Turks in the Second World War. World History: Türkiye in World War II. The situation of the country before the war
Türkiye IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the USSR. Four days earlier, Turkey, at Hitler’s suggestion, signed a “Non-Aggression Pact” with Germany. In connection with the German attack on the USSR, Türkiye declared neutrality. At the same time, on the proposal of the Turkish government, the parliament allowed the conscription of persons over 60 years of age, reserve officers over 65 years of age into active military service, as well as mobilization in the eastern vilayets to fill the gap created by the movement of the 40,000-strong army to the Thrace region. These actions greatly alarmed the USSR.
German propaganda claimed that the USSR intended to seize the Straits. In turn, on June 27, 1941, a TASS refutation resolutely noted “provocatively false statements in Hitler’s declaration regarding the imaginary claims of the USSR to the Bosporus and Dardanelles and about the imaginary intentions of the USSR to occupy Bulgaria.”
On August 10, 1941, the USSR and England made a joint statement that they would respect the regime of the Straits and territorial integrity Turkey. There, Turkey was given assurances of assistance if it turns out to be a victim of aggression. To weaken the effectiveness of German propaganda, the Soviet government confirmed its loyalty to the Montreux Convention and assured the Turkish government that it had no aggressive intentions or claims regarding the Straits. The Soviet side emphasized that it understands Turkey's desire to remain neutral, and therefore will provide it with assistance and assistance if it becomes a victim of an attack by any European power.
Back in May 1941, the British sent troops into Iraq and Syria. Now the British troops stationed from Egypt to Burma had a gap only in Iran.
In August 1941, Soviet and British troops occupied Iran.
The appearance of the Red Army in Iranian Azerbaijan caused serious concern for the Turkish government. The Turks began plotting to take over the northern part of Iran. The German ambassador von Papen reported to Ribbentrop: “A well-informed confidant reports: in view of the successes of the Germans in Russia, Turkish government circles are increasingly becoming concerned with the fate of ... the Azerbaijani Turks.”
The Turks pulled significant forces to the Soviet border - 16 infantry and 8 cavalry divisions. Moscow had to concentrate 25 divisions in Transcaucasia, which were tasked with preventing the invasion of Turkish or German-Turkish troops.
From March 13, 1942, staff exercises were held in Transcaucasia, in which Turkey acted as a potential enemy. The actions of the Red Army began with an attack on North-Eastern Turkey and ended with the capture of Oltu, Sarykamysh, Trobzon and Erzurum. The document entitled “Considerations for planning the operation of the Transcaucasian Front” envisaged defeating the Turkish army over an area of 210 km in the direction of the Black Sea and 300 km in the direction of Erzurum along the Trobzon, Bayburt, Erzurum line, which was part of the main strategic task of the Transcaucasian Military District.
The preparatory stage of the offensive included the destruction of military outposts, reconnaissance of the front line of defense and the occupation of the starting position for the offensive. The first stage of the offensive included the encirclement and defeat of the enemy's Kars group with the entry of front troops to the line Pazar - Artvin - Merdenik - Kars - Kagyzman. The second stage of the offensive included the defeat of the enemy's Olta-Sarykamysh grouping with access to the Egdem-Oltu-Kars-Kurt line and the capture by mobile units of track junctions in the areas of Ispir, Tortum, and Chiftlik station. At the third stage, the occupation of Erzurum was planned. Chronologically, 10 days were allotted for the first stage, the second stage will be completed on the 16th day, and the third stage - on the 31st day of the operation.
On April 25, Stalin received Army General V.I. Tyulenev to discuss the situation in the Transcaucasian Military District. The conversation lasted from 19:50. until 22:05 Also present were members of the State Defense Committee L. Beria, G. Malenkov, A. Mikoyan, Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, his deputy P. Brodin and others. It was decided to strengthen the Transcaucasian Military District with weapons and military equipment in accordance with the General Staff directive signed on April 26. The following were sent to the ZakVO: one rifle and one cavalry division, one tank corps, six air regiments, six artillery regiments, six armored trains, one hundred trucks.
Additional forces were stationed along the Turkish border, and on May 1 the Transcaucasian Front was formed. And on May 5, the commanders of the 45th and 46th armies received a directive to be ready to enter Turkish territory.
In the summer of 1942, several skirmishes occurred between Turkish and Soviet border guards on the Soviet-Turkish and Iranian-Turkish borders, and there were casualties. However, things never came to war.
There were much more incidents at sea. So, on September 23, 1941, the Soviet tug "Ackerman" with a crew of 13 people and 25 passengers on board walked without a compass according to the stars and ended up in Turkish waters. After lengthy negotiations, all passengers and six crew members, along with the tugboat, returned to the Soviet Union.
On November 11, 1941, the ship “Red Vodoley” (displacement 665 tons, speed 8 knots) left Sevastopol for the shores of the Caucasus, but its captain Zadorozhny took the ship to Sinop.
5th of December general secretary During the conversation, the Turkish Foreign Ministry N. Menemencioglu explained to Soviet Ambassador S. Vinogradov that the crew did not want to return to the USSR. At the beginning of 1942, by agreement between Sh. Sarajoglu and S. Vinogradov, the ship was returned to the Soviet Union, but the crew asked in writing to be left in Turkey until the end of the war. In the process of further negotiations and persuasion, three agreed to return to their homeland, and Turkey refused to extradite the remaining 15 people, citing the fact that the USSR’s demand contradicted international norms.
The story of the Soviet passenger liner Svaneti turned out to be much more interesting.
