These guys will be more terrible than all the alphas, GRU special forces and other airborne forces. Engineering formations of the us ground forces Extraction and purification of water, equipment of water supply points

113. In positional defense The engineer-sapper company maintains the barriers installed during the preparation of the defense, including those transferred to it by the company of engineering barriers (other engineering units). When maintaining obstacles, a company usually operates as a platoon.

Building up barriers during defensive battle an engineer company (platoon, squad) carries out by installing minefields, primarily anti-tank, constructing one or two obstacle nodes, installing groups of anti-tank, anti-personnel, anti-vehicle and object mines and destroying road structures in obstacle nodes and on the roads between them .

114. A company (platoon) of engineering barriers, equipped with minelayers, during the course of defense operates in the POS in cooperation with the anti-tank reserve (ATR) or independently.

When assigning a mission to a company, the following are indicated: the combat strength of the POZ, the tasks to be prepared for, one or two directions of action, the main and reserve mining lines in each direction, the advance routes to the mining lines, the main and reserve concentration areas, the assembly area after the installation of obstacles , readiness dates, place and time of deployment of the command and observation post.

Barriers are set up at planned or newly designated mining lines that block the direction of the enemy’s attack (breakthrough).

After receiving the task to prepare for actions in the POS, the company moves to the designated concentration area and prepares to carry out the tasks. The company commander, together with the platoon commanders and together with the commander of the PTR (combined arms formation, unit, subdivision), conducts reconnaissance of mining lines, advance routes to them, objects to be destroyed (mined), passages left in the obstacles for the passage of departing units, the location of the charging point in the assembly area after the installation of barriers and the route of advance to the assembly area.

Upon receipt of a signal (command), the POS moves to the specified mining line together with the PTRez or independently. For reconnaissance of the enemy, advance routes and mining lines, an engineering reconnaissance patrol can be sent from the company. The company commander constantly maintains contact with the commander of the PTR (combined arms unit or subunit) and clarifies with them the mining line, the route to it, the order and signals of interaction at the mining line.

Upon reaching the mining line, the POZ commander clarifies with the commander of the PTRez or combined arms military unit (unit) the location of the minefields, objects for destruction and mining, the readiness time of barriers, the locations of passages, their designation and signals for closing, covering the POZ actions with fire from the PTRez or combined arms military units(divisions). After this, the company commander clarifies the tasks of the platoons, the order of deployment and the route of advancement to the charging point after the installation of barriers. At the mining line, minefields are installed by engineering platoons of obstacles and sections of roads, road structures and other objects are prepared for destruction (mined) by a platoon of controlled mining. The company commander directs the actions of the platoons, being at the head barrier. If it is necessary to temporarily maintain objects prepared for destruction and abandoned passages in barriers, crews are allocated from the mobile barrier detachment.

The POZ commander reports on the construction of barriers to the PTRez commander, the commander of his formation and the head of the engineering service. The activation of the prepared destruction is carried out by dedicated crews at the command of the commander of the PTRez (combined arms military unit), with whom the mobile obstacle detachment interacts. After the destruction is carried out and the passages are closed, the crews go to the charging point (assembly area) on their own. After loading the minelayers, the full company is located in the assembly area in readiness to perform the following tasks.

115. The obstacle engineering department, equipped with a minelayer, operates in the POS as part of a platoon. At the mining line, the squad sets a number of mines. The squad leader directs the actions of his subordinates, controls the correct movement of the minelayer, the size of the mining step and the quality of mine placement. After installing the mine ammunition, the platoon squad goes to the charging point, and after loading the minelayer, at the command of the platoon commander, to the collection point.

116. A company (platoon) of engineering barriers, equipped engineering means remote mining (destruction) sets minefields on identified directions of action of enemy troops in front of him, or directly on him battle formations. When mining, demolition shells can be used in conjunction with remotely deployed mines to create craters and render road and bridge structures on road routes inoperative.

117. The engineering position company performs tasks for fortification equipment of positions, defensive lines in the depths of the defense, operating in full force, where it prepares standard battalion defense areas and standard position areas of missile and anti-aircraft missile divisions.

118. An engineering company (platoon) of control point equipment operates independently in full strength or as a platoon. In order to timely complete tasks related to fortification equipment in the areas where control posts are deployed, the company, as a rule, is strengthened personnel from control point service units or from motorized rifle units.

