One of my favorite topics. About medium-range missiles. "pioneers" of the land of the Soviets
The variety of ground-based combat ballistic missiles is so great that we will talk here only about intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of more than 5,500 kilometers - and only China, Russia and the United States have such (Great Britain and France abandoned ground-based ICBMs, placing them only on submarines). But the two main former Cold War adversaries have had no shortage of ballistics for the last half century.
Ballistic missiles did not appear out of nowhere - they quickly grew out of a captured “legacy.” The first of the Allies to launch captured V-2s was carried out by the British in Cuxhaven with the help of German personnel in the fall of 1945. But this was only a demonstration launch. Then one captured missile was put on display in Trafalgar Square in London.
And the Armament Directorate of the US Department of the Army in the same year gave the task of conducting detailed experiments with captured V-2s. The Americans, who were the first to enter Nordhausen, took out more than 100 finished missiles, sets of parts, and equipment. The first launch was carried out at the White Sands test site (New Mexico) on April 16, 1946, the last, 69th, on October 19, 1951. But a much more valuable “trophy” for the Americans were tons of technical documentation and over 490 German specialists led by von Braun and Dornberger. The latter did everything to get to the Americans, and they turned out to be extremely needed. The Cold War began, the United States, already having nuclear weapon, they were in a hurry to acquire a missile, but their specialists did not make much progress in this matter. In any case, the projects of large missiles MX-770 and MX-774 ended in nothing.
ICBM R-7/R-7A (SS-6 Sapwood). THE USSR. Was in service in 1961-1968.
1. Head part
2. Instrument compartment
3. Oxidizer tanks
4. Oxidizer pipeline tunnel pipe
5. Main engine of the central block
6. Aerodynamic steering wheel
7. Side block propulsion engine
8. Central block
9. Side block
What is especially interesting is that the first American rocket scientist to communicate with von Braun was former GALCIT employee Qian Xuesen. Later he would move to China, become the founder of the Chinese rocket and space industry, and begin... by copying the Soviet R-2 and R-5.
Von Braun, who had already proven himself to be an excellent engineer and organizer, became the technical director of the design bureau at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. The backbone of the bureau consisted of his former Peenemünde employees and other specialists. Previously, they were selected by the Gestapo based on their “reliability,” but now the Americans are selected based on the same criteria.
In 1956, the SSM-A-14 Redstone ballistic missile, created under the leadership of von Braun, appeared, which contained a number of design solutions of the A-4, and a year later - the SM-78 Jupiter with a flight range of up to 2,780 kilometers.
Work on the first “real” ICBMs began here and overseas almost simultaneously. On May 20, 1954, a Decree was issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the creation of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (the work was entrusted to the “royal” OKB-1), and in the United States the first contract for the Atlas ICBM was awarded to the Convair company from the General Dynamics corporation. in January 1955. The program was given top priority status by Washington a year earlier.
"Seven" (KB Korolev) went into the sky on August 21, 1957, nevertheless becoming the first ICBM in the world, and on October 4 it launched the world's first satellite into low-Earth orbit. However, as a combat missile system, the R-7 turned out to be too bulky, vulnerable, expensive and difficult to operate. The preparation time for launch was about 2 hours, and to replenish the oxygen supply for the ICBMs on duty, a whole plant was needed nearby (which made it impossible to use it as a retaliatory strike weapon).
ICBM RS-20A "Voevoda" (SS-18 Satan). THE USSR. In service since 1975
The American Atlas ICBM successfully flew only in November 1958, but its launch weight was only 120 tons, while the R-7 had 283 tons. This rocket took about 15 minutes to prepare for launch (and it did not need liquid oxygen for refueling).
But gradually the USSR began to close the gap with the Americans. In April 1954, on the basis of the design department of the Southern Machine-Building Plant, an independent Special Design Bureau No. 586 (OKB-586) was formed, headed by M.K. Yangel. Soon, under his leadership, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) R-12 and R-14 were created - the culprits of the Caribbean crisis, and then the first Soviet ICBM using high-boiling fuel components, the R-16. The decision to create it was made on May 13, 1959 and initially provided for the production of only ground-based launchers (PU). However, subsequently the R-16 underwent modifications to its design and control system (CS) and became the first Soviet ICBM, which was launched from a silo launcher (silo launcher). Moreover, the silo of this missile (a rare case) ensured the movement of the missile along the guides - platforms were made on the body of the ballistic missile for installing yokes that fixed its position in the guides.
ICBM R-16/R-16U (SS-7 Saddler). THE USSR. Was in service from 1963-1979.
By the way, if the range of the R-7 did not exceed 8,000 kilometers, then the “Yangelevskaya” R-16 could “fly away” already 13,000 kilometers. At the same time, its launch weight was 130 tons less.
True, the “flight” career of the R-16 began with a tragedy: on October 24, 1960, an explosion occurred at Baikonur in preparation for the first rocket launch. As a result, he died a large number of the people at the starting position, led by the Chairman of the State Commission, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Chief Marshal of Artillery M.I. Nedeliny.
In 1955, the US Air Force approved the terms of reference for a heavy liquid-fueled ICBM with thermal nuclear warhead with a capacity of more than 3 megatons; it was designed to destroy large administrative and industrial centers of the USSR. However, the Martin-Marietta company was able to issue an experimental series of HGM-25A Titan-1 missiles for flight testing only in the summer of 1959. The rocket was born in pain, and most of the first launches were unsuccessful.
ICBM R-36 (SS-9 Scarp). THE USSR. Withdrawn from service
On September 29, 1960, the new ICBM was launched at maximum range with the equivalent of a warhead weighing 550 kilograms. From Cape Canaveral to an area 1,600 kilometers southeast of the island of Madagascar, the rocket traveled 16,000 kilometers. It was a long-awaited success. Initially, it was planned to deploy 108 Titan-1 ICBMs, but due to the enormous cost and a number of shortcomings, they limited themselves to half. They served from the beginning of 1960 to April 1965, and were replaced (until 1987) by more modern heavy two-stage ICBMs LGM-25C "Titan-2" with increased hit accuracy (before the appearance in the USSR of the heavy R-36 ICBM itself The most powerful ICBM in the world was the Titan-2 ICBM).
Moscow’s response to the American “Titan” was a new heavy-duty liquid-propellant rocket, the R-36, which could “throw” more than 5 tons of nuclear “surprise” at the enemy. By a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 12, 1962, a missile capable of delivering a thermonuclear charge of unprecedented power to an intercontinental range was entrusted to the creation of the team of the Yangelev Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. This missile was already initially created for a silo-based version - the ground-based launch pad was immediately and completely abandoned.The preparation and remote launch time for the R-36 was about 5 minutes. Moreover, the rocket could already be in a fueled state for a long time using special compensation devices. The R-36 had unique combat capabilities and was significantly superior to the American Titan-2 - primarily in terms of thermonuclear charge power, shooting accuracy and security. We have finally “almost” caught up with America.
In 1966, an operation of particular importance was carried out at the Baikonur training ground, codenamed “Palma-2”: the leaders of sixteen friendly countries were shown in action three examples of Soviet “weapons of retaliation”: missile systems with Temp-S MRBMs (chief designer A.D. . Nadiradze), as well as with the R-36 ICBM (M.K. Yangel) and UR-100 (V.N. Chelomey). The allies were amazed by what they saw and decided to continue to be “friends” with us, realizing that this “nuclear umbrella” was open over them as well.
Try it, find it
With the increasing accuracy of nuclear missiles and, most importantly, reconnaissance and surveillance equipment, it became clear that any stationary launchers could be relatively quickly detected and destroyed (damaged) during the first nuclear strike. And although the USSR and the USA had submarines, they Soviet Union Vast areas of territory were “uselessly” lost. So the idea was literally floating in the air and was eventually formalized into a proposal - to create mobile missile systems that, lost in the vast expanses of their homeland, could survive the enemy’s first strike and strike back.
Work on the first mobile ground-based missile system (PGRK) with the Temp-2S ICBM began in our country “semi-underground”: the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (formerly NII-1) headed by A.D. Nadiradze by that time was subordinated to the Ministry of Defense Industry, which “worked” for Ground troops, and the topic of strategic missiles for the Strategic Missile Forces was given to organizations of the Ministry of General Engineering. But Minister of Defense Industry Zverev did not want to part with the “large” strategic theme and on April 15, 1965, he instructed his subordinates to begin developing a mobile complex with ICBMs, “disguising” it as the creation of an “advanced complex with the Temp-S medium-range missile.” Later the code was changed to “Temp-2S”, and on March 6, 1966 they began to work openly, as the corresponding Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers was issued, “legalizing” work on the topic.
Academician Pilyugin said in one of his conversations: “Chelomey and Yangel are arguing whose rocket is better. And Nadiradze and I are not making a rocket, but a new weapons system. There were also before the offer on mobile missiles, but it’s interesting to work with Nadiradze because he has A complex approach, which many of our military lack.” And this was the absolute truth - they were creating a new “subtype” of nuclear missile weapons.
The basis of the Temp-2S complex is a three-stage solid-fuel missile with a monoblock warhead with a nuclear charge and a firing range of about 9,000 kilometers. The missile could be launched with the minimum possible duration of pre-launch preparation - from any point on the patrol route, so to speak, “on the move.”
Considering that the missile’s firing accuracy was (depending on the range) from 450 to 1,640 meters, this complex was a serious “application for success” in the war and, if adopted by the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, would pose a serious threat to NATO, which the West would oppose I couldn't do anything.
However, an unpredictable lady called “politics” intervened in the matter - in the form of the SALT-2 Treaty, according to the provisions of which the production and deployment of Temp-2S were prohibited. Therefore, the world's first serial MGRK (mobile ground-based missile system) with an ICBM was the Topol (RS-12M/RT-2PM, according to the Western classification - SS-25 Sickle), created again by MIT.
In February 1993, the active phase of work began on the modernization program to the Topol-M variant, which, in a silo-based and mobile version, will become the basis of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces grouping in the first quarter of the 21st century. Compared to its predecessor, the new missile system has more capabilities to overcome existing and future missile defense systems, and is more effective when used against planned and unplanned targets. The new missile, after minor retrofitting, is placed in silo launchers that are freed from RS-18 and RS-20 missiles. At the same time, material-intensive and expensive protective devices, roofs, equipment compartments, and a number of support systems are preserved.
"Militia" and "dwarfs"
Perhaps the brightest mark in world missile history was left by the family of American ICBMs “Minuteman” (“Minuteman” - that’s what soldiers of the people’s militia, or militia, were called at one time). They became the first solid-fuel ICBMs in the United States, the first in the world with multiple independently targetable warheads, and the first with a fully autonomous inertial control system. Their further development stopped only after the onset of detente, the end of " cold war"and the collapse of the USSR.
It's interesting that initial stage it was planned to place part of the ICBMs (from 50 to 150 missiles) on mobile railway platforms. On June 20, 1960, a specially converted experimental train, located at the Hill Air Station in Utah, began running throughout the western and central parts of the United States. He returned from his last trip on August 27, 1960, and the US Air Force announced the “successful completion of the Minuteman mobile missile system concept test program.” Thus, the idea of using the railway for basing ICBMs was first born in the USA, but was practically implemented only in the USSR. But the mobile Minuteman was unlucky; the Air Force chose to focus all its efforts on the silo modification, and on December 7, 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara closed work on the mobile Minuteman.
