What is mouth in the army? Armed forces of the Russian Federation. Organizational and staffing methods of increasing the combat capabilities of motorized rifle squads, platoons and companies

Division, regiment, company, brigade, battalion - all these designations of units are something unknown for people far from military service. It will take a lot of time to describe their main features. Let's talk about the difference between a division and a brigade, because these military formations have many common features.

Definition

Division- a tactical or operational-tactical formation in various branches of the military and branches of the armed forces of the world, consisting of units, subunits and headquarters.

Brigade- a tactical military formation in all branches of the armed forces and branches of the armed forces, which is an intermediate link between a division and a regiment.

Comparison

In some countries, a brigade, along with a regiment, is classified as the main tactical formation. Serves as a kind of intermediate link between the regiment and the division. It has a structure similar to a regiment, but at the same time has a larger number of battalions and other units. It may well include two regiments, as well as auxiliary companies and battalions. The number of people in a brigade varies from two to eight thousand, and its commander, like a regiment, is a colonel.

A division is a larger military formation consisting of a headquarters, subunits and units. It includes a large number of regiments, divisions, battalions, companies and platoons. The strength of the division averages from twelve to twenty-four thousand people, and its commander bears the rank of major general.

Simplified organizational structure and a smaller staff makes a brigade a much more flexible formation than a division. However, the structure of logistics and combat support, unlike a brigade, is duplicated in a division, which gives the latter an advantage in the reliability of the functioning of units in combat conditions. It is logical that the maintenance of divisions, characterized by a more complex staff, implies much larger investments than the maintenance of brigade structures. This is what caused the Russian Armed Forces to abandon divisions and switch to a more mobile and flexible brigade structure. The only exception is the Missile Forces strategic purpose and Airborne Forces. In NATO countries, divisions still remain one of the main types of military formations.

Conclusions website

1. The brigade serves as an intermediate link between the regiment and the division.
2. The division is a larger military formation, its strength on average ranges from twelve to twenty-four thousand people. The brigade's personnel range from two to eight thousand people.
3. The division commander bears the rank of major general, the brigade commander - colonel.
4. A brigade is considered a much more flexible and mobile unit than a division.
5. The division has an advantage in the reliability of the functioning of units in combat conditions.
6. The maintenance of divisions implies much larger investments than the maintenance of brigade structures.
7. To date, the Russian Armed Forces (unlike NATO countries) have abandoned divisions, with the only exceptions being the Strategic Missile Forces and the Airborne Forces.

Reading literature, watching movies or TV shows military theme, an ordinary person constantly encounters the names of various military formations that are not entirely clear to him. Any military man will immediately understand what this means. we're talking about, what kind of troops is represented by this military formation, what is the number of soldiers, what tasks does it perform on the battlefield. For civilians, such information is not familiar due to their ignorance. The division also belongs to such unfamiliar to an ordinary person terms.

The meaning of the term "division"

A division is one of the main tactical military formations. It combines different branches of the military, but one of them still prevails. The structures of, for example, a tank and motorized rifle division are completely consistent with each other. The only difference is that a tank regiment includes two or three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment. But in motorized rifle it’s exactly the opposite. It consists of two or three motorized rifle regiments and only one tank regiment. But in addition to these regiments, the division also accommodates companies and battalions of other types of troops. For example, an automobile battalion or company chemical protection.

Modern army Russian Federation It includes divisions such as missile, tank, airborne, aviation, artillery and motorized rifle divisions. A division for other types of troops is not the largest formation. Either a regiment or a brigade predominates there. Division commander - important person in her life. They can become a military man with the rank of major general.

Historical necessity

The 20th century was marked for humanity by many wonderful achievements in the field of science. But the terrible side of this century was two wars global character, affecting more than one country. In such wartime people measured military force and the potential of other states with the number of divisions. The defense of each country was built precisely on this military formation, and not only defense. A large number of divisions could increase the importance of any country among other states. Division is a variable concept. That is, in each country the number of people and weapons forming a division was different. Therefore, a comparison of the military potential of countries on this basis is modern stage is considered incorrect.

Divisions during the war

Divisions in the USSR before the start of the Great Patriotic War were one of the main military formations. The number of such tactical units in the entire Red Army throughout the war totaled 132 divisions. Number personnel each of them was about 15 thousand people. Armament and technical equipment divisions were only slightly inferior to similar indicators. Also, each of them was reinforced with 16 tanks and armored vehicles, which significantly increased their combat power. Due to the times, the divisions also had horses in their composition, the number of which reached 1,100 individuals. Insufficient funding for the army led to a drop in the division's power level as a tactical military unit. But the war forced the country to activate all its forces, including financial ones. The divisions received the missing resources, including replenishment of personnel. This helped a lot in resolving the situation at the front in a positive way.

Regiment and division - what is the difference?

Both in Soviet times and in the modern Russian army, the regiment is a key military formation. If we consider the regiment from the economic side, it immediately becomes clear that it is completely autonomous in this regard. Most often, the regiment commander is a colonel. The predominant branch of the military gives the name to the regiment, although it includes more than one branch of the military. The largest and main formation is the division. The regiment is part of it, connecting with other regiments, companies and divisions. Unlike a division, the predominance of a certain type of troops is very pronounced. In its ranks, the regiment can contain 200-900 personnel.

Division and brigade

The brigade serves as an intermediate link between the regiment and the division. In many countries of the world it is also considered one of the main military formations. In its structure, a brigade is very similar to a regiment, but the number of units included in it is much larger. The brigade's personnel is 2-8 thousand people. The main thing in this tactical formation, as in the regiment, is the colonel. A division is a larger formation. It has its own headquarters to coordinate military operations, divisions and units. A brigade is considered a more flexible and simpler formation, unlike a division. This led to the Russian army being transferred to a brigade structure. Divisions survived only in a few branches of the military.

Division command

As mentioned earlier, a major general is at the helm of the division. This military rank is common in many countries of the world, including the Russian Federation. A major general is one of the senior officers. On the career ladder, he was located between a colonel and a lieutenant general.