Upon an established signal or upon receipt of a combat order, the company moves to a new mission area and begins engineering equipment for the control point deployment area in accordance with the instructions of the reconnaissance group officer.

Facilities for the protection and work of operational personnel in a group combat control, pits for shelters for command and staff vehicles are erected by the company (platoon) before the operational personnel arrive in the area.

If there is time, the improvement of the fortification equipment in the area where the control point is deployed is carried out by digging out pits by a company (platoon) for shelter for communications vehicles and hardware vehicles, for transport equipment at the communications center and in the support group.

119. The road engineering company maintains the routes for advancing formations (units) to the lines of counterstrikes (counterattacks), and also prepares the routes for advancement to the unplanned line of counterstrikes (counterattacks).

To advance a motorized rifle (tank) battalion to the counterattack line (firing line), paths are prepared from the starting line to the line of deployment into platoon columns, then the directions of movement to the line of transition to the attack are designated.

120. When preparing the routes for the second echelon to launch a counterattack, the road engineering platoon operates as part of the road engineering department and the mechanized bridge department. The paths are prepared for one-way traffic. To overcome obstacles and damage on the tracks, bypasses are prepared, and if this is not possible, crossings are equipped using mechanized bridges, installing decking (gates) through weak areas of the terrain, or filling them in using track-laying machines.

121. During defense, a field water supply company (platoon, department) maintains and, if necessary, equips water extraction and purification points in new areas.

When a defense is broken through and the enemy penetrates, as well as when conducting maneuver defense, field water supply units move from the main areas of equipment for water production and purification points (areas) to reserve ones.

The commander of a company (platoon, squad) can receive an order to move by radio or in writing from the officer of the department of the chief of engineering troops (NIV) of the formation, the head of the engineering service (NIS) of the formation.

In the reserve area, the commander of the field water supply unit organizes the implementation of the task of equipping and maintaining water production and purification points (areas), as in the main areas.

122. During the defense, power supply units for troops operate as part of control point equipment units or independently. Contain power supply points and cable networks, paying attention to Special attention power supply to responsible consumers.

123. When conducting maneuver defense units of engineering troops carry out tasks to ensure the timely and covert deployment of units and their maneuver with the consistent conduct of defensive combat from line to line, firmly holding the final line, and inflicting losses on the enemy with engineering ammunition.

124. An engineering company (platoon, squad) lays minefields in front of maneuver defense lines, strong points, in the spaces between them and on the flanks, mines and prepares sections of roads and road structures for destruction. The first and final lines are most tightly covered with engineering barriers. In order to create a fire pocket, minefields are installed in front of cut-off positions (lines) and in front of fire ambush positions.

On the escape routes, controlled minefields or obstacles are installed in the second stage of readiness, passages are left, which are closed after the withdrawal of friendly troops.

125. An engineer company (platoon) of obstacles operates in POS. When units are maneuvering to the next line, the POZ, together with the PTRez or independently, covers their withdrawal from the rear or flanks with barriers.

A feature of POS actions is increased consumption engineering ammunition due to the increase in the number of mining lines. This requires clear organization of the supply of engineering ammunition to replenish the ammunition loads of minelayers.

126. An engineering positional company (platoon) at positions (in defense areas) of units digs trenches and communication passages, pits for trenches for tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and other fire weapons, for dugouts and shelters, and erects structures at control points and medical posts.

Defensive positions are most fully equipped at the final line of defense, where battalion defense areas are connected by trenches and communication passages, and reserve and decoy defense areas are equipped.

Depending on the situation, the availability of forces, means and time, the fortification equipment of successively occupied lines (positions) is improved, the structures of industrial structures installed in the areas where control points are deployed at the previous line are removed from the ground, if necessary, repaired and installed in the new area where the point is deployed management.

Company strongholds prepared for all-round defense, as well as fire ambush positions, are set up at cut-off positions. Ambushes and positions for roaming units are set up for air defense units.