Before the war, "Svaneti" (displacement 5050 tons, 244 cabin places), served the Odessa - Middle East passenger line. The war found the liner at the entrance to the Dardanelles Strait, but, as follows from our official sources, he was allegedly detained in Istanbul by the Turks and was not released until the end of February 1942. This is wild nonsense. Detain a passenger airliner against all odds international conventions the Turks could not, it would be a “casus belli” for both the USSR and England.
According to the memoirs of our diplomats, the Svaneti in Istanbul was used as a floating hotel for Soviet diplomats who left Germany, and in February 1942 the liner brought the “last group of diplomats” to Poti. And this version looks unconvincing. In fact, the last group of employees of Soviet embassies and consulates was transported to the USSR via Kars in early August 1941, and Ambassador Dekanozov and the diplomatic elite boarded the Istanbul-Ankara train express even earlier, and then flew to the USSR by plane.
In fact, “Svaneti” became a floating branch of the Lubyanka in Istanbul. In the very first days of their stay there, several dozen sailors were written off from the ship and sent to the Union. It goes without saying that a worthy replacement was quickly found for them. “Svaneti” was a base for espionage and terrorist operations, and the headquarters was the Soviet consulate in Constantinople.
At the end of the summer of 1941, our entire espionage and diplomatic team was sent to prepare for the assassination attempt on the German ambassador to Turkey. Generally speaking, it was not customary to kill ambassadors, even during a war, but this was a special case. The German ambassador Franz von Papen belonged to an ancient aristocratic family, the origins of which are lost in the centuries. In any case, at the end of the 15th century, his ancestor Wilhelm von Papen was the owner of large estates.
In the fall of 1913, 34-year-old General Staff officer von Papen, on the personal instructions of the Kaiser, was appointed military attache to the United States. In 1915 he was expelled from America for espionage. During the First World War, he becomes a close friend of Captain Canaris, the future admiral and head of the Abwehr. In the early 30s. von Papen receives the post of Vice-Chancellor of the Reich, then goes as ambassador to Austria. He played an important role in Hitler's rise to power and in the Anschluss (the peaceful annexation of Austria to Germany).
In April 1939, Hitler appointed von Papen as ambassador to Turkey. With the outbreak of World War II new ambassador on the instructions of the Fuhrer, he establishes contacts with British and American diplomats. The purpose of these contacts is to conclude a separate peace.
British analysts already in 1939–1941 understood perfectly well that in the event of the complete defeat of Germany, the USSR would dominate in Europe. The only alternative to this is a separate peace. But Hitler is a very odious figure as a negotiating partner. And here at hand is the former vice-chancellor (the second person in the state, one of his own among the Abwehr, the diplomatic corps and the Wehrmacht generals opposed to the Fuhrer).
As a result, Papen had to play a triple game in Ankara - ambassador, Hitler's secret envoy and representative of the opposition. The main partners in the game were the American and British ambassadors and the Vatican nuncio. I note that Pope Pius XII, like the Fuhrer, sent to Turkey not an ordinary priest, but a talented diplomat and “apparatchik” Giuseppe Roncali. After the war, Roncali would succeed Pius XII and become Pope John XXIII.
The Vatican played throughout the war key role in separate negotiations. Once, at a meeting with Stalin, Churchill mentioned the number of divisions in England and the United States. Stalin asked quite seriously: “How many divisions does the Vatican have?”, hinting at the exorbitant political influence and ambitions of the “Throne of St. Peter.”
And so in Moscow they decided to remove the potential head of the Third Reich.
Soon simple soviet people- Vice-Consul Pavlov and international journalist Leonid Naumov. "In the world" they were known terrorists Georgy Ivanovich Mordvinov and Naum Isaakovich Eitingon. The latter recently returned from Mexico, where he organized the assassination of Leon Trotsky.
Initially, the assassination attempt on von Papen was planned to take place in the theater. He was supposed to be shot by the “athlete, Komsomol member and simply beautiful” Muza Malinovskaya. However, journalist Naumov fell in love with Muse and, apparently, that’s why he failed the operation. In the end, they decided to use a 26-year-old Bulgarian as a terrorist, whose name is still hidden. It is only known that he studied at Istanbul University under the name of the Macedonian Omer.
According to the Soviet version, the Bulgarian was an excellent shot with a pistol, which the consulate staff checked, but for some reason they decided to use a shell-free bomb made by an experienced NKVD bomb technician Timashkov for the assassination attempt. Immediately after the bomb exploded, a motorcyclist was supposed to drive up to the murder site, take Omer and rush off at full speed.
On the evening of February 20, 1942, the Istanbul-Ankara fast train takes Vice-Consul Pavlov and student Omer to the Turkish capital. By coincidence, the next day the Svaneti lifts anchor in the Bosphorus and, together with the “Soviet diplomats,” sets off for their homeland. The liner carefully presses against Turkish coast and only at 12:10 p.m. On February 23, he moored at the port of Poti, where a cavalcade of black “emoks” awaited him.
22 hours later, von Papen and his wife were walking along Ataturk Boulevard, heading to the German embassy. He was extremely punctual and showed up on the boulevard at the same time. According to our special services, the Bulgarian approached the Papen couple, took out a bomb and a pistol, detonated the fuse, but never threw it.
The bomb, as already mentioned, was shellless and did not produce fragments, but all that remained from the Bulgarian were scraps of meat and a shoe on a tree. The blast wave knocked the Papen couple off their feet, but the couple escaped with only a slight concussion. A motorcyclist driving by stopped. At that moment, Papin, who was lying on the ground, raised his hand and the motorcyclist began to help him.