The continuation of the “popular” family was the Minuteman-IIIG (LGM-30G) ICBM. On January 26, 1975, Boeing Aerospace placed the last detachment of these ICBMs on combat duty at the Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. The most important advantage of this ICBM was the presence of a multiple warhead. Since March 31, 2006, warheads removed from MX missiles began to be placed on parts of the Minuteman-IIIG ICBMs remaining on combat duty. Moreover, in 2004, the Americans, frightened by the threat of international terrorism, began to study the issue of placing a conventional, non-nuclear warhead on the Minuteman ICBM.
In the mid-80s of the last century, the US Air Force, which was haunted by the Soviet PGRK, declared its desire to have at its disposal the same complexes with light ICBMs that could move at a fairly high speed along highways and dirt roads.
According to the Americans, in the event of aggravation of the situation and the threat of a nuclear strike on the United States, the Midgetman PGRK (Midgetman, “dwarf”) with a small-sized and light ICBM was supposed to leave its home base and go onto highways and country roads, “spreading out” as if centipedes throughout the country. After receiving the command, the vehicle stopped, unloaded the trailer with the launcher onto the ground, then the tractor pulled it forward, and thanks to the presence of a special plow-like device, it self-buried, providing additional protection from the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. A mobile launcher could “get lost” in an area of up to 200 thousand km2 in just 10 minutes, and then, together with the surviving silo-based ICBMs and strategic submarine missile carriers, deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike.
At the end of 1986, the Martin-Marietta company received a contract to carry out work on the design of the MGM-134A Midgetman mobile missile system and the assembly of the first prototype.
Structurally, the MGM-134A Midgetman ICBM is a three-stage solid-fuel missile. The launch type was “cold”: gases under strong pressure ejected the missile from the TPK, and the ICBM’s own engine was turned on only when it finally left the “container”.
Despite its “dwarf” name, the new ICBM had a very “non-childish” launch range - about 11 thousand kilometers - and carried a thermonuclear warhead with a yield of 475 kilotons. Unlike the Soviet Temp-2S and Topol complexes, the American launcher had a “trailer” type chassis: a four-axle tractor vehicle carried a container with one ICBM on a three-axle trailer. During testing, the mobile launcher showed a speed of 48 km/h on rough terrain and 97 km/h on the highway.
However, in 1991, President George Bush (senior) announced the cessation of work on mobile launchers - they continued to create only the “mine” version. Midgetman was supposed to reach initial operational readiness in 1997 (originally 1992), but in January 1992 the Midgetman program was closed completely. The only PU PGRK "Midgetman" was transferred to the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base - for the museum located there, where it is still located.
The Soviet Union also created its own “dwarf” - on June 21, 1983, a Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, which instructed MIT to create the Courier PGRK with a small-sized ICBM. The initiative to develop it belonged to the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces V.F. Tolubko.
The Courier ICBM, in terms of its weight and size characteristics, was approximately similar to the American Midgetman missile and was several times lighter than any of the previous types of Soviet ICBMs.
A.A. Ryazhskikh later recalled: “Our work, as always, followed them. The development of this original complex did not go very smoothly. There were many opponents, including in the leadership of the Strategic Missile Forces and, in my opinion, among the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Some of them accepted it skeptically - as exotic.”
"Courier" (RSS-40 / SS-X-26) is the first and only domestic small-sized solid-fuel ICBM of a mobile ground-based wheeled complex. It also became the smallest ICBM in the world.
The complex was unique. It easily fit in the back of a Sovavtotrans-type car trailer, in any railway cars, could be transported on barges, and could even fit on an airplane. He, of course, would not have given a clear increase in efficiency, but he could have taken part in the retaliatory strike, since it was almost impossible to detect him.
The preliminary design was completed in 1984, and flight tests of the full-scale prototype were to begin in 1992. But they did not take place due to political reasons - within the framework of the START-1 Treaty: further work on the “Courier” and “Midgetman” was stopped.
"Satan" vs. "Guardian of Peace"
The period of the second half of the 70s of the last century became a particularly dramatic period in the history of the development of ground-based ICBMs. It was then that the evolution of these missiles reached almost its apogee. As a result, the two superpowers created real “planet shakers”, capable of wiping not only cities, but also entire countries from the face of the Earth in the event of a salvo. And only thanks to the efforts of the leadership of the USA and the USSR, the powerful roar of “nuclear monsters” did not herald the onset of the “doomsday of humanity.”
We are talking here about heavy ICBMs with multiple warheads and individually targetable warheads. The first ICBMs of this class were again created by the Americans. The reason for their development was the rapid increase in the “quality” and accuracy of Soviet ICBMs. At the same time, heated debates arose in Washington about the future of silo-based ballistic missiles in general - many generals expressed concerns about their vulnerability to new Soviet ICBMs.
As a result, they began a program to develop a promising rocket - the “X rocket”. The original - “Missile-X” was then transformed into “MH”, and we already know this rocket as “MX”. Although its official designation is LGM-118A “Peacekeeper” (translated from English as “Keeper of Peace”). The main requirements for the new ICBM were: increased range, high accuracy, the presence of a MIRV with the ability to change its power, as well as the presence of a silo with an increased degree of protection. However, Ronald Reagan, who replaced Carter as president, wanting to speed up the deployment of MX ICBMs, on October 2, 1981, canceled the development of “super shelters” and decided to place missiles in Minuteman or Titan silos.
A) LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM (MX). USA. In service from 1986 to 2005. The cost of one ICBM is $70 million.
B) MGM-134A Midgetman ICBM. USA
B) ICBM LGM-30G "Minuteman-IIIG". USA. It is in service. Production completed in December 1978.
D) Heavy ICBM LGM-25C Titan-2. USA. Was in service from 1963-1987.
On June 17, 1983, the “Guardian of Peace” soared into the heavens for the first time from the Vandenberg VVB. Having covered 6,704 kilometers, the missile scattered six unloaded warheads on targets within the Kwajalein test site.
For the first time, the Americans managed to implement the “mortar launch” method in a heavy ICBM: the missile was placed in a TPK installed in a silo, and a solid fuel gas generator (located in the lower part of the TPK), when triggered, ejected the missile to a height of 30 meters from the level of the silo protective device, and only then was turned on first stage propulsion engine. In addition to the silo version, it was planned to place 50 railway-based MX in 25 “missile trains” with two ICBMs on each; even in the START-1 Treaty, the MX missile was already prescribed as “mobile-based”.
However, then “détente” came and the program “came to a close” - in September 1991, President George W. Bush announced the cessation of work on the railway MX (the deployment of mine-based MX was later stopped). The Americans chose to “forget” about their “missile train,” on which they had already spent about $400 million, in exchange for Moscow’s promise to reduce the number of its “miracle weapons,” heavy ICBMs, among which the most famous was the RS-20, nicknamed in the West for its power "Satan".
Despite the shortcomings and high cost of construction, silos remained the dominant type of deployment for ICBMs in the world. In the 1970s, the third generation Soviet ICBMs RS-16 (SS-17 Spanker), RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) and RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) were born one after another. The RS-16 and RS-20 missiles and complexes based on them were developed, as it is now fashionable to say, by a “consortium” led by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (M.K. Yangel was replaced by V.F. Utkin), and the RS-18 was created by the bureau V.N. Chelomeya. All of them were two-stage liquid ballistic missiles with a sequential arrangement of stages and, for the first time in domestic practice, were equipped with a split warhead.
Complexes with these missiles were put into service in the USSR in the period 1975-1981, but then modernized. Moreover, it was thanks to these “monsters” that the USSR managed to achieve reliable parity with the United States in terms of the number of warheads on combat duty: by 1991, the Strategic Missile Forces had 47 ICBMs of the RS-16A/B type, 300 of the RS-18A/B type and 308 of the RS type -20A/B/V, the number of warheads ready for action has exceeded 5,000.
When, in preparation for the signing of the START-2 Treaty, we presented the Americans with data on the total thrown mass of these missiles, they simply fell into a stupor. It amounted to 4135.25 tons! For comparison, the Americans' entire ground-based group of ICBMs amounted to only 1,132.5 tons. Even if Russia had simply blown them up over the North Pole, humanity would have shuddered from the nuclear Apocalypse.
The Yankees were especially frightened by our “Satan,” which had a MIRV with 10 warheads and a throw weight of 7.2 (RS-20A) or 8.8 (RS-20B/V) tons.
The RS-20A was developed based on the solutions of the Yangelevskaya R-36, but was significantly modified. The most advanced modification was the RS-20V, the high combat effectiveness of which is ensured by increased resistance of the missile in flight to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion and accuracy of impact. The missile also received more advanced means of overcoming missile defense.
Nuclear "Well done"Information about the creation by the Americans of a new generation of ICBMs MX excited the Soviet leadership so much that it initiated the development of several new ICBMs and accelerated work on a number of projects already underway. Thus, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau had to create a powerful ICBM, without at the same time going beyond the limitations of the signed agreements.
After a preliminary assessment, it was decided to create a rocket using solid fuel. It was prescribed to create three options: railway, mobile ground "Tselina-2" (almost immediately cancelled) and mine. Flight design tests of the RS-22V (RT-23UTTH) ICBM for the combat railway missile system (BZHRK) began at the Plesetsk training ground on February 27, 1985 and ended on December 22, 1987.
Flight testing of the silo missile began on July 31, 1986 and was successfully completed on September 23, 1987. We called the rocket “Well done”, and in the West it was given the designation SS-24 Scalpel (“Scalpel”).
The first train was put into trial operation in Kostroma, and later another three dozen ICBMs of this type were deployed. “On vacation,” the trains were located in stationary structures at a distance of about 4 kilometers from each other. As for silo missiles, the first missile regiment went on combat duty on August 19, 1988, and in total the Strategic Missile Forces received 56 silos with ICBMs by July 1991. Moreover, only 10 of them were located on the territory of the RSFSR, and after the collapse of the USSR, only they remained with Russia. The remaining 46 ended up on the territory of Ukraine and were liquidated due to the latter’s announcement of its nuclear-free status.
This rocket also launches in a “mortar” manner, tilts in the air with the help of a powder charge, and only then the propulsion engine starts. Firing could be carried out from any point on the patrol route, including from electrified railways. In the latter case, special devices for short-circuiting and tapping the contact network were used.
“Molodets” was equipped with 10 warheads with a yield of 500 (550) kilotons. The breeding stage was carried out according to a standard design, and the head part was covered with a fairing of variable geometry.
Each “special train” was equated to a missile regiment and included three M62 diesel locomotives, three seemingly ordinary railway refrigerator cars (a distinctive feature is eight wheel pairs), a command car, cars with autonomous power supply and life support systems and for accommodating duty personnel shifts. In total - 12 cars. Each of the “refrigerators” could launch a rocket both as part of a train and in autonomous mode. Today one such carriage can be seen in the Ministry of Railways Museum in St. Petersburg.
Those who served on such “armored trains” recall that often the train with the inscription on the cars “For the transportation of light loads” after passing spoiled the track so much that it then had to be thoroughly repaired. I wonder if the railway workers had any idea what kind of “monster” was driving around here at night?
Maybe they guessed, but kept quiet. But the fact that it was thanks to these special trains that the Ministry of Railways was forced to reconstruct many thousands of kilometers of railways throughout the country in a fairly short time is the absolute truth. So “Molodets” on wheels not only increased the country’s defense capability, but also helped in the development National economy, increasing the reliability and service life of part of the railway lines.