The position of division commander appeared after the reform of the military forces in 1924. This was a typical command position. In 1935, after the decision of the Central Executive Committee, the personal rank of “division commander” was introduced, that is, division commander. In the Red Army, the division commander stood above the brigade commander (brigade commander) and below the corps commander (corps commander). This title existed until 1940, when it was abolished, once again becoming simply a position.

Guards Division - what is it?

The Guards Division was considered one of the most elite military formations. The most important and difficult tasks were entrusted to her. The Guard as an elite part of the army appeared during the era of slavery. The concept of "guard" in close to modern meaning was first used in the 12th century in Italy. This was the name given to a detachment of soldiers protecting the state banner. This innovation was adopted by Peter I. He created the first regiments of the Guard in 1690.

During the Second World War, the divisions, which were called Guards, were considered the best. The title of “Guards” was awarded to them for special courage and heroism, as well as for the ability to skillfully conduct battle.

In September 1941, by order of the People's Commissar of the USSR, even rifle divisions were transformed into guards divisions. Subsequently, this day became the day of the Guard. For example, the 42nd Guards rifle division inherited her high rank from the First Guards rifle brigade. Each such division was presented with a banner that had special meaning for them. In addition, the monetary reward for service in such a unit also increased. The salary of chiefs was increased by 1.5 times, and that of privates by 2 times.

In 1942, a new decree was issued, in which, among other things, a special “Guard” badge was established. It was worn on the right side of the chest.

Airborne troops

The Airborne Division is part of a special type of troops that have the ability to operate behind enemy lines. This one was created in order to counteract the enemy, destroying them and their control points. The Airborne Forces, operating in the rear, must help the sailors. Such divisions have the most modern equipment, and the types of weapons are varied. In order to drop the necessary loads in the most difficult conditions (bad weather, open terrain, darkness of night or daylight, high altitude) The Airborne Forces use parachute landing equipment. The airborne division, along with the brigade, is the main unit of this type of troops.

IN Peaceful time The Airborne Forces do not stop performing their service. They perform a variety of tasks that help maintain the level of combat readiness of the troops, as well as the mobilization determination of the civilian population. This is very important, since when a military conflict occurs, it is the mood of people and high combat readiness that decide a lot. From the above, we can conclude that the airborne division is a kind of command reserve that is turned to if it is necessary to carry out an operation to capture the enemy either from the air or from the rear.

Thus, the division is the main formation of the tactical branch in all types of troops. Although the modern Russian army has abandoned the divisional system, other countries and organizations, such as NATO, actively use this system. The division's combat path is not easy. This has been proven in many wars, but it is an indispensable military formation.

Hierarchy and number of military formations.
Finally, our Battle Regulations come into force ground forces. You can more or less decide on the hierarchy, although I have only become familiar with two parts.
In general, I am very often asked questions like “how many people are in the division”, “how many people are in the brigade”. Well, it's impossible to answer this question. Because I can give an answer, say, about a tank regiment, but they were generally interested in cavalry, and even in the 40th year. The fact is that the very name “squad”, “platoon”, “company” depends not on the numerical strength, but, firstly, on the type of troops, and, secondly, on the tactical tasks assigned to the formation of this type.

And so, the smallest formation:
“Squad” (crew for artillery, Crew for tankers).
The squad is commanded by a sergeant (junior sergeant), armed with an AK74
A motorized rifle squad consists of 9...13 people (in addition to the squad commander: a grenade launcher, a private with an RPG-7, PM; a grenade launcher assistant gunner, a private with an AK74; a machine gunner, a private with an RPK74; a senior gunner, a corporal with an AK74; 3...5 riflemen, privates with AK74; mechanic driver of an infantry fighting vehicle and gunner-operator/machine gunner of an infantry fighting vehicle/infantry fighting vehicle).
The squad is named after its branch of service (tank, motorized rifle, engineering, communications)
Motorized rifle squad:
Defense up to 100m,
Advance up to 50m

"Platoon"
Several squads make up a platoon (from 2 to 4).
The platoon is commanded by an officer - lieutenant, Art. lieutenant.
Number of people: 9...45 people.
The platoon is named after its branch of service (tank, motorized rifle, engineer, communications)
Motorized rifle platoon:
Defense 400 m along the front, 300 m in depth.
Advance up to 200...300 meters

"Company" (battery for artillery and squadron for cavalry)
Several platoons make up a company (from 2 to 4). In addition to platoons, a company may include squads that are not part of a platoon.
A company is a formation that can perform independent tasks on the battlefield.
The company commander is a captain.
Number of people from 18 to 200 (motorized rifle companies 130...150 people; tank companies 30...35 people)
The company is named after its branch of service (tank, motorized rifle, engineering, communications)
Motorized rifle company:
Defense 1…1.5 km along the front up to 1 km in depth
Advance: 0.5…1 km

Battalion. (Division for artillery.)
Several companies make up a battalion (from 2 to 4); the battalion also includes platoons that are not part of the companies.
The battalion is named after its branch of service (tank, motorized rifle, engineering, communications). But the battalion includes formations of other types of weapons (For example, in a motorized rifle battalion, except motorized rifle company there is a mortar battery, a logistics platoon, a communications platoon.)
The battalion commander is a lieutenant colonel.
The battalion has its own headquarters.
The number is from 250...950 people (theoretically, the size of the battalion is possible and less).
Motorized rifle battalion:
Defense 3…5 km along the front and 2…2.5 km in depth
Advance 1…2 km

Regiment.
The regiment is named after the branch of service, but includes units from many branches of the military. Consists of at least 3...4 battalions. (2...3 battalions of the military branch)
The regiment commander is a colonel.
(For example, in a motorized rifle regiment there are 2...3 motorized rifle battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery division (battalion), one anti-aircraft missile division, reconnaissance company, engineer company, communications company, anti-tank battery, chemical defense platoon, repair company, logistics company, orchestra, medical center)
The number of personnel in the regiment ranges from 900...2000 people.

