New Great Game in Central Asia? Big Game in Central Asia. In memory of Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev

Is there a new Big game, influencing the existence of Central Asia? Many experts and journalists who write about the region and its global significance claim that there is. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War and the birth of the five republics of Central Asia, this discussion has dominated much of the analysis about the region.
Captain Arthur Conolly, a British officer in the 6th Bengal Light Horse, came up with the concept of the "Great Game" in the 1830s. Later, the English writer Rudyard Kipling immortalized the concept in his 1901 novel Kim. In basic terms, the "Great Game" was simply a struggle for power, control of territory, and political dominance between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia in the nineteenth century. This rivalry in maneuvering and intrigue between the two empires came to an end in 1907, when both countries were forced to focus their resources on more serious threats. The British were forced to prepare and contain the rise of an assertive German in Europe, and the Russians were locked in a bitter fight against the Japanese in Manchuria.
Today, the US invasion of Afghanistan and the opening of military bases in Central Asia and China's economic expansion into the region have convinced experts that a new "Great Game" has begun. German journalist Lutz Klevemen writes that a new "Great Game" is "raging in the region". Quoting Bill Richardson, the former U.S. Secretary of Energy and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during the Clinton administration, Kleveman writes that the U.S. became involved in Central Asia not only to defeat al-Qaeda, but to “diversify [its] sources of oil.” and gas [and] prevent strategic raids by those who do not share [their] values. Niklas Swanström, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, has come to the same conclusion about China and Central Asia: a new Great Game or traditional vassalage? Asia, he says: “The situation in Central Asia seems to be moving towards a new version of the Great Game.”
Contrary to popular belief, China's goal in Central Asia is not to engage in a game with other regional powers, but to secure "support from countries in the region in cracking down on anti-Beijing Uyghur nationalists" and to pave the way for Chinese firms to invest in Central Asia. Asian energy resources. Where to buy e-cigarettes in Moscow The Central Asian states supply oil and natural gas, and China, as a rising economic power and the second largest consumer of energy, has a clear interest in increasing its presence in the region. China's efforts to build roads and improve infrastructure and railways show the country's growing involvement in Central Asia. As China's relations with the Central Asian republics grow, "its relations with major powers such as the US and Russia could suffer," says Kevin Shaves, a regional scholar.
It is too early for China to follow the path of such a strategy. At present, China is facing many domestic problems. For example, he has the issue of Tibet, Xinjiang and other semi-autonomous regions, all of which have separatist inclinations and independence ambitions. China's top priority in Central Asia should be securing security, maintaining regional stability, suppressing Uighur separatists in Xinjiang, and strengthening economic ties in the region.
In order to meet the needs of its 1.4 billion people, China must continuously seek resources around the world. Chinese corporations and state-owned companies are involved in the economic life of the five Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have rich natural gas and oil reserves. Given China's security concerns and energy needs, its engagement with the Central Asian states will increase dramatically in the long term. The Central Asian states are also welcoming China's growing development as they try to break Russia's monopoly over transport routes. Since the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 2001, China has been working to build a new Silk Road to integrate Central Asia and the rest of the world with Xinjiang, an autonomous region in northwest China. The return of the Celestial Empire to Central Asia is likely to change the geopolitics in the region, we hope for the better.

Faheem Masood is a recent graduate of Washington University in St. Louis where he studied history and politics.

Fahim Massoud,
Khaama Press,
January 27, 2014
Translation - "website"

Original material in English.

The new role of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the US strategy

The "Great Game" is a term coined in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to refer to the rivalry and colonial conquests of the British and Russian empires in Central and South Asia. The focus of events was Afghanistan. The term was again remembered in connection with the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new republics of Central Asia. Since then, the situation has evolved rapidly. Today, geopolitics buffs are talking about a new Great Game or “Great Game 2.0, 3.0…”. In relation to the region, this means the same struggle for resources between global players - the United States, Russia and China - with the only difference that such geopolitical constructions are just “optics” - as old as the technologies of the times of the first Great Game.

The recent history of US-Russian relations in Afghanistan actually begins with the collapse of the USSR. The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 was not a withdrawal in the full sense of the word. Support for Najibullah, and after the fall of his regime in 1993, sympathy for the Mujahideen group and the ruling Islamic Party of Afghanistan at that time with a predominance of the Tajik ethnic element. These kinds of bets are almost inevitable in this country, where ethnic and even tribal origin is a political marker. The party, led by Rabbani and Massoud, increasingly lost control, while other groups (for example, led by Hekmatyar) demanded much more than they were intended to within the transitional governments. The disputes escalated into a civil war, which gave birth to the Taliban.

If we remember who at one time financed and armed the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation, it becomes clear why the "ghost" of the United States was seen in all the troubles and conflicts of Afghanistan. Such was the Russian optics of the Afghan problem. But the United States has, in fact, not cared about Afghanistan since 1989. The Cold War is over. The one who was really haunted by this problem was Pakistan.

During the Soviet military presence, Islamabad became the main transit country for financial, material and military assistance to the Mujahideen. The funds were colossal: the United States - USD 1 billion per year, Saudi Arabia - USD 800 million. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence became an almost profitable corporation that stood at the origins of the distribution of such "aid". Having lost a donor, as well as having received many problems with the former "wards", Pakistan faced the task of an intra-Afghan settlement.

The Taliban became a kind of "response". But here, too, things were by no means simple. The ethnically Pashtun movement was supposed to help solve the Pakistani problem of Pashtunistan, about 50% of whose territory is part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. And there was no Afghan government that would recognize the Pakistani-Afghan border as fair. If we talk about the demographic component, then the titular group in Afghanistan is the Pashtuns - 47% of the population (16 million people), while in Pakistan the Pashtuns are an ethnic minority - 15% (30 million people). Considering that the Pashtun tribes are distinguished by militancy, high mobility, pronounced tribal loyalty and almost complete disregard for state borders(for various reasons, including economic ones), it will become clear why it is so important for Islamabad to have a reliable partner or even ally in the face of Kabul.

Pakistan's assistance and support to the Taliban movement was based on two considerations: ensuring Pakistani interests regarding the border issue and entering the market of the new independent states of Central Asia.

Big Game 2.0

The vast majority of geopolitical projects have one significant flaw: the interests of medium and small countries (subjects) are not included in the analysis of the present and the projection of the future. But, entering into a dispute with lovers of geopolitics, I would like to say that global players play, although they play an important role, but do not completely determine the situation.

So it was with the Taliban. The Taliban were building the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but internal resources were not enough to maintain the loyalty of all parties. The Taliban had more opponents in the region and in the world than supporters. Three states recognized their legitimacy - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. The countries of Central Asia in 1996, together with Moscow, outlined their position on the non-recognition of the Emirate. Although, it should be noted that there was no unity here either. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as a whole did not refuse further episodic cooperation, while for Moscow the establishment of ties by the Taliban with the separatists of Chechnya ruled out any possibility of recognizing their regime.

The terrible practice of using the norms of "Islamic law" by the Taliban turned everyone against them international community. Even the demonstrative fight against drug trafficking did not help to correct their image. Devastation, lack of external sources of financing, sanctions and prolonged drought and crop failure in 1999-2001. led to a humanitarian catastrophe. And the alliance of the Taliban with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden personally led to a political disaster. The attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, the destruction of the Buddha statues and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 - this is the chain of events that led to the massive US military invasion of Afghanistan and the military presence in the countries of Central Asia. Let me remind you that we are talking about two military bases in Khanabad (Uzbekistan) and Gansi (Kyrgyzstan). This fundamentally changed the military-strategic situation in the region.

The Russian political and military elite took all this with a mixture of anxiety and relief. It was rather difficult for Moscow to admit its helplessness in the face of the advancing radical Islamism, which seriously and permanently changed the political map of the region. At the turn of the century central Asia shook under the blows of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the civil war in Tajikistan had just ended. There were not enough forces and means to stop the infiltration of terrorist groups from Afghanistan. Russia experienced the default of 1998 and its consequences, the counter-terrorist campaign in Chechnya in 2000.

China, in a certain sense, taking advantage of the situation, announced the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the summer of 2001. The US invasion of Afghanistan counterbalanced the situation, but threatened with long-term consequences for the entire region (including Russian interests).

Big Game 3.0

So, the "ghost" of the United States materialized. A long and complex antiterrorist campaign began in Afghanistan. If you follow the formal history, then it took place in several stages. The first was the establishment of control over the capital and part of the country (2001-2003), then the NATO military mission (2003-2014) and, since 2015, Operation Resolute Support, the purpose of which was to assist the government of Afghanistan in establishing control over the country. If we talk about the true state of affairs, then control was never established, since the expansion of the zones of responsibility to the south and east encountered serious resistance. The Obama administration's promise to end the military campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan spurred the Americans to end NATO's mission.

During all this time, Russian-American relations have experienced ups and downs, although the Afghan issue has been an example of cooperation between countries. In particular, Russia received a solid contract for the supply of fuel for military equipment. But as the troops were withdrawn (and the transitional period was defined from 2012 to 2014), relations got worse. The Ukrainian issue - the Maidan, the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the southeast of the country - in a short time reduced Russian-American relations to the state of the "second edition of the Cold War."

In 2013, Xi Jinping presented his project to the world in Astana, then called the Economic Belts of the Silk Road, and now the One Belt - One Road (OBOR). It has become clear that China sees Central Asia as part of its new strategy. Meanwhile, the situation with the growth of another radical Islamist project had a significant impact on Afghanistan.

In June 2014, the march of ISIS units from Syria to Iraq amazed all experts. Such consequences civil war in Syria, no one expected, but when it became known that this grouping was created on the territory of Iraq back in 2006, it became clear why their captures were so impressive. The idea of ​​the Caliphate, implemented by ISIS, recruited more and more supporters into its ranks. Among them were not only citizens of Iraq, Syria, Jordan and other countries of the region, but also Western states. Over time, it became known that among the militants of the Islamic State there are many immigrants from the former USSR (Russia, the South Caucasus, Central Asia). ISIS militants began to infiltrate Afghanistan and recruit young people into their ranks, but in addition, individual groups also began to take an oath of allegiance to the new emir al-Baghdadi. Among the Taliban, fermentation began.

For Afghanistan, “X-hour” was 2015. The NATO military mission ended, but the transition of control over the country was carried out with problems. The shock came when the Taliban invaded the province of Kunduz on the border with Tajikistan and seized the provincial capital. It was not just an attack, but a real battle for the city and one of the four most important military pillars of NATO's presence in the north. The conflict between ISIS and the Taliban has given rise to a misleading perception that all global players have room to maneuver. Rumor has it that there have been attempts to forge a tactical alliance with the Taliban against ISIS, which has enabled the movement to obtain arms as well as participate in negotiations on a future Afghan settlement. By the fall of 2017, it became clear that the Taliban were taking advantage of the shift in attention to IS to strengthen their position in the country.