In my opinion, the version of our special services is more than unsuccessful. If the motorcyclist was a Soviet agent, then he could shoot, hit Papen in the throat with a knife or even the edge of his hand, fortunately, he was 62 years old, and rush off on a motorcycle. The guy began to provide first aid and waited for the police to arrive. Later during the investigation he was brought in only as a witness. Finally, why is his real name not given now and why has he not received Soviet awards?
The Turkish police and von Papen himself give a different version of the assassination attempt in their memoirs. The Bulgarian was supposed to shoot the ambassador with a pistol, and then detonate the device, which, as they explained to him, was not a bomb, but a smoke bomb, which would help him escape. The guy decided to play it safe and almost simultaneously pulled the trigger of the pistol and the fuse of the checker. If he had fired half a second earlier, the ambassador would have been killed. But, in any case, the terrorist would have ascended to heaven. The motorcyclist ended up on Ataturk Boulevard by accident. Dead people don't need motorcycles.
In 1941–1944 Türkiye sent Germany an extremely important strategic raw material - chromium. Thus, according to the trade agreement, only from January 7 to March 31, 1943, Turkey undertook to supply the Germans with 41 thousand tons of chrome ore. Only on April 20, 1944, under strong pressure from the USSR, England and the USA, Turkey stopped supplies of chromium. In addition, the Turks supplied the Germans and Romanians with other types of raw materials, food, tobacco and other products.
The biggest service the Turks provided to Hitler was the almost free passage of Axis ships through the Straits. Clearly, we are not talking about battleships or even destroyers. The Germans did not need ships of these classes on the Black Sea. But the Germans built hundreds of small, up to 500 tons of displacement, high-speed transports, which, if necessary, could become patrol ships, anti-aircraft defense ships, air defense ships, be used as minelayers, etc. A typical example of a German high-speed transport - type F (MF P) with a displacement of about 300 tons, armed with 7.5, 37 and 20 mm cannons in various versions. In the minzag version, these ships carried 52 mines. Such transports were built throughout occupied Europe - in Germany, Belgium, Poland and even in Nikolaev. Often, transports built in Varna fought in the Mediterranean Sea, and those built in Genoa fought in the Black Sea.
In addition to these transports, hundreds, if not thousands, of conventional Axis transports and tankers passed through the Straits each year. While in the strait zone, some of the artillery on them was hidden in holds or camouflaged.
The most curious thing is that our military historians still have not bothered to determine at least approximately the volume of freight traffic along this route and along the intra-Black Sea route Constanta - Odessa - Sevastopol - Anapa. The reason is obvious: if these top-secret data are published, it will turn out that the Black Sea Fleet, which was many times superior naval forces Germans, Turks, Romanians and Bulgarians, acted, to put it mildly, very ineffectively.
Was the passage of German ships through the Straits in accordance with the Montreux Convention? There were no obvious gross violations, but nevertheless there was something to complain about. In 1941, 1942 and 1943 The Soviet embassy in Ankara repeatedly drew the attention of the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the violation of the Montreux Convention, to the inadmissibility of the passage through the Straits of German and other ships flying the flags of the merchant fleet, but, according to the data available to the embassy, “for purposes of a military nature.”
A memorandum from Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov, presented to Foreign Minister Sarjoglu on June 17, 1944, spoke of a number of cases of German military and military auxiliary ships passing through the Straits under the guise of merchant ships. The note noted that only for the passage of the Straits “were weapons temporarily and partially removed from them.”
One of the decisions taken by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Quebec conference in 1943 was aimed at banning the passage of German ships of military importance through the Straits. The Allies noted the frequent passage of ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The British claimed that these ships were disguised warships and were causing damage to the British Navy's operations in the Mediterranean.
The Turks saw the light only in June 1944, when, after the passage of a group of German ships, the Allies threatened Ankara, and only then did the Turkish services, which inspected the ships, discover weapons, radar installations and military uniforms from another group of German ships. The sailors themselves in the Straits put on civilian clothes. Therefore German ships for the first time they were not allowed into the Bosphorus and returned to the Black Sea.
On this occasion, the British ambassador in Moscow wrote to Molotov on June 25, 1944: “For several last days the situation changed significantly, since the question of the passage of German ships through the Straits was officially and publicly settled to the satisfaction of the Allies. The Foreign Minister resigned and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers gave assurances regarding Turkey's desire for sincere cooperation."
I note that Turkey, which patronized the military transport of Germans and Italians in the Straits, resolutely prevented the Western allies from transporting weapons, strategic materials and even food to the USSR. And they had to do this in a difficult and dangerous way through Murmansk, Iran and the Far East.
A strange situation arose: in 1941–1944. the British fleet reigned supreme in the central part Mediterranean Sea, and the Soviet one is in the Black Sea. Why shouldn’t Allied merchant ships, under the escort of British ships and planes, reach the Dardanelles, cross the strait zone, and at the edge of the Turkish waterways near the Bosphorus they would be met by ships and planes Black Sea Fleet? Yes, theoretically there could be losses, but much less than those of the northern convoys: let us remember the tragic fate of convoy PQ-17 in 1942.
The only obstacle to the passage of merchant ships of the Western allies into the Black Sea was the pro-German position of the Turkish government.
True, there was a case when four Soviet unarmed ships - the icebreaker Mikoyan, the tankers Sakhalin, Tuapse and Varlaam Avanesov - passed from the Black Sea to the Aegean. On November 30, 1941, our ships, accompanied by the leader Tashkent and the destroyers Sposobny and Soobrazitelny, approached the Bosphorus. Here warships wished the tankers and icebreaker “happy sailing” and turned back. In Constantinople, tankers handed over oil to the Turks. Apparently this was payment for passage through the Straits. All four ships managed to safely enter the Aegean Sea. However, the tanker Varlaam Avanesov was sunk on December 19, 1941 by the German submarine U-652 off Cape Baba, approximately 70 km from the Dardanelles.
