Who has the bigger gun: super-heavy artillery of the First World War. Artillery in the First World War Artillery of the German Empire in the First World War

The First World War gave birth to super-heavy guns, one shell of which weighed a ton, and the firing range reached 15 kilometers. The weight of these giants reached 100 tons.

Shortage

Everyone knows the famous army joke about “crocodiles that fly, but low.” However, military men in the past were not always erudite and perspicacious. For example, General Dragomirov generally believed that the First World War would last four months. But the French military completely accepted the concept of “one gun and one shell,” intending to use it to defeat Germany in the coming European war.

Russia, walking in line military policy France also paid tribute to this doctrine. But when the war soon turned into a positional war, the troops dug into trenches, protected by many rows of barbed wire, it became clear that the Entente allies were sorely lacking heavy guns capable of operating in these conditions.

No, the troops had a certain number of relative large-caliber guns: Austria-Hungary and Germany had 100-mm and 105-mm howitzers, England and Russia had 114-mm and 122-mm howitzers. Finally, all the warring countries used 150/152 or 155 mm howitzers and mortars, but even their power was clearly insufficient. “Our dugout in three rolls,” covered on top with sandbags, protected against any light howitzer shells, and concrete was used against heavier ones.

However, Russia did not even have enough of them, and she had to purchase 114-mm, 152-mm and 203-mm and 234-mm howitzers from England. In addition to them, the heavier guns of the Russian army were the 280-mm mortar (developed by the French company Schneider, as well as the entire line of 122-152-mm howitzers and cannons) and the 305-mm howitzer 1915 from the Obukhov plant, produced during the war in Only 50 units available!

"Big Bertha"

But the Germans, preparing for offensive battles in Europe, very carefully approached the experience of the Anglo-Boer and Russian-Japanese wars and created in advance not just heavy, but super heavy weapon- A 420-mm mortar called “Big Bertha” (named after the then owner of the Krupp concern), a real “witches’ hammer.”

The projectile of this super-gun weighed 810 kg, and it fired at a distance of as much as 14 km. The explosion of a high-explosive shell produced a crater 4.25 meters deep and 10.5 meters in diameter. The fragmentation scattered into 15 thousand pieces of deadly metal, which retained lethal force at a distance of up to two kilometers. However, the defenders of the same, for example, Belgian fortresses considered the most terrible armor-piercing shells, from which even two-meter ceilings made of steel and concrete could not save.

During the First World War, the Germans successfully used Berthas to bombard well-fortified French and Belgian forts and the Verdun fortress. It was noted that in order to break the will to resist and force the fort’s garrison of a thousand people to surrender, all that was required was two such mortars, a day of time and 360 shells. No wonder our allies on the Western Front called the 420-mm mortar “fort killer.”

In the modern Russian television series “Death of the Empire”, during the siege of the Kovno fortress, the Germans fire at it from the “Big Bertha”. At least that's what the screen says about it. In fact, “Big Bertha” was “played” by the Soviet 305-mm artillery installation TM-3-12 on a railway, radically different from the Bertha in all respects.

A total of nine of these guns were built, they took part in the capture of Liege in August 1914, and in the Battle of Verdun in the winter of 1916. Four guns were delivered to the Osovets fortress on February 3, 1915, so scenes of its use on the Russian-German front should have been filmed in winter, not summer!

Giants from Austria-Hungary

But on the Eastern Front, Russian troops more often had to deal with another 420-mm monster gun - not a German one, but an Austro-Hungarian howitzer of the same caliber M14, created in 1916. Moreover, yielding German gun in the firing range (12,700 m), it surpassed him in the weight of the projectile, which weighed one ton!

Fortunately, this monster was much less transportable than the wheeled German howitzer. That one, albeit slowly, could be towed. Every time a position was changed, the Austro-Hungarian one had to be disassembled and transported using 32 trucks and trailers, and its assembly required from 12 to 40 hours.

It should be noted that in addition to the terrible destructive effect, these guns also had a relatively high rate of fire. So, “Bertha” fired one shell every eight minutes, and the Austro-Hungarian one fired 6-8 shells per hour!

Less powerful was another Austro-Hungarian howitzer, the Barbara, with a 380-mm caliber, firing 12 rounds per hour and sending its 740-kilogram shells over a distance of 15 km! However, both this gun and the 305-mm and 240-mm mortars were stationary installations that were transported in parts and installed in special positions, which required time and a lot of labor to equip. In addition, the 240-mm mortar fired only at 6500 m, that is, it was in the destruction zone of even our Russian 76.2-mm field gun! Nevertheless, all these weapons fought and fired, but we clearly did not have enough weapons to respond to them.

Entente response

How did the Entente allies respond to all this? Well, Russia had little choice: basically these were the already mentioned 305-mm howitzers, with a projectile weighing 376 kg and a range of 13448 m, firing one shot every three minutes.

But the British released a whole series of such stationary guns of ever-increasing caliber, starting with 234 mm and up to 15-inch - 381 mm siege howitzers. The latter were actively pursued by Winston Churchill himself, who achieved their release in 1916. Although the British turned out to be not very impressive with this gun, they produced only twelve of them.