Brigade.
An intermediate element (so to speak) from regiment to division.
The main difference from a regiment is the larger number of both battalions and other units. (Let's say there are two tank battalions in the MTB) A brigade can also consist of 2 regiments.
Brigade Commander - Colonel
Number of people: 2000...8000 people

Division.
Although it is named according to the type of predominant troops, in fact the predominance can differ only by one regiment (say, in a motorized rifle division there are two motorized rifle regiments, in a tank division, on the contrary, there is one motorized rifle regiment for two tank regiments)
Division commander - Major General
Number of personnel from 12,000...24,000 people

Frame.
Intermediate military formation from division to army.
The corps is a combined arms formation.
The corps was usually created in cases where the formation of an army was impractical.
After completing the combat mission, the corps was disbanded.
Corps commander: Lieutenant General
Now there are 7 Corps in Russia (data on commanders may be out of date):
- 57th Army Corps (Ulan-Ude) (Major General Alexander Maslov)
- 68th Army Corps (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk) (Lieutenant General Vladimir Varennikov)
- 1st Air Defense Corps (Balashikha, Moscow region) (Lieutenant General Nikolai Dubovikov)
- 23rd Air Defense Corps (Vladivostok, Primorsky Territory) (Major General Viktor Ostashko)
- 21st Air Defense Corps (Severomorsk, Murmansk region) (Lieutenant General Sergei Razygraev)
- 16th operational submarine squadron (Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka region) (Vice Admiral Alexander Neshcheret)
- 7th operational squadron of surface ships (Severomorsk, Murmansk region) (Vice Admiral Gennady Radzevsky)

Army.
In this case, the army is a military formation.
The army is a large military formation for operational purposes. The army includes divisions, regiments, battalions of all types of troops.
An army may also include one or more corps.
Staff rank com. army - colonel general.
Armies are usually not formed in peacetime and regiments, divisions and battalions are part of the District.
Now in Russia there are 30 Armies:
- 37th air force(strategic purpose) Supreme High Command(Moscow).
Lieutenant General Mikhail Oparin
- 61st Air Army ( military transport aviation) Supreme High Command (Moscow),
Lieutenant General Viktor Denisov

27th Guards Rocket Army (Vladimir),
Lieutenant General Viktor Alekseev
- 31st Missile Army (Orenburg),
Lieutenant General Anatoly Borzenkov
- 33rd Guards Rocket Army (Omsk)
Lieutenant General Alexander Konarev
- 53rd Missile Army (Chita).
Lieutenant General Leonid Sinyakovich

3rd separate army rocket and space defense (Solnechnogorsk, Moscow region).
Major General Sergei Kurushkin

2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (Samara).
Major General Alexey Verbitsky
- 5th Combined Arms Army (Ussuriysk, Primorsky Territory).
Major General Alexander Stolyarov
- 20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Voronezh).
Lieutenant General Sergei Makarov
- 22nd Guards Combined Arms Army (Nizhny Novgorod).
Lieutenant General Alexey Merkuryev
- 35th Combined Arms Army (Belogorsk, Amur Region).
Lieutenant General Alexander Kutikov
- 41st Combined Arms Army (Borzya, Chita region).
Lieutenant General Hakim Mirzazyanov
- 41st Combined Arms Army (Novosibirsk).
Major General Vladimir Kovrov
- 58th Combined Arms Army (Vladikavkaz).
Lieutenant General Valery Gerasimov

Group Russian troops in Transcaucasia.
Lieutenant General Nikolai Zolotov
- Operational group of Russian troops in Transnistria (Tiraspol).
Major General Boris Sergeev

4th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Rostov-on-Don).
Lieutenant General Alexander Zelin

5th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Ekaterinburg).
Lieutenant General Evgeny Yuryev
- 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army (St. Petersburg).
Lieutenant General Evgeny Torbov
- 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Khabarovsk).
Lieutenant General Igor Sadofiev
- 14th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Novosibirsk).
Lieutenant General Nikolai Danilov

16th Air Army (Kubinka, Moscow region).
Lieutenant General Valery Retunsky

1st submarine flotilla (Zaozersk, Murmansk region)
Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev
- 3rd submarine flotilla (Gadzhievo, Murmansk region).
Vice Admiral Sergei Simonenko

Kola flotilla of heterogeneous forces (Polyarny, Murmansk region).
Vice Admiral Nikolai Osokin
- Primorsky flotilla of heterogeneous forces (Fokino, Primorsky Krai).
Vice Admiral Evgeny Litvinenko
- Kamchatka flotilla of heterogeneous forces (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky).
Vice Admiral Yuri Shumanin

Caspian Flotilla (Astrakhan).
Rear Admiral Viktor Petrovich Kravchuk (since 2005)

Troops and forces of the North-Eastern Direction of the Pacific Fleet (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky).
Rear Admiral Viktor Chirkov (?)

District (during wartime Front)
The highest military formation.
The front includes several armies, corps, divisions, regiments, battalions of all types of troops. Fronts are never divided by types of troops
The front (district) is headed by the commander of the front (district) with the rank of army general
Russia now has 6 military districts, 4 military fleets (data as of May 2007).
-Moscow Military District
Army General Vladimir Yurievich Bakin
- Leningrad Military District
Army General Puzanov Igor Evgenievich
- Volga-Ural Military District
General of the Army Boldyrev Vladimir Anatolyevich
- North Caucasus Military District
Army General Baranov Alexander Ivanovich
- Siberian Military District
Colonel General POSTNIKOV Alexander Nikolaevich
- Far Eastern Military District
Colonel General Bulgakov Vladimir Vasilievich

Northern Fleet
Admiral Vysotsky Vladimir Sergeevich
- Pacific Fleet
Admiral Fedorov Viktor Dmitrievich
- Black Sea Fleet
Admiral Tatarinov Alexander
- Baltic Fleet
Vice Admiral Sidenko Konstantin Semenovich

In addition to this there is:
Subdivision.
These are all military formations that are part of the unit. A squad, platoon, company, battalion - they are all united by one word "unit". The word comes from the concept of division, to divide. Those. part is divided into divisions.