It was the relationship with the Taliban that became the "stumbling block" between the US and Russia. The US military accused the Russian side of supplying small arms to the Taliban, in response there was an accusation of transferring IS fighters to Afghanistan. But one thing needs to be clear in this "muddy story": the Taliban movement is recognized as a force to be reckoned with in future negotiations on Afghanistan.

Big Game 4.0

A year ago, when D. Trump entered the White House, representatives of the US expert community argued that the new president did not have a foreign policy strategy, but today we can fully imagine this strategy.

By the summer of 2017, it became clear that US-Russian relations would not improve. In Washington, a scandal over the interference of Russian special services in the electoral process was gaining momentum. On August 2, Trump signed into law the Russia, Iran, and North Korea Tighter Sanctions Act, which explicitly called Russia an enemy for the first time since the Cold War. The sanctions part of the law has not yet been implemented, including a secret list of people who will be subject to sanctions in the first stage. The White House has taken a pause on this issue for now, but enforcement of the law is inevitable.

On August 21, 2017, a new strategy for Afghanistan was presented, which included five main positions: 1) an increase in the military presence (the number is not specified exactly); 2) the military makes decisions on conducting operations on the spot; 3) the ultimate goal is to force the Taliban into peace negotiations; 4) force Pakistan to stop harboring the heads of terrorist groups (Haqqani); 5) the goal is victory, not state building.

According to unofficial data given Washington post, for the year from December 2016 to December 2017, the number of American military personnel doubled from 8.4 thousand to 15.2 thousand. It is planned to transfer another 1,000 US military by the spring of 2018 to create a new unit under the working name of the Support Brigade law enforcement agencies, which should directly help in the fight against the Taliban.

In December 2017, a new National Security Strategy was published, which actually outlined the main contours of US policy for the coming years. South and Central Asia in the regional context comes fourth after the Middle East. The essence of this direction lies in the fact that the strategic partnership with India is complemented by other partnerships, including with Pakistan, which is determined by many factors. One sentence identifies the main counterparty - China, which is regarded as a challenge to the sovereignty of the South Asian and Central Asian nations in light of the increase in influence due to the new initiative - BRI. Separate attention is paid to the integration of Central and South Asia, and in the military sphere, the importance of the region in terms of transit (the transfer of goods to Afghanistan, as in 2001) is emphasized. At the same time, it is clear from the text that the emphasis is on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

In mid-December, a meeting was also held between the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, at which the issue of building the China-Pakistan Development Corridor (PCDC) was discussed, which includes Afghanistan, which is an integral part of the BRI. At the same time, since the beginning of 2017, the US military has been throwing information about the appearance of the Chinese military in the country. Beijing does not refute such information, but emphasizes that the joint patrolling of the Sino-Afghan border (a section of 78 km) was aimed at joint anti-terrorist exercises.

Thus, we can state the beginning of a new round of the so-called Great Game or Game 4.0. The essential difference of this game will be the inclusion of such states as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as its subjects. The Islamists and the Taliban have proven their viability, and, accordingly, they will also have to be reckoned with.

To be continued

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Is there a return to life of the “Great Game” in Central Asia? Many specialists and journalists who write about this region and its significance for the whole world argue in favor of this. Indeed, after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the five Central Asian republics, this topic has been predominant in most of the analytics devoted to the region.

In the 1930s, an officer in the 6th Regiment of the Bengal Native Light Horse, Captain Arthur Conolly, created the concept of the "Great Game". Later, in 1901, the English writer Rudyard Kipling immortalized the term in his novel Kim. At its core, the "Great Game" was simply a 19th century power struggle for control of territory and political dominance between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia. This competition of empires in maneuver and intrigue ended in 1907, when both states were forced to focus their resources on more serious threats. The British had to prepare and take measures to contain the rise of an assertive Germany in Europe, while the Russians had their hands tied in a fierce struggle with the Japanese in Manchuria.

Today, the US invasion of Afghanistan and the opening of military bases in Central Asia, as well as Chinese economic expansion in the region, have convinced experts that a new "Great Game" is underway. The German journalist Lutz Kleveman writes that “the Great Game is raging in the region”. Quoting former Clinton-era U.S. energy secretary and U.N. ambassador Bill Richardson, Kleveman points out that the U.S. is involved in Central Asian affairs not only to defeat al-Qaeda, but also to “diversify [its] sources of oil.” and gas [and] prevent strategic encroachment from those who do not share [their] values.” Johns Hopkins University professor Niklas Swanström comes to the same conclusion in his article “China and Central Asia: New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?” proves that the US and China are embroiled in a geo-economic rivalry over the natural resources of Central Asia. According to him, "the situation in Central Asia seems to be developing in the direction of a new version of the Great Game."

Contrary to popular belief, China's goal in Central Asia is not to play a game with other regional powers, but to enlist the support of "the countries of the region in suppressing the anti-Beijing movement of the Uyghur nationalists" and to create conditions for Chinese firms to invest in energy resources of Central Asia. Nature has generously endowed the Central Asian states with reserves of oil and natural gas, and China, as a dynamic economic power and the second largest consumer of energy, is clearly interested in increasing the degree of its presence in the region. China's efforts to build highways, improve infrastructure and railways testify to the growing involvement of the country in the affairs of Central Asia. As China's ties with the Central Asian republics develop, "its relations with the major powers, namely the US and Russia, could suffer," says regional expert Kevin Shives.

So far, such a reversal in strategy would be premature for China. At the moment, China is facing many internal problems. For example, he has to deal with Tibet, Xinjiang and other semi-autonomous regions with separatist sentiments and aspirations for independence. China's top priorities in Central Asia should be securing security, maintaining regional stability, pacifying Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang, and strengthening economic ties in the region.

To meet the needs of its 1.4 billion people, China must constantly search for resources around the world. Chinese corporations and state-owned companies are involved in the economic life of the five Central Asian republics with huge reserves of natural gas and oil: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Given China's keen interest in security issues, as well as its energy needs, in the long term, its interaction with the countries of Central Asia will radically expand. The Central Asian states are also welcoming China's growing expansion as they seek to break Russia's monopoly over transport routes. Even after the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, China did not stop working on laying a new Silk Road, designed to connect Central Asia and the rest of the world with its northwestern Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The return of the Middle Kingdom to Central Asia should in all likelihood produce changes in the geopolitical configuration of the region - hopefully for the better.

"When everyone dies, only then will it end

Big game. Not earlier".

Rudyard Kipling. "Kim" (1901)

In February 2002, US Secretary of State Colonel Powell, in his speech before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives of the US Congress, stated that "the United States will acquire such long-term interests and military presence in Central Asia as we have never dreamed of", emphasizing thus, not only did a profound change take place in the American perception of Central Asia, but also unofficially confirmed new US ambitions for the entire region.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the resulting massive US-led military deployment, the entire concept of a "new Great Game" has been redefined. The term "new Great Game" is based on the already well-known concept of the "Great Game", which describes the rivalry between Russia and Great Britain for dominance in Central Asia in the 19th century. However, the term "new Great Game" is even more multifaceted and describes a wider range of goals, objectives, means and risks in various areas, and therefore can definitely be characterized as "The Greatest Game" . Although The Greatest Game began as a joint action by various players to counter a common terrorist threat, today it seems to have taken on an overtone of competition.

Washington's involvement in Central Asian affairs was initially perceived as marginal compared to core US security interests. The events of September 11, 2001 aroused unprecedented interest in the region, since, from the official point of view, the most active radical Islamic terrorist groups have found shelter there. The United States became involved in regional

issues extremely deep, and even become a major player in Central Asia. They not only pushed the border of their national security interests far to the east, but also applied a new security strategy that resembles the myth of the American “new frontier” strategy.

By waging a war on terrorism and consistently emphasizing the importance of using force in that war, primarily by projecting military power into the region, the US administration's new Central Asian policy pursues conflicting goals.

The question may arise as to whether the new American politics national security to ensure stability in Central Asia, or it may induce other forces operating in the region to take retaliatory actions, and thus provoke further destabilization of the situation both in individual states and in the region as a whole.

This article suggests that while the United States initially contributed to some stability in Central Asia, its actions after September 11, 2001, are not only aimed at solving security problems in the short term. First of all, US involvement in the problems of the region pursues long-term strategic goals, which can probably lead to destabilization of the situation by creating new security problems in the countries of Central Asia and in the region as a whole.

First, we will show that US policy in Central Asia largely responded to classic post-Cold War security and economic challenges as part of a focused strategy for the region. Since September 11, 2001, the new US national security policy has undergone fundamental changes in terms of assessing foreign and security policy priorities. Secondly, the article will show that the current US policy in Central Asia has given impetus to the development of a more complete, comprehensive strategy, which, in turn, has set the stage for the start of the “Greatest Game”, which can not only change the balance of power, but and provoke geopolitical rivalry in the region.

The Emergence of the "Eurasian Dimension" of US Foreign Policy in the 1990s: From Foreign Policy Concerns to Vital National Security Interests

There is no doubt that US interests in Central Asia were affected by their response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. explore US policy and interests in Central Asia prior to the events of autumn 2001 to pave the way for further analysis of what lies ahead for the region in terms of stability and security.

We will demonstrate that the emergence of the "Eurasian dimension" of American foreign policy in the 1990s paved the way for massive US strategic intervention in the region, triggered by the events of 9/11. Thus, the massive introduction of US military power into the region greatly accelerated the development of the processes that had been taking shape there over the previous decade.

Towards a Targeted Strategy in Central Asia

"From the point of view of US foreign policy, the post-Soviet states of Central Asia were before the events of September 11, 2001, just like on the other side of the moon" . Most experts on Central Asia believe that the United States initially had neither a common strategy nor significant interests in this region. Below we will show that, despite the seeming contradiction of this point of view, US policy has rapidly evolved into a strategy that we will call the “ordering strategy”. This term refers to the US strategy aimed at "Westernization" of the states of Central Asia through the use of economic and military levers. The goal of the "streamlining strategy" is not only to benefit from the energy resources of the region. First of all, this strategy is aimed at preventing the restoration of Russian influence in the region.

Until 1991, the states of Central Asia were “backwater territories” in the sense that all of these five republics of the Soviet Union played practically no role in the bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States during the Cold War. Although Central Asia has always been at the crossroads of mutually influencing countries and regions, such as Russia and Eurasia or the Middle East and South Asia, its geopolitical significance as a potential “buffer zone” or territory through which goods transited from ancient times (“Silk Road”) has been minimized by the efforts of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. and recognition by the United States of the new states of Central Asia, Washington began to develop diplomatic ties with the countries of the region by supporting democratic initiatives in them, providing economic assistance and encouraging a balanced security policy.