It threw a projectile weighing 635 kg over a distance of only 9.87 km, while the installation itself weighed 94 tons. Moreover, it was pure weight, without ballast. The fact is that in order to give this gun greater stability (and all other guns of this type), they had a steel box under the barrel, which had to be filled with 20.3 tons of ballast, that is, simply put, filled with earth and stones.

Therefore, the 234-mm Mk I and Mk II mounts became the most popular in the British army (a total of 512 guns of both types were produced). At the same time, they fired a 290-kilogram projectile at 12,740 m. But... they also needed this same 20-ton box of earth, and just imagine the amount of earthwork that was required to install just a few of these guns in positions! By the way, you can see it “live” today in London at the Imperial War Museum, just like the 203-mm English howitzer displayed in the courtyard of the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg!

The French responded to the German challenge by creating a 400-mm howitzer M 1915/16 on a railway transporter. The gun was developed by the Saint-Chamon company and already at the first combat use October 21–23, 1916 showed her high efficiency. The howitzer could fire both "light" high explosive shells weighing 641–652 kg, containing about 180 kg explosives respectively, and heavy ones from 890 to 900 kg. At the same time, the firing range reached 16 km. Before the end of the First World War, eight 400 mm such installations were made, two more installations were assembled after the war.



During the First World War, a huge leap was made in military production in the Russian Empire, and the pace of industrial development was so high that it was not repeated after that in national history, and were not repeated in any of the periods of the Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The basis for this leap was the rapid expansion of military production capacity in 1914-1917. behind count of four factors:
1) Expanding the capacity of existing state military enterprises.
2) Massive involvement of private industry in military production.
3) Large-scale program for the emergency construction of new state-owned factories.
4) Widespread construction of new private military factories, secured by government orders.
The Russian Empire entered the war with an unfinished military reform, which was supposed to end by 1917. It must be taken into account that the planning authorities of absolutely all countries made mistakes in forecasting the course of the war. Nobody thought it would last more than a year.

Accordingly, military reserves were designed for a relatively short period of time. fighting. Industry, including Russia's, could not quickly compensate for the decline that a long war would imply.
Therefore, purchases of weapons and ammunition abroad were natural and justified. The tsarist government ordered 1.5 million rifles of the 1891-1910 model. from the American companies Remington and Westinghouse, plus 300 thousand rifles chambered for the Russian three-line cartridge from Winchester. But this order for the most part did not reach Russia - after the Bolshevik revolution, the US government confiscated the rifles and adopted them as US Rifle, Cal. .30, Model of 1916.
How great were the needs of the Russian army for weapons at the beginning of the First World War and how they were subsequently satisfied by domestic industry can be judged by the figures that are now quite accessible. They were analyzed in his study by Mikhail Barabanov, former scientific editor of the Arms Export magazine, since 2008 - Researcher Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Chief Editor Moscow Defense Brief magazine. The following are necessary excerpts from his work.

Rifles.

The rifles were produced at three state-owned arms factories - Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk. The military capacity of all of them in the summer of 1914 was estimated at a total of 525 thousand rifles per year. In reality, in the first five months of the war from August to December 1914, these three factories produced 134 thousand rifles.
Since 1915, accelerated work was undertaken to expand all three factories, as a result of which the monthly production of rifles at them from December 1914 to December 1916 was increased fourfold - from 33.3 thousand to 127.2 thousand pieces . In 1916 alone, the productivity of each of the three factories was doubled, and the actual delivery amounted to: Tula plant 648.8 thousand rifles, Izhevsk - 504.9 thousand and Sestroretsk - 147.8 thousand, a total of 1301.4 thousand. rifles in 1916

In 1915, appropriations were authorized for the construction of a second arms factory in Tula with an annual capacity of 500 thousand rifles per year, and in the future it was supposed to be merged with the Tula Armory with a total total capacity of 3500 rifles per day. Additionally, money was allocated to purchase equipment from Remington (1691 machines) for the production of another 2 thousand rifles per day! In total, the entire Tula arms complex was supposed to produce 2 million rifles per year. Construction of the 2nd plant began in the summer of 1916 and was to be completed by the beginning of 1918.
In 1916, construction began on a new state-owned Yekaterinoslav arms factory near Samara with a capacity of 800 thousand rifles per year.

Thus, in 1918, the annual production capacity of the Russian industry for the production of rifles (without machine guns) should have amounted to 3.8 million units, which meant an increase of 7.5 times in relation to the mobilization capacity of 1914 and tripling in relation to issued in 1916. This overlapped the requests of the Headquarters (2.5 million rifles per year) by one and a half times.

Ammo.

