Russian participation in operations to establish and maintain peace in the former Yugoslavia. Russian Airborne Forces. Yugoslavia 554th Infantry Battalion UN Yugoslavia

56th Guards Separate air assault brigade(Kamyshin) At the end of 1989, the brigade was reorganized into a separate airborne brigade (airborne brigade). The brigade passed through “hot spots”: Afghanistan (12.1979-07.1988), Baku (12-19.01.1990 - 02.1990), Sumgait, Nakhichevan, Meghri, Julfa, Osh, Fergana, Uzgen (06.06.1990), Chechnya (12.94-10.96, Grozny, Pervomaisky, Argun and since 09.1999).
January 15, 1990 Presidium Supreme Council The USSR, after a detailed study of the situation, made a decision “On declaring a state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and some other areas.” In accordance with it, the Airborne Forces began an operation carried out in two stages. At the first stage, from January 12 to 19, units of the 106th and 76th airborne divisions, the 56th and 38th airborne brigades and the 217th parachute regiment landed at airfields near Baku (for more details, see . article Black January), and in Yerevan - the 98th Guards Airborne Division. The 39th separate air assault brigade entered...

On December 9, 1994, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict” followed. Provided for the actions of military groups under the cover of front-line and army aviation advance in three directions towards Grozny and blockade it. The plan of the operation envisaged an attack by assault detachments from the northern, western and eastern directions. Having entered the city, the troops, in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSK, were supposed to seize the presidential palace, government buildings, television, radio, Train Station, other important objects in the city center and block the central part of Grozny.

Group "North" included the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 276th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The combined detachment of the 131st Omsbr under the command of Colonel I. Savin numbered 1,469 people personnel, 42 infantry fighting vehicles, 20 tanks and 16 artillery pieces. The brigade was located - 1st MSB on the southern slopes of the Tersky Kh...

Based on the Directive of the Minister of Defense Russian Federation No. 314/12/0198 of March 17, 1995 and at my personal request to carry out the tasks of restoring constitutional order and disarmament of illegal gangs on the territory of the Chechen Republic on the basis of the 167th motorized rifle brigade and the 723rd motorized rifle regiment The 205th separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 74814) was formed with a location in the city of Grozny, Chechen Republic. May 2, 1995 - Brigade Day. The basis of the units and divisions of the brigade were battalions and companies: 167th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Red Banner Ural Military District (military unit 29709, Chebarkul Chelyabinsk region); partly of the 131st separate motorized rifle Krasnodar Red Banner Order of Kutuzov and Red Star of the Kuban Cossack Brigade (Maykop) of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District; 723rd Guards Motorized Rifle Order of the Red Banner Suvorov Regiment (military unit 89539, Tchaikovsky) 16th Guard…

In the 90s, Yugoslavia demonstrated to the whole world what, under a slightly different set of political circumstances, the collapse of the former Soviet Union could lead to: on the territory components In the former Yugoslavia, protracted and bloody civil wars broke out with the collapse of the vertical state power, the acute problem of refugees and the forced intervention of the world community.

In various territories and lands (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, adjacent Adriatic waters, etc.) since 1992, a whole range of operations has unfolded, in which the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU took part , WEU, as well as a number of countries as participants in coalitions to conduct individual operations.

At the same time, a number of operations were in the nature of coercive actions (sea and air blockade of part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, individual components of the operation in Albania, air pressure operation on the FRY, etc.). The other part of the operations was of a precautionary nature (Macedonia). There were operations and their individual components that correspond to the classical understanding of peacekeeping (for example, the post-Dayton organization of elections in Bosnia under international control and etc.). Not all of these operations were carried out by the UN itself (see Chapter 1 on the role of the OSCE, NATO and WEU in individual operations), and some (the air operation to put pressure on the authorities of the FRY) did not have a UN mandate at all. In general, the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Albania introduced many innovations and changes into the practice of UN peacekeeping.

The scale and strength of the Russian contingent involved in operations in this region (varying from 900 troops in 1992 to a maximum of 1,500 in 1994 and slightly exceeding 1,000 currently) is, say, significant. in comparison with operations in Moldova and South Ossetia (in 2000, 460 and 462 Russian peacekeepers were deployed there, respectively), but far from decisive. For comparison, it is enough to mention that only the ground component of the forces of the SFOR operation amounted to 33,400 military personnel from different countries, not counting civilians.