Several foreign ships were caught in the war in the ports of the Black Sea on June 22, 1941. According to established international practice, the USSR could requisition them and use them for military purposes. This is what England did in 1914 and 1939, and Russia in 1914 (in the Baltic and Black Sea). However, the Moscow admirals decided otherwise - too many transports ended up on the Black Sea, and they were also sent to the Mediterranean Sea. The tanker Oilshipner sailed the Bosporus under the Panama flag, but was damaged by enemy aircraft beyond the Dardanelles and had to be interned in Turkey. The small Greek steamer "Aghios Georios" managed to reach Cyprus.
Alas, this episode cannot serve as an example of Turkey’s benevolent or even neutral attitude towards the USSR. The fact is that the withdrawal of the largest transport ships from the Black Sea was extremely beneficial... to the Kriegsmarine.
No, unfortunately, I'm not joking. From March 23, 1942 until the fall of Sevastopol, the Germans sank six of our transports (Chapaev, Svaneti, Gromov, Abkhazia, Georgia, Bialystok) with a total displacement of 21,773 tons. And our historians-lampas consider this a disaster and a reason to stop transport trips to Sevastopol. But our historians did not even notice the withdrawal by Moscow admirals from the Black Sea theater of military operations of six transport ships with a total displacement of 42,574 tons, that is, twice the tonnage. Yes, God's dew...
A few words should be said about attacks by Soviet submarines on Turkish ships. Since July 1941, Türkiye has been the only neutral Black Sea state. Romania was officially at war with the USSR, Bulgaria did not formally declare war on the Soviet Union, but actually waged fighting against the Black Sea Fleet. On March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact of the fascist states, and the next day Wehrmacht units entered the country. Finally, on December 13 of the same year, Bulgaria declared war on the United States and Great Britain.
Needless to say, any Turkish ship not sailing strictly east along the Anatolian coast of Turkey was carrying cargo to countries that were actually at war with Soviet Russia. I note that at the end of 1941, both British and American submarines mercilessly sank all ships (regardless of the flag) heading to the ports of Germany, Japan and their allies.
Soviet submarines in 1941–1944 had patrol areas exclusively to the west and north of the Bosphorus and almost never searched for ships off the Anatolian coast. Often, submarines received categorical orders from their superiors to avoid attacks by Turkish ships. Nevertheless, there were several episodes of sinking of Turkish schooners and steamships. Thus, in 1941, a submarine sank the schooner Kaynakdere and the transport Yenidzhe. Another schooner was sunk on the morning of January 1, 1942.
On June 20, 1942, the submarine Shch-205, pursuing the Turkish transport Duatepe, entered Turkish territorial waters near the city of Igneada, 12 km from the Bulgarian border, and sank the Duatepe and the schooner Kainarji with artillery fire. Three days later, the submarine Shch-205 sank the camouflaged transport Shafak with a torpedo. Let me note that all three Turkish ships sunk by Shch-205 were chartered by the Germans and transported German cargo, including chrome ore.
Also in 1942, the submarine Shch-213 sank the small Turkish steamer Cankaya. Later, Black Sea submarines sank the Turkish ships Kociboglu, Huday-Bahri, Gurpinar and Dervish.
A rather strange episode occurred on August 5, 1944, when the submarine Shch-215 sank the Turkish schooner Mefkure (53 GRT capacity) with artillery fire. The schooner was carrying two crew members and 301 Jewish refugees. The boat fired ninety 45 mm shells, one hundred 12.7 mm bullets from the DShK and 650 rounds of 7.62 mm caliber. Application can be understood artillery shells to sink the schooner, but why shoot refugees with machine guns? Alas, this is another secret of the Great Patriotic War.
As you can see, all the Turkish ships sunk by our submarines had a small displacement. As for large ships, the boat commanders usually recognized them as Turkish and refused to attack. Several times our submarines discovered Turkish merchant ships guarding Turkish warships. There was at least one case (unsuccessful) of a pike attack on a Turkish convoy.
How much military and other cargo was transported in 1941–1944? Turkish ships are still a sealed secret for the Germans and their allies. Although the author is sure that these materials exist in the archives of the Russian Federation, they are kept classified as “secret” or “top secret.”
17:33 — REGNUM
Stalin between Atatürk and İnönü
From 1921 to 1938, the strategic partnership between Russia and Turkey was one of the pillars of the security of the two states. But in the last years of Mustafa Kemal’s life, problems arose in the relationship between Moscow and Ankara. These episodes are practically not studied by historiography. Recently, the Turkish newspaper Yeni Asya recalled this period of bilateral relations, writing that “Joseph Stalin changed his attitude towards the founder of the Turkish Republic because the latter accepted the communist Trotsky, expelled from Russia.” At the same time, the publication clarifies: “In 1923 and 1924, when communist Russia was ruled by three major leaders (Lenin - Trotsky - Stalin), and Kemalist Turkey was also headed by a strong triumvirate (Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Pasha and Fevzi Pasha), two the triumvirate were somehow connected with each other.”