Flight diagram of the RS-22 ICBM
Orbital warheads
After the world's first artificial satellite was launched into low-Earth orbit on October 4, 1957 by a Soviet launch vehicle (and actually a combat rocket R-7), the leading American media erupted in a whole wave of publications, the main core of which was the very fantastic at that time threat of the emergence of Soon there will be a huge swarm of Soviet “orbital warheads” in low-Earth orbits. To combat them, the United States even began to create a multi-echelon anti-missile and anti-satellite defense system consisting of interceptor missiles, anti-satellite missiles, orbital inspector satellites and combat satellites, the so-called “space fighters”. And already in 1959, the Americans made at least two attempts to shoot down satellites in low-Earth orbit.
Fear, as they say, has big eyes. But who would have thought then that science fiction in the near future, through the efforts of Soviet designers, would become reality and the most “deadly threat” to the United States and NATO.
In the mid-60s of the last century, the idea of creating some kind of “global rocket” and “orbital warhead” began to be worked out in the USSR. The latter provided for partial orbital bombardment of objects on enemy territory: a nuclear warhead on a launch vehicle (ICBM) is launched into space, into low-Earth orbit and there it turns into a kind of artificial mini-satellite, which is waiting for the command to attack. Having received one, the “orbital warhead” turned on the engine and left orbit, beginning a dive towards its assigned target. It was almost impossible to intercept such a “cunning” warhead.
The program to create an “orbital warhead” reached its peak on November 19, 1968, when the R-36orb ICBM entered service with the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces. Its test was successful and carried out “in full” on December 16, 1965, the rocket launched from Baikonur and did everything it was supposed to. Well, except that the warheads did not fall on the territory of the United States. The program for creating the “Global Rocket” (GR-1) was closed for technical reasons, as was the R-46 rocket project.
The R-36orb ensured the launch of the warhead into orbit of an artificial Earth satellite orbital warhead (ORV) and its descent from orbit to a target located beyond the reach of ICBMs or from directions not protected by enemy missile defense systems.
In the United States, the Russian OGCh received the designation FOBS - Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (partial orbital bombardment system).
Only the famous Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1968 with the approval of the UN, stopped Russian engineers. According to it, the USSR and the USA pledged not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space. And the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) already “in black and white” prohibited the presence or development of such complexes. By 1984, the R-36orbs were finally removed from the mines.
Well, anyone can see what could have actually happened if the two superpowers had not signed an agreement on peaceful space by watching the American adventure film “Space Cowboys” with Clint Eastwood in one of the main roles. It, of course, shows a combat missile-carrying satellite, and not “orbital warheads.” But still…
Wonder weapon
Having closed the topic of “orbital warheads”, the Soviet military switched to conventional warheads - ideas arose about how to make them more accurate and less vulnerable to American missile defense systems.
For a long time, these works were shrouded in mystery and speculation. Therefore, the statement made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 18, 2004 at a press conference in Plesetsk on the occasion of the completion of the large-scale exercise “Security 2004” sounded like a bolt from the blue and plunged our Western “partners” into a state described in medicine as shock.
The fact is that Putin uttered an unexpected phrase: they say that over time, the Russian Armed Forces will receive “the latest technical systems that are able to hit targets at intercontinental depths with hypersonic speed, high accuracy and the ability to maneuver deeply in altitude and course.” And then he added, as if he had taken a “control shot in the head”: there are no random words in his message, each of them matters!
Only later, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Yuri Baluevsky, reported that during the exercises, two ICBMs were launched - Topol-M and RS-18. It was on the latter that there was an “experimental apparatus” that “can bypass regional missile defense systems, bypass certain means that can control it, and, by and large, the apparatus can solve problems of overcoming missile defense systems, including promising ones.” .
It turns out that instead of a typical warhead that flies along an unchangeable ballistic trajectory, we are creating a certain device capable of changing both the direction and altitude of flight. According to our military leaders, such a system will be put into service before 2010.
Most likely, such a device is equipped with ramjet engines of a special design, which allow the warhead to maneuver in the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. In the words of the head of our state, these are very “serious complexes that are not a response to the missile defense system, but for which it makes no difference whether there is a missile defense system or not.”
So, ICBMs not only do not go into reserve or retire, but, on the contrary, they continue to improve and acquire a “second youth.”
Vladimir Shcherbakov | Illustrations by Mikhail Dmitriev
To return is not to turn back. Does Russia need medium-range missiles?
The head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Sergei Ivanov, said that the agreement on the ban on ground-based medium- and shorter-range missiles cannot exist indefinitely. In an interview with the Rossiya 24 TV channel at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Ivanov noted that recently this type of weapon has begun to develop in countries neighboring Russia. According to the head of the presidential administration, the Americans did not need this class of weapons either before or now, because theoretically with its help they could only fight with Mexico or Canada.
So what are intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)? Why can’t Russia have them now, and what advantages will the adoption of MRBMs give it?
AT THE DAWN OF THE ROCKET AGE
People of the older generation are set on edge by the stamp: “The American military is intensifying the arms race.” However, now, when previously closed information about the development of strategic weapons has become publicly available, it turned out that all this was true, but dumbed down to the point of absurdity by incompetent propagandists.
It was the Americans who created the first nuclear bomb, its first carriers are the “flying fortresses” B-29, B-50, B-36, the world’s first strategic jet bombers B-47 and B-52. The United States also takes the lead in the creation of MRBMs. Another question is that here the difference in time was not four years, as with the atomic bomb, but was calculated in months.
The “grandmother” of the US and USSR MRBMs was the famous German V-2 ballistic missile, designed by SS Sturmbannführer Baron Wernher von Braun. Well, in 1950, Wernher von Braun, in collaboration with Chrysler, began work on the Redstone rocket - a development of the V-2. Flight range - 400 km, launch weight - 28 tons. The missile was equipped with a W-3942 thermonuclear warhead with a yield of 3.8 Mt. In 1958, the 217th Redstone Missile Division was transferred to West Germany, where it began combat duty that same year.
The Soviet answer to the Redstone was the R-5 missile. The preliminary design of the R-5 was completed in October 1951. The weight of the warhead with a conventional explosive according to the project is 1425 kg, the firing range is 1200 km with a probable deviation from the target along the range of ±1.5 km and lateral deviation of ±1.25 km. Alas, the R-5 missile initially did not have a nuclear charge. It had a high-explosive warhead or a warhead with radioactive substances "Generator-5". I note that this is the name of the warhead, but in a number of documents this was the name of the entire product. From September 5 to December 26, 1957, three launches of the R-5 with the Generator-5 warhead were carried out.
In accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated April 10, 1954, OKB-1 began developing the R-5M missile with a nuclear charge on the basis of the R-5 missile. The firing range remained unchanged - 1200 km. The warhead with the nuclear warhead was separated from the body during flight. The probable deviation from the target in range was ±1.5 km, and lateral ±1.25 km.
On February 2, 1956, Operation Baikal was carried out. The R-5M rocket carried a nuclear charge for the first time. Having flown about 1200 km, the warhead reached the surface in the Aral Karakum region without destruction. The impact fuse went off, causing a nuclear explosion with a yield of about 80 kt. By decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 21, 1956, the R-5M missile was adopted by the Soviet Army under the designation 8K51.
Redstone and R-5M can be considered the “mothers” of medium-range ballistic missiles. Von Braun at Chrysler in 1955 began developing the Jupiter MRBM for the US Army. Initially, the new missile was conceived as a deep modernization of the Redstone missile and was even called Redstone II. But after several months of work, it was given a new name “Jupiter” and the index SM-78.
The launch weight of the rocket was 50 tons, the range was 2700-3100 km. "Jupiter" was equipped with MK-3 warheads with a W-49 nuclear charge. The weight of the nuclear charge is 744 - 762 kg, length - 1440 mm, diameter - 500 mm, power - 1.4 Mt.
Even before the decision to adopt the Jupiter missile into service (it was adopted in the summer of 1958), on January 15, 1958, the formation of the 864th squadron of strategic missiles began, and a little later another one, the 865th squadron. After thorough preparation, which included conducting a combat training launch from standard equipment at the training ground, the squadrons were transferred to Italy (Gioia base, 30 missiles) and Turkey (Tigli base, 15 missiles). The Jupiter missiles were aimed at the most important objects in the European part of the USSR.
On December 27, 1955, the US Air Force, independently of the army, entered into a contract with Douglas Aircraft to design its own Thor MRBM. Its weight is 50 tons, range 2800-3180 km, CEP - 3200 m. The Tor missile was equipped with an MK3 warhead with a W-49 nuclear charge. The weight of the nuclear charge is 744-762 kg, length - 1440 mm, diameter - 500 mm, power - 1.4 Mt. Production of W-49 warheads began in September 1958.
Four squadrons of Thor missile systems with 15 missiles each were based in the southern part of England (York, Lincoln, Norwich, Northampton). A total of 60 missiles were deployed there. Some of the missile systems of this type were transferred to the operational control of Great Britain in 1961, where they were placed at missile bases in Yorkshire and Suffolk. They were considered NATO nuclear weapons. In addition, two squadrons of Tor missile systems were stationed in Italy and one in Turkey. Thus, by mid-1962 there were 105 deployed Thor missiles in Europe.
OUR RESPONSE TO THE GOD OF SKY
The answer to the Jupiter and Thor was the Soviet R-12 and R-14 missiles. On August 13, 1955, a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers was adopted “On the creation and production of R-12 (8K63) missiles with the start of flight tests - April 1957.”
The R-12 missile had a detachable monoblock warhead with a 1 Mt charge. In the early 60s, a cluster-type chemical warhead “Tuman” was developed for the R-12 missile. In July 1962, during Operations K-1 and K-2, R-12 missiles with nuclear warheads were launched. The purpose of the tests is to study the effect of high-altitude nuclear explosions on radio communications, radars, aviation and missile technology.
On July 2, 1958, a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers was issued on the development of the R-14 (8K65) ballistic missile with a range of 3600 km. OKB-586 was appointed as the lead developer. The start date for flight development tests is April 1960. On June 6, 1960, the first launch of the R-14 rocket was made at the Kapustin Yar test site. Its flight tests were completed in December 1960. By resolution of the Council of Ministers of April 24, 1961, the combat missile system with the R-14 missile was adopted by the Strategic Missile Forces. Serial production of R-14 missiles was carried out at plant No. 586 in Dnepropetrovsk and plant No. 166 in Omsk. In September 1962, R-14 missiles with a nuclear warhead were launched.
There were many similarities in the design and operation of the first generation MRBMs of the USA and the USSR. All of them were single-stage and had liquid jet engines. All were launched from open stationary launchers. The fundamental difference was that the Soviet MRBMs were based exclusively on their own territory and could not pose a threat to the United States. And American MRBMs were stationed at bases in Europe and Turkey, from where they could strike the entire European part of Russia.
This imbalance was disrupted by Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to carry out Operation Anadyr, during which the 51st Missile Division under the command of Major General Igor Statsenko was secretly delivered to Cuba in 1962. The division had a special staff; it included five regiments. Of these, three regiments each had eight R-12 missile launchers and two regiments each had eight R-14 missile launchers. In total, 36 R-12 missiles and 24 R-14 missiles were to be delivered to Cuba.
About a third of the American territory was within the range of the R-12 missiles, from Philadelphia through St. Louis and Oklahoma City to the Mexican border. R-14 missiles could hit the entire United States and part of Canadian territory.
Within 48 days of its arrival (that is, October 27, 1962), the 51st Division was ready to launch missiles from 24 launches. The time to prepare the missiles for launch ranged from 16 to 10 hours, depending on the delivery time of the missile warheads, which were stored separately.