The B. Clinton administration began developing stable relations with the five countries of Central Asia from diplomatic contacts and economic interaction. The basis for US assistance to these states was the Freedom Support Act, adopted on October 24, 1992. The Central Asian countries were initially viewed by the US administration as potential members of the community of democratic states with market economies, and the US initially focused specifically on democratization and market reforms in them. To do this, the United States also began to encourage cooperation between countries within the region, relying heavily on multilateral mechanisms, such as the Central Asian Economic Community and NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

In addition, the collapse of the USSR coincided with the discovery of new mineral reserves in the Caspian Sea, which could not but attract many multinational oil companies, including the largest American ones, to the region. The then US Deputy Secretary of State, S. Talbott, argued for the need to support democratic change in his 1997 speech, which to this day articulates vital US strategic interests in Central Asia. According to experts, "his speech clearly shows why access to regional oil and gas resources is the most pressing US interest in the region" . Before the signing of the largest oil supply contracts between the US and Kazakhstan in 1993-1994. Central Asia was not perceived as a region of economic importance. Thus, the commercial interest of American oil companies in the exploitation of new fields gave rise to a specific interest of the US administration in ensuring the security of the region. However, in the period from 1992 to 1996, insufficient coordination of actions did not allow the United States to act effectively in this direction, since work with various Central Asian countries was divided between separate ministries pursuing their own goals. According to F. Hill, "the implementation of a single policy was practically impossible due to conflicts of departmental powers" . It wasn't until 1996 that the US National Security Council, one of the government's closest bodies to the president, began to coordinate the previously independent actions of various ministries, focusing on the security threats posed by the exploitation of the Caspian Sea oil fields in close proximity to Russia. Meanwhile, the economic and diplomatic isolation of Iran (a consequence of the passage of the US Iran and Libya Sanctions Act as a punishment for supporting international terrorism) has become a major factor in determining political decision-making in Central Asia. Therefore, it can be argued that already in 1996, when the US National Security Council participated in the process of searching for new energy suppliers and even set the priority for the construction of pipelines, the energy “economic basket” became a strategic tool, and not just economic assistance to Central Asian companies.

The development of permanent diplomatic relations between the United States and the five states of Central Asia has also become a factor holding back the expansion of Russian influence in the region. Cooperation in the field of security, observance of the geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the United States in the region have become no less important than the development of democracy in the Central Asian states and their integration into the world community.

The need for cooperation in the field of security became apparent already in 1991, when the George W. Bush administration was extremely keen to eliminate the nuclear arsenal of Kazakhstan and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. Thus, it was Kazakhstan that became the first state in Central Asia, on which the United States focused, pursuing the interests of its security. However, significant changes have already been made to the policy of the B. Clinton administration regarding the states of the region, reflecting other strategic and economic characteristics of these countries. The United States was still interested in the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Kazakhstan, but at the same time, the B. Clinton administration also pursued economic interests, in particular those related to oil production in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

If we take into account the annual 2% growth in world energy consumption predicted by the US Department of Energy, as well as the political instability in the Middle East that continued throughout the last decade of the 20th century, it becomes clear why the need to find additional, independent of OPEC, sources of oil supplies , alternative energy sources and various ways of transporting energy carriers has been elevated to the rank of a priority in US foreign policy. According to existing forecasts, the fields of the Caspian Sea can produce from three to four percent of the world's oil production, while Kazakhstan has the opportunity to become one of the five largest oil exporters by 2015.

The Clinton administration initially favored the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), whose capacities began to transport crude oil from Kazakhstan (Tengiz) and Russia to the Black Sea, thus respecting Moscow's interests. But in 1998, the United States launched a campaign to reduce Russia's influence on Central Asian energy resources in the Caspian Basin by supporting pipelines that run through the Caucasus (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), as well as through NATO member Turkey, but do not pass through Russia. .

In the 1990s there are two (quite viable politically and economically) opportunities to transport Caspian oil and gas to the east - through China and Afghanistan, which, in addition, could reduce future energy supplies and regional trade links taking place on the North-South axis, Russia - Iran. Thus, the main motive for US action was geo-economic: the development of Caspian energy resources would not only have a positive impact on US energy security, but would also create several commercial opportunities for US companies. Moreover, the creation of the post of Caspian Energy Coordinator in the State Department, rather than in the Department of Commerce or Energy, highlights the fact that in this case geopolitical considerations are more important for the US than commercial interests. Finally, the Clinton administration's national security strategy officially calls the need to create an environment of stability for energy exports the cornerstone of US foreign policy. Even American officials, such as former Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, General E. Zinni, began to say that "access to energy carriers determines the entire US policy in Central Asia" . However, despite this, one cannot analyze US actions in the region only from the point of view of the struggle for oil and gas reserves.

US military presence in Central Asia in the 1990s demonstrated the importance of US national security interests in the region, which were not limited to the provision of humanitarian assistance and support for reforms. In 1994, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a defense cooperation agreement, which was then expanded with another agreement in 1997. By mid-1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan had joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program, not only thus formalizing its relations with NATO, but also further isolating Russia from its former sphere of influence. In December 1995, the United States supported the creation of the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion("Centrazbat"), formed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with the aim of ensuring peace and stability in Central Asia. According to S. Talbott, the expansion of military cooperation should reduce instability in the region and promote mutual security. However, military cooperation can also be seen as an attempt to reduce Russia's political and security influence. In the late 1990s was held a large number of joint exercises both in Central Asia, mainly in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and in the United States. These exercises were conducted on a regular basis at the battalion or brigade level as part of NATO's Partnership for Peace (Joint Exercise Nugget and Osprey), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program or bilateral cooperation agreements. They involved the US armed forces (airborne troops, units special purpose or mountain troops), the forces of NATO and the Central Asian states.

The passage of the Silk Road Strategy Act by the US Congress in May 1999 highlighted the importance of US geostrategic and economic interests in Central Asia. The Congress reaffirmed the intention of the United States to use military methods to counteract the development of Islamic radicalism in the region. US assistance to the Central Asian states in conducting antiterrorist operations, including preventive measures, began two years before the events of September 11, 2001. This assistance was expanded after the invasion of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999. As a result, the Pentagon redistributed the areas of responsibility of various commands in the area of ​​the Caspian Sea. Central Asia was transferred to the area of ​​responsibility of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) in order to strengthen and consolidate military cooperation with the states of the region. In April 2000, the United States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan created the Central Asian Border Security Initiative (CASI) to combat the terrorist threat.

Most US officials and experts on Central Asia deny that the US followed a single "Grand Strategy" with regard to the region. Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that already in 1998 the "westernization" of security issues, as well as issues of oil production in the Caspian (which already directly implies the revival of the energy "Silk Road") showed that geopolitical factors and strategic considerations have greater influence than purely economic logic. Moreover, this paper will show that the “ordering strategy” already existed in the 1990s. The US, through the involvement of US companies, has been able to gain leverage over most of the oil and gas export routes from the Caspian Basin, as well as significant leverage over this “geopolitical chessboard vital to US dominance and historical heritage.”

There is no doubt that the system of strategic relations between the United States and the states of Central Asia, which was gradually created in the 1990s, greatly helped to develop military cooperation and rapidly increase the projection of military power on Central Asia immediately after the terrorist attacks on New York. York and Washington.

Formal recognition by the American administration of its most important interests in Central Asia after 9/11

“The strategic interests of the United States in Central Asia are: security, including the fight against terrorism, the spread and trafficking of drugs; energy; as well as internal reforms. […] Our policy must include commitments to deeper, longer-term, and better-coordinated engagement on a wide range of issues,” said US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Jones on October 29, 2003.

The attack on the US on September 11, 2001 changed the entire geostrategic situation in Central Asia, greatly increased the importance of the region and led to the recognition of the profound trends that had developed there over the previous decade. Due in part to the strategic and hostilities challenges faced by US forces during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the importance of the Central Asian states in the eyes of US officials has risen to a previously unthinkable level.

Having officially declared its pressing national interests in Central Asia, the United States decided to use unprecedented military power to carry out Operation Enduring Freedom, while significantly increasing financial and economic assistance to the states of the region.

In October 2001, the US Department of Defense released the Four-Year Defense Policy Plan, which outlined the key principles underlying fundamental US security interests. The content of this document explicitly substantiated the need to develop diplomatic, military, and economic ties between the United States and the countries of Central Asia. The document emphasized the importance of maintaining free access to key markets and strategic resources, and also noted that the increased likelihood of military clashes in Central Asia led to characterizing the region as an "arc of instability." To prevent

"Afghanization" of Central Asia and an increase in the number of terrorist groups with international contacts that could threaten the stability of surrounding territories and attack the United States, American foreign policy has focused primarily on security issues, and not on following the "Grand Strategy". It seemed that the supposed revival of US interest in Central Asia and involvement in the affairs of the region was dictated by the need to wage war in Afghanistan. As A. Cohen stated, "the US presence in Central Asia is a direct result of the attack on the United States on September 11" .

In December 2001, the US Senate decided to create a Special Subcommittee on Central Asian Affairs, once again showing how seriously the United States is concerned about what is happening in the region.

Immediately after the US was faced with the need to quickly project military power into the region to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda, US officials turned to the Central Asian states for help. Because of the region's geography, these states have proven to be very important to both short-term and long-term US national security interests. The proximity of the Central Asian states to the theater of operations in Afghanistan has increased their strategic importance within the new security paradigm that has emerged since the events of 9/11. Although their reaction was initially rather cautious, in the end, for financial and strategic reasons, all five Central Asian states agreed to share intelligence information and allowed access to their airspace.

Uzbekistan was the first to allow American troops access to its territory. Its strategic location and robust air transport infrastructure can support operations not only in Afghanistan, but also anywhere in Central Asia and parts of South Asia. For this reason, at the same time as the maneuvers already taking place throughout the region, US military strategists began to look for opportunities to use the military airfields of the former USSR. According to the results of assessments of the current state of the runways and other equipment, the two largest bases of the Uzbek Air Force - Kakaydy and Karchi-Khanabad - were officially recognized as the most suitable for basing heavy and super-heavy transport aircraft and handling large cargo flows. Khanabad was also chosen as a "jump airfield" for the US Special Forces and the 10th Mountain Division. According to unconfirmed reports, five other former Soviet military installations were also unofficially used by the US Army. Tajikistan, which has a 1,200-kilometer border with Afghanistan, has also proved to be extremely useful in carrying out Operation Enduring Freedom.

It also provided air corridors and stationed US forces on its territory after obtaining the appropriate permission from Russia. The Dushanbe airport was originally chosen for this purpose, but four other Tajik air bases were also reportedly used by both US forces and other members of the Coalition. In December 2001, the United States signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan on the use of the Manas International Airport, located near Bishkek. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have also granted the US the critical right of access to their airspace and limited access to their airfields.