Indeed, in the early 1920s, Stalin, together with Trotsky, prepared the formation of the “Socialist Turan”, uniting the Turks of the former Ottoman Empire and the Turks of the former Russian Empire. Mustafa Kemal, accepting the rules of the Bolshevik “game,” insisted, for example, on transferring Baku under the jurisdiction of “brotherly Turkey,” “since the British deprived the Turks of energy resources.” Only after Kemal abandoned the “revolutionary geopolitical project” proposed by Moscow - to carry out large-scale Sovietization in Turkey and begin expansion throughout the Middle East - Stalin in Transcaucasia revived the term “Azerbaijan” and began to present it as “the center of the entire Turkic world” . In response, as recently published documents from Turkish archives show, Kemal decided to revive the ideology of pan-Turkism, which led to an intensification of the internal political struggle between Kemal’s associates, and also cooled relations with the Kremlin. Historians are still at a loss as to who exactly was at the origins of the assassination attempt on Kemal that was being prepared in 1926, whether there was an attempt at all, or, following the example of the Moscow show trials, he thus removed his former associates from power. By the way, while still the head of the Turkish government, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, conducting a political discussion with his main political opponent, the Republican People's Party (CHP), founded by Kemal, showed photographs from the front page of the Cumhuriyet newspaper in early 1933, where the Turkish government's greeting to Adolf Hitler was published in connection with his rise to power in Germany. Erdogan then accused the CHP of “political unscrupulousness.”
In this regard, the modern German historian Stefan Ihrig writes the following in his book “Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination”: “To say that the roots of the rise of the Third Reich have been carefully studied would be an understatement. However, one element of Hitler's seizure of power was largely ignored: the role of Turkey and Ataturk - or, as Hitler called him, the "shining star - in his thinking", hinting at the pro-German strategic orientation of the then Ankara based on the resuscitation of Germany's historical ties with Ottoman Empire. In October 1937, Kemal dismissed Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, one of the founders and leaders of the CHP, appointing Celal Bayar to this post, which was perceived in Moscow as “a political victory in Turkey for pro-German forces.”
In the last years of his life, Ataturk drank a lot, visited European neighborhoods, met emigrants from Russia, and loved to dance. Once, as the Turkish historian Sadyk Tural, who gained access to classified archival materials, managed to establish, on November 10, the day of the founding of the Turkish Republic, at half past one in the morning, in the company of personal friends and girls, he came to the Soviet embassy and addressed Russian Ambassador with the question: “Why didn’t your leader congratulate me on our holiday?” USSR Ambassador to Turkey Karakhan replied that the Turkish leader was congratulated on the holiday by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin. Atatürk asked this next question: “Is your chairman of the Central Election Commission also the leader?” - "No". - “Who is your leader?” - “Stalin”. - “Then let him congratulate me.” I am both the chairman and the leader of the country. Let it not Kalinin, but Stalin send me congratulations,” Ataturk said. After this episode, Ataturk, according to the Turkish professor, said the following words: “I know you have a strong and mechanized army, but I am not afraid of it or you. 18 million people stand behind me. One word from me is enough. The people will do whatever I want. I can do great harm, although, of course, I will never do this, because my word and my friendship are sacred.” Ataturk’s words were recorded and sent by the ambassador to Moscow under the heading “top secret” with the inscription “for the personal reading of Stalin and Molotov.”
On November 10, 1938, Atatürk died in the former residence of the Ottoman sultans, Dolmabahçe, in Istanbul. Doctors diagnosed him with cirrhosis of the liver, however, according to Turkish historian Ali Kuzu, the autopsy data were never made public, which gave rise to an incredible number of rumors, even to the point that he was killed. And immediately, as the Aksam newspaper writes, on November 11, 1938, İnönü, by a majority vote - “unexpectedly” - received the post of second President of Turkey in parliament. By the way, Erdogan also returned to this historical episode and compared Inenu to Adolf Hitler. “Inönü is the politician who introduced new banknotes without Atatürk’s image into circulation immediately after his death,” Erdogan exclaimed. - New postage stamps were issued - also without the image of Ataturk. Who did it? The Republican People's Party knows this well. After World War II, no stone was left unturned in Germany, and now it is a highly developed country. What did Türkiye gain during the CHP rule? I have a huge archive with numerous dossiers on Inenya. My people must know this."
Indeed, what kind of policy did Inönü begin to implement? In a special certificate about him, prepared by the head of the Middle East department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR N. Novikov, it was noted that “Inönü is a supporter of statism and reliance on internal resources. In foreign policy, he is a defender of Turkish independence and a supporter of the development of friendly relations with the USSR.” Novikov’s certificate also indicates that there were tensions between Atatürk and Inönü on the issue of orientation in foreign policy. Now he is beginning to attract a number of figures who were in opposition to Ataturk to leadership positions. At the same time, İnönü began to narrow the possibilities of both communist and pan-Turkist forces, and against the latter, however, only in 1944, when the outcome of the Second World War was obvious, he organized trial. Concerning foreign policy, then Ankara maneuvered, trying to hide behind all sorts of geopolitical combinations offered to it by Berlin, London, Paris and Moscow. In 1939, Turkey stated that “it could be attacked first by Germany,” agreeing with Moscow’s view that this attack would most likely come from the north through Romania and Bulgaria.”