A number of liberal historians argue that Operation Anadyr was Khrushchev’s adventure. I am not going to argue with them, but will only note that for all Russian emperors from Catherine II to Nicholas II, the arrival of troops of any European power in Turkey would have become a “casus belli,” that is, a reason for war.
During the negotiations, the USA and the USSR reached an agreement according to which the USSR removed all missiles from Cuba, and the USA gave a guarantee of non-aggression against Cuba and removed Jupiter medium-range missiles from Turkey and Italy (45 in total) and Thor missiles from England (60 units). Thus, after the Cuban crisis, the US and USSR MRBMs found themselves on their own territories. The Thors and Jupiters were stored in the United States until 1974-1975, while the R-12 and R-14 remained on combat duty.
"PIONEERS" OF THE COUNTRY OF THE SOVIETS
In 1963-1964, modified R-12U missiles began to be installed in protected Dvina-type silos, and R-14U in Chusovaya silos. The survivability of the silo launchers of the R-12U "Dvina" and R-14U "Chusovaya" missiles was low. The radius of their destruction during the explosion of a 1 megaton bomb was 1.5-2 km. The combat positions of the silo launchers were grouped: four for the R-12U and three silos for the R-14U, located at a distance of less than 100 m from each other. Thus, one explosion of 1 megaton could destroy three or four mines at once. However, the protection of missiles in silo installations was significantly higher than in open installations.
According to the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated March 4, 1966, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) began development of the new generation rocket 15Zh45 “Pioneer”. The launch weight of the rocket is 37 tons, the range is 5000 km.
The self-propelled launcher for the Pioneer complex was developed at the Design Bureau of the Barrikady plant. The six-axle MAZ-547V vehicle was used as the chassis. The missile was constantly kept in a transport and launch container made of fiberglass. The missile could be launched either from a special shelter at the main position, or from one of the field positions prepared in advance in geodetic terms. To carry out the launch, the self-propelled launcher was hung on jacks and leveled.
Flight testing of missiles began on September 21, 1974 at the Kapustin Yar test site and continued until January 9, 1976. On September 11, 1976, the State Commission signed an act on the adoption of the 15Zh45 complex for service with the Strategic Missile Forces. Later the complex received the pseudonym RSD-10. It is curious that Council of Ministers Resolution No. 177-67 on the adoption of the complex was adopted six months earlier - on March 11, 1976.
Serial production of 15Zh45 Pioneer missiles has been carried out since 1976 at the Votkinsk plant, and self-propelled launchers at the Barrikady plant. The first regiments of Pioneer missiles stationed in Belarus went on combat duty in August 1976. From these positions, not only all of Europe was within the range of the Pioneer missiles, but also Greenland, North Africa to Nigeria and Somalia, the entire Middle East and even northern India and the western regions of China.
Later, Pioneer missiles were deployed beyond the Ural Range, including near Barnaul, Irkutsk and Kansk. From there, the entire territory of Asia, including Japan and Indochina, was within range of the missiles. Organizationally, the 15Zh45 missiles were united into regiments, which were armed with six or nine self-propelled launchers with missiles.
On July 19, 1977, work began at MIT to modernize the 15Zh45 Pioneer rocket. The modernized complex received the index 15Zh53 “Pioneer UTTH” (with improved tactical and technical characteristics). The 15Zh53 rocket had the same first and second stages as the 15Zh45. The changes affected the control system and the instrumentation unit. The CEP was increased to 450 m. The installation of new, more powerful engines on the instrumentation unit made it possible to increase the warhead deployment area, which made it possible to increase the number of targets to be hit. The firing range was increased from 5000 to 5500 km.
From August 10, 1979 to August 14, 1980, flight tests of the 15Zh53 rocket were carried out at the Kapustin Yar test site in the amount of 10 launches. By resolution of the Council of Ministers of April 23, 1981, the Pioneer UTTH complex was adopted for service.
In the 1980s, a new modernized rocket was developed, called Pioneer-3. The missile was equipped with a new warhead, which had a significantly lower CEP. A new self-propelled launcher for Pioneer-3 was created in the design bureau of the Barrikady plant on the basis of the six-axle chassis 7916. The first rocket launch took place in 1986. The Pioneer-3 missile system successfully passed state tests, but was not put into service due to the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles.
The number of Pioneer missiles of all modifications increased rapidly. In 1981, there were 180 self-propelled launchers of the complexes. In 1983, their number exceeded 300, and in 1986 - 405 units.
PISTOL POINTED TO TEMPLE
The American answer to the Pioneer IRBM was the Pershing 2 IRBM. Its launch weight was 6.78 tons, its firing range was 2500 km. Both stages of the Pershing 2 rocket were equipped with Hercules solid fuel engines. Military tests of Pershing 2 missiles were carried out by the US Army from July 1982 to October 1984. During the tests, 22 missiles were launched from Cape Canaveral.
The missile was intended mainly to destroy command posts, communication centers and other similar targets, that is, primarily to disrupt the operation of military and state control systems. The low CEP of the rocket was ensured by the use of a combined flight control system. At the beginning of the trajectory, an autonomous inertial system was used, then, after separation of the warhead, a system for correcting the flight of the warhead using radar maps of the area was used. This system was turned on at the final part of the trajectory, when the warhead was transferred to almost horizontal flight.
The radar mounted on the warhead received an image of the area over which the warhead was moving. This image was converted into a digital matrix and compared with the data (map) stored before the launch in the memory device of the control system located on the warhead. As a result of the comparison, the warhead movement error was determined, from which the on-board computer calculated the necessary data for the flight controls.
The Pershing 2 missile was supposed to use two types of warheads - a conventional one with a power of up to 50 kg and a ground-penetrating one. The second option was distinguished by high elongation and high strength and was made of high-strength steel. At a speed of approach of the warhead to the target of 600 m/s, the warhead went deep into the ground by about 25 m.
In 1983, production of W-85 nuclear warheads began for the Pershing 2 missile. The weight of the nuclear warhead was 399 kg, length 1050 mm, diameter 3130 mm. The explosion power is variable - from 5 to 80 kt. The M1001 transport and launcher for Pershing-2 missiles was created on a six-axle wheeled chassis. It consisted of a tractor and a frame semi-trailer, which, in addition to the rocket, housed power supply units, a hydraulic drive to give the rocket a vertical position before launch, and other equipment.
On December 8, 1987, Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the INF Treaty in Washington. At the same time, Gorbachev said: “The decisive prerequisite for the success of these transformations is democratization and openness. They are also the guarantee that we will go far and that the course we have taken is irreversible. This is the will of our people... Humanity is beginning to realize that it has won back. That we must end wars forever... And, celebrating a truly historical event - the signing of a treaty, and even being within these walls, one cannot help but pay tribute to the many who put their minds, energy, patience, perseverance, knowledge, devotion to duty to their people and international community. And first of all, I would like to name Comrade Shevardnadze and Mr. Shultz” (“Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR” No. 10 of December 25, 1987).
According to the treaty, the US government should not seek “to achieve military superiority” over Russia. To what extent is this promise fulfilled? The main question is: is this agreement beneficial for Russia? The numbers speak for themselves: the USSR eliminated 608 medium-range missile launchers and 237 short-range missile launchers, and the Americans eliminated 282 and 1, respectively (no, this is not a typo, really one).
RUSSIA IN THE RING
What has changed in the quarter century that has passed since the signing of the treaty on the elimination of MRBMs? Almost immediately after the signing of the treaty, Israel adopted the Jericho-2B ballistic missile with a firing range of about 1,500 km. By 2000, Israel was armed with over 100 of these missiles, placed in closed silos.
And in 2008, the Jericho-3 MRBM with a range of 4000 km entered service. The missile is equipped with two or three multiple warheads with a nuclear charge. Thus, the entire European part of Russia was within the range of Israeli missiles, with the exception of the Kola Peninsula.
In addition to Israel, along the perimeter of Russia’s borders Iran, India, Pakistan, North Korea and China. Their missiles can hit large areas of the Russian Federation. Moreover, of these countries, only Iran does not yet possess nuclear weapons. It is curious, but according to official statements from the White House and the Pentagon, it was Iranian missiles that forced the United States to create a huge missile defense system both on its territory and in Central Europe and in the World Ocean.
Chinese ballistic missiles in parade formation
Currently, the PRC has hundreds of IRBMs of the Dong Feng-4 (4,750 km), Dong Feng-3 (2,650 km), Dong Feng-25 (1,700 km) and others. Some Chinese MRBMs are installed on wheeled mobile launchers, and some are installed on railway launchers.
But six states along the perimeter of Russia's borders that possess IRBMs are only one side of the coin. The second side is even more important, that is, the threat from the sea. Over the past 25 years, the balance of power at sea between the USSR and the USA has changed dramatically. By 1987, it was still possible to talk about parity of naval weapons. The Tomahawk system, installed on surface ships and submarines, was just being deployed in the United States. And now the US Navy has 4 thousand Tomahawk cruise missiles on surface ships and another thousand on nuclear submarines.
In addition, the US Air Force is capable of using approximately 1,200 cruise missiles in a single mission. Total in one salvo - at least 5200 cruise missiles. Their firing range is 2200-2400 km. The weight of the warhead is 340-450 kg, the quadratic probable deviation (QPD) is 5-10 m. That is, the Tomahawk can even get into a certain Kremlin office or apartment on Rublyovka.
By 1987, the Soviet 5th operational squadron, armed with dozens of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, held the entire south of the Mediterranean coast of Europe under fire: Rome, Athens, Marseille, Milan, Turin and so on. Our Redut coastal mobile missile systems (range over 300 km) had launching positions in the south of Bulgaria, from where they could hit the Strait Zone and a significant part of the Aegean Sea with special charges. Well, now the entry of Russian ships into the Mediterranean Sea has become a rarity.
It is difficult to disagree with Ivanov - the question of denunciation of the INF Treaty is ripe. The United States showed us how to carry out a technical denunciation when it withdrew from the ABM Treaty on June 12, 2002.
What could be the capabilities of the 21st century IRBM? Let's remember recent history. According to the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers dated July 21, 1983 No. 696-213, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering began developing the small-sized Courier 15Zh59 ICBM. The starting weight of ICBMs is 15 tons, length -11.2 m, diameter -1.36 m. Firing range - over 10 thousand km. Two mobile launchers were developed on the four-axle MAZ-7909 chassis and the five-axle MAZ-7929. The “Courier” could be placed in any railway cars, on river barges, in the bodies of Sovtransavto trailers and had to be air transportable.
Thus, the Courier rocket, manufactured at the Votkinsk plant, after being installed on the launcher, simply disappeared for both spacecraft and spy planes. From March 1989 to May 1990, four test launches of Couriers were made from the Plesetsk cosmodrome. Alas, in accordance with the agreement between the leadership of the USSR and the USA dated October 6, 1991, the USSR stopped developing the Courier, and the Americans stopped developing the Midgetman (Dwarf) ICBM weighing 18 tons and 14 m long.
Well, the new MRBMs will have much smaller weight and dimensions than the Courier. They will be able to be transported and launched from ordinary trucks that clog our roads, from ordinary railway cars, and from self-propelled river barges. To overcome missile defense, new MRBMs can fly along the most exotic variable trajectories. A combination of hypersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missiles is not excluded. In addition to targeting ground targets, MRBMs will also be able to hit naval targets - aircraft carriers, Ticonderoga-class cruisers - carriers of cruise missiles, and even submarines.