However, in many respects, Russia's involvement in operations in the former Yugoslavia was and remains unique.

Firstly, this is an atypical situation in which the Russian military and not only Western military “observers”, but also NATO combat units, who have been training for decades for a “big war,” acted together in solving the tasks set by the UN.

Secondly, the extent of application military force in these operations as a whole was extremely high, on average much higher than in most all other operations of previous decades, with the exception of Desert Storm. As a result, there were increased demands on military professionalism and the ability of real combat interaction between the Russian military and the military of other countries, and not only those that were previously allies under the Warsaw Pact.

Thirdly, in conditions of ethnic and historical proximity or the relationship of individual countries with certain warring forces, it was particularly difficult to maintain an unbiased, equidistant attitude of peacekeepers towards the parties to the conflicts. Although the unofficial “pro-Serbian” orientation of Russian peacekeepers only balanced the unofficial “pro-Croatian”, “pro-Muslim” or “anti-Serbian” orientation of some Western countries participating in the coalitions, in general Russia is not playing the nationalist “card” in this complex of conflicts ” and takes the position of a relatively unbiased mediator.

Fourthly, Russia’s cooperation with other countries and organizations in conducting operations in the former Yugoslavia was significantly affected by the Russia-NATO contradictions in connection with NATO expansion and NATO’s actions without a UN mandate in the FRY in 1999. More broadly, peacekeeping cooperation in Yugoslavia was and remains influenced by the intersection and clash of interests of the great powers in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.

Units and formations of Russian airborne troops were first involved in the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia already in 1992. At that time, there were no specially trained peacekeeping contingents in Russia (with the exception of a small group of military observers from previous UN operations, which had experience only of non-combat operations “under the banner” of the UN). A special Russian motorized rifle battalion for landing in Yugoslavia was formed from airborne units on the basis of the Presidential Decree “On sending the Russian contingent to Yugoslavia to participate in UN peacekeeping operations” and the order of the Commander of the United Armed Forces of the CIS[i]. The size of the contingent was determined to be 900 people armed with light small arms, and equipped with 150 vehicles and 15 armored personnel carriers. The battalion was formed and underwent reduced training and instruction in 6 weeks.

Both the simple structure of the contingent (headquarters, headquarters company, five motorized rifle companies), and light weapons and the lack of communications, intelligence, and reinforcement units indicated that Russia did not have adequate experience in participating in military peacekeeping operations and was preparing for “classical” peacekeeping, in which weapons are used only for “showing force.” But the real situation civil war in Yugoslavia forced during the UNPROFOR operation, even before the transition to SFOR, to change the rules of combat contact and strengthen the combat power of the contingent. The battalion requested and received from Russia 54 more modern BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, 82mm artillery guns, mobile anti-tank missile launchers and portable anti-aircraft systems. “Separating” the warring parties required action according to the rules of a serious war.

In 1994, the 554th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion was reinforced by the 629th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion, and total Russian military personnel in Yugoslavia reached 1,500 people. on 95 armored combat vehicles.

When on December 15, 1995, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1031 on the former Yugoslavia, the Russian contingent received a new status and changed its structure (brigade) and scale. First of all, in connection with the adoption in the Russian Federation in the same year of a new law on the participation of Russian contingents in peacekeeping operations, the issue of the participation of Russian peacekeepers in the UN operation was brought up for discussion in the Russian parliament. The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation confirmed the decision on Russia's participation in the operation, and in mid-February 1996. The President of the Russian Federation by his decree increased the permitted number of troops to 1,600 people.

The Russian brigade received an area of ​​responsibility in Yugoslavia of 1,750 square kilometers, which included a line of separation of the warring parties 275 kilometers long. An American brigade, a Turkish brigade, and a joint brigade “North”, consisting of peacekeeping contingents from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland, served in close proximity to the Russian peacekeepers.

The tasks carried out in Bosnia by the Russian contingent also included control at five checkpoints, patrolling of numerous roads and territories, reconnaissance, search and inspection of facilities. During its participation in SFOR/IFOR operations in 1997-1999, in which NATO forces played a leading role in agreement with the UN, the Russian brigade was not involved in mass battles. The losses of 4 people killed and 11 wounded occurred mainly as a result of mine explosions.