In response to the unprecedented granting of these access rights, and in recognition of heightened national security interests and U.S. involvement in the region, the George W. Bush administration has decided to significantly increase assistance to the Central Asian states through "well-targeted" financial assistance. In September 2000, the US estimated that financial assistance to all five Central Asian states in fiscal year 2002 would be about $110.5 million. Already in 2001 this figure more than doubled and amounted to 230 million dollars, and in 2002 it increased to 594 million dollars. On March 14, 2002, the George W. Bush administration launched the Millennium Challenge Account initiative aimed at increasing financial assistance to developing countries by 50% over the next three financial years. Aid to the Central Asian states is expected to grow by 39%. Moreover, the US Agency for International Development has allocated another $22.2 million for the development new Program Community Investment in Central Asia (CAIP) .

Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, US actions in Central Asia were mainly aimed at countering the security challenges that arose as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the development of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea. As already mentioned, in the late 1990s a new “streamlining strategy” has emerged, aimed at achieving various strategic goals through the provision of foreign financial assistance, the development of regional energy resources, and the implementation of military cooperation programs. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington exacerbated and formalized a profound change in the US understanding of its national security priorities and strategic interests. The "security vacuum" in Central Asia posed a serious threat to US national security and needed to be addressed.

The war on terror has caused global geopolitical changes in Central Asia. Regional powers entered into interaction with the United States, and the latter, in turn, began to try to take the place of the main guarantor of the region's security, which used to belong to Russia. The US is becoming almost a "regional" power, as it turns Central Asia into a quasi-protectorate, where the development of destabilizing processes that cause concern is likely.

The "Greatest Game" in Central Asia: from cooperation to rivalry

The US military presence in Central Asia is a direct consequence of the al-Qaeda attack on the US. The rapid introduction of troops into the region has undoubtedly brought stability in the short and medium term, and also contributed to the security of the region. However, it was not aimed at stabilization as such, but at countering a direct and clear threat to US national security. Some analysts also believe that the American invasion gave the Central Asian states a chance to "start over".

It can be argued that the intended long-term US military presence in the region could be counterproductive. The US quest for dominance in Central Asia could pose two challenges related to local political realities and regional security. They can lead to long-term friction within the region and regional geopolitical instability.

Challenge One: Provoking Regional Destabilization

Due to the fact that the states of Central Asia were not so long ago part of the USSR, today they are ruled by secular regimes. In addition, these countries boast some of the most educated and moderate Sunni Muslim populations in the world. However, one of the main characteristics of the current Central Asian regimes is a strong tradition of authoritarianism, elite corruption, and disregard for the law and human rights. Moreover, the Central Asian states, with the exception of Kazakhstan, are among the poorest states in the world, which means they are fertile ground for the development of radical Muslim movements. Therefore, it is not surprising that the US administration has decided to fight the causes of Islamic terrorism by providing economic assistance to the countries of Central Asia. But, despite a significant increase in volume, this assistance still covers only a part of the urgent needs of the states of the region. It can even be said that Washington's assistance to these countries is intended only to persuade them to carry out actions that are in the sphere of American interests, and the allocation of financial assistance is not aimed at a real solution to most political and political issues. economic problems region. Geopolitical reasons and the predominantly military nature of the US presence oblige Washington to deal with almost everything that happens in the region. US officials are even in dialogue with regional authorities about human rights violations in Central Asia. Critics usually say that the George W. Bush administration follows the practice of "double standards", as it is ready to ignore facts of this kind in exchange for unconditional support for its policies. Thus, the US policy in the field of assistance to the states of Central Asia, in the presence of serious shortcomings in the regional political structure, can contribute to the development of destabilizing processes, which in turn can lead to instability in various areas.

Although the reason for this is quite understandable, US assistance to the Central Asian states is still too concentrated on the provision of military assistance to the detriment of other areas of assistance. A total of $564.4 million was allocated to Central Asian assistance programs in fiscal year 2002, of which $187.5 million was for security and law enforcement purposes and $138.7 million was for unspecified “humanitarian” purposes. help." Only $73.6 million went to democracy development programs and $52.8 million to support market reforms. These funds are not enough to meet Washington's goals of stabilization in the region, which are exacerbated by extreme poverty and explosive population growth.

Terrorism is not seen by the people of Central Asia as an important domestic issue, while drug trafficking, food delivery, and health care are much more of a concern. Since foreign aid was doubled in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the region has seen neither economic progress nor democracy. On the contrary, it is believed that the human rights situation, like democracy, is in decline. Focusing cooperation with the countries of the region exclusively on anti-terrorist actions using force and "humanitarian aid", it is hardly possible to ensure their integration into Western society and transform them into liberal democracies. Institutional and democratic reforms are most likely to be initiated through economic development and market transformation. The shortcomings of the Central Asian states cannot be effectively overcome only by ensuring their security or increasing their military power. Moreover, there is no doubt that the region's authoritarian states hope that US patronage will ward off accusations of violating human rights and failing to become truly democratic states. An increasing US military presence could create the perception that Washington is backing local corrupt elites. Thus, the current policy of assistance to the states of Central Asia, pursued by the United States, can not only increase the vulnerability of the troops stationed in them, but also exacerbate public discontent, provoke rebellions and increase support for radical Islamist movements.

The US military presence not only indirectly supports authoritarian regimes, but also provides a grateful audience for extremist ideological groups. With the growing dissatisfaction of the masses, the attractiveness of Islamic radicalism as an alternative to the dull reality is growing all the time. Despite the fact that the most radical Islamist movements were formally destroyed, thousands of former members of terrorist groups were most likely scattered throughout Central Asia, and the more persistently the local authorities pursue a policy of suppression, the more potential followers of such movements are found. In other words, if within a secular society there are no ways left for the development of the opposition, and the economy of the state continues to be in decline, radical Islamist groups will continue to form and develop. Thus, the United States should not only increase financial assistance provided through a mechanism like the Marshall Plan, that is, a coordinated system of measures aimed at economic development, but also begin to promote the values ​​​​of freedom and democracy, that is, start a "war of ideas" against radical Islamism. . The dissatisfaction in some Central Asian countries with the presence of American troops, as well as the authority that these troops have, also reflects the concern of Central Asian governments about the impact that the US military presence has on the regional balance of power.

The mention by President George W. Bush of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in a speech delivered at a joint session of both houses of Congress on September 20, 2001, was apparently a nod to Uzbekistan, counting on gaining its support in the military campaign against the Taliban and Al- Qaeda". Thanks to the gullibility of its people and long-term military cooperation, Uzbekistan has become a de facto key member of the antiterrorist coalition. Therefore, it was this state that received the lion's share of the funds allocated to the countries of Central Asia after September 11 (for example, 41% of all funds allocated in 2002, or 161.8 out of 394.1 million dollars). Uzbekistan gradually slipped out of Russia's sphere of influence and was able to establish itself (with American help and assistance) as a prominent autonomous player capable of influencing the development of political processes in the region. The President of Uzbekistan, I. Karimov, was clearly trying to obtain economic assistance and security guarantees from the United States, not only to fight the flourishing Islamist movements, but also to realize his own ambitions and realize his intention to become a regional hegemon in Central Asia. By creating favorites instead of pursuing a more balanced and honest policy of helping the Central Asian states, the United States risks exacerbating existing divisions and creating the basis for regional conflicts, for example, over issues of water supply, drug trafficking, national minorities and territorial disputes.

A shift in the balance of power in the region is also likely due to the aggravation of already serious tensions between the Central Asian countries. The long-term American presence in Uzbekistan is a "double-edged sword." It can either force the United States to become the de facto guarantor of Uzbekistan's immunity, or have a destabilizing effect, exacerbating public doubts about the true intentions of the US presence in Central Asia, which in turn could weaken support from Moscow and Beijing for Washington's regional anti-terrorist efforts.

The US approach to stability in Central Asia based on power calculations and the concept of national interest may be quite effective in the short term, but is likely to prove counterproductive over time. It can be argued that the new "Great Game" is quite different from the original composition of the participants. Indeed, many non-state actors have emerged, such as radical Islamist terrorist groups or Western oil companies. Besides, regional states use the United States in their own interests, trying to strengthen their own influence in the region at their expense. Winning in the new "Great Game" is also much more significant. If you win, you can get unprecedented financial benefits, ensure your own energy security by accessing new energy sources, achieve the reign of Islam throughout the region, achieve state independence or even its superiority over other countries in the region.

Therefore, it can be argued that the new "Great Game" is also a zero-sum game in which geopolitical and strategic dominance in the region is played out, but this time it involves a much larger number of players. This is where the concept of The Greatest Game comes from.

Challenge Two: US Policy in Central Asia Provokes Superpower Rivalry

The US military presence in Central Asia, unprecedented in terms of the number of troops and deployed equipment, illustrates the degree of US involvement in the most critical region from a geopolitical point of view. The very existence of US Air Force bases is not only unprecedented, but also of great strategic importance. US interests are pursuing various strategic goals that mark the beginning of a profound change in the political landscape of the region.

More than three years after the unparalleled U.S. military deployment to Central Asia, it remains difficult to assess its results and impact on the regional geopolitical situation in the medium and long term. However, it can be argued that until Washington explicitly discloses its ultimate goals and clarifies its exit strategy from the region, the mere presence of US military forces in Central Asia may have an unpredictable political cost and is likely to exacerbate geopolitical tensions. rivalry between the main players present in the region - Russia, China and the United States.

The creation of American military bases in the region was justified by the temporary need to conduct military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

However, as it became clear after the end of hostilities, the presence of the American military turned out to be permanent and disproportionately large in order to achieve previously designated goals.

The continued presence of US military forces in Europe, the Balkans, Japan, South Korea, and the Persian Gulf makes it clear that where they once were, they are likely to remain. The successful completion of the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan coincided with the beginning of the process of building Afghan statehood and the possible involvement of NATO in the person of the International Security Force IV. Official statements up to this point have emphasized that the US did not plan a permanent military presence in the region. Therefore, the end of hostilities in Afghanistan should have entailed a reduction in the American presence in Central Asia, led to a gradual withdrawal of troops, and ended with a return to the geopolitical concepts that determined the degree of US military involvement in the region before 9/11. However, given the significant investment in upgrading various facilities to create a forward-based military capability, the US is likely to try to stay longer in the region in case future combat deployments are needed. In addition, the deployment of US troops in Central Asia does not meet the previously stated goal of destroying the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In early 2002, senior American officials, such as Deputy Secretary of Defense P. Wolfowitz, began to reveal their plans, albeit in a very vague and random way: “US military bases in Central Asia may have more political than military significance […] and be warning […] that [the US] has the ability to return and will return to the region.”

In October 2003, Russian President V.V. Putin personally officiated the opening of a new Russian air base in Kyrgyzstan, just a few kilometers from the US Air Force base at Manas. The fact of the opening of the first Russian military base on foreign territory since the collapse of the USSR in this very place may indicate an increase in geopolitical competition in the region, and can also be regarded as an attempt to balance the growing influence of the United States in Central Asia.