127. The road engineering company (platoon) prepares and maintains frontal routes throughout the entire depth of defense from the first brigade road route to the road route at the final position. In the brigade's area of ​​responsibility, frontal routes are prepared for the withdrawal and maneuver of first and second echelon battalions, command posts and brigade subordinate units. In addition, to ensure the maneuver of the first echelon from line to line, routes to the final line of defense are prepared on the flanks of the brigade’s area of ​​responsibility.

For the maneuver of brigade control points, artillery, air defense military units, and logistics units, a brigade frontal route and brigade road routes are prepared - one behind the first defensive position, the second at the final defensive position.

128. A pontoon, ferry-landing company (platoon), a company (platoon) of amphibious transporters equips and maintains crossings over water obstacles on the escape and maneuver routes. With the completion of the crossing, the crossing means are removed, and in the event of a threat of capture by the enemy, they are destroyed, existing bridges on the water barrier are destroyed, and fords are mined.

Soviet military miracle 1941-1943 [Revival of the Red Army] Glanz David M

ENGINEERING (SEPER) TROOPS

ENGINEERING (SEPER) TROOPS

Engineer and sapper regiments and battalions

Throughout the war, the engineering troops of the Red Army included sapper troops as part of the active fronts and sappers under the control of the leadership of the RGK or RVGK, who were allocated by the Headquarters to the active fronts and armies as needed. Both of them were supposed to be involved in the construction and renovation of defensive structures and providing various kinds of engineering support to field troops during offensive and defensive operations.

Engineering troops as part of the active troops of the Red Army included separate sapper battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, motorized engineer battalions in mechanized corps, sapper battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, pontoon-bridge battalions in tank divisions, light engineering battalions in motorized rifle divisions, engineer companies or platoons in rifle and cavalry regiments and in tank and motorized rifle regiments and brigades, as well as sapper platoons in the regiments of the RVGK and corps artillery.

Sapper battalions of corps and divisions consisted of three sapper companies of three platoons and a technical company in battalions of a corps or technical platoon in battalions of divisional subordination, a bridge-building platoon and a platoon of secret weapons and a small rear service. The total strength of the corps engineer battalion was 901 people, the divisional one - 521 people. Depending on the division to which they belonged, these battalions moved either on foot or on horseback. On June 22, 1941, the field forces of the Red Army included over 200 sapper battalions, all of which retained their pre-war structure until December 1941, when the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) reduced the battalion's strength to two companies, mainly due to the creation within the RVGK larger and more efficient engineer troops.

IN engineering troops The RGK included 19 engineering and 15 pontoon-bridge regiments stationed in military districts, which the NKO formed in the first half of 1941 from 22 separate engineering battalions and 21 separate pontoon-bridge battalions. Of this number, ten engineer and eight pontoon-bridge regiments, seven engineer battalions and two sapper battalions were assigned to active fronts, two engineer and two sapper battalions were directly subordinate to the RGK, and the rest were located in military districts and inactive fronts.

The RGK engineering regiment consisted of a headquarters, two engineering battalions (one of them motorized), a technical battalion with electrical, electrical, defensive, hydraulic and camouflage companies, a light pontoon-bridge fleet (NPL), 35 engineering vehicles, 48 ​​trucks and 21 tractors. The pontoon-bridge regiment included a headquarters, three pontoon-bridge battalions (but only one personnel), a technical company with platoons for road laying, bridge construction, lumberjacks, electrical and field water supply, the N2P pontoon-bridge park and an officer school equipped with pontoon bridges and technical equipment.

On the eve of the war, the military plans of the General Staff required the NCO to have in each field army at least one separate motorized engineering battalion, one motorized pontoon-bridge battalion and separate field water supply companies, camouflage, electrical and hydraulic support, educational unit sappers and a separate reserve pontoon-bridge fleet, equipped with the N2P kit. In addition, each field army should have a reserve engineering regiment and a separate reserve technical company to perform special engineering tasks.

However, in addition to the general shortage of engineering troops, the engineering regiments and battalions of the RGK existing on June 22, 1941 were missing from 35 to 60 percent of the full-time command personnel, from 20 to 70 percent of the full-time sergeant majors. They were short on average 35 percent of their manpower and approximately 50 percent of their equipment.

In addition to the engineering troops, the People's Commissariat of Defense on the eve of the war also had 25 military construction departments. 23 of them were engaged in the construction of fortified areas and field defensive structures in the western military districts, along with the majority of engineer troops belonging to future fronts. As a result, with the outbreak of the war, most combat formations were deprived of the necessary engineering support.