Inönü tried to find out everything for sure in order to make the main bet. Today, the authoritative Turkish publication Uluslarası Politika Akademisi states: “With the outbreak of World War II, Turkey signed a mutual assistance agreement with Great Britain and France, however, acting in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the country, it made every possible effort to protect the state from being drawn into the war, and , starting from this starting point, pursued different policies depending on the course of events. Fearing superiority German army in the war, at the insistence of the Turkish statesmen On June 18, 1941, Türkiye signs a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany. As soon as Germany declared war on the USSR on June 22, 1941, Turkey took a position of neutrality. An agreement was signed between Great Britain and the USSR on joint actions against Germany. During the war, Türkiye seemed to be playing a chess game, performing various diplomatic maneuvers. During periods of German superiority, politicians known for their closeness to her moved to the forefront, their positions were strengthened, and they contributed to the development of bilateral relations between states. With Germany's loss of political, economic and military superiority in the subsequent years of the war, politicians and bureaucrats close to Germany one by one resigned. Among the numerous assumptions in this regard, the idea is expressed that Field Marshal Turkish army Fevzi Cakmak was removed from his position as head General Staff due to this circumstance. Consequently, thanks to the incredible efforts of Turkish statesmen, especially President İnönü, Turkey was able to avoid being drawn into the war and remain aloof from the devastating events.”
But such a “double game” aroused serious suspicions on the part of the Soviet government, especially since Turkey supplied strategic raw materials to Germany. Ankara had information that “its issue was discussed in pre-war contacts between Berlin and Moscow.” Then this factor was used by Germany to influence Turkey, just as Moscow put pressure on Ankara from almost similar positions. We are talking about one of the most controversial issues in the history of relationships Soviet Russia and Turkey during this period. Historians are still debating whether Turkey was then preparing an attack on the USSR.
It is reliably known that the Nazi advance towards the Caucasus aroused certain hopes in the pan-Turkic Turkish ruling circles, which were trying to implement their grandiose geopolitical project. The Turkish army was mobilized to the border with Soviet Union About 30 Turkish divisions moved forward. The original plan for resource acquisition North Caucasus was considered by the German command in the summer of 1941 and was specified in a document called “Operation from the North Caucasus region through the Caucasus Range and Northwestern Iran in order to capture the Rawanduz and Hinagan passes in the Iran-Iraq direction.” When planning to seize the North Caucasus, the German command was preparing not only to take advantage of the rich resources of this region, but also to extend German influence to the entire Transcaucasus and even to the Middle East with its oil reserves. In response, from August 25 to September 17, 1941, the USSR and England carried out a joint operation “Concord” to send troops into Iran.
But by that time there was also a scenario, prepared in 1939, according to which London and Paris, in response to Stalin’s pact with Hitler, were preparing to bomb Baku, which directly resulted from the British-French-Turkish military alliance concluded on October 19, 1939 on mutual assistance in the event of a transfer military operations in the Mediterranean region. True, in Protocol No. 2 of the treaty concluding an alliance, the Turkish government indicated that its provisions did not apply to the Soviet Union, but this could change under new conditions. The capture of Stalingrad by the Germans or their breakthrough into Transcaucasia would be a signal for Turkey to send its troops into Transcaucasia. Such plans were curtailed only after the successful counter-offensive of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front, but primarily after the Stalingrad victory. On February 23, 1945, Turkey formally declared war on Germany, although it did not take part in the hostilities. That is why Stalin’s pressure on Inenu, which was carried out from the Tehran Conference all the way to Potsdam, was not successful - London and Washington stood behind the Turkish president.
TASS-DOSSIER /Kirill Titov/. During the Second World War, the government of the Turkish Republic, while maintaining neutrality, maneuvered between two opposing military blocs - the anti-Hitler coalition and the Axis countries. Only on February 23, 1945, Turkey sided with the anti-Hitler coalition and declared war on Germany and Japan. Turkish troops did not participate in hostilities, but its diplomatic position had an impact significant influence on the position of the warring parties. Turkey controlled the passage of warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, connecting the Aegean and Black Seas, and also had an army capable of changing the balance of power both in the Mediterranean and in the south of the Soviet-German front.
At the first stage of the war, in 1939-1940, Ankara collaborated with the Anglo-French bloc. Not wanting to strengthen Italy's position, the Turkish government concluded a mutual assistance agreement with Great Britain and France on October 19, 1939.
After the surrender of France in June 1940, Turkey began to move closer to Germany. On June 18, 1941, a treaty on friendship and non-aggression was concluded between these states. As part of cooperation with the Third Reich, the Turkish Republic supplied Germany with chrome ore and other strategic raw materials, and also sent German and Italian warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles.
After the German attack on the USSR, on June 25, 1941, the Turkish government declared its neutrality in the Soviet-German conflict. However, among the Turkish military and politicians, the prospect of participation in the war with the Soviet Union was actively discussed. Several infantry corps (26 divisions) of the Turkish army were stationed on the border with the USSR; in June-July 1942, Turkish troops conducted large-scale maneuvers in the east of the country. As a response, the leadership of the USSR was forced to maintain a significant group of troops in Transcaucasia in case of war with Turkey. Tensions in the region decreased after the encirclement of German troops at Stalingrad on November 19, 1942. Convinced of the failure of German plans to defeat the USSR, the Turkish government again intensified negotiations with the allies. In 1943, a meeting took place between Turkish Prime Minister Erdal İnönü and the head of the British cabinet, Winston Churchill. In an effort to involve Turkish troops in the fighting against Germany, the United States and Great Britain began supplying modern weapons to Turkey under the Lend-Lease program. Despite this, the Turkish government continued its policy of neutrality and only in August 1944 broke off diplomatic relations with Germany.
The main reason that prompted Turkey to declare war on the Third Reich on February 23, 1945 was one of the key decisions of the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945). In Yalta, the heads of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA agreed that only those states that declared war on Germany before March 1, 1945 would participate in the creation of the United Nations (UN). Thus, neutral countries risked being outside the system international relations, which was built by the victorious powers.