In 1914, three state-owned cartridge factories were engaged in the production of rifle cartridges in Russia - Petrograd, Tula and Lugansk. The maximum capacity of each of these plants was 150 million rounds of ammunition per year during single-shift operation (450 million in total). In fact, all three factories should have already produced a third more in total in the peaceful year of 1914 - the state order amounted to 600 million rounds of ammunition.
From the beginning of 1915, enormous efforts were made to expand the capacity of all three factories, as a result of which the production of Russian three-line cartridges was tripled from December 1914 to November 1916 - from 53.8 million to 150 million pieces. In 1916 alone, the total production volume of Russian cartridges was increased by one and a half times (to 1.482 billion pieces). In 1917, while maintaining productivity, the supply of 1.8 billion cartridges was expected, plus the arrival of approximately the same number of Russian imported cartridges. In 1915-1917 the number of pieces of equipment from all three cartridge factories doubled. Think about it, 3 billion rounds of ammunition per year!
The headquarters in 1916 made clearly inflated demands on cartridges - for example, at the inter-union conference in January 1917, the need was calculated at 500 million cartridges per month (including 325 million Russians), which gave a cost of 6 billion . per year, or twice the consumption of 1916, and this with a sufficient supply of cartridges to the units by the beginning of 1917.
In July 1916, construction began on the Simbirsk Cartridge Plant (capacity 840 million rounds per year). In general, the total estimated capacity of the Russian cartridge industry in 1918 can be calculated at up to 3 billion cartridges per year.

Machine guns.

In fact, until the 1917 coup, the issue heavy machine guns was carried out only by the Tula Arms Factory, which increased production to 1,200 units per month by January 1917. Thus, in relation to December 1915, the increase was 2.4 times, and in relation to December 1914 - seven times. During 1916, the production of machine guns almost tripled (from 4251 to 11072 units), and in 1917 the Tula plant was expected to supply 15 thousand machine guns.

Together with large import orders (in 1917, the delivery of up to 25 thousand imported heavy machine guns and up to 20 thousand light machine guns was expected), this should have satisfied the requests of Headquarters. With exaggerated hopes for imports, proposals from private industry to produce heavy machine guns were rejected by the GAU (Main Artillery Directorate).
The production of Madsen light machine guns was organized at the Kovrov machine gun plant, which was being built under an agreement with Madsen. An agreement on this with the issuance of an order to the syndicate for 15 thousand light machine guns was concluded in April 1916, the contract was signed in September, and construction of the plant began in August 1916 and was carried out at a very fast pace. The first batch of machine guns was assembled in August 1917. By the beginning of 1918, despite the “revolutionary” chaos, the plant was ready. The production of machine guns was planned at 4,000 units in the first half of the year, followed by 1,000 units per month and increasing to 2.5-3 thousand light machine guns per month.
However, contrary to popular belief, the armies of the countries participating in the First World War were driven into fortifications not by machine guns, but by light field artillery and shrapnel.

A good example is the armament of the Russian infantry division in 1914, where the regimental machine gun teams had only 32 Maximas, but 48 Death Scythes in the division's artillery brigade. One Russian shrapnel shell contained 260 bullets, machine gun belt Maxima - 250 rounds. Artillery was definitely more effective than machine guns!

Light weapons.

The production of light and mountain three-inch artillery was carried out at the Petrograd State and Perm gun factories. In 1915, the private Putilov plant (eventually nationalized at the end of 1916), as well as the private “Tsaritsyn group of factories” (Sormovsky plant, Lessner plant, Petrograd metal and Kolomensky plant) were connected to production. The monthly production of guns of the 1902 model eventually increased over 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) by more than 13 times (!!!) - from 35 to 472 systems.
To further expand artillery production, at the end of 1916, the construction of a powerful Saratov state-owned gun factory began. Due to the revolution of February 1917, construction was stopped at the initial stage.
Thus, with the monthly requirement for 1917, declared by Headquarters in January 1917, for 490 field and 70 mountain 3-dm guns, Russian industry had actually already reached its supply by that time, and in 1917-1918, apparently , would significantly exceed this need. With the commissioning of the Saratov plant, one could expect the production of more than 700 field guns and 100 mountain guns per month (assessing the disposal of 300 guns per month by execution without taking into account combat losses)...
It should be added that in 1916 the Obukhov plant began development of the 37-mm Rosenberg trench gun. Of the first order of 400 new systems from March 1916, 170 guns were delivered already in 1916, the delivery of the rest was scheduled for 1917. There is no doubt that this would be followed by new massive orders for these guns.

Heavy weapons.

By the beginning of the war, the production of 48-line howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model was carried out at the Putilov plant, the Obukhov plant and the Petrograd gun factory, and the 6-dm howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model were carried out at the Putilov and Perm factories.
Release heavy artillery grew very quickly. In the first half of 1915, only 128 heavy artillery pieces were manufactured, but in a year and a half the volume increased 7 times! In total, in 1917, if the revolution had not happened, the GAU (without Morved) industry should have supplied up to 2,000 Russian-made heavy guns (versus 900 in 1916).
The second new center for the production of heavy artillery was to be the Saratov State Gun Factory with an annual program for heavy guns: 42-lin guns - 300, 48-lin howitzers - 300, 6-dm howitzers - 300, 6-dm fortress guns - 190, 8 -dm howitzers - 48. Due to the revolution of February 1917, construction was stopped at the initial stage. Among other measures considered by 1917 to increase the production of heavy artillery were the issuance of an order for 48-lin howitzers to the private Tsaritsyn group of factories, as well as the development in 1917 of the production of 12-dm howitzers and new “light” 16-dm howitzers at built since 1913 with the participation of Vickers at the Tsaritsyn plant for the production of naval heavy artillery (RAOAZ), whose construction was carried out sluggishly during WWII, but the first stage of which was expected in July 1916, and commissioning in the spring of 1917.