A matter of political significance was the establishment of a chain of command. For “ideological” reasons, it was considered wrong to agree to the direct subordination of the Russian contingent to the command of NATO structures, although it was the NATO command, in accordance with the UN mandate, that carried out the overall coordination of operations. Through diplomatic channels, a military-political special condition was agreed upon: the commander of the Russian brigade, General L. Shevtsov, received the status of Deputy Commander of the entire operation in the former Yugoslavia and reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO ground forces in Central Europe.

The Russian command group at NATO's Supreme Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) solved problems not only of a military, but also of a political and diplomatic nature. Among them, in particular, is the coordination of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements with the Bosnian military-political leadership, as well as the organization and holding of meetings of joint reconciliation commissions, in which representatives of the Bosnian political forces and the military leadership of the SFOR operation participated.

By March 1999, when the NATO air operation in the FRY, which began without UN Security Council authorization, led to the freezing of Russia-NATO relations and the formal withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, the overall result of cooperation between Russian peacekeepers and the military of the coalition countries was generally positive. The crisis was not caused by internal factors in the development of the operation in Bosnia itself, but became a projection into the sphere of peacekeeping of “macropolitical” tension in Russia-NATO relations.

Political complaints about NATO's actions in the FRY can be summarized as follows:

• The alliance violated the UN Charter by launching a coercive operation in the territory sovereign state contrary to the will of the legally elected government of the country and without a mandate from the UN Security Council;
• The operation was carried out outside NATO's area of ​​direct responsibility, limited, in accordance with the Washington Treaty of 1949, to the territory of member countries;
• The operation was exceeding the limits of necessary use of force, since not all channels of political influence have been exhausted;
• Operation violates prerogatives regional organizations , because, firstly, the OSCE as the leading regional organization collective security was pushed aside by NATO and the OSCE mandate was also absent, secondly, NATO itself never recognized itself (and was not recognized by the UN) as a regional security organization and, thirdly, operations with elements of coercive action (bombing and blockade) fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UN Security Council rather than regional organizations and agreements;
• The operation is controversial from the point of view of being categorized as a “humanitarian motivated intervention”, since the fact of genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo (which could be the basis for such an intervention) was not recorded and confirmed by the UN or OSCE, and the flow of refugees from Kosovo after the start of the intervention (bombing) the flow of refugees significantly exceeded before the operation;
• Finally, NATO and Western powers have set a dangerous precedent by openly ignoring Russian protests and the position of powers such as China and India, which, among others, have spoken out at the UN against forceful intervention.

At the same time, it is obvious that Russia was reacting not only and not so much to the events in the former Yugoslavia itself (although opposition to the bombing was consistent and supported by public opinion within Russia), but to ousting Russia from the process of making fundamental decisions on problems of pan-European security (which, undoubtedly, , related to the decision to bomb Yugoslav territory).

It should be realistically realized that the Russian leadership did not shy away from the use of military force in the Yugoslav conflict in general, and the recognition of the need for coercive actions, including in relation to the government of S. Milosevic, in particular. The political problem consisted primarily of the violation by the North Atlantic Alliance (and the leadership of a number of Western powers) of the rules and procedures for decision-making on the use of force in the international community. As soon as 11 weeks after the start of the bombing, the UN Security Council managed to adopt an agreed resolution regarding the international operation in Kosovo and the FRY, the Russian military-political leadership persistently returned the Russian contingent to the international intervention force (the famous paratrooper raid led by General Zavarzin from Bosnia to Pristina airport in Kosovo). Cooperation between Russia and NATO in peacekeeping was immediately unfrozen. At the same time, although the bombing as a type of influence on the government of S. Milosevic was stopped, other coercive elements in the operation (for example, a strictly controlled embargo on the supply of weapons to the parties to the conflict) remained.