When Wehrmacht troops brutally defeated the Red Army during Operation Barbarossa, the already fragile Soviet engineering forces suffered great damage. The NKO responded to this by hastily and practically from scratch starting the formation of new engineer battalions for the RGK (later RVGK) with their subsequent allocation to active fronts. For example, in July 1941, all engineer and pontoon-bridge regiments of the RGK were disbanded, and their remains were used to form 100 small sapper battalions, equipped only with rifles and other hand weapons, as well as entrenching tools, explosives and anti-tank mines. 25 such battalions were assigned to rifle corps, and another 75 to rifle divisions.

As a result, the total number of engineer-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army constantly grew - from 20 on July 1 to 178 on November 1, including 140 assigned to the active fronts. However, during the same period, engineering support for rifle divisions decreased markedly. For example, on July 29, the NKO disbanded the technical and pontoon platoons in the sapper battalions of the rifle divisions, and in July 1942, after the liquidation of the battalion's three sapper companies in December, he reduced the size of the battalion by 60 soldiers, also reducing the number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

Starting from the first months of 1942, the NKO began to compensate for the shortage of engineering troops, giving the active fronts and armies one or two new engineer or sapper battalions, and the fronts - new pontoon-bridge battalions. Individual engineer battalions could be either foot or motorized, they consisted of three engineer companies with three engineer or motorized platoons and one technical platoon each (the latter had electrical, lumber and transport sections). The total strength of the battalion was 405 people. Individual sapper battalions had two or three sapper companies with a total strength of approximately 320 people.

While the number of separate engineer and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army increased during the period described from 82 and 46 on January 1, 1942 to, respectively, 184 and 68 on January 1, 1944, the number of separate engineer battalions decreased from 78 to three .

Sapper brigades and armies

Although during the initial stages of the German Operation Barbarossa the number of Red Army engineering troops was greatly reduced, the State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered

Headquarters to build new strategic defensive lines and positions to slow down the Wehrmacht’s advance, using newly created engineering and sapper units for this purpose. For example, on June 24, the State Defense Committee ordered the construction of a strategic defensive line along the Luga River south of Leningrad, on June 25 - a second line from Nevel through Vitebsk and Gomel along the Dnieper to Dnepropetrovsk, and on June 28 - a third line from Ostashkov through Olenino, Dorogobych and Yelnya along the Desna to Zhukovka, 50 kilometers west of Bryansk.

As the Wehrmacht advance accelerated, the GKO in mid-July ordered Stavka to build two more major defensive lines, the first to defend Odessa, Crimean peninsula and Sevastopol, the second - to protect the approaches to Moscow. The Moscow line, which blocked the Wehrmacht's advance in the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets directions, began from Rzhev, went through Vyazma, south from the Moscow reservoir along the Lama River, then through Borodino and Kaluga to Tula.

Responsibility for the construction of these defensive lines was assigned by the Headquarters to Main Military Engineering Directorate NPOs and the Main Directorate of Hydraulic Construction ( Glavgidrostroy) under the NKVD. The first was to use military construction battalions subordinate to the front and army military field construction departments in the areas allocated to them for the construction of lines; in turn, the latter had to use its construction troops to build defensive lines in the deeper rear. When this organization of work turned out to be ineffective, the GKO on August 22 transformed Glavgidrostroy into the Main Directorate of Defense Works (GUOBR) under the NKVD and gave it responsibility for coordinating the construction of rear defensive lines.

Despite all the efforts of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters, the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht caused heavy damage engineering troops of the Red Army, not allowing most of them to take part in the construction of defensive lines. The Germans forestalled many of Stavka's attempts to build defensive lines. In August and September, German troops overcame the Vitebsk-Gomel and Luga lines of the Red Army, and in early October they broke through the strategic defenses in the Vyazma and Bryansk sectors, encircling and destroying large forces Soviet troops. Alarmed by the possibility of the Germans reaching Moscow, the Headquarters formed the Moscow Defense Zone on October 12, which was to consist of a series of defensive belts around the city. The most important of them passed through Khlebnikovo, Skhodnya, Zvenigorod, Kubinka and Naro-Fominsk, along Pakhra and the Moscow River.