The expansion of the American presence in the region entails an intensification of the US geopolitical rivalry with the two largest neighboring powers, which have long common borders with the states of Central Asia. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that Central Asia will be able to enjoy real stability in the near future, since the neighboring powers still view the region as their own "strategic backyard" and therefore view the US military buildup as a manifestation of an aggressive policy towards them.

While it can be argued that US and Russian interests in the region are "not entirely compatible or incompatible," Washington is clearly, albeit unofficially, perceived as Moscow's successor as regional security guarantor. A prolonged American presence would undermine Russia's notion of special rights in the region and cause Moscow to view it as an intrusion into its traditional sphere of interest, its "near abroad."

Russia's interests really strongly coincided with those of the United States after the events of September 11, and basically also lay in the field of security. Russia was the first country to support the United States in its war on terrorism, and Moscow also shared Washington's view of the dangers of radical Islamic terrorism. Here we can say that the new factor of the "Greatest Game" is the presence in it of cooperation along with rivalry. This new anti-terrorist strategic partnership has also given Russia the opportunity to re-enter the club of superpowers. Despite assurances of mutual friendship from both sides during the celebration of the tercentenary of St. Petersburg in June 2003, the US presence in Central Asia still remains one of the main irritants in difficult relationship between Washington and Moscow. It is clear that in the absence of a clear timetable for the withdrawal of US troops from Central Asia, Moscow will begin to believe that Washington is using the war on terrorism as an opportunity to expand its sphere of military influence in the border areas of Russia. Moreover, the US has to take into account the fact that Russian politicians and high-ranking military officials disagree on how to respond to the changing geopolitical situation that has taken place in Central Asia, and make various political statements in order to “appease” Russia. . Some Russian politicians and military officials have reportedly said they view the US presence as an obstacle to the strategic goal of regional dominance. Ultimately, it can be argued that once stability is restored in Afghanistan, the creation of a southern oil export route, lobbied by the US oil companies Unocal and Delta Oil, will further isolate Russia.

As a result of the above, during 2002 and 2003. Russia has demonstrated deep disagreements with the United States on a range of international issues and has even developed relations with the countries of the “axis of evil”. Moreover, Moscow has redoubled its efforts to balance the US military presence, mainly by demonstrating its own military power, but also by supporting international organizations dealing with Central Asian security issues and making bilateral agreements with countries in the region. These events do not so much emphasize the success of the development of multilateralism in Central Asia, but are the consequences of Moscow's attempts to counteract Washington's presence in the region. Thus, by the end of 2003, the nature of the "Great Game" between Russia and the United States had changed, cooperation was replaced by competition.

So, the ever-increasing US military presence in Central Asia can lead not only to a deterioration in Russian-American relations, but also to provoke an open rivalry for influence in the region that is disadvantageous to both sides.

The build-up of American military power in the region is of concern not only to Russia, but also to China, which is also accustomed to considering Central Asia as its fiefdom. Although Beijing initially did not object to the US invasion of Afghanistan, and even supported this invasion to some extent, today it has serious reasons to worry about the continued American presence in the region, because it can be regarded as the beginning of the process of encircling and containing China. The appearance of US forces near the strategically important western continental border of China, and the simultaneous military deployment in the region of its eastern maritime borders, as well as in South and East Asia, looks like the US is taking premeditated actions to geostrategically encircle China. The emergence of a new possible threat along the western borders, not far from the energy-rich Xinjiang province, not only provokes Beijing to reconsider its security concepts, which are currently aimed mainly at repelling the threat from the east, but also undermines the "ideological security" of the Chinese ruling regime. Therefore, China is likely to begin to increase the number and equipment of its armed forces and spread its economic influence throughout Central Asia, thus creating the basis for destabilization in the region.

Conclusion

The US-led global war on terrorism following the events of September 11, 2001, has reduced the threat to the Central Asian region from radical Islamist terrorist movements and has led to some stability in the short term. Moreover, the geopolitical importance of Central Asia has greatly increased. Washington began to play a key role in ensuring the security of the countries of the region, and then began to point out to them the need for reforms aimed at maintaining peace and effective economic development. However, in the absence of a sincere understanding between the US and the major countries with interests in the region, the prospects for long-term stability in Central Asia remain dim.

The protracted US military presence in the region is viewed by Russia and China as an overt expansion of the US into their spheres of influence, and can also be interpreted by these two states as a strategic threat to their national security interests. Thus, US actions in Central Asia have every chance of being counterproductive and could provoke rivalry that undermines the security and prosperity of any country in the region. By destroying the Central Asian threat emanating from Afghanistan, Washington can destabilize the region, provoking both friction between states with interests in the region and internal conflicts in them. Cooperation in the fight against terrorism may be replaced by rivalry in the "Great Game" for influence in the region.

The United States should do everything possible to prevent any of the players from becoming too strong, to avoid unilateral actions that are likely to lead to the strengthening of suspicions in the Central Asian states about the true motives of the American invasion. Washington also needs to continue to encourage support for its anti-terrorism campaign from states in the region.

However, the main problem facing Washington is not the need to eliminate terrorists in Central Asia, but the management of the “Pax Americana” he created. Perhaps the US has already extended its influence over too many territories. The US must not simply withdraw troops from Central Asia. They should also begin to promote intra-regional security cooperation by providing balanced financial and technical assistance to local intergovernmental organizations, while relying on inter-regional initiatives such as NATO's Partnership for Peace or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Notes

Translation - V.G. Fedchenko. PIR Center, 2004. The views of the author of this article may not coincide with those of the Geneva Center for Security Policy or the Government of France.

Cited in: Loeb Vernon. Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia. Washington Post. February 9, 2002.

The term "Central Asia" in this article refers to the five republics of the former USSR in the form in which they were created in 1924. I.V. Stalin, who arbitrarily drew their borders, and which, as is now believed, constitute Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. However, the tradition of defining Central Asia as a group of these five countries is of dubious value. For effective development of political decisions and high-quality strategic analysis, it is necessary to have a coherent vision of the entire region, which, from a strategic point of view, is not at all closed within its borders. Therefore, generally speaking, it would be more correct to think of it as "Greater Central Asia" or "Inner Asia". See Hoson David. Inner Asia: a geographical perspective. Caucasus and Central Asia Newsletter. 2002 Summer.

The concept of a "new Great Game" has become an integral part of the literature on Central Asia and is applied, explicitly or implicitly, in academic studies, journals and official reports. This concept is recognized throughout the world, but it is very different from the original concept of the "Great Game". See by this occasion: Menon Raja. The New Great Game in Central Asia. survival. 2003. Vol.45, No.2, Summer. P.187-204. Cm. See also: Edwards Matthew. The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder. Central

This concept was coined in the 1830s. to describe Russian-British rivalry in Afghanistan, but was not widely used until the beginning of the 20th century, when it became popular thanks to R. Kipling's novel "Kim".

The term "new Great Game" today describes the rivalry of the great powers for influence on the energy resources of Central Asia and options for laying pipelines. But despite the fact that most experts reduce the meaning of this term to simple "energy imperialism", considering the problem solely in terms of oil reserves (see, for example: Kleveman Lutz. The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003. P. 304), the "new Great Game" must also be considered from a geostrategic point of view.

The myth of "American strategy of new frontiers" usually implies territorial expansion. However, after the "New Space Frontiers" of the 1960s. the term also carries much more strategic concepts.

Maynes, Charles William. America Discovers Central Asia. foreign affairs. 2003 Vol. 82, No.2, March-April. P. 120-132.

Luong, Pauline Jones and Erika Weinthal. New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia. foreign affairs. 2002. Vol.81, No.2, March-April. P.61.

Talbot Strobe. A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia . Address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 21 July 1997.

Blank Stephen. The United States and Central Asia. In: Central Asian Security, the New International Context. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. P.130.

Hill Fiona. Une strategie incertaine: la politique des Etats-Unis dans le Caucase et en Asie centrale. Politico Etrangere. 2001. Fevrier, No.1. P. 95–108.

In December 1993, US Vice President A. Gore and Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev signed the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement, according to which 104 SS-18 missiles and their launchers were destroyed in Kazakhstan. See: Wishnick Elizabeth. Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. 2002, Oct. P.3.

In fact, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that global oil demand will grow by 56% by 2020 to reach 119.6 million barrels per day. US dependence on imported oil is likely to grow from the current 57% to 64% of all oil consumed by 2020.

See data in: Cordesman, Anthony H. The U.S. Government View of Energy Developments in the Caspian, Central Asia, and Iran. W.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2000, April 27. See also US Department of Energy (DOE) 1998 reports: http://www.eia.doe.gov.emeu/cabs/caspgrph.html DOE and EIA estimates that proven reserves of Kazakhstan range from 10 to 17.6 billion barrels of oil and from 53 to 83 trillion. cubic feet of natural gas. According to the same estimates, Turkmenistan also has from 98 to 115 trillion. cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. In 2000, the Kashagan gas field, one of the largest in the world, was explored in Kazakhstan. Although Uzbekistan will remain the largest regional producer of natural gas for some time to come, its export potential may not be significant by

2005–2010 due to the high level of domestic consumption, due to the largest population compared to the rest of the countries in the region.

This process reached its peak in November 1999, when President B. Clinton personally signed the Agreement on the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which bypasses Russia. This circumstance clearly demonstrates the relationship between business interests and issues of national security and defense. See: Nichol Jim. Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. interests. Issue Brief for U.S. Congress. foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service. April 2003 P.14.

The Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan was started by Chevron-Texaco in 1993, later joined by U.S. Mobil and Lukoil. Mention may also be made of pressure exerted by the US company Unocal to open a southern route for oil exports from Turkmenistan to India, through Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, DC: White House. 1999, December. See also the law: The Silk Road Strategy Act. 1999, 106th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1–5.

Zinni Anthony. Avoid a Military Showdown with Iraq. Middle East Quarterly. 1998. Vol.5, No.3, Fall. P. 64.

Butler Kenley. U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central Asian States. Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2001, September 17.

According to Professor K. Kelleher, who was directly involved in the creation of "Centrazbat", Russia's influence in the region has significantly decreased. Interview, January 15, 2004. If Centrazbat were part of the Partnership for Peace program, it would not be an exclusively NATO program. See: Bronson B. R. NATO's Mixed Signal in the Caucasus and Central Asia. survival. 2001. Vol.42, No.3, Autumn. P. 132.

See: Geopolitique du Tadjikistan, le nouveau Grand jeu en Asie centrale. Ellipses, 2000. P. 104.

Brigadier General marines USA M.R. Berndt, head of joint training exercises for US Atlantic Command, stated of the Centrazbat maneuvers that "the goal is pre-training, and if we are ever ordered to do a task like this, we will know in advance who we will meet." See: Butler Kenley. Op.cit.

Vassort-Rousset, Brigitte. The U.S. Silk Road Strategy: American Geostrategy For Central Asia. ARES. 2003. No.50, January.

Facon Isabelle. Entre interets politiques et enjeux de securite: les dilemmes de la Russie en Asie centrale. Les Cahiers de Mars. 2003. No. 177.