The allocation of a zone of responsibility to the Russian contingent in Kosovo in the predominantly Albanian sector led to difficulties in carrying out peacekeeping functions and partial blocking of elements of the contingent by the local population. Nevertheless, Russia has returned to the number of countries actively participating in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Some lessons from the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia can be summarized as follows:

• There has been a certain “specialization” of various international organizations in conducting operations in conflict regions. The UN is failing modern conditions with the organization of force operations to establish peace (enforce peace), if the conflict has the scale of a real civil war. This requires a “working” integrated military organization. The involvement of NATO is generally assessed in UN circles as effective and, apparently, will continue to be practiced if there is consensus within the ranks of NATO itself. The WEU was unable to effectively establish itself even in the “hothouse” conditions of conducting elements of operations “under the wing” of NATO. The OSCE skillfully carries out activities to restore political infrastructure and hold free elections in conflict regions. The UN ensures general political coordination of the interests of powers regarding the conflict and intervention in it, and this function (coordination of the interests of major powers regarding the conflict) is becoming increasingly important.
• Yugoslavia demonstrated the stages of deterioration in interaction between organizations of the international community (UN. OSCE) and the great powers (the first such disarray occurred during the conclusion of the Dayton Agreements on Bosnia outside the UN and the OSCE, the second during the deployment of NATO actions in the FRY contrary to the position of a number of great powers) , and the stages of their coordinated interaction. Experience shows that, as before, in the international community, the positive involvement of the UN, OSCE, and other multilateral mechanisms in the peacekeeping process cannot be replaced by the will and strength of individual powers. International community still considers joint action of “great powers” ​​and “great organizations” to be the norm, and not their opposition of their efforts to each other.
• At the same time, as a relatively new formula of interaction is developing (and, apparently, will expand in the future), the practice of transferring operations by the United Nations to created adhoc coalitions of powers. It is advisable for Russia to develop the practice of participating in such coalitions and apply it to the development of coalition participation in peacekeeping in the CIS.

Operations in the former Yugoslavia showed the need (and possibility) of close political interaction between broad groups of powers in real time of the unfolding conflict ( we're talking about not only about the relatively successful maintenance of consensus in ambiguous conditions by NATO countries, but also about the practice of agreeing on decisions in adhoc coalitions of countries that carried out operations in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo). This is an important example for Russia, which needs to use the mechanisms of political consultations and maintaining consensus among the CSTO countries.

[i] Order dated February 26, 1992. Strictly speaking, due to well-known hopes for preserving a unified military infrastructure of the CIS, the contingent was not “Russian” at first; it represented the entire former Soviet Union, all CIS countries, and only later in Yugoslavia began to talk about separate Russian and separate Ukrainian contingents.

A year later, the “ceiling” was lowered to 1,400 people, and the real number in the late 90s. did not exceed 1340 people.

IN Lately V Russian society a dispute flares up between the leadership of the Airborne Forces and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces about the directions of reform Airborne troops. On November 21, the head of the Main Operations Directorate - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Colonel General Yuri Baluevsky, announced that in order to increase combat readiness, the airborne troops will be freed from peacekeeping functions that are unusual for them. The Airborne Forces headquarters confirmed this information and reported that the number of troops would be reduced by 5.5 thousand military personnel. Already this year, the 10th parachute regiment in Gudauta (Abkhazia), the 237th airborne division of the 76th airborne division (Pskov) and the 283rd Podolsk aviation squadron will be disbanded.

Meanwhile, the final decision on deprivation Airborne troops peacekeeping functions have not been accepted, since the President of the Russian Federation has not yet signed a document on the directions of further military development in Russia. As reported by a number of means mass media, the Airborne Forces headquarters agrees with the reduction of some units and subunits, but the leadership of the troops is categorically against depriving the Airborne Forces of peacekeeping functions. The Airborne Forces headquarters associates its arguments on this matter with the following circumstances:

Firstly, there is an instruction from the President of the Russian Federation dated May 17, 1997, which states that the Airborne Forces in peacetime should form the basis of the troops participating in peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, airborne troops are mobile. The peculiarities of their training, the tactics of their actions, the transportability of weapons and equipment allow short time transfer airborne units over long distances. According to paratroopers, this circumstance became one of the main reasons for attracting in 1998-2000 year of the Airborne Forces to participate in more than 30 operations to resolve interethnic conflicts, eliminate the consequences of emergency situations, maintain or restore international peace and safety. Transnistria and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Armenia (liquidation of the consequences of the earthquake). Central Asia and Chechnya are not a complete list of regions of operation of the Airborne Forces.