By the end of World War II, one of the main problems for Turkey was maintaining control over the Black Sea straits. The country's leadership feared that the Allies might organize international management of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Joining the anti-Hitler coalition allowed Turkey to avoid the landing of foreign troops on its territory and ensure sovereignty over the Black Sea straits.
Simultaneously with the Turkish Republic in February 1945, a number of Latin American and Middle Eastern states declared war on Germany and its allies. Six countries joined the anti-Hitler coalition South America: Ecuador (February 2), Paraguay (February 9), Peru (February 12), Chile and Uruguay (February 15), Venezuela (February 16). Later, Egypt (February 24), Syria (February 26), Lebanon (February 27) and Saudi Arabia(28th of February). The armies of all these countries did not take part in the hostilities.
On June 26, 1945, representatives of 50 states founded the UN in San Francisco. These included all the countries that declared war on Germany in February 1945.
In the mid-30s. Kemalist reforms began to bear fruit: the political and economic position of the state strengthened, Turkey’s authority in neighboring countries increased. This situation allowed Turkish diplomacy to undertake a number of foreign policy actions that were supposed to increase the prestige of the Ankara government on the world stage. The most successful of them should be considered the holding of an international conference in the Swiss city of Montreux, dedicated to the revision of the regime of the Black Sea straits. The convention developed by its participants took into account the main proposals of the Turkish government on security measures for the straits and gave Ankara the right to remilitarize them.
In the last years of Atatürk's life and after his death (1938), the strength of the one-party regime began to weaken. However, his successors, given the aggravation of the international situation on the eve of World War II, chose to maintain this system. The need to ensure the country's defense capability allowed the principles of statism to be applied in the widest possible way and the most severe forms of authoritarian rule to be used to suppress any manifestations of discontent. With the outbreak of hostilities, Türkiye declared its neutrality. Throughout the years of the war, Ankara, trying to maintain the inviolability of its borders, flirted either with the “Axis powers” or with its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. Only after becoming convinced of the inevitability of the imminent defeat of Nazi Germany did the Turkish government at the end of February 1945 decide to declare war on Germany and Japan. This purely symbolic act allowed Turkey to be among the founding countries of the UN. However, its prestige in the international arena has noticeably declined, and its relations with the Soviet Union have especially deteriorated. The country's ruling circles had to radically change their foreign and domestic policies.
27.Iran during World War II
Obvious pro-fascist sentiments in Iran in the context of Germany's attack on the USSR caused great concern among the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition. At the suggestion of W. Churchill, England and the Soviet Union carried out a joint military occupation of Iran. In 1941, British troops were introduced into southern Iran, and Soviet troops into the northern part, after repeated warnings and on the basis of an article of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921. The Foroughi government promised to remove German diplomatic representatives and agents from Iran. However, Reza Shah did not take measures to implement his obligations. This policy caused discontent and protest demonstrations in Iran. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate the throne in favor of his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Fascist agents in Iran were eliminated.
On January 29, 1942, an alliance agreement was signed in Tehran between the USSR, Great Britain and Iran, which provided for the allies to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Iran in order to protect it from aggression from Germany and other powers, for which the USSR and England received the right maintain its armed forces in Iran until six months after the end of the war. On the basis of this agreement, transportation of military equipment and materials to the USSR through Iran was organized.
In 1943, Iran formally declared war on Germany, but Iranian troops did not participate in hostilities. All these events had a great impact on the socio-political life of Iran. The regime of the Shah's military dictatorship was eliminated. The democratic movement intensified, former political prisoners were released from prison, and there was a tendency in society to limit the power of the monarch and increase the role of the Majlis. In 1941, the People's Party of Iran was founded, which soon became the most popular political party in the country. She advocated strengthening the national sovereignty of Iran, improving the living conditions of workers, and combating internal reaction.
At the same time, old politicians are returning to the political arena. Ahmed Qavam (Qawam al-Saltaneh) tried to create a “Democratic Party” whose main task was to unite all the bourgeois elements of Iranian society. While serving as prime minister in 1942-1943, he contributed to Milspeau's second mission. During this period, the Americans, taking advantage of the expulsion of the Germans and the weakening positions of England, strengthened their positions in Iran. At the end of 1942, under the pretext of the need to ensure the transit of military cargo, the United States sent troops to Iran. Qavam invited American economic advisers, as well as advisers for the Iranian army, gendarmerie, police, and the Ministry of Health, who proposed a number of measures to stabilize prices and increase production. The Iranian Majlis granted Milspo emergency powers, including control over foreign and domestic trade, storage and distribution of industrial and food products, transport, wages, etc. However, Milspo's mission only aggravated the already difficult situation of Iran's finances and economy. His activities caused general outrage and protests. Milspaugh's mission was a failure.
England, which had old connections with the ruling circles in Iran, tried not to cede the right of primacy to the United States and also contributed to the consolidation of pro-English groups. In 1943, the British occupation authorities helped the return of Seyid Zia ad-Din from Palestine, who created his own faction in the Majlis.
At the same time, liberal-nationalist parties appeared, which include primarily the Iran party, and Islamic organizations were created, including the clerical-nationalist terrorist organization Fedayane Islam (Advocates of Islam), which aimed to fight the opponents of Islam and foreign influence . A little later, the Fighters for Islam party arose, whose task was to strengthen the influence of Islam in the socio-political life of the country.
Thus, by the end of World War II, all the political trends that determined the life of the country in the subsequent period were present in Iran.
Turkey took a neutral position in World War II and did not officially support any of the opponents. It was not until 1945 that the country declared war on Germany and Japan. did not take part in the hostilities. In this article we will look at the internal situation of the country and diplomatic relations with other states in 1941 - 1945. and we will try to determine the role of Turkey in World War II.