With the commissioning of the howitzer plant at the Putilov plant and the first stage of the Tsaritsyn plant, Russian industry would have reached an annual output of at least 2,600 heavy artillery systems in 1918, and more likely, even more. In fact, this meant that the 1916 Headquarters requests for heavy artillery could be covered by Russian industry by the end of 1917.
According to imports in 1917 - early 1918. about 1000 more heavy artillery systems were to be imported. In total, the total number of Russian heavy artillery, even minus losses, could reach 5,000 guns by the end of 1918, i.e. be comparable in number to the French.

Shells.

The main role in shell production under the GAU was played by the Perm plant, as well as the Putilov plant, which eventually united around a number of other private enterprises (Russian Society, Russian-Baltic and Kolomna). Thus, the Perm plant, with an annual design capacity of 3-dm shells of 500 thousand units, already in 1915 produced 1.5 million shells, and in 1916 – 2.31 million shells. The Putilov plant with its cooperation produced a total of 75 thousand 3-dm shells in 1914, and in 1916 - 5.1 million shells.
If in 1914 the entire Russian industry produced 516 thousand 3-dm shells, then in 1915 - already 8.825 million according to Barsukov, and 10 million according to Manikovsky, and in 1916 - already 26.9 million. shots according to Barsukov. Reports from the War Ministry provide even more significant figures for the supply of Russian-made 3-mm shells to the army - in 1915, 12.3 million shells, and in 1916, 29.4 million rounds. Thus, the annual production of 3-dm shells in 1916 practically tripled, and the monthly production of 3-dm shells from January 1915 to December 1916 increased 12 times!
Barabanov writes that according to all calculations, the army’s requirements for shells would have been more than satisfied in 1917 only by domestic production. “Most likely, by 1918, Russian light artillery would have been overstocked with ammunition,” in particular, he believes, “and if the pace of production and deliveries had been maintained and at least limitedly increased, by the end of 1918 the warehouses would have been bursting with huge reserves.” 3-dm shells."
The Russian Empire achieved a colossal and still underestimated leap in military production in the years 1914-1917. The growth of military production and development of the defense industry in 1914-1917 were probably the most ambitious in Russian history, surpassing in relative figures any jumps in military production in Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The Russian Empire demonstrated its high ability to invest in the military industry and the real possibilities of a gigantic increase in the power and capabilities of the PKK in as soon as possible.
Famous organization GAU Commissioner Vankov, attracted 442 (!) private factories to cooperation in military production. The conversion was not invented under Yeltsin, but under him it was carried out in one direction. In the Russian Empire, it was considered normal that if your private plant did not receive a military order today, then you produce, for example, blanks for handicraftsmen, and “if there is a war tomorrow,” then instead of samovars, cartridges and shells begin to roll off your production lines. And it was very honorable (and profitable!) to be among the companies trusted by the state.

In general, S.V. gives the same assessment of the pre-revolutionary defense industry. Volkov: “During 1915-16, a giant leap was made in arming and supplying the army. And it had great inertia - the production that was established led to the fact that by the spring of 1917 the Russian army was overwhelmed with weapons and ammunition.” .
But for the Bolshevik nonhumans who seized the central warehouses, these reserves were enough for the entire war of 1917-1922.

Russia is the only country of all involved in the first world war, who had no food problems. None. Not only in 1917, but also in 1918.

At the time of its exit from the First World War, the Russian Empire had enormous mobilization resources. In our country, only 39% of men of the corresponding age were drafted, while, for example, in Germany and France - over 80%.


Russia has actually demonstrated the mobilization abilities of the economy. By 1917-1918, the country was almost completely self-sufficient in domestically produced weapons and ammunition (for a number of items, with a strong reserve).
Russia, as they say, kept pace with the times: a significant increase in armor was planned in the army and new capacities were being prepared in the field of aircraft construction.

I decided to study the equipment of German heavy artillery. I have a suspicion that there are many people who confuse the standard number, the actual number and the number of guns in combat-ready units. There are also problems with taking into account departmental affiliation.
It is very often mentioned that the Germans either have 168 guns or 216. One comes across references to 264 guns and 144 guns.