Since the Red Army lacked the engineering and construction troops needed to build these and other defensive lines, the GKO on October 13 ordered the NKO to form six engineer armies consisting of engineer brigades by November 1, 1941, and transferred all engineering and construction troops of the Red Army consisting of active fronts and in the rear under the command of the GUOBR (NKVD). Numbered 1st to 6th, these armies were formed in Vologda, Gorky, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Stalingrad and Armavir, their total strength was 300,000 people.

The GKO assigned responsibility to the GUOBR for the creation of all rear defensive lines and positions by December 10, especially west of Moscow, and ordered it to prepare all personnel assigned to the newly formed sapper armies and other engineering troops of the Red Army.

Each sapper army was supposed to have approximately 50,000 people, mostly reservists under the age of 45. It was intended to involve personnel from engineering and construction units from active front zones, as well as other specialists mobilized in the rear. The sapper brigades consisted of 19 sapper battalions, one motor-tractor battalion and one mechanized detachment. By order of the State Defense Committee, the sapper army was to have 3,000 trucks, 90 passenger cars, 1,350 tracked tractors and 2,350 tractor-trailers, 12,000 wagons of building materials and the full number of necessary construction tools. In addition, the departments of other commissariats and the civilian population were involved in the construction of defensive lines.

By order of the State Defense Committee, the local population was mobilized for construction. These were mostly women, old people, schoolchildren and teenagers of pre-conscription age. By order of the military councils of the fronts and military districts, as well as regional and district party and administrative bodies, working battalions [mobilized] were formed from them, which were then subordinated to the sapper armies.

Ultimately, nine sapper armies were formed, numbered 1st to 9th. These armies consisted of 30 engineer brigades and had a total of 570 engineer battalions, numbered 1200 to 1465 and 1543 to 1771. The total number of sapper armies as of November 1, 1941 was 299,730 people. However, an acute shortage of engineering and construction troops limited the size and capabilities of these armies and brigades.

Each of the first nine engineer armies consisted of a headquarters and two to four separate engineer brigades. The sapper brigade included a headquarters, 19 separate sapper battalions, divided into three companies with four platoons each and a total battalion strength of 497 people, a mechanized detachment with one road and one bridge platoon, a lumberjack platoon, a position construction platoon and an automobile and tractor platoon with four departments. Although each engineer brigade was supposed to have a strength of 9,979 soldiers, most brigades remained understrength. As a result, the personnel of the sapper battalions, who were supposed to spend 12 hours a day on construction work and another two hours on military training, were forced to work on the construction of defensive structures for 12-14 hours a day and did not undergo any military training at all. The tenth sapper army, number 1, which completed its deployment to the Western Front in January 1942, consisted of ten sapper brigades with eight sapper battalions each - a total of 80 sapper battalions and 45,160 soldiers.

Initially, the sapper armies were subordinate to the GUOBR under the NKVD, but worked under the direct leadership of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the NKO. However, this organization of command turned out to be not entirely effective, and on November 28, the Headquarters subordinated these armies to the chief of the engineering troops of the Red Army. In December 1942, the chief of engineering troops assigned nine sapper armies and 29 sapper brigades to military districts and active fronts (two to the Western Front and one to the Karelian Front). By mid-January 1942, the structure of the Red Army engineering troops had expanded, now there were ten sapper armies, 40 sapper brigades, three engineer regiments and 82 engineer-sapper, 78 sapper and 46 pontoon-bridge battalions.

These sapper armies and brigades were primarily responsible for the construction of strategic defensive lines deep in the rear of the Red Army. The first of these lines, located in the Moscow, Stalingrad, North Caucasus and Volga military districts, were permanent in nature and consisted of complex system fortified battalion defensive areas and company strongholds located on likely directions of German offensive and around major cities. However, on December 27, 1941, after the victory of the Red Army near Moscow, the GKO ordered the cessation of defensive work around Moscow so that more resources could be allocated to transport refugees, grain and bread for the needy population, and limited construction works on other defensive lines.