Part.
The main unit of the Armed Forces. Most often, a unit is understood as a regiment or brigade.
Characteristic for the part:
- having your own office work,
- military economy,
- having a bank account,
- postal and telegraph addresses,
- having your own official seal,
- the commander’s right to give written orders,
- the presence of an open (for example, 44 educational tank division) and closed (military unit 08728) combined arms numbers.
The presence of a Battle Banner is not necessary for a unit.
In addition to the regiment and brigade, the units include division headquarters, corps headquarters, army headquarters, district headquarters, as well as other military organizations (voentorg, army hospital, garrison clinic, district food warehouse, district song and dance ensemble, garrison officers' house, garrison household goods services, central school junior specialists, military school, military institute, etc.)
In some cases, a unit may be a unit other than a regiment or brigade. Battalion, Company and even platoon. Such parts are called the word “separate” before the name

Compound.
United units: Division. Less often, Brigade.

An association.
Unification is a term that unites a corps, an army, an army group and a front (district).

I'm still working on the text.

Branch

In the Russian Army, a squad is the smallest military formation that has a full-time commander. The squad is commanded by a junior sergeant or sergeant. Usually there are 9-13 people in a motorized rifle squad. In departments of other branches of the military, the number of personnel in the department ranges from 3 to 15 people. In some branches of the military the branch is called differently.
In artillery - crew, in tank forces - crew. Typically a squad is part of a platoon.

Platoon

Several squads make up a platoon. Usually there are from 2 to 4 squads in a platoon, but more are possible. The platoon is headed by a commander with the rank of officer. In the Russian army this is junior lieutenant, lieutenant or senior lieutenant. On average, the number of platoon personnel ranges from 9 to 45 people. Usually in all branches of the military the name is the same - platoon. As a rule, a platoon is part of a company, but can exist independently.

Company

Several platoons make up a company. Usually a company consists of 2-4 platoons, sometimes more platoons. A company is the smallest formation of tactical importance*, i.e. a formation capable of independently performing small tactical tasks on the battlefield. The company commander is a captain. On average, the size of a company can be from 18 to 200 people. Motorized rifle companies usually have about 130-150 people, tank companies 30-35 people. Usually a company is part of a battalion, but often the existence of companies as independent formations. In artillery, this type of formation is called a battery.

Battalion

Consists of several companies (usually 2-4) and several platoons that are not part of any of the companies. The battalion is one of the main tactical formations*. A battalion, like a company, platoon, or squad, is named after its branch of service (tank, motorized rifle, engineer, communications). But the battalion already includes formations of other types of weapons. For example, in a motorized rifle battalion, in addition to motorized rifle companies, there is a mortar battery, a logistics platoon, and a communications platoon. Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel. The battalion already has its own headquarters. Usually, on average, a battalion, depending on the type of troops, can number from 250 to 950 people. However, there are battalions of about 100 people. In artillery, this type of formation is called a division.

Regiment

In the Russian army this is the main tactical formation* and a completely autonomous formation in the economic sense. The regiment is commanded by a colonel. Although the regiments are named according to the types of troops (tank, motorized rifle, communications, pontoon-bridge, etc.), in fact this is a formation consisting of units of many types of troops, and the name is given according to the predominant type of troops. For example, in a motorized rifle regiment there are two or three motorized rifle battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery battalion, one anti-aircraft missile battalion, a reconnaissance company, an engineer company, a communications company, an anti-tank battery, a chemical defense platoon, a repair company, a logistics company, orchestra, medical center. The number of personnel in the regiment ranges from 900 to 2000 people.

Brigade

Just like a regiment, it is the main tactical formation*. Actually, the brigade occupies an intermediate position between a regiment and a division. The structure of a brigade is most often the same as a regiment, but there are significantly more battalions and other units in a brigade. So in a motorized rifle brigade there are one and a half to two times more motorized rifle and tank battalions than in a regiment. A brigade can also consist of two regiments, plus battalions and auxiliary companies. On average, the brigade has from 2 to 8 thousand people. The brigade commander is a colonel.

Division

Main operational-tactical formation*. Just like a regiment, it is named after the predominant branch of troops in it. However, the predominance of one or another type of troops is much less than in the regiment. A motorized rifle division and a tank division are identical in structure, with the only difference being that in a motorized rifle division there are two or three motorized rifle regiments and one tank, and in a tank division, on the contrary, there are two or three tank regiments and one motorized rifle. In addition to these main regiments, there are one or two divisions artillery regiment, one anti-aircraft missile regiment, a jet battalion, a missile battalion, a helicopter squadron, an engineer battalion, a communications battalion, an automobile battalion, reconnaissance battalion, battalion electronic warfare, logistics battalion. a repair and restoration battalion, a medical battalion, a chemical defense company, and several different support companies and platoons. In the modern Russian Army, there are or may be divisions of tank, motorized rifle, artillery, airborne, missile and aviation divisions. In other branches of the military, as a rule, the highest formation is a regiment or brigade. On average, there are 12-24 thousand people in a division. Division commander, Major General. Currently, after the reorganization of the Russian army, divisions are being reduced and so-called reinforced brigades of a new look are being formed on their basis.

Army

An army is a large military formation for operational purposes*. The army includes divisions, regiments, battalions of all types of troops. Armies are usually no longer divided by branch of service, although tank armies may exist where tank divisions predominate. An army may also include one or more corps. It is impossible to talk about the structure and size of the army, because as many armies exist or existed, so many of their structures existed. The soldier at the head of the army is no longer called “commander”, but “commander of the army.” Usually the regular rank of army commander is colonel general.

District

This is the highest military formation strategic type*. There are no larger formations. In wartime, a front is formed on the basis of the district. The district includes several armies, corps, divisions, regiments, battalions of all types of troops. The composition and size of the district may vary. Districts are never subdivided by types of troops (i.e. there cannot be a tank district, an artillery district, etc.). The district is headed by a district commander with the rank of army general.