Actually, there is nothing new in this idea. Back on April 24, 1962, a resolution of the Council of Ministers was adopted, which provided for the creation of a ballistic missile with a homing warhead capable of hitting moving ships. On the basis of the R-27 missiles, the R-27K (4K-18) ballistic missile was created, intended for firing at sea surface targets. The R-27K rocket was equipped with a small second stage. The launch weight of the rocket was 13.25 tons, length - about 9 m, diameter -1.5 m. Maximum firing range - 900 km. The head part is monoblock.
Control on the passive part of the trajectory was carried out according to information from a passive radar sighting device, processed in the on-board digital computer system. The warhead was aimed at moving targets based on their radar radiation by turning on the second stage propulsion system twice during the extra-atmospheric phase of the flight. However, for a number of reasons, the R-27K anti-ship missile was not put into service, but only in trial operation (1973-1980) and on only one K-102 submarine, converted according to Project 605.
By 1987, work was successfully underway in the USSR to create an anti-ship ballistic missile based on the Pioneer UTTH.
What they didn’t do in the USSR, they did in China. Now they have adopted the mobile MRBM "Dong Fyn-21", which can hit enemy surface ships at a range of up to 2,700 km. The missile is equipped with a radar homing head and a target selection system.
In the mass consciousness, especially the Russian one, the fact that the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite (AES) was carried out by the Soviet Union looks almost like a historical inevitability - especially taking into account the failed first launch of the American AES, and the American lag in manned space exploration in the first half sixties. Few people realize how close the Americans (or rather the team of Wernher von Braun) were to launching the world's first satellite.
So, in the first half of the fifties, three families of ballistic missiles developed relatively independently in the United States. The Air Force was working on the Atlas program, the Army (ie, the Army) was working on the Redstone program, and the Navy was working on the Vanguard - the latter a development of the Viking missile made in the forties by Glenn L. Martin Co.
Wernher von Braun's team worked on the Redstone ballistic missile. This operational-tactical missile had a length of 21.1 m, a diameter of 1.78 m and a mass of 27.8 tons. 
The Redstone head section was separated to increase the firing range. The rocket was powered by a Rocketdyne NAA75-100 ethanol/liquid oxygen liquid rocket engine, producing 347 kN of thrust.
In the mid-fifties, the US administration announced that as part of the International Geophysical Year 1957-1958, Americans would launch the world's first satellite. The joint project of the Army and the Navy (Project Slug / Project Orbiter), proposed by Brown on the basis of Redstone and Vanguard, was considered and rejected in favor of the purely civilian intended Vanguard - on July 29, 1955 it was announced that this particular rocket would launch the first satellite in 1957 . The Eisenhower administration did not want to launch the first satellite on a “combat” rocket, and also did not want to give this honor to a team whose core would be German engineers who had worked in the past in Nazi Germany.
A disillusioned von Braun (second from right in the photo below, center Obert) continued to work for the army on the next generation of combat ballistic missiles. Created on February 1, 1956, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency began developing an ICBM codenamed Jupiter.
The Jupiter-C (Composite Re-entry Test Vehicle) was a modified Redstone, with a longer first stage and two additional stages. The second stage consisted of eleven Thiokol Baby Sergeant solid propellant engines (those were three times smaller copies of the MGM-29 Sergeant engine), the third stage consisted of three such engines.
In the second half of 1956, the first test launch of this missile was to take place from Cape Canaveral. As a payload on the rocket, they were going to put a mock-up of a satellite with a fourth stage, consisting of another Baby Sergeant TT engine - von Braun never gave up on trying to create the world's first space launch vehicle. However, the White House administration rightly suspected Brown that he would quietly try to overtake Vanguard on the way to space. After catching up from the Pentagon, the head of ABMA, General Medaris, called von Braun and ordered him to personally verify that the fourth stage on the rocket would be inert. As a result, the engine fuel in the fourth stage was replaced with sand ballast.
The rocket, codenamed "UI" and equipped with a Redstone #27 booster, was launched on September 20, 1956, reaching a then-record altitude of 1,097 kilometers and a range of 5,472 kilometers.
The overall weight of the prototype of the fourth stage did not reach the orbital speed of only a few hundred meters per second. Thus, the possibility of launching the first satellite using Jupiter-C was successfully demonstrated. Actually, if the fourth stage had been active and worked successfully (the chances of which were very high, since it was the simplest in the whole bunch), then space age would have started back in September 1956.
However, the Eisenhower administration remained committed to the first satellite launch on Vanguard. In “gratitude” for the successful launch of Jupiter-C, two months later in 1956, US Secretary of Defense Wilson generally banned ABMA from launching missiles at a range exceeding 200 kilometers (!) - longer-range missiles were to become the prerogative of the Air Force. This order, as far as I understand, was de facto ignored, but it perfectly demonstrates the mood that reigned at that time in the highest echelon of the US political leadership.
Meanwhile, in August 1957, the Soviet R-7 (No. 8L) successfully completed the planned flight plan for the first time, normally completing the entire active portion of the flight and reaching a given area eight thousand kilometers from the launch site. Korolev immediately sent a request to the Central Committee for permission to use two R-7 rockets for the experimental launch of the simplest satellite PS-1, the development of which began in November 1956, and received consent from N. S. Khrushchev. On October 2, Korolev signed an order for flight tests of the PS-1 and sent a notification of readiness to Moscow. No response instructions were received, and Korolev independently decided to place the rocket with the satellite at the launch position. Two days later "Beep! Beep!" from near-Earth orbit heralded the beginning of a new era in human history.
In the United States, the successful launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union led society into a state of natural shock - the Eisenhower administration clearly greatly underestimated the propaganda effect of such an achievement. On November 8, five days after the successful launch of the second Soviet Earth satellite, von Braun was finally given permission to prepare Jupiter-C for the launch of an American satellite. True, priority was again given to the Vanguard project - its launch was scheduled for December 6, 1957, and von Braun's brainchild was supposed to serve as a backup. However, as I already mentioned in the first sentence of the post, a double was really needed. “Kaputnik,” as it was quickly dubbed in the press, fell back onto the launch pad shortly after launch and exploded:
On January 31, 1958, the Juno I rocket, designated "UE" (Redstone #29), was successfully launched.
The first American satellite, Explorer I, was launched into Earth orbit - on the right side of the diagram you can see the same Baby Sergant solid fuel engine that was attached to the satellite.
The structure of the first American satellite (Fig. K. Rusakov, "Cosmonautics News" 2003 No. 3): 
1 - nose cone;
2 - temperature probe;
3 - low-power transmitter (10 mW, 108 MHz);
4, 14 - external temperature meter;
5, 10-slot antenna;
6 - compartments for the study of cosmic rays and micrometeorites (devices of Dr. J. Van Allen);
7 - micrometer microphone;
8 - powerful transmitter (60 mW; 108 MHz);
9 - internal temperature meter;
11 - empty fourth stage housing;
12 - micrometeorite erosion meters;
13 - flexible antenna 56 cm long
Apart from the presence of a “live” fourth stage, Jupiter-C in this launch was no different from the rocket launched in 1956. Moreover, the rocket that launched Explorer 1 was a duplicate of the rocket launched in September 1956. Due to the successful launch of the first rocket, the second one was not needed at that time and was sent for storage. Finally, this RLV itself was very reminiscent of the original Project Orbiter, proposed by Brown in the mid-fifties.
As a summary: it was only and solely a political ban on the part of the American government that prevented the space age from beginning 1 year and 2 weeks earlier than it began. Moreover, this era could have begun later if not for Korolev’s persistence - immediately after the successful test of the R-7, instead of resting on his laurels, he immediately began lobbying the Central Committee for the launch of the satellite. This is about the role of the individual in history - after all, if the first satellite had been American, the space race that so greatly influenced the history of mankind in the second half of the 20th century might not have happened.
The content of the article
ROCKET WEAPONS, guided missiles and missiles are unmanned weapons whose movement trajectories from the starting point to the target are realized using rocket or jet engines and guidance means. Rockets usually have the latest electronic equipment, and the most advanced technologies are used in their manufacture.
Historical reference.
Already in the 14th century. missiles were used in China for military purposes. However, it was only in the 1920s and 1930s that technologies emerged that made it possible to equip a rocket with instruments and controls capable of guiding it from the launch point to the target. This was made possible primarily by gyroscopes and electronic equipment.
The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, deprived Germany of its most important weapons and prohibited it from rearming. However, missiles were not mentioned in this agreement, since their development was considered unpromising. As a result, the German military establishment showed interest in missiles and guided missiles, which ushered in a new era in the field of weapons. Ultimately, it turned out that Nazi Germany was developing 138 projects for guided missiles of various types. The most famous of them are two types of “retaliation weapons”: the V-1 cruise missile and the V-2 inertial guidance ballistic missile. They inflicted heavy losses on Britain and the Allied forces during the Second World War.
TECHNICAL FEATURES
There are many different types of military missiles, but each of them is characterized by the use latest technologies in the field of control and guidance, engines, warheads, electronic jamming, etc.
Guidance.
If the rocket is launched and does not lose stability in flight, it is still necessary to bring it to the target. Various types of guidance systems have been developed.
Inertial guidance.
For the first ballistic missiles, it was considered acceptable if the inertial system launched the missile to a point located several kilometers from the target: with a payload in the form of a nuclear charge, destruction of the target in this case is quite possible. However, this forced both sides to additionally protect the most important objects, placing them in shelters or concrete shafts. In turn, rocket designers have improved inertial guidance systems, ensuring that the rocket's trajectory is corrected by means of celestial navigation and tracking the earth's horizon. Advances in gyroscopy also played a significant role. By the 1980s, the guidance error of intercontinental ballistic missiles was less than 1 km.
Homing.
For most rockets carrying conventional explosives, one or another homing system is required. At active homing the missile is equipped with its own radar and electronic equipment, which guides it until it meets the target.
In semi-active homing, the target is irradiated by a radar located at or near the launch pad. The missile is guided by a signal reflected from the target. Semi-active homing saves a lot of expensive equipment on the launch pad, but gives the operator control over target selection.
Laser designators, which began to be used since the early 1970s, proved their effectiveness in the Vietnam War high efficiency: They reduced the amount of time the flight crew remained exposed to enemy fire and the number of missiles needed to hit a target. The guidance system of such a missile does not actually perceive any radiation other than that emitted by the laser. Since the scattering of the laser beam is small, it can irradiate an area not exceeding the dimensions of the target.
Passive homing involves detecting radiation emitted or reflected by a target and then calculating a course that will guide the missile to the target. These can be radar signals emitted by enemy air defense systems, light and thermal radiation from the engines of an aircraft or other object.
Wire and fiber optic communications.
The control technique typically used is based on a wired or fiber-optic connection between the rocket and the launch platform. This connection reduces the cost of the rocket, since the most expensive components remain in the launch complex and can be reused. Only a small control unit is retained in the rocket, which is necessary to ensure the stability of the initial movement of the rocket launched from the launch device.
Engines.
The movement of combat missiles is ensured, as a rule, by solid fuel rocket engines (solid propellant rocket motors); Some missiles use liquid fuel, while cruise missiles prefer jet engines. The rocket engine is autonomous, and its operation is not related to the supply of air from the outside (like the operation of piston or jet engines). The fuel and solid fuel oxidizer are crushed to a powder state and mixed with a liquid binder. The mixture is poured into the engine housing and cured. After this, no preparations are needed to operate the engine in combat conditions. Although most tactical guided missiles operate in the atmosphere, they are powered by rocket engines rather than jet engines, since solid rocket motors are quicker to launch, have few moving parts, and are more energy efficient. Jet engines are used in guided missiles with a long active flight time, when the use of atmospheric air provides a significant gain. Liquid rocket engines (LPRE) were widely used in the 1950s and 1960s.
