobile air defense systems and S-300P air defense systems.
4. Limit the operation of the RES of the air defense system to radiation; turn on the air defense system for radiation only if there is a control center with a VCP.
5. Shoot at targets with a minimum parameter and deep in the affected area, limiting the broadcast time as much as possible.
Thus, the potential capabilities of the ZRAP system are quite high, but their implementation in the fight against a modern air enemy requires the application of certain efforts. The air defense system will show its strength only with the organized use of its components, one of which is the fighter air cover system (SIAP).
Syria's fighter air cover system has the same problems as all of the country's armed forces. The Air Force's fighter aviation consists of four squadrons flying the MiG-25, four squadrons flying the MiG-23MLD, and four squadrons armed with the MiG-29A.
The basis of fighter aviation is 48 Mig-29A fighters, modernized at the turn of the century. 30 MiG-25 interceptors and 80 (according to other sources 50) MiG-23MLD fighters are already outdated and have limited opportunities combat use. Even the most modern of the presented fleet, the MiG-29, needs improvements. Besides, in active composition The Air Force has over 150 MiG-21 fighters, but their combat value is very low.
The weak point of SIAP is aerial reconnaissance. Syrian aviation does not have air-based radars - AWACS aircraft, and therefore in the event of an armed conflict, Syrian pilots will have to rely only on ground reconnaissance and guidance stations, also represented by an outdated fleet.
The effectiveness of fighter air cover depends on the number and combat capabilities of fighters, the presence of a number of fighters in various degrees of readiness, the capabilities of reconnaissance and control systems in terms of detection range of airborne attack systems, the number of guidances, their stability in electronic warfare conditions, the nature of enemy aviation actions (altitude, speed, strike depth , types of aircraft, etc.), level of training of flight personnel, time of day, weather conditions and other factors.
Estimated effectiveness of fighter aircraft cover (as the ratio of the number of airborne attack aircraft destroyed by fighter aircraft to total number SVN participating in a raid in the zone (area) of responsibility) will be about 6-8%. Of course, this is clearly not enough, especially since even this low efficiency can only be achieved with high level readiness of flight personnel.
Thus, the capabilities of the SIAP to disrupt the execution of a combat mission by enemy aviation are extremely insignificant. The countries of the potential enemy (Israel, Turkey) have a general military-technical superiority over Syria and an overwhelming superiority in military aviation, command and control systems, communications, and intelligence. The air forces of these countries are more numerous, more maneuverable, and their fleet of military equipment is constantly being replenished with modern weapons.
In general, the assessment of the state of Syrian air defense is ambivalent and ambiguous.
On the one hand, air defense groups have a large number of samples of a wide variety of anti-aircraft weapons and military equipment. The mixed principle of manning military formations makes it possible to create a multi-layered fire system in all altitude ranges, ensuring shelling and destruction of the entire variety of modern air defense systems. Air defense zone over important objects (the capital, large industrial centers, seaports, groupings of troops, airfields) can have a 10-12-fold overlap of the engagement and firing zones of various types of air defense systems, air defense systems and air defense systems. The presence of long-range air defense systems in groups makes it possible to carry out the removal of the affected area to distant approaches to covered objects. The fighter air cover system increases the air defense capabilities to intercept the most dangerous air targets over areas difficult to reach for ground air defense systems, in important directions, etc.
The air defense system is strong enough and capable of performing combat missions both in peacetime and in wartime. Destroying single air targets, intruder aircraft, and repelling low-density air defense strikes in medium-intensity interference are quite feasible tasks for the Syrian air defense.
On the other hand, having only 12-15% of modern weapons, it is difficult for an air defense system to count on success in countering a strong, highly organized, equipped with the most modern weapons, control and guidance systems for weapons (primarily high-precision) to the air enemy. By applying a complex of organizational, operational-tactical and technical measures, it is possible to achieve some success in difficult matter fight against a modern air enemy. However, in its current state, the Syrian air defense system will not be able to withstand the combined coalition air force Western states, conducting air offensive operations using several thousand cruise missiles, fighters, bombers, and combat helicopters with mandatory preliminary fire and electronic suppression of air defense systems.
Syrian air defense urgently needs radical re-equipment to modern military equipment, deep modernization of existing weapons and military equipment. High-quality training of military personnel is extremely important, preparing them for conducting anti-aircraft battles with a technically superior enemy, training in anti-aircraft shooting techniques (missile launches) with all types of available anti-aircraft weapons both modern and technology of the last century. Only under these conditions can we count on success in protecting the airspace.
Anatoly Dmitrievich GAVRILOV – Lieutenant General of the Reserve, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, Honored Military Specialist