Above in the text there are the concepts “tactical formation”, “operational-tactical formation”, “strategic..”, etc. These terms indicate the range of tasks solved by this formation in the light of military art. The art of war is divided into three levels:

1. Tactics (the art of combat). A squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment solve tactical problems, i.e. are fighting.
2. Operational art (the art of fighting, battle). A division, corps, army solve operational problems, i.e. are fighting.
3. Strategy (the art of warfare in general). The front solves both operational and strategic tasks, i.e. leads major battles, as a result of which the strategic situation changes and the outcome of the war can be decided

Subdivision

This word refers to all military formations that are part of the unit. A squad, platoon, company, battalion - they are all united by one word "unit". The word comes from the concept of division, to divide. Those. part is divided into divisions.

Part

It is the basic unit of the armed forces. The term “unit” most often means regiment and brigade. External signs units are: the presence of their own office work, military economy, bank account, postal and telegraph address, their own official seal, the commander’s right to give written orders, open (44 training tank division) and closed (military unit 08728) combined arms numbers. That is, the part has sufficient autonomy. The presence of a Battle Banner is not necessary for a unit. In addition to the regiment and brigade, the units also include division headquarters, corps headquarters, army headquarters, district headquarters, as well as other military organizations.
*the terms military unit and military unit do not mean exactly the same thing. The term "military unit" is used as a general designation, without specifics. If we are talking about a specific regiment, brigade, etc., then the term “military unit” is used. Usually its number is also mentioned: “military unit 74292” (but you cannot use “military unit 74292”) or, for short, military unit 74292.

Weakness and failure of the brigade structure

Today it is already quite obvious that the initiated organizational reform had no other content than a large-scale reduction of the officer corps and the maximum “compression” of the existing structure of the Armed Forces to a size that allowed it to function more or less effectively within the allocated budget.

. Why in the Ground Forces, the divisions that existed before 2008 were reorganized into brigades, reducing the entire command and control as much as possible and distributing the existing regiments into battalions and divisions, while at the same time reducing the entire mobilization structure to zero.

At the same time, the “reformers” did not even try to test their proposals in any way experimentally. First, the entire Armed Forces were thrown under the steamroller of total reform, which cost tens of billions of dollars, and then, when old army was dismantled, new brigades were formed, the “reformers” finally began studying the combat capabilities of what they had achieved.
. And here they were very much expected unpleasant discoveries. It turned out that the “optimized” brigades in their combat effectiveness did not even reach the regiments of the old state. Hanging with all sorts of weapons, advertised as “the latest” and “unique”, during all past exercises they with sad consistency show their unacceptably low combat effectiveness. Not once during the past exercises did higher headquarters and numerous advisers and inspectors manage to achieve coordinated, confident, energetic actions of the new model motorized rifle brigade.

. If at the first stage - extension and deployment It is still possible to manage it somehow, but as the tactical situation becomes more complicated and inputs are received, control of the brigade as a single combat mechanism is lost by the brigade command and chaotic impulsive movement of troops begins.

As one of the generals of the Ground Forces headquarters sadly joked: the actions in the exercises of the new brigades are very good for studying in academies the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet mechanized corps in the first days of the war. Lots of chaotic movements, constant delays, loss of control and, as a result, the conduct of combat operations by hastily put together combined combat groups.

There are many reasons for this.

. Firstly, in brigades, compared to regiments, the number of officers sharply decreased. If a regiment of 2,000 soldiers had 250 officers and 150 warrant officers, then the new brigade of 4,000 soldiers had 327 officers.
. The number of officers has decreased and, accordingly, management has become weaker. The officers simply cannot cope with command. Especially at the brigade headquarters level. The brigade's combat command is simply not capable of managing such a bloated structure. In addition, massive dismissals of officers with combat experience and length of service led to a sharp decline in the already not very good high level training of today's officers.

As confirmation, we can cite words from an interview with commander 693 motorized rifle regiment Andrei Kazachenko, who was the first to enter South Ossetia in August 2008:

“Reforms had to be carried out. I completely agree here. Another question is how to carry them out? For example, I will say from my point of view, from the commander’s side. What difference does it make whether you command a regiment or a brigade? On the contrary, a regiment is not such a cumbersome organization as a brigade is. In my regiment there were 48 officers and warrant officers of the regiment's management. This is for 2200 people. And now in the brigade, where there are 3500-4000 people, there are 33 people. What kind of optimization are we talking about? Have our officers changed, or have they become gold? Or did they all immediately become professionals? As it was, so it remains...”

. Secondly, the brigades turned out to be “blind” - the reconnaissance units available in the brigade do not provide full-fledged reconnaissance in the zone of its operations. Their strength and technical means are absolutely insufficient. Reconnaissance platoons of battalions are not capable of providing full-fledged reconnaissance in the battalion's zone of action, and the scanty "reconnaissance battalion" of the brigade is not capable of not only providing them with effective assistance, but simply conducting reconnaissance to the depth necessary in the interests of the brigade.

And even the information received cannot be processed in a timely manner and brought to the command of the brigade, since the brigade management does not provide for any intelligence and information structure: neither a department, nor even a department that could analyze the incoming information, check it, systematize it and bring it to the commander .
. All reconnaissance in the brigade's combat command is represented only by the chief of reconnaissance, the instructor-sergeant major and a civilian translator. All!

All this does not allow the brigade command, even during exercises, to receive a sufficient amount of information to correctly assess the enemy, and as a result, does not allow it to correctly assess it and develop it accordingly. correct solution to fight.
. And this is while conducting combat operations against a potential enemy technologically equal to the level of our army. What can we say about conducting battles against similar units of technologically advanced armies? Their reconnaissance, target designation and combat use exceed the meager capabilities of the “new-look brigades” by an order of magnitude!