Thirdly, the Airborne Forces headquarters believes that the Airborne Forces have developed a coherent system for training and replacing peacekeeping units. The 245th training center has been operating since January 1, 2000 peacekeeping forces(Ryazan), on the basis of which training and rotation of personnel of peacekeeping contingents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Abkhazia are carried out.

Fourthly, over the eight-year period of participation in peacekeeping operations, the Airborne Forces have developed friendly and respectful relations between the command of peacekeeping units and personnel with the local administration and residents of the conflicting parties, close interaction has been organized with military contingents of other states, representatives of various international organizations (UN , OSCE, etc.).

Fifthly, repurpose the Airborne Forces into purely combat missions unprofitable in material terms. According to calculations by the Airborne Forces headquarters, the total financial costs for transporting peacekeeping units from the areas of deployment will be about 900 million rubles:

a) according to the conclusion:

– by rail – 138-150 million rubles;

– by air transport – 254-280 million rubles.

Total: 392-430 million rubles.

b) by input:

– by rail – 168-180 million rubles;

– by air transport – 288-300 million rubles.

Total: 456-480 million rubles.

In addition, officers believe that this could lead to disruption in the implementation of peacekeeping missions, disruption of the management of units and subunits, disruption of a well-functioning system of interaction and comprehensive support.

Reference

The participation of units and units of the Russian Airborne Forces in peacekeeping operations began in March 1992, when the Russian 554th separate infantry battalion UN of 900 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces.

In February 1994, in accordance with political decision Russian leadership part of the forces of the 554th FSB was redeployed to the Sarajevo area and, after appropriate reinforcement, was transformed into the 629th UN FSB with operational subordination to the Sarajevo sector and the task of separating the warring parties and monitoring compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

After the transfer of powers from the UN to NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 629th UN FSB in January 1996 stopped carrying out peacekeeping tasks and was withdrawn to Russian territory.

Based on the decision of the UN Security Council on the gradual reduction of the military component of the UN mission in Eastern Slavonia in October 1997, the 554th Regiment was transformed into a Security Group and reduced to 203 people. In June 1998, the Security Group was withdrawn to Russian territory.

Since May 1994, on the basis of the Agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia on a ceasefire and separation of forces, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) were created. The main task is to separate the conflicting parties, maintain law and order, create conditions for a return to normal life in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, prevent the resumption of the armed conflict, and protect important facilities and communications.

The parachute battalion of the 10th separate airborne regiment of the Airborne Forces operates as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces.

Units of the 10th Special Operations Division are deployed as follows to carry out peacekeeping missions:

– one parachute battalion in the Gali region,

– one parachute platoon in the Kadori Gorge,

– one parachute platoon performs security and defense tasks at the KPM Headquarters in Sukhumi. The service is organized at one control post and six observation posts: in the Gali district - 6, in the Kadori gorge - 1.

In January 1996, a separate airborne brigade of 1,500 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces, was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the peacekeeping operation of the multinational forces.

The brigade's area of ​​responsibility is 1,750 square meters. km, the total length of the controlled line of separation of the parties is 75 km.

Tasks performed by the Russian brigade:

– separation of warring parties;

– maintaining law and order, returning to conditions of normal life in the assigned area of ​​responsibility;

– participation in the provision of humanitarian assistance;

– assistance in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of December 14, 1996.

The tasks are carried out by serving at four control posts and patrolling routes in the area of ​​​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects and planned targets. The brigade's units are deployed in the base areas of Uglevik, Priboi, Simin-Khan and Vukosavtsi.

The number of Russian military personnel in 1999 was reduced and currently amounts to 1,150 people, armored vehicles - 90 units, automotive vehicles - 232 units.

In June 1999, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution N 1244, on the basis of a decree of the President of the Russian Federation, and in accordance with the “Agreed Points” signed by the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation and the United States on June 18, 1999 in Helsinki Russian participation in the KFOR forces”, a decision was made to send to Kosovo (FRY) a military contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation numbering 3,616 people, of which about 2,500 are paratroopers.

The main tasks are:

– creating security conditions for the return and residence of refugees and displaced persons;

– ensuring public safety;

– carrying out work to clear mines and destroy unexploded ordnance and explosive objects;

– fulfillment of border control duties;

– joint activities with KFOR forces to operate the Pristina (Slatina) airfield;

– ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of its forces, the international civilian presence and the personnel of other international organizations.