Improvements in solid fuel manufacturing technology have made it possible to begin production of solid propellant rocket engines with controlled combustion characteristics, eliminating the formation of cracks in the charge, which could lead to an accident. Rocket engines, especially solid propellant engines, age as the substances they contain gradually enter into chemical bonds and change composition, so control fire tests should be periodically carried out. If the accepted shelf life of any of the tested samples is not confirmed, the entire batch is replaced.
Warhead.
When using fragmentation warheads, metal fragments (usually thousands of steel or tungsten cubes) are directed at the target at the moment of explosion. Such shrapnel is most effective in hitting aircraft, communications equipment, air defense radars and people outside shelter. The warhead is driven by a fuse, which detonates when the target is hit or at some distance from it. In the latter case, with the so-called non-contact initiation, the fuse is triggered when the signal from the target (reflected radar beam, thermal radiation, or signal from small on-board lasers or light sensors) reaches a certain threshold.
To destroy tanks and armored vehicles covering soldiers, shaped charges are used, ensuring the self-organizing formation of directed movement of warhead fragments.
Advances in the field of guidance systems have allowed designers to create kinetic weapons - missiles, the destructive effect of which is determined by an extremely high speed of movement, which upon impact leads to the release of enormous kinetic energy. Such missiles are usually used for missile defense.
Electronic interference.
The use of combat missiles is closely related to the creation of electronic interference and means of combating it. The purpose of such jamming is to create signals or noise that will "trick" the missile into following a false target. Early methods of creating electronic interference involved throwing out strips of aluminum foil. On locator screens, the presence of ribbons turns into a visual representation of noise. Modern electronic jamming systems analyze received radar signals and transmit false ones to mislead the enemy, or simply generate enough radio frequency interference to jam the enemy system. Computers have become an important part of military electronics. Non-electronic interference includes the creation of flashes, e.g. decoys for enemy heat-seeking missiles, as well as specially designed jet turbines that mix atmospheric air with exhaust gases to reduce the infrared "visibility" of the aircraft.
Anti-electronic interference systems use techniques such as changing operating frequencies and using polarized electromagnetic waves.
Advance assembly and testing.
The requirement for minimal maintenance and high combat readiness of missile weapons led to the development of the so-called. "certified" missiles. Assembled and tested missiles are sealed in a container at the factory and then sent to a warehouse where they are stored until they are requested by military units. In this case, assembly in field conditions(practised for the first rockets), and electronic equipment does not require testing and troubleshooting.
TYPES OF COMBAT MISSILES
Ballistic missiles.
Ballistic missiles are designed to transport thermonuclear charges to a target. They can be classified as follows: 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a flight range of 5600–24,000 km, 2) intermediate-range missiles (above average) – 2400–5600 km, 3) “naval” ballistic missiles (with a range of 1400– 9200 km), launched from submarines, 4) medium-range missiles (800–2400 km). Intercontinental and naval missiles, together with strategic bombers, form the so-called. "nuclear triad".
A ballistic missile spends only a matter of minutes moving its warhead along a parabolic trajectory ending at the target. Most of the warhead's travel time is spent flying and descending through space. Heavy ballistic missiles usually carry multiple individually targetable warheads, directed at the same target or having their own targets (usually within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the main target). To ensure the required aerodynamic characteristics upon re-entry, the warhead is given a lens-shaped or conical shape. The device is equipped with a heat-protective coating, which sublimates, passing from a solid state directly into a gaseous state, and thereby ensures the removal of heat from aerodynamic heating. The warhead is equipped with a small proprietary navigation system to compensate for inevitable trajectory deviations that can change the rendezvous point.
V-2.
The first successful flight of the V-2 took place in October 1942. In total, more than 5,700 of these missiles were manufactured. 85% of them launched successfully, but only 20% hit the target, while the rest exploded upon approach. 1,259 missiles hit London and its environs. However, the Belgian port of Antwerp was hit the hardest.
Ballistic missiles with above average range.
As part of a large-scale research program using German rocket specialists and V-2 rockets captured during the defeat of Germany, US Army specialists designed and tested the short-range Corporal and medium-range Redstone missiles. The Corporal missile was soon replaced by the solid-fuel Sargent, and the Redstone was replaced by the Jupiter, a larger liquid-fuel missile with an above-average range.
ICBM.
ICBM development in the United States began in 1947. Atlas, the first US ICBM, entered service in 1960.
The Soviet Union began developing larger missiles around this time. His Sapwood (SS-6), the world's first intercontinental rocket, became a reality with the launch of the first satellite (1957).
The US Atlas and Titan 1 rockets (the latter entered service in 1962), like the Soviet SS-6, used cryogenic liquid fuel, and therefore their preparation time for launch was measured in hours. "Atlas" and "Titan-1" were initially located in heavy-duty hangars and were brought into operation only before launch. combat status. However, after some time, the Titan-2 rocket appeared, located in a concrete shaft and having an underground control center. Titan-2 ran on long-lasting self-igniting liquid fuel. In 1962, the Minuteman, a three-stage solid-fuel ICBM, entered service, delivering a single 1 Mt charge to a target 13,000 km away.
In 1954, the director and then chief engineer of NII-88, M.K. Yangel, appointed chief designer of the then largest Dnepropetrovsk plant No. 586, sharply increased the capacity of the design bureau and began large-scale development of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) using high-boiling fuel components .Launch of the R-5M rocket
In this he was encouraged by the highest Ukrainian state and party leaders, many of whom soon moved to the Kremlin, in particular L.I. Brezhnev. In their opinion, the work of OKB-586 could contribute to the growth of the prestige of Ukraine in the face of the supreme power, which gave the republic new opportunities. In addition, in the future, Yangel could compete with Korolev himself by creating ICBMs using long-lasting fuel. However, at first, the urgent task was the operational design of the first own MRBM. The transition to new components required solving a number of problems related to increasing the durability of structural materials in an aggressive environment and maintaining the stability of fuel components when they remain in rocket tanks for a long time. Taking as a basis the initial project prepared under the leadership of V.S. Budnik, M.K. Yangel could not and did not want to call the rocket, the development of which he did not start, “entirely his own.” In order for the advantages of the Dnepropetrovsk brainchild to appear more clearly, the project was revised and an IRBM was proposed, with a range of about 2000 km (66% more than that of the R-5M), capable of carrying a more powerful warhead. The missile was designated R-12.
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Diagram of R-5M, R-12 prototype and R-12 series missiles
On August 13, 1955, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers “On the creation and production of the R-12 (8K63) rocket” was adopted with access to the LKI in April 1957, and in October 1955 it was possible to release an adjusted preliminary design. The range and thrown mass have increased, which has led to an increase in the relative fuel supply. As a result, the starting mass of the “product” became significantly greater. The thrust of the RD-211 engine turned out to be insufficient. However, M.K. Yangel did not see this as a particular problem - he felt behind him the powerful support of V.P. Glushko, who promised him to quickly develop and deliver all the necessary liquid-propellant rocket engines using new components. It must be said that work on the RD-211 engine began in 1953. Knowing from previous experience that the combustion chamber, determining such important characteristics of the liquid-propellant rocket engine as thrust and specific impulse of thrust (specific impulse of thrust is a parameter characterizing the efficiency of the engine; measured in kgf /kg·s. The physical meaning is the thrust developed by the engine at a fuel consumption of 1 kg per second. Further in the text, for brevity, simply “specific impulse" - author’s note), is the most capricious element of the engine in fine-tuning, Valentin Petrovich suggested make the rocket engine multi-chamber. He believed that it would be easier to develop one relatively small chamber of a multi-chamber engine than to develop a liquid-propellant rocket engine with a single high-thrust chamber. The original nitric acid RD-211 was initially made with four chambers - the thrust of each chamber was almost half that of the first RD-100 - an analogue of the German A-4 engine. Experimental and development tests of a nitric acid combustion chamber with displacement fuel supply, which began at the stand in the same 1953, gave very good results.
A-4 rocket engine
By this time, OKB V.P. Glushko, in addition to creating an engine for OKB-586, participated in work on liquid-propellant rocket engines for two intercontinental missiles at once - for both stages of the Korolev R-7 ICBM (on oxygen and kerosene) and for the launch boosters of the Soviet supersonic intercontinental cruise missile (MCR) "Buran", designed at OKB-23 by V.M. Myasishchev. RD-212 on nitric acid and kerosene for Buran was made on the basis of RD-211. A.M. Isaev, who a little earlier created a liquid-propellant rocket engine for the launch accelerators of the first Soviet MCR "Storm" developed by the S.A. Lavochkin Design Bureau, was faced with an unpleasant phenomenon - explosions of the fuel mixture in the closed cavities of the injector heads. Kerosene turned out to be far from the best fuel for pairing with nitric acid - it did not provide self-ignition and gave too “harsh” combustion in the chambers. Having had enough of it, Isaev, in all his subsequent engines using long-lasting fuel, abandoned the use of kerosene in favor of self-igniting fuel - first amines, and then hydrazine-based fuels. V.P. Glushko got out of this situation by using turpentine-type hydrocarbon fuel TM-185, which had smooth ignition characteristics and ensured more stable combustion with nitric acid than conventional kerosene or RG-1 rocket fuel. In any case, there were no mentions of difficulties with fine-tuning the liquid-propellant rocket engine due to the fault of fuel in the OKB-456 reports. Bench testing of the RD-212 was not completed due to changes in the tactical and technical requirements for the Buran small missile cruiser - it was necessary to increase the thrust of the launch boosters by 22%, and therefore the development of the RD-213 began, completed in 1956 with official bench tests and delivery batches of engines to the customer. However, in the same year, the customer realized that he did not need two small missiles (“Storm” and “Buran”), so work on the latter was stopped. Using the resulting groundwork, V.P. Glushko was able to quickly create a powerful and very reliable engine for the R-12 rocket, called RD-214.
Engine RD-214
RD-214 (beginning of development in 1955) became the most advanced liquid-propellant rocket engine from the entire family of OKB-254 engines running on nitric acid and kerosene and the only one of them that has received practical application. In 1957, its fire development tests began, which were carried out in two stages. The liquid-propellant rocket engine was tested immediately in its full four-chamber configuration. At the first stage, the launch was practiced and the performance of the engine was checked for a given operating time. Numerous features of the start-up and shutdown transients have been identified. In particular, it turned out that a delayed approach to the nominal thrust mode leads to the appearance of high-frequency pulsations in the combustion chambers. As a result, the first series of development tests and final development tests were successfully completed. Control and technological fire tests of a batch of commercial engines also passed successfully. In March 1957, bench tests of the RD-214 as part of the R-12 rocket began at the NII-229 stand in Zagorsk. By the beginning of the LCI, four liquid-propellant rocket engines had undergone such tests. From the same batch, engines were selected for the LCI of the R-12 rocket. The second stage of fire tests would be aimed at reducing the spread of the aftereffect impulse, as well as collecting the necessary statistics on engine reliability. It became clear that the optimal way to reduce the aftereffect impulse is to switch to the final thrust stage mode before turning it off. However, tests have shown that when the pressure in the chambers decreases below a certain value, low-frequency vibrations arise in them, which can lead to the destruction of the liquid-propellant rocket engine. As a result, the mode of reaching the final stage and the amount of thrust before shutdown were determined.