To understand the weakness and inconsistency of the resulting structure, you just need to put next to a similar US or NATO brigade, which, in fact, should be “balanced” by our brigades, and compare their capabilities. But not by the number of barrels or heads, which no longer reflects real combat effectiveness modern troops, A by combat capabilities:
— depth and density of exploration,
— information support,
— speed and accuracy of target designation,
— reaction time,
- communications and combat control.

In addition to problems with the combat effectiveness of the new brigades, it was revealed another no less acute group of problems — "weight" of logistics support. Having copied the brigade principle from the US Army, the “reformers” for some reason forgot to copy the American logistics system. And it is precisely this that makes the “brigade” organization in the US Army work. According to it, logistical support for brigades is carried out by the divisions to which these brigades are organizationally included. The brigades themselves are structures that are focused only on conducting combat operations.

With the liquidation of the divisions, all rear support was assigned to the same brigades. As a result, as the chairman of the board of military experts, Major General Vladimirov, aptly described the resulting monster, Instead of combat brigades, we ended up with “ugly bloated regiments”. Which completely lost the mobility and unitarity of the regiments, but never reached the power of the division.

One of the arguments in favor of the transition from a divisional to a brigade structure was the experience of advanced countries. However, here too the reformers got something wrong. In the US armed forces, there were divisions (mechanized, armored, infantry, etc.), and they remain the same. The divisional structure also forms the basis of the ground forces of the People's Liberation Army of China.

If we remember that war involves an armed clash with the enemy, then the combat potentials of the opposing military formations should be mutually comparable. In other words, the brigade is fighting with the brigade of the opposing side, and not with its division or army. But this just doesn’t work. For some reason, the standard defense (offensive) zone of our “compact” ground brigade turned out to be equal to the zone of employment of a “non-compact” mechanized division - 20 km along the front.

In the event of a military conflict with an enemy whose armed forces structure coincides with the American one, in this lane they will converge:
from the Russian side:
- two motorized rifle battalions

- two tank battalions

Tank battalion of the Russian mechanized brigade

(perspective structure)

Two artillery battalions
- one reactive battery

from the enemy:
- two heavy brigades
- two brigade groups
- one brigade army aviation
- one artillery brigade.

TOTAL:
- against 170 enemy tanks we will field 84 tanks;
- against 394 of his infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers - 263 of his own;
- 16 thousand soldiers and officers of the mechanized division will meet on the battlefield with 4.5 thousand soldiers and officers of the motorized rifle brigade of the Russian Ground Forces.

And to what has been said, we will add that we will not put anything against the 118 army aviation helicopters that are regularly in the division of the American army (including 24 attack helicopters) due to their categorical absence in the staff of the new look brigade. Let's add some small details to this:
- threefold superiority of the alleged enemy in artillery pieces and mortars;
- sixfold superiority in jet systems volley fire, etc.

/ V. Shurygin “BIG REFORM OR BIG LIE?”, zavtra.ru /

Rearmament that will not happen

Night launch of missiles by S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems.

What will actually prevent the Russian army from being modernized on time?

Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin doubts that the rearmament program of the Russian army will be completed on time. And the main obstacle here is not corruption, but substitution military science propaganda.

Quantity government programs weapons adopted in post-Soviet Russia are now even difficult to establish. At the same time, all programs without exception, both in the “dashing 90s” and in the “blessed 2000s”, suffered the same fate. Not only were they not completed, but they were all abandoned in the middle of the term - precisely because of the obvious failure. And in return, new programs were adopted with new deadlines and plans. After which everything repeated itself. In particular, this happened with the 2007-2015 program. Just recently, all state media widely advertised it as “a new stage in the development of the Russian armed forces,” but now no one remembers it. According to established tradition, this unfulfilled program “hit the ground” and turned into another new state armament program (GAP) for 2011-2020.

20 trillion rubles is the minimum for rearming the army

On new program It is planned to allocate approximately 20 trillion rubles. As expected, liberal public raised a loud cry about “exorbitant military spending” and “militarization of the country” on this occasion. This cry, to put it mildly, is beside the point.

But the fact is that the armed forces have practically exhausted Soviet resources, and they require total rearmament. So total that in fact these 20 trillion will obviously not be enough. This is the bare minimum, not an “exorbitant expense.” Without total rearmament, we simply will not have an army. The international situation, as is easy to see, does not stimulate disarmament in any way.

In this regard, it should be noted that the “compact professional army” is another liberal myth, if not more harshly, amateurish nonsense. The experience of European armies irrefutably demonstrates this. Their long-term permanent reductions are beautifully called optimization, but in reality it is simply a loss of combat effectiveness. In particular, the production of equipment and weapons in microscopic series is completely pointless. Firstly, this is extremely unprofitable economically: the smaller the series, the more expensive each sample is. Secondly, this is extremely irrational from a military point of view. If there is very little equipment, then it is almost impossible to use it in battle, both because of the lack of quantity itself, and because of the inadmissibility of losses: it will simply run out. Moreover, now Europeans are running short not only of equipment, but also of ammunition, which has also become very complex and expensive, so very little of it is purchased. As a result, as experience shows recent years, almost all European armies are losing the ability to fight not only independently, but even collectively.

What saves Europe is that there is no one to attack it, and intervention is voluntary. Iron NATO discipline exists only in the imagination of Kremlin propagandists. Russia's geopolitical position is fundamentally different; it needs a large army with big amount technology. It is obvious that humanity is very quickly sliding into the chaos of the “new Middle Ages,” which will obviously be accompanied by many wars between old and new “centers of power” for the complete redivision of the world. It is strange to assume that this process will bypass a country with the largest territory in the world and a huge number of natural resources with not the largest population. Therefore, either complete amateurs or people carrying out someone’s order can talk about a “compact professional army”.