Where did these guns come from?
The experience of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, where the Turks offered resistance, showed the need to allocate heavy artillery to the corps. Before the advent of shoe belts, the maximum caliber was de facto limited to 150-155 mm mortars. Therefore, the corps of the imperial and royal army received 150 mm M80 mortars. A very mediocre artillery system, but it can fire from the ground. With the advent of shoe hulls, they were re-equipped with 15 cm sFH M94 heavy howitzers. The Russians had 152 mm field mortars and suffered with a 152 mm gun at 70 pounds. It was proposed to give each corps a three-battery division of these guns when it was put into service. Total 18 guns, eight horses, firing range 33 kg shell (ammunition unified with mortars) 6 versts. But the system was completed only in 1910. At Shirokorad in "History" domestic artillery"referred to as a 152 mm cannon of 80 pounds. The Spanish-American experience showed complete ineffectiveness field artillery against entrenched infantry. American shrapnel didn't even hit blockhouses.
It was decided to give each building artillery regiment consisting of 16 guns, so as not to call in siege artillery for help. In 1903, the 15 cm sFH 02 was adopted, which was gradually equipped with units.
The experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the use of 120 and 150 mm howitzers by the Japanese under the supervision of German specialists showed the effectiveness of heavy artillery. The Japanese came to the conclusion that each division should be given a howitzer battery. This came down to the actual availability of materiel, but the conclusions were drawn correctly. Moreover, theoretical calculations and Austrian experience were confirmed. The Russians used much more heavy guns, there were only 128 6 dm guns in 120 poods, but this did not help. Japanese howitzer artillery was superior to Russian in mobility. The Russians fought normally only with 6 dm field mortars and 107 mm battery guns. Everything turned out to be expected. The Russian concept of using siege artillery to combat field fortifications seemed incorrect to the Germans. If the Japanese had not lost their only battery of 105 mm guns at the very beginning, history German artillery could have gone differently. Based combat experience emphasis was placed on howitzers, and only before the war the opinion changed, but the 10 cm K 14 began to arrive only in May 1915.
A separate point was the use of 203 mm light siege guns weighing 190 pounds, of which there were 16 in the Siberian Siege Regiment. Essentially this is a heavy howitzer. The use of guns of this caliber in field battles was considered impossible. General Schlieffen made a rational proposal: the corps would be reinforced with 150 mm howitzers, the army with 210 mm. So that the army command does not call in siege artillery to fight the numerous old Belgian fortresses. They were mainly designed to fire 150 mm guns of the 1860s-80s. The staffing number was determined to be 21 divisions of two batteries, four-gun batteries. Total 168 guns.
In addition to the artillery attached to the army, there was siege artillery armed with 21 cm mörser 99. The new mortar was a howitzer, but for a number of reasons it was called a mortar. To storm the Belgian fortresses, according to the calculations of the command, it was necessary to have 30 batteries.

On August 1, 1914, 14 divisions were formed for the needs of field armies and 4 more were under formation. Some of the guns were produced and accepted, but were at the manufacturing plant. All 4 divisions became combat-ready from October 1914 to February 1915. That is, in fact, 14 divisions with 112 guns.

The siege artillery had 30 batteries with 120 210 mm guns, of which 72 21 cm Mörser 10 and 48 21 cm Mörser 99.
By the end of 1915, all 288 21 cm Mörser 10s were to be produced.

In others European countries the situation was worse.
The French assigned a regiment of 3-5 battalions of guns with a caliber of 120-155 mm to each army. A total of 308 guns, of which 84 were very mediocre 120 mm C mle 1890 howitzers for the First World War. They fired 18-20 kg shells at a distance of up to 5.8 km. But they had to bring up territorial troops for field battles, which also had 120-155 mm guns. We must understand that the main problem the French - confusion and vacillation. By 1913, they finally adopted a 105 mm cannon, which was almost an exact copy 107 mm gun adopted by the Russian army. The French, after problems with the 155 mm CTR mle 1904 howitzer, were against guns other than 75 mm guns. There were 155 mm howitzers to show that the money was not wasted. The 155 gun 1877/14 and the 105 mm gun were intended for siege artillery. Although according to the staff they have a battalion of 12,155 mm howitzers in their corps artillery regiment. Usually there was one battery, the other two were armed with 75 mm cannons.
In 1913, they conducted maneuvers, as a result of which they decided to accept 105 and 155 howitzers, but everything was drowned in chatter. Luckily for the French, they had a lot of systems suitable for military operations. There were about 2,200 155 mm guns alone, to which were added 2,500 long 120 mm guns and 330 220 mm mortars. Before the First World War, they thought about new guns of 193, 220 and 274 mm, but almost nothing was done. A sample of a 340 mm mortar was tested; 370 mm siege guns were ordered, but these guns cannot be used as field guns. Fortunately for the French, they designed a 280 mm mortar for the Russians and received an order, and in 1913 they began work on a 229 mm mortar. This made it possible to launch production of 220 mm mortars in 1915.

Austria-Hungary turned out to be a model of disintegration. Due to chronic problems and the peculiar cost structure, there was not enough money to purchase guns. Added to this were the problems of lobbying.
Theoretically, each corps should have 8,150 mm howitzers; if necessary, fortress artillery was used. It was represented by 120 and 150 mm cannons, 150, 240 and 305 mm mortar howitzers and 150 and 180 mm howitzers.
If necessary, 50 batteries (200) of 15 cm SFH M94 guns were allocated, that is, the same ones with which the army corps were armed, but only 240 guns were produced, of which 112 were used as corps artillery, 128 were transferred to the fortress. The shortcoming was covered by the 12 cm Kanone M80, an analogue of the Russian 107 mm siege gun, higher projectile weight, but shorter firing range. These 200 guns formed the basis of the army's artillery in the first year of the war, the 120 mm gun becoming the heaviest system used by Austria-Hungary in field battles at this time.
It must be said that Skoda presented prototypes of new heavy guns several times, but they were not accepted. The Austrians had 7 batteries (14 guns) of 240 mm 98/07 mechanized mortars and 12 batteries (48 guns) of 240 mm 98 mortars, but they did not dare to throw them into field battles.
It should be noted that money was allocated for the purchase of new 195 and 150 mm howitzers and 104 mm guns, but the lobbyists did not reach an agreement. But with these funds we bought 25,305 mm mortars. But the imperial and royal armies were left without modern heavy field guns.