The tasks are carried out by serving in base areas and at control and observation posts by a security and maintenance group, patrolling routes in the area of ​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects. Units of the Russian military contingent (RMC) are deployed in the base areas - Slatina airfield, Banja, Velika Hoca, Kosovska Kamenica, Donje Karmenjane, Srbica and Kosovo Polje.

Tasks are carried out at 15 control posts and 14 observation posts. 13 guard posts, patrolling 23 routes, traveling patrol in 3 settlements. IN constant readiness There are 19 reserve groups, 4 helicopters. To ensure their own safety, 10 guards are appointed, patrol groups - 15, checkpoints - 8, and 3-6 columns are escorted daily. Number airborne units as part of the RVC in Kosovo:

– personnel – 2445 people,

– armored vehicles – 131 units,

– automotive equipment – ​​387 units.

Thus, at present, the Airborne Forces in three peacekeeping operations - in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo together with NATO, in Abkhazia as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces involve: - personnel - about 5,600 people; – armored vehicles – more than 320 units; – automotive equipment – ​​more than 950 units.

To successfully complete tasks logistics support When conducting peacekeeping operations, the following influence factors: conditions for conducting peacekeeping operations; the scale of the conflict between the warring parties; tasks of the UN Security Council, the unified command, the General Staff of the Armed Forces; constructing a line of demarcation between warring parties; depth of the area of ​​responsibility; military-political situation in the area of ​​responsibility; physical and geographical features of the area; the order of logistics support for peacekeeping forces established by the UN mission, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Logistics Headquarters.

Largest scale Armed forces Russians were used during peacekeeping operations during the Yugoslav conflict. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation participated in the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia from April 1992 to February 1994 on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution No. 743 of 02/26/1992 and Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation of 03/06/1992 No. 2462, initially as part of the 554th separate infantry battalion ( "Rusbat-1") in the amount of 420 people.

The tasks of the 554th separate infantry battalion, prescribed by the UN mandate, were: delimitation of the warring parties; monitoring compliance with the terms of the truce; monitoring compliance with allotment conditions heavy weapons beyond the 30-kilometer zone from the line of contact of the parties; escorting convoys with humanitarian aid; patrolling areas of responsibility; assistance to the civilian population (protection, medical assistance, evacuation) in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. The main objective was to prevent the resumption of hostilities and the separation of the Serbian Yugoslav People's Army and the Croat-Muslim confederation in the area settlements Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci, Klisa, Tenja, Orolik, where armed clashes between the parties took place due to territorial disputes. The battalion command post was located on the territory of the airfield in the Croatian city of Osijek, the remaining combat units were stationed 20-25 km from the command post along the line of the battalion’s zone of responsibility.

The battalion was subordinate to the command of the UN sector headquarters and interacted with the French, Norwegian, Danish, English and Ukrainian battalions.

The 554th separate infantry battalion consisted of two infantry companies (each company had three infantry platoons and a utility department) and a headquarters company, which included a reconnaissance platoon, anti-aircraft missile platoon, communications department, repair platoon and utility platoon (Fig. 30.1).

Fig. 30.1 Organizational and staffing structure 554 OPB

The utility department of the infantry company consisted of two units of refueling trucks (AC-5.5-4320 - 1 unit; ATMZ-5-4320 - 1 unit) and an ambulance UAZ-452A. He supervised the work of the rear of the infantry company - the deputy company commander for logistics. This composition of the rear increased the autonomy of the infantry company in logistics terms when performing peacekeeping missions in the areas of responsibility.

The rear of a separate infantry battalion included the following officials: deputy battalion commander for logistics (officer); head of the fuel and lubricants service (officer), head of the fuel warehouse (warrant officer); head of the clothing service (officer), head of the clothing warehouse (ensign); the head of the food service (officer), the head of the food warehouse (ensign) and the head of the canteen (ensign). The utility platoon of the headquarters company had functions similar to the platoon material support motorized rifle battalion.

At the beginning of 1994, the situation in the area of ​​the city of Sarajevo worsened, and in February an additional 629 separate infantry battalion (Rusbat-2) was sent there with the task of stabilizing the situation in this sector and providing humanitarian aid refugees and ensure their safety. To carry out this task, the battalion was assigned a zone of responsibility with an area of ​​40 km 2 (the distance between 554 opb and 629 OPB was about 200 km).