Industry is not ready

The GPV 2020 faces a lot of serious problems. The first of them is the state of the military-industrial complex, which should produce these very weapons. During the post-Soviet period, it lost many important technologies, and never had some at all. In addition, production capacity and personnel have been catastrophically lost. During the post-Soviet period, many military-industrial complex enterprises ceased to exist; those that survived, as a rule, had severely worn-out machinery. There is nothing to say about the loss of personnel. As a result, a situation is now beginning to emerge where industry, even with normal funding, is physically unable to fulfill domestic orders and, especially, export orders. Firstly, she often cannot master production for real modern technology, because of which we have to return to modernized Soviet models (Su-30 and Su-35 fighters, Mi-35 helicopters, frigates of Project 11356, submarines of Project 636). And as it were, new equipment often turns out, upon careful examination, to be, again, slightly improved Soviet (for example, the S-400 today, in fact, is a kind of S-300PM+, since the “long-range” 40N6 missile defense system is still not suitable for it adopted for service).

Secondly, there is not enough production capacity to produce equipment in adequate quantities. Now, factories are being urgently built in Nizhny Novgorod and Kirov to produce components of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. True, it is not very clear where the personnel for these factories will come from. Similar problems are being experienced by all branches of the military-industrial complex without exception. Consequently, building and equipping new enterprises and training personnel for them can take a lot of time and money. Funding for the construction and modernization of factories may be needed no less than for the re-equipment program itself.

On the other hand, military-industrial complex enterprises charge exorbitant prices for their products, and the pricing scheme is not always clear. Because of such prices, the Ministry of Defense acquires such a small amount of equipment that it would be better not to buy it at all. Moreover, an increase in price is by no means accompanied by an increase in quality; more often the opposite happens. And, of course, all this is superimposed by a powerful corruption factor, both from the Armed Forces and from the military-industrial complex.

However, defense enterprises are not to blame for everything. Often the customer, represented by the Ministry of Defense, is simply not able to clearly formulate the tactical and technical specifications for the weapons and equipment he requires. In general, over the two post-Soviet decades, the military-political leadership of the country has not decided on external threats in different time perspectives. And without this, the military construction of the army in general and rearmament in particular become actually impossible. Because of this, various “miracles” like the Mistrals arise: it is still unclear whether their purchase is outright madness or banal corruption. The extremely expensive fifth-generation fighter program T-50 (or PAKFA) is being made for the sole consideration - “to be like the people,” that is, like the United States. At the same time, American experience so far suggests that the entire concept of fifth-generation fighters may turn out to be a dead-end branch of the development of combat aviation.

The reform was carried out without any scientific study

Also, following the United States, Russia really wants to create a network-centric army, which in itself is reasonable. But since the essence of this concept is not fully understood by the state, the automated control systems currently being created for different types armed forces and military branches turn out to be incompatible with each other, and accordingly, the money spent on their creation is simply thrown away. Due to a lack of understanding of what exactly the Armed Forces need, a completely paradoxical situation is emerging: the money has already been allocated, but what equipment and in what quantity they will buy with it have not yet been decided. Naturally, a fierce struggle is unfolding for this money using various lobbying and corruption schemes; as a rule, no one here remembers the interests of the army.

This sad state of affairs is largely explained by the state of Russian military science, which today, with rare exceptions, is not only unable to create new concepts, but has practically lost the ability to even analyze foreign ones. Moreover, even the descriptive function of military science is almost no longer fulfilled, with the exception of certain issues of a technical nature. In fact, most works in the field of military science in Russia have nothing to do with science at all, but are low-level propaganda.

Accordingly, there is simply no scientific basis for military development. A good example in this case, it is the military reform of ex-Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov. As a result of this reform, the armed forces underwent tremendous changes (mostly negative, although there were also positive aspects), but neither its authors, nor its real goals, nor the criteria by which the reforms were carried out are still unknown. In fact, the then Chief of the General Staff Makarov openly admitted that the reform was carried out without any scientific study.

Apparently, the Russian economy today is beginning to experience significant problems that may affect the implementation of the State Program 2020 in the direction of reduction. But on this moment The main problem is not money, but the state of industry and science. Importing weapons will definitely not save Russia, simply because it really modern weapons no one will sell it to her. Industry and technology can still be purchased to a certain extent, although at a very high cost; it is much more difficult to train personnel for it. But the hardest part is science. Today this is where our bottleneck lies. Buy basic science will not work. Moreover, without such science, even stealing or buying foreign technologies will be pointless; they will still not be mastered. You can give nuclear weapons to Paraguay or Mauritania, but this will not make them nuclear powers, since they will not be able to reproduce them. In the 40s, the USSR, in fact, “borrowed” nuclear weapons from the United States, but this only happened because Soviet science instantly “mastered” this technology.

In this regard, the situation has radically worsened compared to Soviet period. The point is not only and not so much the destruction of schools and the loss of developments, but the anti-scientific public atmosphere. The current violent clericalization of society is extremely dangerous, primarily because it destroys the scientific worldview; against the backdrop of a rapid decline in the level of average and higher education Agitprop does not contribute in any way to the emergence and, especially, retention of scientific personnel. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for us to implement the GPV-2020. Most likely, in a couple of years it will magically transform into some kind of GPV-2025.

Three-tier structure of the Russian Armed Forces

Now let's look at the question, what changes have occurred in the Russian army over the two years of Serdyukov’s reform?
. For some reason, the main visible manifestation of this military reform was not social transformations, not measures to improve the situation in the troops, but the organizational “squeezing” of the Armed Forces to a three-tier structure: battalion - brigade - operational command , in which the brigade became the main operational-tactical unit. Such traditional levels as regiments, divisions, corps and armies were completely eliminated.

To date Ground forces are consolidated into 85 brigades:
- 39 combined arms brigades,
- 21st brigade missile forces and artillery,
- 7 army air defense brigades,
- 12 communications brigades,
- 2 electronic warfare brigades,
— 4 air assault brigades.

To manage them, from one to three operational commands have been formed in each district.
This disruption was presented to the Russian public as an “optimization” of the chaotic military structure that Russia inherited from Soviet times. The figure 1890 was cited as confirmation military units, listed in the Armed Forces in 2008. After “optimization,” there should have been 172 of them left. It was emphasized that all of them would be 100 percent staffed with people and weapons and fully combat-ready. That the brigades will become universal combat units from Kamchatka to Pskov.