The situation of the country before the war
Before World War II, signs of Turkey's orientation toward France and England, which had been evident since the 1930s, turned into a stable trend. Foreign Minister Saracoglu, who took office in 1938, was an active supporter of this line. After Albania was occupied by Italy in April 1939, Britain provided Turkey with guarantees of security and independence. In October 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Act of Mutual Assistance was signed in Ankara. At the same time, the country tried to maintain diplomatic relations with Germany. So, on June 18, 1941, a non-aggression pact was signed between the powers. In general, Turkey maneuvered between two blocs in World War II, trying to maintain neutrality.
Türkiye at the initial stage of the war
Even before the occupation of France by German troops, changes were evident in Turkey's policy. She completely switched to a position of neutrality, without denying a favorable attitude towards England. However, the defeat of France and the further military-political successes of Germany prompted the country's government to negotiate with Hitler's leadership. They ended with the signing of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression on June 18, 1941. It should be noted that before this, Germany successfully occupied and came close to the borders of Turkey. At the same time, rumors spread in Ankara about a possible military threat from the USSR.
Thus, in 1940, Turkey's participation in World War II was in doubt. The government continued its policy of maneuvering, concluding agreements with warring parties. The Turkish position became more definite after the Soviet Union entered the war.
Türkiye in 1941
On June 22, 1941, Germany unleashed a powerful blow on the USSR. The largest state in the world was drawn into a military conflict. After the start of the German-Soviet war, on June 25, 1941, she handed over a note to the government of the USSR, which confirmed her neutrality. Ankara continued to adhere to its obligations. But over the following years, especially after the USSR repressions against Muslim peoples Crimea and the Caucasus, and anti-Soviet sentiment intensified in Turkey.
Türkiye in 1942 - 1945: internal situation
Despite the fact that Turkey did not participate in World War II, the conflict greatly affected economic situation countries. The size of the army was constantly increasing (by 1942 it amounted to 1 million soldiers and officers). By 1945, military spending consumed approximately half of the country's budget. Türkiye experienced economic decline during World War II. Agriculture and culture. This was due to mass mobilizations and the introduction of bread cards in Ankara and Istanbul. Cities were deprived of workers, and prices for the most necessary products rose. In 1942, a property tax was introduced, which was collected from property owners and the income of entrepreneurs. This led to a deepening financial crisis, which was associated with abuses by officials.
Political situation in the country
Türkiye during the Second World War experienced the rise of nationalism - pan-Turkism. This was reflected not only in the foreign policy plans of the elite that concerned the USSR. This was clearly demonstrated in internal actions the Turkish government, which turned to the ideology of pan-Turkism proposed by the Young Turks and the updated concept of racism developed by Nihal Atsiz.
From 1940 to 1945, martial law was in effect in the vilayets (provinces where national minorities lived). In this regard, unjustified confiscations of property often occurred here. In 1942, the government formed by Şükrü Saracoglu began a broad campaign of patriotic propaganda in a pan-Turkic style.
The question of Turkey's entry into the war
Since 1943, Turkey began making efforts to enter the conflict on its side. Churchill was especially interested in this. Turkey's entry into the war would make it possible to open a Second Front and avoid the appearance of Soviet troops in this territory. In the winter of 1943, the Adana Conference took place. Churchill made every effort to get the Turkish President to abandon his position of neutrality. But these negotiations were not successful for either side. Türkiye continued to remain neutral during World War II. However, the sympathies of the country's government were already on the side of Germany.
In October 1943, representatives of the allied countries gathered at a conference in Moscow. They decided to get Turkey to renounce neutrality by the end of the year. This issue was also discussed at Cairo and, however, Turkey declared its unwillingness to enter the war.
Türkiye at the final stage of the war
During World War II, Turkey pursued an ambivalent policy towards rival powers. In 1944, the Allies stopped supplying weapons to the country. In this regard, the Turkish government was forced to abandon the export of chromium to Germany. However, in June 1944, several German warships entered the Black Sea. This led to an escalation of the situation, and the Allies demanded that Turkey break off relations with Germany. August 2 all contracts for economic cooperation between the countries were terminated.
Work began in February 1945 Yalta Conference. During the negotiations, the allies decided that only those countries that acted on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition in the conflict could take part in the formation of the United Nations. In this regard, on February 23, 1945, Türkiye declared war on Germany. Despite the fact that its army did not participate in hostilities, the country received an invitation to join the UN.
Discussion about the straits
After the end of the war, the issue of the Black Sea straits began to be discussed. During the discussions, an agreement was signed. The straits were to be under the control of Turkey and the USSR, as the most interested powers. In addition, for the sake of their security and maintaining peace in the Black Sea region, they cannot allow these routes to be used by other states with hostile intentions.
Turkey's international position in the post-war years
After the war, Turkey's politics became clearly pro-Western. Thus, wanting to demonstrate loyalty to the United States, the government of A. Menderes sent its brigade to Korea in July 1950. Turkey became the only country in the Near and Middle East to participate in the war on the Korean Peninsula.
In October 1951, the country joined NATO and also signed treaties with Pakistan and Iraq. Under the auspices of England and the United States, a new military bloc was created in November 1955 - the Baghdad Pact (Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan). In 1959 it was transformed into the Central Treaty Organization, with its headquarters in Ankara.
conclusions
Thus, it is impossible to say for sure whether Turkey participated in World War II or not. Officially, the country maintained a position of neutrality. But the government was constantly inclined to cooperate with one or the other warring side. Turkey renounced neutrality only in February 1945, but its army did not take part in the hostilities.