For example, F. Hill argues that the United States could only succeed in dividing the region, failing to completely subordinate it to its influence. Hill, Fiona. Op. cit.

Djalili Mohammad-Reza and Thierry Kellner. Les Etats-Unis et l'Asie Centrale apres le 11 Septembre 2001. Revue Francaise de Geopolitique. Geopolitique des Etats-Unis, Ellipses. 2003. No.1. P. 243.

Brzezinski Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard. NY: Harper Collins Publishers, Basic Books. 1997.

State's Jones Testifies on U.S. Policy Awards Central Asia. U.S. Department of State, Testimony for House Subcommittee. October 29, 2003

Hill, Fiona. The United States and Russia in Central Asia. The Aspen Institute Congressional Program, The Brookings Institution. 2002, August 15.

Cohen, Ariel. Radical Islam and U.S. Interests in Central Asia. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives. October 29, 2003

Aktash Chirchik, Denau, Kagaity and Tuzel. See: Butler, Kenley. Central Asian Military Bases. Monterey Institute of International Studies, NIS Nonproliferation Program. 2001, October 11. See also Schmitt, Eric and Dao James. U.S. Is Building Up its Military Bases in Afghan Region. New York Times. January 9, 2002.

Tajikistan is a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty (also known as the "Tashkent Treaty", although Uzbekistan has withdrawn from it), and in addition, its southern borders are protected by the Russian 6,000th 201st motorized rifle division, as well as about 20,000 border troops. See: Butler, Kenley. Ibid.

Parkhar Khujand, Kurgan-Tube and Kulyab. See: Loeb Vernon, Susan B. Glasser. Tajikistan Allows U.S. to Assess 3 Air Bases. Washington Post. 2001, November 3; Gordon Michael R., C.J. Chivers. A Nation Challenged: U.S. May Gain Use of More Air Bases to Strike Taliban. New York Times. November 5, 2001

Unlike the agreements with the two previous states, this agreement does not specify the type of aircraft and the set of missions that air Force allies can perform from the Manas airfield. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the United States could, albeit only theoretically, conduct only humanitarian and search and rescue operations. See: Oliker Olga and Thomas S. Szayana. Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Implications for the U.S. army. Rand Arroyo Center, 2003. P. 269.

Although Kazakhstan is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program and engages in bilateral and multilateral activities with the US and NATO, Astana is careful to maintain a balance in relations with both Russia and the US, as well as with the People's Republic of China. Turkmenistan's officially declared neutral status will likely prevent it from offering more than assistance in humanitarian missions. See: Bisenova A. Kazakhstan tries to balance disparate interests. Eurasia Insight. 2001, 9 October; Kaiser R.

For example, the United States has promised to triple foreign aid to Uzbekistan to $160 million on the condition that "democratic transformations in society" take place in that country. See: United States – Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation framework. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet. March 12, 2002

Promoting Long-term Stability in Central Asia: U.S. Government Assistance One Year After 9/11. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheet. November 27, 2002

Central Asia: Community Action Investment Program. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet. July 11, 2002

It has also been argued that Washington took on the bulk of the task of providing security in Central Asia because the existing regional organizations could not effectively deal with Islamic terrorism. However, several interstate organizations in Asia were ready to reshape their structure to counter new transnational threats. See: Wishnick Elizabeth. Op.cit. P. 17.

Olcott, Martha Brill. Taking Stock of Central Asia. Journal of International Affairs. 2003. Vol.56, No.2. Spring. P. 3.

Almost all the heads of the Central Asian states during the Soviet era held high positions in the CPSU, with the exception of Tajik President E. Rakhmonov.

President of the Eurasia Foundation Ch. Maines asserts that “in Central Asia there is almost no ground for the development of democracy, even in its folklore the heroes are Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. The region values ​​intrigue and military superiority, not compromise and concessions. Decades of Soviet rule only reinforced these authoritarian traditions.” See: Maynes Charles William. America discovers Central Asia. foreign affairs. 2003, March-April. P. 131.

According to Human Rights Watch (HRWO), the Central Asian states are responsible for the "maltreatment of prisoners, the use of torture in prisons, tight control of the media, and the permanent ban on independent political parties and social movements." See: Human Rights Watch World Report 2001. New York, 2002, pp. 370-378.

This is all the more surprising when one considers that the states of Central Asia own a large amount of mineral resources, including rich mineral reserves. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are among the top 20 countries in the world with the largest proven natural gas reserves. See Cordesman Anthony. The US Government View of Energy Developments in the Caspian, Central Asia and Iran. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2000, April 7. P. 8. In March 2001, the EIA stated that it estimated Uzbekistan alone had $1 trillion in oil and natural gas reserves.

Rasizade Alec. Washington and the Great Game in Central Asia. contemporary review. May 2002 According to the US State Department's 2002 Religious Freedom Report, more than 7,000 people are imprisoned in Uzbekistan on religious and political charges. See: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002. However, it must be remembered that all bilateral declarations between the US and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan oblige the US to promote the development of civil society in the states of Central Asia.

U.S. Assistance to Central Asia. U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheets. 2002. (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/c5738.htm). At the same time, the US State Department acknowledges that “domestic conditions in the states of Central Asia are not conducive to long-term stability. Regional security is threatened by the lack of prospects in the economy, disappointment in political processes, social degradation, isolation and conflicts within the region”. See: U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheet. 2002, November 27. (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/15560).

Kyrgyzstan receives the most assistance in carrying out market reforms, although it is already a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

More than two-thirds of Tajiks live on less than $2 a day. Half of the inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan and a third of the inhabitants of Uzbekistan live below the poverty line. See Maynes Charles. Op.cit. P.123.

Tabyshalieva A. Human rights and Democratization in Central Asia after September 11. Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies. 2002, No.3; Khamidov A. Regional experts call on U.S. to bolster civil society. Eurasia Insight. 2002, October 2.

With the exception of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which in 1998 became the 133rd country to receive the status of a full member of the WTO. Despite this, Kyrgyzstan is still considered a country that does not meet all the principles of Western democracy.

Opinion polls conducted in Central Asia from autumn 2001 to spring 2002 by the US State Department showed "significant public dissatisfaction with the US military presence in the region." Wishnick Elizabeth. Op.cit. P. 31. During his visit to Central Asia in the spring of 2002, US Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld noted "excellent cooperation with the five states of Central Asia in the fight against terrorism", the involvement of these states in the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program, their own "efforts to destroy terrorist organizations" that threaten state security. But, as Peter K. Forster noted, D. Rumsfeld "did not mention the situation with respect for human rights or with the development of democratic values ​​in these states." See: Forster Peter K. Balancing American Involvement In Uzbekistan. connections. 2003 Vol. II, No. 1, March. P. 48.

Although the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was severely damaged during Operation Enduring Freedom, the movement survived underground in the Ferghana Valley. This valley is located on the territory of eastern Uzbekistan, southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan. Its population is about 10 million people. It is one of the most densely populated and fertile regions of Central Asia, although the unemployment rate there is around 80%. Being the political and cultural center of Islam in Central Asia, as well as being the main source of food and water for the entire region, the Ferghana Valley has always been the base area in which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan operated and recruited supporters. See: Cornell Svante E. and Regine A. Spector. Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists. Washington Quarterly. 2002 Winter. P. 193-206.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) is beginning to threaten not only stability in Central Asia, but also American interests in the region. Created in 1953 in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it aims to create a single Islamic superstate, a caliphate in Central Asia, which should be governed by Sharia law. Although the Islamic Liberation Party does not advocate the violent overthrow of existing regimes, it has declared jihad against the United States. Hizb ut-Tahrir is taking advantage of the economic downturn in the region, and in particular in the Fergana Valley, to promote its goals and recruit new members. Cohen Ariel. Op. cit.; Makarenko Tamara, The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism. Jane's Intelligence Review. February 1, 2002.

US President George W. Bush personally recognized the need to work on this problem in the National Security Strategy, where he called on the US to "wage a war of ideas in order to win the battle against international terrorism." See: National Security Strategy of the United States of America. white house. 2002, September 20. P. 6.

This refers to the fact that public opinion reflects the preferences expressed by the media. As a matter of fact, the government-controlled media in Uzbekistan were mostly supportive of the US military presence, while media attitudes were skeptical in Kyrgyzstan and negative in Kazakhstan. For the current state of the media and the development of democracy, see Olcott Martha Brill. Op.cit. P. 9

See data in: U.S. Assistance to Central Asia. U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheets. 2002. (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/c5738.htm); Senior U.S. Diplomat Hails Improved Relations with Uzbekistan. Associated Press. June 14, 2002; Khan Natalia. The Afghanistan Campaign: Implications for Uzbekistan. Caucasus and Central Asia Newsletter. 2002, Issue 2, Summer. P. 10.

Hence the decision, taken on April 25, 1999, to join GUUAM, which included Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, as a counterbalance to the Moscow-controlled CIS. Uzbekistan "temporarily" withdrew from GUUAM in June 2002 due to a "lack of progress" on security issues. See: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 111, Part I, June 14 and 26, 2002. http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/06/2-tca/tca-260602-asp

Oliker Olga and Thomas S. Szayana. Op.cit. Summary, P. 25

“President Islam Karimov has developed an ideology based on reverence for the past, including the cult of Emir Timur (Tamerlane), in whose honor a monument has been erected in the center of Tashkent. The empire of Tamerlane occupied most of modern Central Asia, reaching Russia in the west, China and India in the east. This is a clear cult of military might and territorial expansion.” Cohen Ariel. U.S Foreign policy Interests and Human rights in Central Asia. heritage foundation. July 18, 2001

On this subject, see Luong, Pauline Jones and Erika Weinthal. Op.cit. P. 69.

It should be mentioned that Uzbekistan ranks third among the countries of Central Asia in terms of the size of the territory and the first in terms of the number of inhabitants. Its population is about 25 million people. Moreover, Uzbeks are a noticeable national minority in neighboring states and in Chinese province Xinjiang. It is the fact that a large number of Uzbeks live outside of Uzbekistan that can serve as the basis for President Karimov's constant claims to dominance in the region. Miletitch Alexandre. Au center de la peripherie: enjeux actuels et a venir de l'Asie centrale. Armees d'Aujourd'hui. 2002, No. 273, September. P. 31

O. Oliker and T.S. Zayana argue that the development of close relations between Uzbekistan and the United States is fraught with the creation of levers of influence on Washington from Tashkent, which could lead to the involvement of the United States in hostilities aimed at protecting Uzbekistan and the regime ruling in it. Oliker Olga and Thomas S. Szayana. Op.cit. P.356. In the report "US Strategy in Central Asia" by the American Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, M. Sweeney also emphasizes that "a strategic alliance with Uzbekistan undermines US security interests in the region." Cit. by: Blua, Antoine. Central Asia: Report Calls on U.S. to Rethink its Regional Approach. Eurasia Insight. 2004, 22 Feb. (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022204-pr.shtml).