In addition to fulfilling their construction duties, the sapper armies also served as a training base for the engineering troops of the Red Army as a whole. For example, in November-December 1941, the NKO assigned two and then three battalions in each brigade the designation of training and ultimately transferred over 90 such battalions to the active fronts. Trained as ordinary engineering, pontoon-bridge or road-bridge battalions and staffed with the most experienced personnel, the units intended for transfer to the front immediately stopped all defensive work and engaged in intensive field training. After they left for the front, engineer brigades formed new battalions and companies to replace those who left. However, the chaos caused by the constant flow of personnel between the sapper armies and the active fronts negatively affected the effectiveness of the former's actions.

The ten sapper armies proved their worth during the Red Army's winter offensive of 1941-1942, helping to maintain security behind the lines while enhancing the engineering and sapper capabilities of the fronts. However, they turned out to be clumsy, ineffective and difficult to control, especially in a constantly changing combat situation. Therefore, in February 1942, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to disband half of the sapper armies and brigades, assign the rest to active fronts, and use the personnel of the disbanded troops to facilitate the formation of new rifle divisions and brigades.

In February-March, the NKO disbanded the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 9th and 10th sapper armies and six sapper brigades, increasing the number of the 7th and 8th sapper armies of the Southwestern Front, respectively, to five and ten brigades. In addition, he gave the active armies and the Moscow defense zone four sapper armies, three separate sapper brigades and many newly formed special engineering units.

At the same time, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Red Army Troops under the NPO removed the command staff from the engineer armies and brigades for transfer to the active forces, and also reduced the number and strength of engineer battalions in the engineer brigades. The NPO took the second step in April, reducing the number of engineer battalions from 497 to 405 people, replacing motor-tractor battalions with companies with four motor vehicles and one tractor platoon in each, and reducing the number of engineer brigades to seven battalions with one motor-tractor company for a total brigade strength of 3,138 people.

At the end of June, two months after the completion of this reorganization, the NKO was faced with the difficult task of stopping the Wehrmacht's new summer offensive, Operation Blau. In addition to providing support to the active fronts, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 8th engineer armies of the NKO were supposed to strengthen the defensive lines west of Moscow, build new lines to defend the approaches to Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and allocate manpower from their ranks to compensate for losses in the Red Army.

Five sapper armies built these defenses at an accelerated pace, but on July 26, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to extract 400,000 people from non-combat units by August 20, including 60,000 sappers to assign them to combat formations. The remaining sapper armies and brigades were supposed to be reduced, since they “too large and organizationally immobile and cannot effectively carry out their tasks of engineering support for the combat operations of our troops, especially in offensive operations”.

The GKO intended to create more flexible and effective engineering troops, which the Headquarters could use in defensive and offensive operations in the most critical areas in the late summer and autumn of 1942. As a result, it was decided to disband the remaining sapper armies and part of the sapper brigades, and transform another part of the brigades into specialized engineering brigades designed to support active fronts.

By order of August 17, 1942, the NKO began transforming the remaining five sapper armies and 27 sapper brigades into defensive structures directorates (see the “Construction Troops” section below). Six sapper brigades were reorganized into engineering brigades of the RVGK, subordinate to the active fronts, and another 8 were disbanded. 30,000 people from the former 1st, 7th and 8th engineer armies were transferred to staff the newly formed rifle divisions. Later, already in September, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 7th sapper armies were reorganized into the UOS (Defense Construction Administration), the 8th sapper army became the UOS in October. 12 sapper brigades became engineering brigades as part of the active fronts (see Table 9). The remaining 18 sapper brigades, assigned to the active fronts on October 15, now performed dual functions, providing the front troops with engineering support and serving as bases for the formation of new, more specialized engineering brigades and battalions.

Sapper armies and brigades made a significant contribution to the victories of the Red Army at Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, preparing defensive lines, providing engineering support to the active fronts, and serving as a base for the formation of other, more specialized engineering troops transferred to the active fronts. For example, in 1941, nine engineer armies organized, trained, and fielded more than 150 specialized engineer battalions; in 1942, engineer armies and brigades formed 27 specialized engineering brigades of the RVGK, 23 of which served until the end of the war, and five still exist today. Finally, the engineer armies contributed more than 150,000 men to man and form new rifle divisions.