The British had army artillery consisting of 6 dm cannons weighing 30 cwt and 240 mm mortars purchased in the Czech Republic. Very similar to the Austrian 240 mm mortars 98. There are only four of them, two of them in China. Was manufactured prototype 234 mm howitzers.

Natural disasters befell the Russian artillery: either the epic conflict between Genispart and the Minister of War, the infantry and the General Staff, then The State Duma, which cut expenses to show that they have power, then the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty.
Most of the systems considered necessary were adopted. The Russo-Japanese War showed the unsuitability of the systems in service. There were two opinions: most of the members of the party committee and the Genispart V.Kn. Sergei Mikhailovich. With corps artillery there were two different options: most of authorities believed that it was necessary that the corps division consisted of three 6-or batteries of 122 mm howitzers, V.Kn. believed that a division consisting of 8,152 howitzers and 4,107 mm guns was needed. However, the allocated money was enough to form 20 heavy divisions for 37 corps; the mortar divisions had two batteries. However, in 1912-14, the necessary funds were knocked out that would allow each corps by April 1 (13), 1915 to have 8,152 mm howitzers model 1910, 4,107 mm cannons and 24,122 mm howitzers model. 1909. According to our generals, Russian corps artillery would be superior to German with its 16,150 mm howitzers. When mobilized in 1914, some corps were able to receive 24,122 howitzers.
Army artillery in European Russia was to be represented by six brigades, each with three divisions of three batteries (36,152 mm howitzers model 1909). The Caucasian and Siberian brigades of the same composition were also formed. It was assumed that the Siberian Brigade would be in Harbin a month after the start of mobilization.
Finally, they allowed us to order 280 mm mortars from France. There were two consecutive orders for a total of 32 guns, all to be delivered by March 1915 inclusive. This made it possible to form 7 divisions of 2 two-gun batteries each and have 4 guns in reserve. To this, if necessary, siege brigades could be added. Thus, the Northwestern Front was supposed to receive 120 152 mm guns of 120 and 200 pounds, but the General Staff, citing the Russian-Japanese experience, refused to deploy them at the front, but they were mobilized. When v.k. Claims were made against Sergei Mikhailovich, and he blamed the General Staff. The first siege brigade was sent to the front and arrived at the beginning of 1915. The difference from the original version was the replacement of 24,152 mm guns of 120 pounds with 8,152 mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 16 107 mm guns. There was a similar situation on the Southwestern Front.
In general, the main problem of the Russian army is not in materiel, but in the fact that the ruling elites have forgotten a simple truth: they must serve the Motherland “with pen and sword”©, and the majority had on their minds “balls, lackeys, cadets and the crunch of French bread”© . The exterminatus of the nobility and other elites was inevitable.


76.2 mm field rapid-fire gun model 1902 in the artillery museum Sotamuseo, Finland.

Russian light field artillery gun of 76.2 mm caliber.

Actively used in Russian-Japanese war, World War I, Russian Civil War and others armed conflicts with the participation of countries from the former Russian Empire (Soviet Union, Poland, Finland, etc.) All versions of this gun were used in the Great Patriotic War.

These guns were in mass production for 36 years and were in service for about 50 years, making a worthy contribution to all the wars that Russia waged from 1900 to 1945.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the gun.

Years of manufacture --1903-1919

Issued, pcs. -- about 17,100

Caliber, mm -- 76.2

Barrel length, club -- 30

Weight in stowed position, kg -- 2380

Firing angles

Elevations (max.), ° -- +17

Decrease (min.), ° -- -3

Horizontal, ° -- 5

Fire capabilities

Max. firing range, km - 8.5

Rate of fire, rds/min -- 10-12


At the end of the 19th century, all types of artillery guns underwent dramatic changes. The advent of piston bolts and unitary ammunition significantly increased the rate of fire. Elements began to be introduced into the design of carriages to ensure the rollback of the barrel along its axis. Appeared sights, providing shooting from closed firing positions. As a result of all these innovations, artillery began to acquire the appearance inherent in modern artillery systems.

In those years, Russia was at the forefront of technical progress in the field of artillery. Thus, already in 1882, Baranovsky’s 2.5-inch rapid-fire gun was adopted, which had all the features of a modern artillery piece. Russia also looked closely at foreign models. Thus, in 1892 -1894, on the initiative of the Main Artillery Directorate, comparative tests of high-speed field guns with a unitary shot were carried out: 61 and 75 mm guns of the Nordfeld system, 60 and 80 mm of the Gruzon system and 75 mm of Saint-Chamon. However, none of the foreign guns satisfied the GAU, and in December 1896, tactical and technical requirements for a new three-inch rapid-firing field gun were formulated and a competition was announced for best project such a weapon.