The term "The Greatest Game" was first used by retired French colonel R. Kanya, who wrote a thesis on Central Asia and lives in Bishkek. However, Colonel R. Kanya's dissertation is almost entirely devoted to the geo-economic rivalry between superpowers with interests in the region. Cagnat Rene. Asie Centrale: le Tres Grand Jeu. Revue de la Defense Nationale. May 2002 P. 27-38.

The author was unable to find a single clear official estimate of the number of American soldiers, as well as combat and transport aircraft in the five states of Central Asia. Estimates of the number of soldiers permanently stationed in the Central Asian states range between four and ten thousand, depending on the source.

There is no doubt that Iran is another major regional power that is most likely working to undermine US strategic interests in Central Asia. In addition, Tehran views the expansion of the US presence in the region as the main threat posed by US military power. Given the unprecedented diplomatic successes of the US and European states in the nuclear field at the end of 2003, one can also argue that Iran is unlikely to become even more involved in geostrategic rivalry in Central Asia.

As Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, General T. Franks, stated at a conference in Tashkent, "we have no long-term plans for a presence either in Uzbekistan or in any other Central Asian country." Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 2002, January 24; According to US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs E. Jones, "The US does not want to have its own bases in this region." See: U.S. Wants Engagement, Not Bases, in Central Asia. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, 2002, February 22; Central Command spokesman Lt. Col. M. Compton said, "To date, the US military is not building any permanent structures in its area of ​​responsibility." See: Jontz Sandra. U.S. military looking at long-term options in Central Asia. Stars and Stripes. March 1, 2002; According to US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs B.L. Pasco, "the US has no intention of building large long-term bases in the region." See: U.S. Intensifying Efforts in Central Asia. CDI Russia Weekly. 2002, September 24; During his visit to Uzbekistan in February 2004, US Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld made it clear that the US intended to establish so-called "operating sites" in Asia and explained that they "would not be permanent in the sense , which has a permanent military base, but will become a place where the United States and coalition countries can periodically receive support. See: Blank S.U.S. Strategic Priorities Shifting in Central Asia. Eurasia Insight. March 25, 2004(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032504a-pr.shtml)

Colonel B. Montgomery, commanding officer of the US Air Force 376th Expeditionary Wing of Engineers, Technicians and Planners, at Manas International Airport, Kyrgyzstan, said, "Frankly, our long-term presence here will continue after the end of hostilities." See: Loeb Vernon. Op.cit. However, it must be taken into account that the nature of such presence can vary significantly - for example, it can be reduced to the simple presence of technicians and maintenance personnel maintaining certain buildings and installations in a mothballed state.

Cited in: Loeb Vernon. Op. cit.

However, President V.V. Putin carefully explained that he sees no reason for rivalry and contradictions, since these two air bases have completely different purposes. In addition, V.V. Putin told the Interfax news agency that "the base at Manas is temporary, while the new Russian base has been operating on a permanent basis." Utyaganova Maria. Opening of Russian Airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. November 5, 2003

Olcott, Martha Brill. The Situation on the Ground: Security Risks and Opportunities in Central Asia. 2003, November 19 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.(http://www.ceip.org/files/events/OlcottSitonground.asp)

Having geopolitical interests in Central Asia, Russia feels obliged to promote the development of the states of the region. Some experts, such as Kh. Salukvadze, argue that "Russia is a hostage of its own colonial history." Salukvadze Khatuna. The US on the Silk Road of expansion to Eurasia? Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. 2002, March 13. (http://www.cacianalyst.org)

As C. Fairbanks, a Central Asia specialist at the Johns Hopkins Institute, states, "Russia is extremely frightened by our presence there." See: Buzbee, Sally. United States expanded likely to remain in Central Asia. Associated Press. March 12, 2002(http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020312-attack01.htm); former Speaker of the State Duma G.N. Seleznev also stated, "I would not approve of permanent US military bases in Central Asia." Yankees are coming and the Russians are Upset. Economist. 2002, January 17; At the end of 2003, Russian Defense Minister S. B. Ivanov said that Moscow would put up with the existence of American bases in Central Asia only for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, and no longer. Blank S. Op. cit.

The territory of Russia itself is also threatened by terrorism and drug trafficking coming from Afghanistan through Central Asia. It must be remembered that, starting from 2000, V.V. Putin is promoting the idea of ​​countering world terrorism jointly with the United States and European countries.

Jafalian Annie. Russie, Etats-Unis, Asie centrale: la nouvelle version du grand jeu. Annuaire militaire et strategique. 2002. P. 55-70.

Kazio Taras. The U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership: Permanent Fixture or Temporary Marriage of Convenience? Central Asia Insight. December 4, 2001; The Russian President undoubtedly expected serious concessions in exchange for his support, mainly on the issue of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya. See Blank, Stephen. Putin's Twelve-Step Program. Washington Quarterly. 2001. Vol.25, No.1. P. 147.

Maynes Charles William., Op.cit. P.129. S. Blank also argues that "traditionally anti-American elites in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs are undermining cooperation with the United States that has developed since 9/11." Blank Stephen. Scramble for Central Asian Bases. Asian Times. December 1, 2003.

Deputy Secretary of State E. Jones said: "We want the Russian side to understand that we are not trying to compete with them in Central Asia and are not trying to take their place there." See: Jones Elizabeth. Op.cit.

In addition, Russian officials are likely to be concerned about the proximity of US forces to Russian secret installations in Central Asia known to be part of the military, nuclear or space infrastructure, such as a missile early warning system or high-tech communications and observations. Martin, Patrick. U.S. bases pave the way for long-term intervention in Central Asia. World Socialist Web Site. 2002, January 11. (http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jan2002/base-j11-prn.shtml)

Some experts argue that the US is thus pursuing its "grand strategy", which is expressed in the desire to gain control over the "strategic energy ellipse" - the territory stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia. Kemp G. and Harkavy R. Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle-East. W.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brookings Institution Press. 1997. P.109-153.

On this subject, see: Peimani Hooman. American military presence in Central Asia antagonizes Russia. Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. October 23, 2002.(http://www.cacianalyst.org)

For example, the biggest military exercise in Russian history, held in the northern part of the Caspian Sea in August 2002 by Chufrin Gennady, served as a stark reminder to the outside world of Russia's intention to continue to play a significant role in ensuring the region's security. The Changing Security Model in Post-Soviet Central Asia. connections. 2003 Vol. II, No.1, March. P.6; J. Nichol officially told the US Congress that "Russia has apparently changed its policy of reducing its military presence in Central Asia to increasing its military presence in Tajikistan." In mid-June 2002, Russia also signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to extend the lease on part of its military infrastructure for fifteen years. Nichol Jim. Central Asia's New States: Political developments and Implications for U.S. interests. Congressional Research Service Issue Brief. April 2003 P.5.

Seriously concerned about its ability to control security issues in Central Asia, Russia (like China, which operates along the same lines) began to strengthen its position in 2002 and 2003. by providing support to international organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In June 2001, the Shanghai Five, named after the Shanghai Summit in June 1996, which was attended by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China and Tajikistan, became known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In response to the expansion of the field of activity of the SCO, Uzbekistan also joined it. Initially, the existence of the SCO could be regarded as an attempt to balance the growing US economic interests in the region. After September 11, the SCO turned out to be ineffective in terms of countering terrorists, although an anti-terrorist unit was created in Bishkek. But on January 2, 2002, at a meeting in Beijing, a new Russian-Chinese strategy was announced. In accordance with it, the SCO should be transformed from a forum discussing disarmament and trade issues into a regional security structure capable of conducting joint antiterrorist operations. On August 12, 2003, such an operation was carried out in Kazakhstan and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. See: Ahrari, Ehsan. Copycatting the U.S. war on terrorism. Asian Times. December 1, 2003; Kyrgyzstan and China begin Joint Anti-terrorism Exercises. Associated Press. 2002, October 10. The CSTO member countries decided to give the Treaty a more formal institutional framework. In May 2002, the CSTO became a full-fledged organization, which included Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In June 2002, the first exercises of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (KSRB) of the CSTO took place in Kyrgyzstan. In October 2003, a new Russian military base was established in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has reportedly made several concessions to Moscow in addition to providing a military base at Kant. For example, Russian became the official language in Kyrgyzstan, and trade with this country increased by 49% in 2002. It was also decided to transform the 201st motorized rifle division stationed in Tajikistan into a military base to strengthen the Russian military presence in the region. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) was reportedly instructed to facilitate a change of government in Tajikistan in 2002. Blank S. Op.cit. In the field of energy, Russia strengthened its ties with Kazakhstan in 2002 by entering into a bilateral agreement for a period of 15 years, according to which 15 million tons of oil should be exported through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, and another 2.5 million tons through the pipeline. to Novorossiysk. However, Kazakhstan has always preferred to pursue a truly balanced strategy in relations with Moscow and Washington, as well as with China. Gvosdev N. Pipelines and grand strategy. Perihelion. European Rim Policy and Investment Council (ERPIC). 2002. Vol.1, August. (http://www.erpic.org/pipelinesandgrandstrategy.html)

Beijing, however, has largely left the security of the region to Moscow, preferring to build trade ties throughout Central Asia, primarily through the SCO.

It is likely that Beijing initially believed that the US's preoccupation with building an antiterrorist coalition would reduce Washington's focus on China as a potential source of strategic threat. US President George W. Bush even spoke of "friendly and constructive relations." But the war on terrorism launched by the United States has, above all, helped Beijing make progress in securing its national security.

China is extremely concerned about the activities of radical Islamic terrorists in Xinjiang province and is actively fighting them. Uyghur Islamic movements and parties are fighting violently for Xinjiang's independence, and since they are supposedly trained and equipped by undestroyed al-Qaeda members, Chinese authorities have initially welcomed the US invasion of Central Asia.

Geopolitics expert Fukyu Gao argues that “the US invasion of Central Asia not only prevents China from expanding its influence, but also restricts China from the West and East, effectively containing a rising China. Gao Fuqiu. The real purpose of the American march into Central Asia. Liaoang. 2002, May 10. (http://www.uscc.gov/works.htm); According to Tajik radio, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiahuan said: "It is impossible to endlessly expand the scope of the anti-terrorist operation, which, moreover, should be carried out under the auspices of the UN." Cit. by: Basken, Paul. China, Russia Voice Concern Over U.S. Bases in Central Asia. Bloomberg News. January 11, 2002.

Not to mention the non-explicit military and security ties that exist between the US and Taiwan.

With the official status of a "strategic rival", China is destined to become the next "super-antagonist" of the United States. See: Bacevich Andrew J. Steppes to Empire. National Interest. 2002 Summer. P.51.

The US Air Force base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, is only 200 miles from China's westernmost province of Xinjiang, which can be easily reached by American fighter-bombers.