Engineering teams

Disbanding its engineer armies in the spring of 1942, the NKO at the same time took into account the demands of the front commanders, who proposed the formation of specialized and flexible engineering brigades that would better meet their needs. Therefore, at the same time, the creation of a wide range of new engineering brigades and battalions began. For example, responding to the March demand of the chief of engineering troops of the Western Front, the NKO began forming special-purpose engineering brigades (IBON) from April 18. The first of these, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Western Front, formed in May from the 33rd Engineer Brigade of the 1st Engineer Army, consisted of six engineer barrage battalions, two electrical battalions, one searchlight battalion, an electrification detachment, an electric generator train, a special technical engineering company, a motor transport company and four electrical engineering companies (seconded), with a total brigade strength of 4,757 people. Ultimately, the NKO formed six special-purpose engineering brigades by July 1 and eight more by November 1, giving their field troops one brigade per active front.

Although the structure of these special purpose engineer brigades could vary, most consisted of a headquarters, a motor-tractor company, five to eight engineer barrage battalions, one of which was converted into a special mine battalion in October 1942, an electrical battalion and an electrification detachment, with a total number of 3097 people per 5-battalion brigade. The brigade's main mission was to perform specialized tasks such as laying and removing minefields, placing controlled minefields, and creating electrified and other obstacles, but they often had to carry out more dangerous combat missions. For example, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Volkhov Front used its engineer barrage battalions as assault groups during the breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad in January 1943.

In addition to these special purpose engineering brigades, the NKO also formed separate mine engineering battalions in April 1942. One such battalion was assigned to each of the anti-tank brigades of the Red Army with the task of erecting anti-tank barriers and destroying enemy tanks together with artillery troops.

The NKO continued this process at the end of the summer of 1942, when the formation of guards mine battalions began - the most interesting and most secret of all specialized types of engineering troops. In August, two Guards mine battalions were deployed to the Voronezh and North Caucasus fronts. By October 1, the field troops already had ten such battalions, as a rule, one battalion per active front. Formed specifically to carry out sabotage operations behind enemy lines, the battalions usually operated in small sabotage groups.

In addition to the Guards mine battalions, the NKO formed a Guards mine brigade in the Moscow Military District on August 17, subordinating it to the direct leadership of Headquarters. Formed from two engineer battalions of the 37th Engineer Brigade of the 1st Engineer Army, the 1st Guards Mine Brigade consisted of a headquarters group, a control company and five Guards mine battalions with a total brigade strength of 2,281 people. Like separate battalions, this brigade not only laid and removed mines, but also formed and deployed small groups to carry out sabotage operations (often in conjunction with partisans) against German communications and important rear objectives.

During the summer of 1942, the NKO also created a wide range of smaller specialized units, including five high-explosive flamethrower companies, several field water supply companies, and an artesian well drilling group to provide drinking water to active troops.

In preparing the Red Army for major counteroffensives and the subsequent winter campaign, the Stavka ordered the NKO to form larger and more specialized engineer troops to support these offensives. As a result, many of the existing engineer battalions were consolidated into engineer engineer brigades (Isbr) in October, each of which consisted of four to five engineer battalions, a light pontoon-bridge fleet of the NLP and a motorized engineer reconnaissance company. Several of these brigades were formed as mountain engineering brigades, subdivided into four mountain engineering battalions, capable of operating effectively in mountainous terrain.

On November 12, responding to the demand of the chief of the engineering troops of the Red Army, Major General M.P. Vorobyov, the NKO transformed part of the sapper brigades into 15 engineering mine brigades (IMB), numbered from 1 to 15. These brigades, responsible for creating operational obstacle zones, consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company and seven mine engineering battalions with a total strength of 2,903 people.

In addition, on November 26, 1942, the NKO ordered the transformation of five sapper brigades of the Transcaucasian Front into mountain engineering and mine brigades of the RVGK (from 1st to 5th) in November-December. Each such brigade (gimbre) consisted of five mountain engineering mine battalions, the companies and platoons of which had horses and donkeys rather than tractors as vehicles; the total number of the brigade was 2,344 people.