The competition was attended by the Aleksandrovsky, Metallichesky, Obukhovsky and Putilovsky factories, as well as foreign companies Krupp, Chatillon-Camantry, Schneider, Maxim. According to the terms of the competition, each enterprise had to present two copies of a three-inch rapid-fire cannon that met the requirements of the State Autonomous Army and 250 ammunition for each gun.

According to the test results, the development of the Putilov plant, created according to the design of engineers Zabudsky and Engelhardt, was recognized as the best. Military trials began in 1899 new gun. Tests were carried out in five military districts in different climatic conditions. Six infantry and two horse artillery batteries, equipped with new guns, took part in them.

The tests were considered successful, and by the Highest Order of February 9, 1900, the gun was put into service under the name 3-inch field gun mod. 1900 In the troops she received affectionate

nickname - three-inch.

Serial production of the gun was organized at four factories at once: Putilov, St. Petersburg Ordnance, Perm and Obukhov. Total time serial production(1900-1903) about 2,400 guns were manufactured and delivered to the troops. Design of a 3-inch gun mod. 1900 represented a sharp qualitative leap compared to the 87-mm field guns of the 1877 model. However, the design of its carriage still had many obsolete elements. The barrel rolled back not along the axis of the channel, but parallel to the frames and rolled back along with the barrel along the carriage slide. The hydraulic recoil brake cylinders were located inside the frame, and the knurling consisted of rubber buffers mounted on a steel rod of the buffer column.

Everything made it difficult for the troops to operate the weapon. Therefore, soon after the adoption of the sample system. In 1900, at the Putilov plant, engineers Bishlyak, Lipnitsky and Sokolovsky began design work to improve the carriage design.

Barrel and bolt design and internal ballistics The new gun was practically no different from the characteristics of the gun mod. 1900. The only difference was the absence of trunnions and the trunnion ring. In the new gun, the barrel was attached to the carriage cradle using a beard and two guide grips. The design of the carriage became completely different. Recoil devices are now placed in a cradle under the barrel. The hydraulic-type recoil brake was placed inside a cylindrical cradle, and its cylinder was attached to the barrel and rolled back with it when fired. The knurling springs were placed on top of the recoil brake cylinder and were compressed when fired, thus accumulating recoil energy, which was subsequently used to return the barrel to its place. The rollback occurred along the axis of the bore. The cradle was attached to the carriage using trunnions. Both guns had screw-type lifting and turning mechanisms.

The design of the gun provided for the maximum use of carbon and low-alloy steel to simplify mass production and reduce costs, but such a replacement did not entail a deterioration in the characteristics of the gun. The new three-inch carriage was equipped with mechanisms that provided horizontal guidance within 1° and vertical guidance from -6.5° to +17°. The gun itself was equipped with a sight with a longitudinal level, a mechanism for taking into account lateral corrections and a protractor with two movable diopters. These devices allowed crews to fire not only direct fire, but also from closed positions when the enemy did not see the battery.

In the same year, in accordance with the order of the Main Artillery Directorate, the gun was presented for comparative tests along with similar guns of the Krupp, Saint-Chamon and Schneider systems. All guns submitted for testing rolled back along the axis of the barrel bore, all of them had a hydraulic recoil brake, and a spring-type knurl. After test firing and transporting guns over a distance of up to 600 versts, the design of the Putilov plant was recognized as the best. In accordance with the Highest Order of January 16, 1901, 12 new guns were manufactured at the Putilov plant, which were transferred to the troops for testing. Based on their results, the plant was asked to make some changes to the carriage design by April 1902.

After repeated military tests By order of the GAU dated March 3, 1903, the gun was put into service under the name 3-inch field gun mod. 1902.

In the same year, an order was issued for the production of 4,520 guns. The production of guns was organized at the Putilov, Obukhov and Perm factories. In addition, barrels were manufactured at the St. Petersburg Gun Factory, the carriages for which were assembled at the St. Petersburg, Kiev and Bryansk arsenals.

In 1906, the gun was modernized: a shield cover was installed on the three-inch gun, and therefore two seats for crew numbers were excluded from the design; in addition, a panoramic sight was installed on the gun with an artillery panorama of the Hertz system, which were produced at the Obukhov plant.

The entire guns were manufactured by the Putilov, Obukhov and Perm factories. The St. Petersburg Arms Plant produced only barrels from blanks from the Perm and Obukhov plants; carriages for it came from the St. Petersburg, Kyiv and Bryansk arsenals. Since 1916, the Tsaritsyn group of factories became involved in the production of cannons. Note that all the factories, except for the Tsaritsyn troupe, were state-owned (the Putilov factory was nationalized during the war).

Before the beginning Great War 4520 guns were fired

in 1915 - 1368,

in 1916 - 6612

in 1917 - 4289 (out of 8500 ordered)
Total 16,789 guns.
The production program of the tsarist government for 1918 was planned production of 10,000 guns

At the beginning of 1917, the GAU announced a competition for a new carriage forlight field artillery piece that could be towed usingtrucks at a speed of at least 45 km/h. This dramatically increased mobilityRussian field artillery and increased its effectiveness.
In addition, the GAU was considering the feasibility of modernizing the 1902 gun in terms oflengthening the barrel by 10-15 calibers, or announcing a competition for the development of a new lightweight three-inchfield gun with a barrel length of 45-50 calibers.