According to M. Jalili and T. Kellner, the imposition of democratic values ​​in Central Asia is a very serious political concern for the Chinese authorities. See Djalili M. and T. Kellner. Op. cit. P. 261.

Beijing began modernizing its navy as well as improving its power projection capability after 9/11. As soon as the US military arrived in the region, China held massive military exercises in Xinjiang province "to demonstrate its military power." Rashid Ahmad. Jihad, The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. London: Yale University Press, 2002. P.205. In 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan held joint exercises near their common border. Blue Antoine. Central Asia: Report Calls on U.S. To Rethink its Regional Approach. Eurasia Insight. 2004, February 22. http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022204-pr.shtml. The US military presence in Central Asia has also helped develop Chinese diplomacy in the region. First, it paved the way for the development of regional security arrangements such as the SCO. Secondly, it gave impetus to the development of multilateral economic cooperation, for example, through the creation in June 2002 of the "Conference on interaction and confidence-building measures in Central Asia." Cm.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Libery Central Asia Report. June 6, 2002

"Nuclear Control" No. 1(75), Volume 11, Spring 2005

Central Asia is a region that attracts and intimidates at the same time. The once strategic segment of the Silk Road today is to a certain extent on the periphery of international politics. Territorial isolation, low economic growth rates, political instability, the spread of radical Islamism are just some of the factors that explain the region's weak political position at the global level.

Was Halford MacKinder wrong in assigning a key role to the "Heartland" with its steppe peoples? The English geographer, inspired by the vast expanses of Eurasia, its solidity, believed that a developed system of transport communications would allow the region to compete with the maritime powers of the World Island. This is how MacKinder imagined the balance of power in 1904. Eurasianism, as an ideological trend, appeared back in the 20s of the 20th century, but it received its political content in the 90s, being adopted by the Russian political elites. The collapse of the USSR set the task for the Russian Federation to determine its place not only in the new world politics, but also to outline its “critical space” on the map. The concept of "Heartland" was the best fit for new political thinking, which opened up new opportunities for uniting the disintegrated Soviet space. The once-forbidden geopolitics has become one of the popular sciences, within the framework of which the Eurasia project was formed. The Eurasian project was conceived, and is still primarily a political project, but it does not exclude the components of economic cooperation and security.

Thus, the region of Central Asia, or the "near abroad", as it was designated in the Russian political discourse, entered the sphere of interests of the new state - the Russian Federation. However, having gained independence, the former republics of the USSR also received freedom of choice in terms of developing foreign and domestic policies. Moreover, the newly formed geopolitical space attracted the attention of other world powers. In this context, we can talk about a new "Great Game" between influential actors in international relations in Central Asia.

Russian presence in the "near abroad"

Russia's return to the region implied the creation of an institutional platform, which was reflected in the emergence of organizations such as the CSTO, aimed at cooperation in the field of security, or the Eurasian Economic Union, involving the creation of a single market.

One of the most developed areas of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the countries of Central Asia is military cooperation. Neighborhood with Afghanistan, SUAO assumes numerous threats, connected, first of all, with the spread of radical Islamism. Russian military bases are located in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the basis of long-term interstate lease agreements. Currently lacking the economic and technical capabilities to create their own powerful military potential, the countries of Central Asia use the help of their northern neighbor, thereby integrating into the local security complex initiated by Russia.

Various associations in the territory of the post-Soviet space also have the goal of maintaining political ties at the highest level, which were formed back in Soviet era. The leaders of the countries of the near abroad are representatives of the same Soviet political elite, appointed with the consent of Moscow. These ties are actively supported by the Russian side, as evidenced by the visit of Vladimir Putin to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in February 2017, aimed at strengthening "geopolitical loyalty" . Secondly, the political structure and culture of the countries of Central Asia is largely similar to the Russian one, which favors mutual understanding on both sides and promotes multilateral cooperation.

In addition, close economic ties have been maintained since Soviet times, in particular those associated with labor flows. So, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the end of 2016, more than 3 million people were registered only with citizens of Uzbekistan. This fact gives the Russian side an advantage in the course of negotiations with the leaders of the Central Asian countries, when relaxations in the field of migration legislation in relation to migrant workers are used to reach an agreement. For example, during the aforementioned visit to the Kyrgyz Republic, the President of the Russian Federation emphasized the role of Russia in the country's economy, drawing attention to the fact that “due to Kyrgyzstan's accession to the EAEU, over the nine months of last year, remittances from Russia of Kyrgyz labor increased by 18.5%. migrants - up to $1.3 billion, which is almost a third of the country's GDP.

Strong ties between Russia and the countries of Central Asia are also observed in the field of energy cooperation, preserved from the times of the USSR, and manifested in the activities of such large companies as Gazprom and Lukoil.

However, the Russian project to create the Eurasian space has faced a number of problems in this region. First of all, having gained independence, the countries of Central Asia were interested in creating a union based on cooperation, and not on interdependence. In this context, Russia's position as a dominant player, due to its economic and military potential, may become an obstacle to the Eurasian project.

In addition, at present, the preservation of the structural interdependence of various industries in Russia and the states of the region is still largely determined by the economic and geographical isolation of Central Asia and Russia's monopoly on the transit of energy resources from the countries of the region. However, the wide potential of the region, endowed with rich hydrocarbon resources, is increasingly attracting other countries interested in their import. The struggle for influence in Central Asia raises the question of a new "Great Game" in the region.

China's Turn to the West

The One Belt, One Road project, launched at the initiative of Chinese President Xi Jinping, is still in development, and although a number of programs have been issued outlining its goals, objectives and scope, there is still no clear framework for its activities. In general terms, the project represents a long-term ambition to develop economic cooperation, internal interconnectedness and infrastructural progress of the Eurasian region under the auspices of the PRC.

In addition, being the largest consumer of oil, China, naturally interested in the resources of Central Asia, once under the monopoly of the USSR. Almost half of China's oil imports come from the Middle East, and thus, China faces the challenge of diversifying it, which causes it to turn towards its western neighbors.

It is clarified that the initiative of the PRC does not imply competition with the influence of other actors or any limitation of their activities in the region. Nevertheless, is it possible to assume that the project, which relies mostly on Chinese financial resources and is aimed at the development of countries with relatively low economic indicators, does not have a political component? It is worth taking into account the fact that the "One Belt, One Road" is perhaps the first project of this magnitude since the founding of the PRC, and its adoption coincides with the time when China's economic growth rates have noticeably decreased compared to the indicators that appeared a consequence of the active recovery as a result of the reform and opening up policy of Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, at the beginning of the 21st century, there was an initiative to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), excluding the participation of China and aimed at creating an economic association in opposition to the PRC. In this context, it is quite logical to assume that the project itself is a kind of response to the TPP initiative, as well as a reaction to the decline in economic growth. To give the economy a new impetus for development, China is making a "pivot to the West" in search of new markets for Chinese goods and new opportunities for investors.

Thus, despite its economic focus, One Belt, One Road inevitably (or intentionally) becomes political. Some experts refer to the project as the "Marshall Plan" of the PRC. This circumstance may lead to a clash of China's interests with the interests of other countries in the target regions, including Russia's interests in the Central Asian region. As the project progresses, Russia's "near abroad" may be transformed from China's "near abroad", since the latter's economic potential is more attractive to the Central Asian countries than Russia's.

Security questions

One Belt, One Road, just like the Eurasian project, inevitably faces security problems in the region. For the successful implementation of these projects, it is necessary to ensure political stability and maintain a peaceful environment. As mentioned above, the priority in the sphere of security and in the sphere of political contacts is still on the side of the Russian Federation. However, the PRC also has some security concerns associated with countries in the region. This primarily concerns the spread of radical Islamism and the Uighur separatist movement. Since the independence of the Central Asian countries, separatist sentiments in the region have increased significantly, as there is a potential opportunity to recreate the Uyghur state, or East Turkestan, which sharply contradicts the interests of the PRC.

Thus, for successful "introduction" into the region, two conditions are necessary: ​​economic and financial opportunities and possession of a significant military potential. In this context, the prospect of joining the efforts of the PRC and the Russian Federation is presented to the leaders of the two countries the best option.

The “norm” of Russian-Chinese relations

Since the intersection of interests of the Russian Federation and China in the Central Asian region in one form or another is inevitable, since the late 90s, after the official definition of the interstate border, attempts have been made to formalize and coordinate the ambitions of the two countries. The “Strategic Partnership” (1996), backed up by the Treaty of Friendship (2001), gradually evolved into the creation of an official institutionalized platform in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which today seems to be the best option for coordinating the activities of the Russian Federation and China in Central Asia. As a result, a certain concept of the “norm” of Russian-Chinese relations was defined: equal, de-ideologized pragmatic relations aimed at satisfying their interests, within which each side adheres to realistic expectations regarding the behavior of the other side. In addition, there is a tacit consolidation of the priority of the military-strategic positions of the Russian Federation in the region and non-obstruction to the economic expansion of China's influence.

This logic lies in the desire to combine the Eurasian project and the One Belt, One Road. One of the mechanisms for coordinating activities within the two projects was launched on June 25, 2016 by the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. In October 2016, the presidents of Russia and China reaffirmed their intentions to cooperate. As the Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation Denis Manturov noted, "Russia continues negotiations on linking the EurAsEC and the Silk Road Economic Belt project being implemented by China."

However, it is worth asking yourself the question: is such an initiative realistic and feasible? The delimitation of the spheres of security and the economy, in particular the energy sector, raises some doubts in this regard.

An example of this is the founding of the Quadripartite Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism, which includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and China. Within the framework of this association, it is planned to create a local security system without the participation of Russia, which caused some dissatisfaction with the latter. Andrey Serenko, an expert at the Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan, noted in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper that it is about "creating such a 'Central Asian NATO' under the Chinese umbrella." Undoubtedly, the Quartet format is less developed than NATO and, perhaps, deserves less critical assessments, but, nevertheless, it forces the Russian Federation to reassess its positions in the region in relation to China.

The political and economic opportunities of the countries of Central Asia depend on how relations between the Russian Federation and China develop in the region. Firstly, the competition between the two neighbors will increase the level of economic development of the countries: interest in the energy sector will make it possible to develop the still untouched hydrocarbon reserves and attract investment in this sector. Secondly, both the Russian Federation and the PRC are making efforts to maintain the stability of the region and maintain the status quo.

At the moment, there are no sharp contradictions between Russia and China, which is largely due to the context: the policy of relative economic isolation of Russia from the United States and the European Union in connection with the Ukrainian conflict and subsequent sanctions makes it "turn east", while going to some concessions. The possibilities of the PRC in Central Asia should not be overestimated. At the moment, China's presence in the region has not yet reached the size that could pose a threat to Russia's interests. For example, Yan Xuetong, head of the Institute of International Studies at Beijing Tsinghua University, considers plans to build infrastructure under the New Silk Road initiative “beyond China’s capabilities.”