In the fall of 1942, the NKO began to form larger and more efficient pontoon-bridge units - primarily because the Headquarters considered the consolidation of bridge-building units an important condition for achieving success in extended offensive operations. At the beginning of autumn, the NKO sent reinforcements to the active fronts and armies in the form of 11 separate pontoon-bridge parks of the RVGK, and in November 1942 formed two pontoon-bridge brigades and assigned them to the Stalingrad Front for use in the counter-offensive near Stalingrad. These brigades consisted of a headquarters company, three to seven (usually four) N2P motorized pontoon-bridge battalions, one DMP-42 pontoon-bridge battalion with a total bridge capacity of 50 tons, and several diving squads for underwater work. When the winter offensive unfolded, the NKO assigned the third pontoon-bridge brigade to the Leningrad Front in January 1943. In February, four new heavy pontoon-bridge regiments were added to these brigades, each consisting of two battalions equipped with the new 100-ton capacity TMP pontoon bridges.

During 1942, the NPO not only formed and transferred an impressive number of new engineering brigades to the active forces, but also strengthened the existing engineering forces, including new engineering units in existing structures. For example, engineer battalions were included in all the new guards rifle and mechanized corps, and mine engineering companies were included in the new tank corps.

Thus, by February 1, 1943, the structure of the Red Army engineering troops expanded and included 13 special-purpose engineering brigades, one sapper brigade, 17 engineer-sapper brigades (including five mountain), 15 engineer-mine brigades, 185 separate engineer battalions, ten separate Sapper battalions, one Guards mine brigade, 11 Guards mine battalions, three pontoon-bridge brigades, four pontoon-bridge regiments and 78 pontoon-bridge battalions.

All these special-purpose engineering brigades, engineer-sapper, engineer-mine, pontoon-bridge brigades and the Guards mine brigade, as well as pontoon-bridge regiments and mine-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions, together with the guards mine battalions, were created by the NKO specifically to carry out specific combat missions during offensive operations, either as part of active fronts and armies, or under the direct control of Headquarters.

In 1943, the NKO continued to expand and improve the structure of its engineering troops. For example, in February, the formation of five rear barrage brigades began, consisting of five to seven engineer battalions each. The task of such brigades was to clear the liberated territory of mines and obstacles. After a long process of formation, the Headquarters in December 1943 transferred one of these brigades to the Moscow Military District, two to the newly formed Kharkov Military District, and one each to the North Caucasus and Ural Military Districts.

And more importantly, given the growing ferocity of ground battles and the increased strength of the Wehrmacht’s defenses, the NKO began on May 30 to create assault engineer brigades. Converted from existing engineer brigades, these new brigades consisted of a headquarters, five assault engineer battalions, one motorized engineer reconnaissance company, a light fleet for crossing rivers, a mine clearing company (including mine detection dogs), and a small logistics service. These new brigades were supposed to assist infantry and tank forces in overcoming well-prepared enemy defensive lines and fortified positions.

When the Red Army began new offensive operations, clearing minefields has become more important than laying mines. Therefore, the NPO began to replace the RVGK engineer-mine brigades with the RVGK engineer-sapper brigades, creating new and reorganizing existing engineer-sapper brigades to increase their efficiency. As a result, the number of mine engineering brigades in the structure of the RVGK decreased from 15 on February 1 to 12 on July 1, and by December 31 - to zero, but at the same time the number of engineering and sapper brigades increased from 12 on February 1 to 13 on July 1, and finally - until 22 on December 31, 1943. In addition, by July 1, 15 new assault engineering brigades were created, and by December 31 there were already 20 of them.

And finally, in June 1943, the NKO put into operation new tank regiments, equipped with 22 T-34 tanks and 18 PT-3 mine trawls. Formally, these regiments were not part of the structure of the engineering troops, but their main task was to clear passages through the numerous minefields installed by the Germans throughout their defenses.

Thanks to these NGO efforts, the size and diversity of the structure of the Red Army engineering troops increased dramatically in two years - from 32 engineer brigades, three engineer regiments and 206 battalions various types on January 1, 1942, up to 68 brigades different types, six pontoon-bridge regiments and 270 engineer and pontoon-bridge battalions on December 31, 1943. When the Red Army began the 1944 campaign, the structure of its engineering troops was already fully responsive to increased operational needs.

1. Ground Forces Before the Manchurian Incident Japanese army consisted of 17 divisions according to peacetime plans, and 30 divisions according to wartime plans. With the emergence of the Manchurian conflict in 1931 and especially in connection with the growth of military power Soviet Union