As of June 15, 1917, the active army had 8,605 serviceable 76-mm field guns (of which 984 were model 1900 and 7,621 were model 1902), in addition, there were at least 5,000 in warehouses inside Russia. both new and those in need of repair 76-mm field guns.

By the end of 1917, the production of guns had practically ceased.

Even the outbreak of the Civil War did not initially cause the need to resume production - there were enough three-inch guns in Russia - both in the Red and White armies. However, the pre-revolutionary supply soon began to dry up, and already in 1919, about 300 field guns were manufactured.

During the First World War, some of the batteries armed with 3-inch field guns were equipped with Ivanov system machines. Such machines made it possible to fire at air targets- airships and airplanes.

The divisional gun of the 1902 model was the basis of the artillery of the Russian Empire. The three-inch gun took part in combat operations during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China, in the Russian-Japanese and the First World Wars.

In terms of its characteristics, the Russian three-inch gun was superior to the German and French analogues of 75 and 77 mm caliber and was highly appreciated by both the Russian military, allies and enemies. Among the Germans and Austrians, our three-inch gun received the nickname “death scythe,” since the advancing Austro-German infantry, coming under the deadly fire of shrapnel from our guns, was destroyed almost to the last man.

To field and horse guns -- 5,774,780

To mountain cannons -- 657 825

Total -- .6432605

The consumption of shells already in the first months of the war significantly exceeded the calculations of the command, and in 1915 there were cases of a shortage of 76-mm shells at the front. Which led to limiting the consumption of shells. However, an increase in the production of ammunition at domestic factories and orders abroad led to the fact that by the end of 1915, the supply of shells began to significantly exceed their consumption. This made it possible to remove limits on shell consumption by the beginning of 1916.

Total in 1914-1917. Russian factories produced about 54 million 76-mm rounds. 56 million 76-mm rounds were ordered abroad, about 37 million arrived in Russia.

In 1915, the length of 76-mm guns mod. 1900 and 1902 chemical, smoke, incendiary, lighting and anti-aircraft shells. It should be noted that the use of chemical ammunition was effective not only when operating against infantry units, but was also used to suppress artillery batteries. So, on a clear, quiet day on August 22, 1916, at a position near the village of Lopushany not far from Lvov, the Austrian 15-cm howitzer brigade, with the help of a spotter aircraft, opened fire on a battery of 76-mm field guns mod. 1902 The Austrian howitzers were hidden from the Russian guns by the ridges of the heights and were outside the range of the Russian guns. Then the commander of the Russian battery decided to respond with chemical “choking” fire, firing at the areas behind the ridge, behind which smoke from the enemy battery’s shots was discovered over a length of about 500 m, with rapid fire, 3 shells per gun, jumping through one division of the sight. After 7 minutes, having fired about 160 chemical shells, the battery commander stopped firing, because the Austrian battery was silent and did not resume fire, despite the fact that the Russian battery still transferred fire to the enemy trenches and clearly showed itself by the brilliance of the shots.

By the mid-20s, the three-inch design was somewhat outdated. In Poland, where there were a significant number of guns, the three-inch gun was modernized in 1926. The Polish three-inch gun was recalibrated in order to update worn barrels and unify ammunition with the 75-mm Schneider gun mod. 1897. In the Polish army these guns, designated 75 mm armata polowa wz. 02/26 were in service with divisions horse artillery in cavalry brigades and regimental two-gun batteries of infantry regiments. By 1939, the Polish Army had 466 such guns in service.

In the Soviet Union, work on modernizing the 1902 model gun began in 1927 and continued until 1930. An order for the development of a project to modernize the gun was issued design bureau plants No. 7 in St. Petersburg, No. 13 (Bryansk) and Motovilikha (Perm). The purpose of the modernization was primarily to increase the maximum firing range and increase the towing speed. The project of the Motovilikha plant, developed under the leadership of designer V.N., was recognized as the best. Sidorenko, despite the higher cost compared to others. The firing range was increased by lengthening the barrel to 40 calibers and increasing the elevation angle. To ensure the movement of the breech of the gun when firing at high elevation angles, the design of the frame was changed - in its middle part there was now a through window. A balancing mechanism was added to the carriage design. New panoramic sights with a normalized scale were installed on the gun.

The design of the modernized carriage made it possible to use both new barrels extended to 40 calibers and barrels 30 calibers long.

The modernized three-inch gun was put into service under the name 76-mm divisional gun model 1902/30. Production of the three-inch gun continued until 1937 and was discontinued due to the adoption of the 76 mm divisional gun of the 1936 F-22 model.

Performance characteristics after modernization

Years of production -- 1931-37

Issued, pcs. -- 4350

Weight and dimensions characteristics

Caliber, mm -- 76.2

Barrel length, club -- 40

Weight in firing position, kg -- 1350



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