Chassis of the R-12 rocket (end view)
Visible plugs in the critical sections of the nozzles and control levers of the gas rudders
Already during the LCT of the R-12 missile by 1959, the RD-214 successfully passed the entire scope of final development and flight tests, was put into serial production and adopted by the Soviet Army. Inspired by the success of the R-211/R-214 family, V.P. Glushko went to rearrange the engines for the “seven” from a single-chamber to a four-chamber, when it was necessary to increase thrust due to an increase in the launch mass of the rocket. After this, the multi-chamber arrangement of a liquid-propellant rocket engine with a single turbopump unit began to be widely used by the Khimki Design Bureau.
Layout of R-5M and R-12 missiles on transport carts
The use of the RD-214 affected the appearance of the R-12 rocket: it was necessary to significantly change the tail section by introducing a conical fairing skirt. However, when blowing rocket models in wind tunnels, it turned out that such a skirt has a positive effect on the stability of the rocket. Speaking about the appearance of the R-12, we can say that it was significantly different from the appearance of the R-5M: the former elegance of smooth contours was replaced by the choppy straightness of simple contours formed by connecting the cylindrical compartment of the tanks with the cones of the head and tail skirts. S.P. Korolev, having seen the drawing of this rocket for the first time, did not fail to remark: “This “pencil” will not fly...” Another controversial issue in which M.K. Yangel sought to defend an independent position was the missile guidance system. Old gyroscopic devices - the heirs of the "gyrohorizons" and "gyroverticants" of the German A-4 - gave too much dispersion of warheads at long ranges. To increase accuracy, some experts at that time proposed introducing a radio correction system on the active part of the trajectory. S.P. Korolev had a positive attitude towards such proposals - all of his missiles, starting with the R-2, had (some as the main one, others as an auxiliary) radio channel for lateral trajectory correction. M.K. Yangel believed that it was necessary to develop purely autonomous, inertial guidance systems based on the improvement of gyro devices. This gave the ballistic missile greater invulnerability - such a system cannot be “clogged” with radio interference. In accordance with these requirements, an inertial and fully autonomous control system was developed for the R-12. Time has shown that for combat missiles this approach was absolutely justified. It is interesting to note that tests of the control system for the R-12 were carried out using the R-5M rocket.
Diagram of R-12, R-14 and R-16 missiles
Flight tests of the R-12 began on June 22, 1957 from GCP No. 4 Kapustin Yar and continued until December 1958. They were carried out in three stages; a total of 25 missiles were launched. All work on this missile, including the production of the experimental series R-12, its LKI at the test site and preparation for serial production, was completed in 1959. On March 4 of the same year, the ground-based R-12 complex was put into service, and plant No. 586 and OKB-586 were awarded the Order of Lenin. M.K. Yangel, L.V. Smirnov (plant director) and V.S. Budnik were awarded the title of Heroes of Socialist Labor. To present government awards in July 1959, N.S. Khrushchev visited the plant. Almost in parallel with the flight test of this rocket, the OKB-586 team carried out new developments. By September 1957, a preliminary design of the R-15 missile for arming Navy submarines was drawn up, released in accordance with the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of August 17, 1956, and by November 1957 the designers, in accordance with the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of December 17, 1956 “On the creation of the intercontinental ballistic missile R-16 (8K64)”, prepared a preliminary design of their own ICBM. It was supposed to reach its LKI by June 1961. To accelerate the testing of some design solutions, the Dnepropetrovsk team simultaneously developed a project for a missile to replace the R-12 - a more advanced MRBM with double the previous range. On July 2, 1958, a Resolution of the Council of Ministers was issued on the development of the R-14 (8K65) ballistic missile with a flight range of 4000 km in order to enter the LKI in April 1960. By December 1958, the preliminary design was ready. Meanwhile, the establishment of mass production of the R-12 was actively underway, not only in Dnepropetrovsk, but also in Omsk. Since the RVGK engineering brigades were equipped with R-5M and R-12 missiles, their combat capabilities And firepower have increased significantly. In addition to the brigades, which by that time were subordinate to the Headquarters of the jet units, on the basis of aviation units in 1956–1959. Long-Range Aviation missile units were formed. On December 17, 1959, a Resolution of the Council of Ministers was issued on the merger of these units into a single Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) under the command of Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin. The R-12 became the basis for creating a group of medium-range missiles. The first regiments of the Strategic Missile Forces with ground-based R-12 missiles were deployed on May 15–16, 1960 in populated areas Slonim, Novogrudok and Pinsk in Belarus, Gezgaly in the Caucasus and Plunge in the Baltic states. The pace of development and subsequent deployment of missiles cannot fail to impress. However, the time was such, and the main slogan remained “Overtake America!” This was not an abstract race - NATO's arsenals were by no means imaginary. Already on December 1, 1955, the program for creating a ballistic missile engine was declared a priority by President Eisenhower, and from that moment on, the Americans went with us literally “head to head,” practically keeping up with the deadlines, and sometimes getting ahead in certain characteristics of the missiles. As a result of the developments carried out, the United States created two systems at once, which in many ways are analogues of the R-12 and R-14. On March 14, 1956, testing began on the Jupiter missile, designed for the US Army Ballistic Missile Directorate by the “German team” of the Redstone Arsenal under the leadership of V. von Braun. (In fact, Wernher von Braun was the chief engineer of the project and director of the Jupiter program. The direct design of the mechanical systems was carried out by William Mrazek, the guidance and control system was developed by Walter Hössermann, the ground equipment by Hans Heuter, the launch equipment by Kurt Debus. The coordination of work and the overall layout of the system conducted by Heins Koelle and Harri Ruppe.) On the third launch, on May 31, 1957, the rocket reached an estimated range of 2,780 km. Until July 1958, 38 launches were carried out, of which 29 were considered successful. Since the summer of the same year, the SM-78 Jupiter system was put into service with the 864th and 865th strategic missile squadrons of the US Army, stationed in Italy and Turkey. Each squadron has 30 missiles. Several Jupiters were transferred to the Royal Air Force of Great Britain.
Preparing for the launch of the Jupiter IRBM
Less than ten months after the start of the Jupiter flight test, on January 25, 1957, the Thor rocket, developed by Douglas Aircraft for the United States Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, launched for the first time. The first launch took place just 13 months after the contract for the creation of this rocket was signed. Already on September 20, 1957, with a simplified control system, it reached a range of 2400 km. In the eighth and fourth successful flight, on December 19, 1957, the warhead of the Thor, equipped with a standard control system, “hit” the target range with high accuracy. Until January 28, 1959, 31 launches of this rocket were carried out, of which 15 were completely successful, 12 were partially successful and four ended unsuccessfully. The first Thor was handed over to RAF Bomber Command on September 19, 1958 and entered service with the 77th Strategic Missile Squadron stationed near Foltwell (Norfolk). In addition to Great Britain, the SM-75 Thor system was in service with two squadrons of 15 missiles each, based in Italy and Turkey.
Installation of upper stages on the Tor-Able launch vehicle, created on the basis of the Tor IRBM
“Jupiter” and “Thor” were designed by different companies and differed quite significantly in appearance (initially von Braun wanted to offer “Jupiter” to the Navy for use from submarines, and this rocket turned out to be short and “fat”). At the same time, they had a lot in common. In particular, liquid oxygen and kerosene were used as fuel components; single-chamber liquid-propellant rocket engines were used to control the flight, swinging in a gimbal and differing from each other only in layout, since they were created by the same company - Rocketdyne. Both of these missiles were considered mobile, since they were transported on a wheeled conveyor, and the Jupiter was generally launched from a mobile launcher. The targets of the missiles were objects in the European part of the USSR. "Thor" and "Jupiter" were built in a small series. Their total number in the US Air Force and Army reached 105 units.
RS-27A is a modern modification of the liquid-propellant rocket engine, which was installed on the Jupiter and Thor MRBMs.
However, let’s return to R-12 and its role in the formation of the Strategic Missile Forces. By 1960, a very difficult situation was developing in the world. Despite the fact that the USSR had already adopted the R-7 ICBM and the R-12 IRBM, priority in the number of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles remained on the side of the United States. The first Soviet ICBMs based on the “seven”, due to their small numbers and limitations in use, could not really compete with American missiles and bombers. The Dnepropetrovsk MRBMs are a different matter - due to their comparative simplicity, low cost and high combat readiness, they could be quickly and widely deployed in units. In accordance with the new opportunities, a new military doctrine USSR, the main provisions of which were formulated on January 14, 1960 by N.S. Khrushchev in a speech in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR entitled “Disarmament for lasting peace and friendship." Ballistic missiles occupied a central place in military strategy, which became the decisive factor in influencing the enemy in both European and global wars. In accordance with this doctrine, possible scenarios for future wars were constructed, which now had to begin with a massive nuclear strike. The Strategic Missile Forces became the most important part of the USSR Armed Forces. Here is what is written about the R-12 missile in the collection “Soviet Nuclear Weapons”: “With the deployment in 1958 of the SS-4 Sandal (the name of the R-12 missile according to NATO terminology - author’s note), the USSR gained the ability to launch nuclear strikes operational in nature, regardless of long-range strategic forces. The SS-4 was soon complemented by the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile (R-14 - approx. auto), which entered service in 1961. Number of deployed SS–3 (Р–5М - approx. auto), SS-4 and SS-5 peaked in the mid-1960s, when there were over 700 of them, with all but 100 directed at targets in Western Europe.” Although ground complex with R-12 missiles was considered highly automated at that time; many procedures associated with preparing the missile for launch and refueling it were carried out manually. The complexity of operating the complex in parts and formations was revealed, in particular, during complex classes on refueling training missiles with rocket fuel components, which were carried out from the second half of 1963. The missiles were refueled many times and then sent to the arsenal. The work of the personnel of the regiments and formations of the RSD was especially intense during their trips to the State Center No. 4 Kapustin Yar to conduct combat firing training.
Diagram of installation of the R-12 rocket on the launch pad
This is how one of the rocket veterans, retired Colonel General Yu.P. Zabegailov, recalls such moments: “In July 1964, the air temperature at the test site reached plus 40 degrees. During refueling of the rocket at the position, the air does not move; up to approximately a height of 1–1.5 meters above the ground there is a yellow cloud of oxidizer vapors emerging from the tankers’ drainage system. The battery personnel work in gas masks and protective clothing, dressed on their naked bodies, since otherwise they cannot withstand even a minute; Every 4-5 minutes, soldiers, sergeants and officers run up to the water carrier, pull back the hood of their protective suit and pour 1-2 buckets of cold water down the back of their necks from a hose. A wet body dries within 5 minutes under protective clothing. This was how we saved ourselves from overheating...” Yes, in such conditions it was possible not only to test what our warrior was capable of even in Peaceful time, but also understand that it is necessary to take serious measures to reduce manual operations at the starting position. In addition, despite the fact that the R-12 missiles were stored in arched concrete structures, the launch complex itself, which was built on almost the same principles as its prototypes for missiles from A-4/R-1 to R-5M inclusive , due to the abundance of service equipment (which included transport vehicles, tractors, tankers, command posts, communication centers, etc.) and an unprotected ground launch, it was a vulnerable target during an air attack. It was necessary to provide for a new method of basing, which was the installation of the rocket in special silos.
An artist’s drawing characterizing the operation of the Atlas ICBM silo launcher
In his memoirs, Sergei Nikitovich Khrushchev claims that silo-based missiles were proposed by his father, which we leave without comment. “Technically”, the Americans were the first to come up with the silo, but they only intended to store a rocket in it (first Atlas, then Titan-1), protecting it from damage during an air attack. Before launch, the rocket, along with the launch pad, had to be lifted from the shaft to the surface by elevator and launched from there. Later it was decided to launch directly from the mine. The first full-fledged silo launchers (silos) were silos for Titan-2 missiles.