The provision of fuel, oils and lubricants was carried out through a fuel depot deployed by the French battalion in the area of ​​Sarajevo airport. The fuel service staff includes 629 OPB in addition to 8 units of fuel tankers (2 units in each infantry company and 2 units in the headquarters company), there were: an MNUG-20 motor pump unit, domestically produced R-4 and R-8 tanks, as well as French-made R-5 tanks, which were a battalion fuel warehouse with a capacity of 65 m 3 is equipped. In total, the battalion warehouse contained 2.0 filling stations of motor gasoline and 1.8 filling stations diesel fuel. A battalion refueling point was equipped, where equipment was refueled and the storage and distribution of oils and lubricants was organized. In order to organize the protection of the warehouse, the tanks were placed on the ground and lined with sandbags. An earthen parapet was placed around the perimeter of the warehouse.

The battalions were supplied with Slovenian-made fuel, oils and lubricants High Quality, gasoline was supplied grade A-95, diesel fuel highly purified from paraffins, gear oils of seven grades, gun oil - three grades. A peculiarity of accounting and reporting on the fuel service was that UN specialists from the sector headquarters required daily faxing of data on the consumption and availability of fuel in the battalion as of 15.00. Based on these fax reports, they wrote off fuel from the battalion. Receipt of fuel was carried out after the head of the battalion fuel service showed in the report the presence of free containers. The battalion received an invoice by fax for receiving fuel and lubricants from the sector warehouse; using this document, fuel, oils and lubricants were received.

To the features of logistics support 554 and 629 OPB The following can be attributed: the supply of battalion personnel was carried out according to UN standards, the same for all battalions; personnel were given televisions, refrigerators, video equipment, audio equipment, microwave ovens, fans, heaters, washing machines as equipment; badges of belonging to the UN troops were issued: berets blue color, blue formal scarves, sleeve insignia UN, UN flags; The battalion personnel had their own uniform (uniform) - domestic; washing of personnel was carried out in shower modules of battalions (French production); washing of underwear was carried out in units (each platoon had washing machine), wash bed linen was produced in the laundries of the city; food was obtained from a warehouse set up by the French near the Sarajevo airport, the range of products is very wide (fruits, juices, mineral water, cheeses, seasonings, etc.); meals for personnel were provided in the officers' and soldiers' canteens (personnel from local population); the battalion was provided with dry rations made in France; storage of perishable products was carried out in container-type refrigeration chambers; to improve nutrition on the battalions' territory, smokehouses were built with their own resources and resources for smoking chickens and fresh fish; Meals at checkpoints were organized using small-sized kitchens, which necessitated the training of additional freelance cooks.

The attitude of the local population (Bosnians and Muslims) towards the presence of Russian battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely negative, which significantly complicated the work of the rear.

In 1995, the Russian leadership decided to withdraw battalions from Sarajevo, as provocations and the continued presence of Russian troops this region was becoming dangerous. The region has resumed fighting Using heavy equipment, in August-September 1995, UN coalition forces made attempts to stabilize the situation; NATO aircraft bombed the positions of the Yugoslav People's Army, but no significant success was achieved. A refugee problem arose; Serbs fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina and settled along the border with Serbia, proclaiming the formation of a state not recognized in the world - the Republic of Srpska.

In connection with the current situation, the Government of the Russian Federation, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1031 of December 15, 1995 and Federation Council Resolution No. 772 of January 5, 1996, decided to increase its presence in the conflict zone. In accordance with the directive of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, on the basis of two airborne divisions, a separate airborne brigade was formed to participate in the peacekeeping operation and subsequently introduced into the conflict zone (Fig. 30.2).

The brigade's task was to prevent the resumption of hostile actions and ensure the security of the situation. 20 days were allotted for the formation and immediate training of the brigade. A special feature of the training was the correct determination and creation of the optimal organizational and staffing structure of rear units with the appropriate technical equipment, which makes it possible to increase the autonomy, adaptability and flexibility of the brigade’s tactical actions.