But the plans, beautiful on staff papers, turned out to be very far from their real implementation in life. Least a third of the brigades in the end it turned out to be formed according to some “easy” states. According to one of them, the number of motorized rifle brigades - the main operational-tactical unit of the ground forces - is 3,500 people. But there are “brigades” with a total strength of 2,200 people, although it was initially stated that all brigades would have a strength of 4,600 people.

Further more. The presence or absence of weapons and geographical features forced the “reformers” to change existing states in relation to a specific region and the basic set of weapons. As a result, today there are no less SIX approved brigade staffs. But in reality, taking into account various “amendments” to the states, in today’s Armed Forces you can’t even find two identical teams.
. That is There is no talk of any “unification” that the “reformers” strived for so much and what they used to justify the abandonment of the divisional structure. The resulting brigades are extremely diverse in numbers, organization and weapons. At the same time, no one remembers the promised equipping them with new weapons. “New” now simply means operational. We achieved this most in a simple way— all serviceable kits were removed from storage bases and reserve warehouses and sent to staff these brigades.

On the one hand, of course, it is wonderful that now the “new look” brigades contain only functional and serviceable weapons and equipment, but on the other hand, what will happen to this equipment after its service life is over and it suffers the fate of those kits? , which were in service before? If the Ministry of Defense does not have the money to restore the equipment that was in the “old look” regiments and divisions, then where will it come from to repair the new one?
. And wouldn’t it be wiser in this case to repair the “old” one? After all, the current “rearmament” is not a transition to qualitatively new weapons and equipment, but only “eating” the mobilization reserve, without which Russia simply cannot win a single more or less large-scale war.

As an example it is worth taking Far Eastern Theater of Operations(TVD).

In 1986-1997 the number of divisions in the Far Eastern theater of operations decreased from 57 to 23, tanks - from 14,900 to 10,068, surface-to-surface missiles - from 363 to 102, combat helicopters - from 1,000 to 310, combat aircraft - from 1,125 to 500. Process reductions continued after 1997, although at a slightly slower pace.
. As a result, before the start of the Serdyukov reform, 23 divisions were located here, but more than half of these formations were “staffed” - that is, reduced in strength, and the total grouping of the Ground Forces consisted of about 100 thousand soldiers and officers.

In the Shenyang and Beijing military districts of the PLA opposing us, directly bordering Russia on Far East and in Transbaikalia, 22 divisions (4 tank, 6 mechanized, 6 motorized infantry, 3 airborne, 3 artillery) and 38 brigades (6 tank, 12 motorized infantry, 1 infantry, 7 artillery, 1 anti-tank, 11 air defense) are concentrated. In reserve - 7 infantry divisions and 3 air defense divisions, in total more than 500,000 soldiers and officers, 3,000 tanks and more than 1,000 airplanes and helicopters.

Chinese helicopter pilots

To transport reinforcements from the west, we have only one communication line - Transsib. Its length (from Yaroslavsky railway station in Moscow to Vladivostok station) is 9288 km. Wherein more than 1500 kilometers of this railway They go in close proximity to the Soviet-Chinese border, sometimes approaching it within line of sight. Therefore, in Soviet times, the high military command never counted on it as a way to transport reserves in the event of an aggravation of the situation in this region.

The bet was placed on something else - in case of war, the Far Eastern group had in its warehouses and bases the storage of equipment, weapons, ammunition and ammunition for almost a million-strong military group. In the event of a military threat, the ground military group deployed here could be increased to almost 500 thousand in thirty days, and up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers in forty-five days, which would already qualitatively change the balance of power in the region, given the ongoing technical superiority, and most importantly, superiority in command and control at the operational-strategic level. Considering the strategic superiority of the USSR in nuclear weapons and the covering of the main economic centers with fortified areas, this made the war against the USSR a senseless adventure.

After Serdyukov’s “optimization,” the number of deployed troops in this region even increased by about 20 thousand people. It would seem that one can only rejoice, but at the same time, the entire mobilization part of our military group has been virtually completely eliminated. All “cadre” regiments and divisions were reduced and disbanded. According to the plans of Makarov and Serdyukov, only a few can be deployed here in case of war. separate brigades. Moreover, after Putin signed agreements with China on a hundred-kilometer demilitarized zone along the border and territorial concessions to China all our fortified areas were disarmed and blown up.

In the event of a hypothetical war with China, the half-million Chinese group will be opposed by a thin defensive chain of three dozen brigades numbering just over 100 thousand people. Moreover, stretched over more than 1,500 kilometers along the Chinese border, without reserves and without any hope of strengthening. Since the transfer of one brigade from the European part of Russia here will take no less than a month, unless, of course, the Chinese cut the Trans-Siberian Railway earlier.

The permanent deployment point of the northernmost MSBR in Primorye has been determined in Sibirtsevo, and the southernmost MSBR Khabarovsk Territory in Bikin. Between them there are more than 400 km of border strip, protected electronic system observations of border posts with 15% staffing and abandoned military camps: Salskoye, Grafskoye, Vedenka, Dalnerechensk, Lazo, Filino, Koltsevoye, Panteleimonovka, Lesozavodsk, Sungach, Knoring, Spassk, Chernigovka.
. At the same time, fully understanding the state of our Far Eastern group, the current chief General Staff General Makarov cheerfully hypnotizes the public:

« Now the new brigades are ready not only for the immediate use of force, but are also capable of holding off any enemy for 45 days. This time is quite enough to mobilize and reinforce them with additional forces if necessary...«

I remember that in our history there were already military leaders who promised Comrade Stalin to defeat any enemy with one powerful blow, quickly and on foreign territory. And then it was forty-one...
. I'm afraid that General Makarov remembers very poorly military history his army and the fate of these “optimists” in the general’s stripes.
. How sadly Far Eastern officers joke today: after the Serdyukov-Makarov “optimization” for Chinese army it won't be a difficult problem to defeat Russian army. The problem will be to find it...