Routine maintenance of the Titan-2 ICBM in the mine
From the very beginning, our specialists considered it expedient to launch from the mine. Of all the possible designs, the one that provided for the free exit of the rocket installed on the launch pad, located at the bottom of the shaft, was chosen. The gases flowing from the rocket engine had to exit through an annular gas duct between the inner wall of the shaft and the protective metal cup enclosing the rocket. To test the new basing method, it was planned to conduct a full-scale experiment with the R-12 rocket. Here’s what Nikolai Fedorovich Shlykov, a participant in those long-ago events, said about the creation of the first silo installations for R-12 missiles: “When creating the first two silo launchers at the test site, the builders encountered quicksand at a depth of about 20 m. Since at that time methods for passing quicksand had not yet been worked out, they decided to build the shaft up by pouring soil... in the form of a mound about seven meters high. In this case, the rocket was completely immersed in the shaft. On flat terrain, these mounds were visible from about 10–15 km away. They often served as landmarks when moving around the training ground and therefore were nicknamed “beacons.” Ground service equipment was located approximately 150 m from the mine. The missile was installed in the silo using a 25-ton crane, refueling was carried out by means located at the zero level. All decisions formed the basis technical developments experimental silo. The detailed design was carried out by the V.P. Barmin Design Bureau and the Design Institute of the Ministry of Defense (TsPI-31 MO). The first launch of the rocket took place from one such “beacon” in September 1959. Eyewitnesses’ memories of the first launch of the R-12 from the silo are ambiguous: some claim that, having flown about 100 km, the rocket deviated from its course and fell: an emergency shutdown of the rocket engine occurred - when the engine was running, undesigned vibrations occurred in the shaft, which led to damage to one of the four steering gears. Others say that the accident occurred for a more prosaic reason - the gases flowing from the engine in the shaft, when interacting with the injected air, squeezed a metal strip of its shell inside the “glass”, which cut off the third stabilizer of the rocket. The flight was controlled until the 57th second, then, while passing through the zone of maximum aerodynamic loads, due to the asymmetric configuration with three stabilizers, the rocket lost stability and fell. During the inspection of the silo, a deformation of the protective cup was revealed, and the cut stabilizer was lying not far from the shaft. On the one hand, it was a failure, on the other - big victory- for the first time in the USSR, a rocket was launched from a silo. On May 30, 1960, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers was issued, and on June 14, 1960, an order was signed by the State Committee for Defense Equipment (GKOT) on the development of combat silo launchers with the code names “Dvina” (for the R-12 missile), “Chusovaya” (for the R –14), “Sheksna” (for R-16) and “Desna” (for R-9A ICBM developed by OKB-1).
R-12U rocket in the silo
After a number of improvements (in particular, the modernization of the control system and the removal of aerodynamic stabilizers), on December 30, 1961, the first launch of a modernized rocket, called R-12U, was carried out. Its tests at GCP No. 4 continued until October 1963. The first combat silos for the R-12U were built by January 1, 1963 in Plunge (Baltic States), and a year later, on January 5, 1964, a combat missile system with the R-12U missile was adopted by the Strategic Missile Forces.
Routine inspection of R-12 missile launch support equipment
During the initial period of adoption and deployment of these systems, the R-12 quite often exhibited malfunctions and shortcomings that interfered with their safe use. In particular, pipeline flange connections were leaking. In addition, during fire tests of liquid rocket engines of serial rockets, high-frequency pressure pulsations in the chambers were observed. The analysis showed that the serial pumps had greater efficiency than the experimental ones, and the gas generator was equipped with a smaller supply of catalyst. Subsequent technological measures completely eliminated engine accidents. From the beginning of 1957, control tests of liquid-propellant engines were carried out, analysis of the results of which showed the high reliability of the engines, and the use of more advanced methods of control flushing of a number of RD-214 units made it possible, from 1963, to completely abandon control and technological tests of engines. In June 1961, the first launches of R-12 with combat warheads equipped with nuclear warheads were carried out (“Operation Rose”). From a field position east of Vorkuta, it was planned to carry out three launches of the R-12 at the test site on the island of Novaya Zemlya (the first launch with a “blank” warhead, the next two with warheads of different power). During the practical classes at the launch site to prepare the first missile for launch, due to an error by the combat crew personnel, the electrical circuit of one missile was “burnt.” Only the prompt actions of the launch management, the chief designer of OKB-586 M.K. Yangel and the director of the serial plant Ya.V. Kolupaev made it possible to quickly deliver a new missile from Omsk and successfully complete Operation Rose.
Shaft head R-12SH
In July 1962, during “Operation K-1 and K-2,” R-12 missiles and high-altitude missiles were launched nuclear explosions in order to study their influence on radio communications, radars, aviation and missile technology. During flight testing and the beginning of deployment of the R-12, numerous experiments were carried out using these missiles in the interests of various military and scientific programs. In particular, to test the rocket plane model developed at OKB-52 under the leadership of V.N. Chelomey, two launches were carried out - in 1961 and 1963. In the second half of the 1960s - early 1970s, tests were carried out using the same rockets models of reusable aerospace aircraft “BOR-1” and “BOR-2” (BOR - unmanned orbital rocket plane), created according to the “Spiral” project at the A.I. Mikoyan Design Bureau. One can note the numerous launches of the R-12 to test the missile defense systems of the G.V. Kisunko Design Bureau.
BOR-2 device launched by R-12 rocket
In 1962, these missiles almost blew up the whole world. Due to the crisis that occurred as a result of the negative political and military situation in the Caribbean after the Cuban revolution, a real threat of American intervention in Cuba was created. The USSR hastened to provide assistance to the new ally. Overt military assistance would be too obvious a counter to United States efforts to return the former regime to Cuba. N.S. Khrushchev took a step that, in his opinion, could cut the Gordian knot of problems with one blow: he gave instructions to station Soviet MRBMs with Soviet personnel in Cuba. The arguments for this decision were that American “Jupiters” and “Torahs” from the territory of Turkey and Italy could reach important centers of the Soviet Union in just 10 minutes, and for us to retaliate on American territory with the help of ICBMs it would take more than 25 minutes. Cuba was supposed to become a launching pad and threaten the very “underbelly of America” with Soviet missiles. The Americans, according to N.S. Khrushchev, would not dare to attack the starting positions served by Soviet crews. The plan for the operation, called Anadyr, provided for the deployment of three ground-based R-12 regiments (24 launchers) and two ground-based R-14 regiments (16 launchers) on Cuban territory. To carry out this operation in the Baltic, in Odessa and Sevastopol, transports were allocated (mainly dry cargo ships with a displacement of 17 thousand tons each), which, in an atmosphere of strict secrecy, were loaded with equipment and units, and personnel were transported in specially converted holds of dry cargo ships. Part of the command staff was delivered to Cuba by passenger ships “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Latvia”, etc. American intelligence was able to detect three Soviet missile regiments in Cuba only a month later, filming the launch equipment from the U-2 aircraft. It’s easy to imagine what happened after that in Washington! On October 17, 1962, Life magazine published a map of the location of Soviet missile systems in Cuba and, in arcs, the range of missiles and possible areas of destruction on American territory. Panic arose in these zones and the evacuation of people to safe areas began. Apparently, for the first time in the history of America as a state, its residents felt real threat. From that day on, US strike aircraft began a continuous round-the-clock flight over Cuban territory. The planes flew at low altitude over the missile positions, threatening, but fortunately not using weapons. By the end of October, half of the 36 P-12s delivered to Cuba were ready for launch operations. Due to the naval blockade, the R-14s did not arrive on the island. Any next careless step on either side could turn into a disaster. The world was on the brink of nuclear war. Only after realizing this did N.S. Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy come to the conclusion that the conflict must be resolved peacefully. During the negotiations, we agreed that we would remove the missiles from Cuba, and the Americans would remove them from Turkey and Italy. These events forced the missilemen to take a completely different look at operations of this type: instead of including the “Cuban Brigade” in the Strategic Missile Forces, they had to quickly curtail weapons and equipment and send personnel to the USSR. The Caribbean crisis influenced not only the entire subsequent course of history, but also the development of strategic weapons in particular. The Soviet military understood the power (military and political) of weapons such as MRBMs. It is interesting to note here that the R-12, which became a stage in the life of the Dnepropetrovsk Design Bureau, a step “to new achievements,” turned out to be the most massive medium-range missile in service (according to American data, about 2,300 units of the R-12 were manufactured during the entire period of serial production 12). By the end of the 1960s. In the USSR, more than 600 R-12 missiles and about 100 R-14 missiles were deployed. The life cycle of the R-12 lasted until 1990, until the elimination of the entire class of RSD in accordance with the Treaty between the USSR and the USA.
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R-12 rocket before the parade on Red Square
© V. BOBKOV, 1997
Before the large-scale adoption of the SS-20 Pioneer mobile missile systems developed by A.D. Nadiradze Design Bureau in 1977, the number of deployed systems with R-12 and R-14 missiles remained relatively constant. October 27, 1983 Secretary General The CPSU Central Committee Yu.V. Andropov stated that all SS-5 (R-14) missiles have been taken out of service. Thus, after the newer R-14 missile was removed from service, a number of older R-12s still remained in “service” in the Strategic Missile Forces. By the beginning of the Soviet-American negotiations on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles (INF), R-12s were deployed at the bases of Aluksne, Viru, Gusev, Karmevala, Kolomyia, Malorita, Ostrov, Pinsk, Skala-Podolskaya, Sovetsk, Stryi. After the signing of the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on December 8, 1987 complete elimination medium-range (from 1000 to 5500 km) and shorter-range (from 500 to 1000 km) missiles, within three years, starting from June 1, 1988, all such American and Soviet medium- and shorter-range missiles were destroyed as a class. Along with the well-known SS-20 Pioneer MRBMs, this agreement also eliminated complexes with R-12 missiles, of which by October 1985 there were only 112 units left. By the end of 1987 there were only 65 of them, by June 1988 - 60. In June 1989, all R-12s were withdrawn from service. According to the annual bulletin “Soviet military power"(Soviet Military Power) for 1989, "... in April 1988, 52 SS-4 launch complexes with 170 combat missiles (65 deployed and 105 non-deployed), 142 blank training missiles were in service. The number of missiles fell sharply from 608 in 1964–1966, although 112 missiles were deployed on 81 launchers (79 deployed and 2 non-deployed) from late 1985 to 1987.” At the birth of the R-12 rocket, its creators looked at it with pride, although they predicted that it would quickly disappear from the scene. Even the cadets of military schools were told (and for good reason) that by the end of their training the R-12 would be removed from combat duty and they would serve on the latest missile systems. However, new missiles appeared, but the R-12 complexes continued to “stand guard over the Motherland.” And only when yesterday’s cadets themselves had already finished their service, the missiles began to be removed from service, and then only because of the INF Treaty. According to the stories of army specialists who participated in the dismantling of R-12 missiles, the Soviet and American sides carried out mutual launches in the presence of inspectors. “When the first one went into the sky soviet rocket, second, the Americans applauded in admiration. And when the fifth, tenth soared into the sky... and everything was timely, precise, and also right on target, they stopped applauding. The fact is that when launching their missiles, failures began almost at the first launches...”
June 1989 Meeting of unit veterans on the last day before the destruction of R-12 missiles in accordance with the Soviet-American INF Treaty
© O.K.ROSLOV, 1997
December 1989 Missile unit officers at the last training camp in the formation missile forces at one of the last combat training MRBM R-12