Rice. 30.2. Organizational and staffing structure of a separate

airborne brigade

The special features of the brigade rear staffing structure were: in addition to the head of the service, the food service staff included an auditor officer, a catering officer, a veterinarian, a food service technician (ensign), the head of the officers' canteen, the head of the soldiers' canteen, a cook-instructor, a mobile mechanized bakery (the head of the bakery is an officer, the bakery technician is a warrant officer); In addition to the head of the service, the fuel service staff included an inspector officer, a warehouse manager, and a warehouse mechanic; the staff of the clothing service consisted of the head of the service, the head of the warehouse, the head of the clothing repair shop, the head of the field bathhouse, and the head of the field laundry; the apartment maintenance service was headed by the head of the service, the service staff was partially staffed by military personnel rmo(electrician, plumber, driver of a garbage collection vehicle, driver of a cleaning and watering vehicle), part of the staff was recruited seasonally from local residents (Serbian refugees) for the positions of stokers in the boiler room of the brigade.

20 days before the brigade’s departure, in early 1996, a reconnaissance group led by the brigade commander was sent to the area of ​​the peacekeeping operation. The deputy brigade commander for logistics took part in the work of the reconnaissance group. The group's tasks were: selection and preparation of unloading sites; selection of base areas for the deployment of brigade headquarters, battalions, special forces and support units; determining the location of checkpoints; studying the situation on the ground and making decisions on further actions in the conflict zone. Simultaneously with the arrival of the reconnaissance group at the Tuzla airfield from the cities of Ivanovo, where the headquarters and most of the combat, rear and technical support brigades (signal company, rmo, repair company, medrota, isr, vrhr), Kostroma, where 1 pdb, commandant company, platoon military police, sabatre; was trained reconnaissance group special purpose 45 ORP Airborne Forces, and from Pskov, where 2 were formed pdb And sabatre, the railway trains set off towards Yugoslavia. At the end of January 1996, the trains, having completed a 3,200-kilometer journey through Ukraine, Hungary, and Serbia, arrived at railway station Bijelina.

Upon the arrival of the trains at their destination, practice has confirmed the difficulties of organizing the unloading of materiel, logistics equipment, their delivery to base areas and placement. There was a lack of means for mechanizing loading and unloading operations.

In addition to peacekeeping tasks to disarm the conflicting parties and clear mines, the brigade monitored the condition of combat equipment and the movement of military equipment, as well as residents and monitored the situation. The brigade solved problems of ensuring the delivery of food and other humanitarian supplies, assisted in organizing and holding elections, monitored the observance of human rights, provided assistance in restoring administrative systems and infrastructure, solved the problems of its own logistical support, interacting with the command of the 1st MD of the US Army , with local suppliers and service organizations. The Russian military contingent was ready to assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other international organizations in carrying out humanitarian assistance.

The most difficult tasks for the rear were: establishing connections and concluding contracts for the replacement and washing of linen, the supply of food, fuel, fuel from local suppliers; organizing bread baking; organization of electricity and water supply; evacuation of the wounded and sick.

In Yugoslavia it was fundamentally changed material supply scheme. A mixed method was used, in which support was carried out both by the forces and means of the joint command of the peacekeeping forces, and by the forces and means of the Center (Moscow Military District, airborne rear services). There was no delivery by rail or river (sea) transport. Part of the cargo (standard and camp tents, uniforms and shoes, engineering equipment, oils and special liquids, logistics equipment, repair kits for technical equipment for logistics services) was transported by air, military transport aircraft (Il-76) from a military airfield near Moscow "Chkalovsky" and Ivanovo military airfield "Severny" to the airfield of the Bosnian city of Tuzla.

The deputy brigade commander for logistics sent a request for the necessary material to the airborne logistics headquarters. Within a month, the property specified in the application was received at the bases of the center and district, prepared for shipment (by the forces of a separate airborne communications regiment) and transported by plane to Yugoslavia. The decision to deliver cargo was made by the Airborne Forces Commander in agreement with the VTA command. The cargo was delivered by landing by Il-76 aircraft in VAK-5 containers. The organization of the reception of material resources was as follows: in the brigade, by order of the commander, an officer was appointed in charge of receiving cargo at the airfield of the city of Tuzla; a team was allocated in advance to work on unloading material, equipment and combat guards for automobile convoys were allocated; with the departure of the plane from Moscow, the automobile convoy assigned to receive cargo was sent to the airfield of the city of Tuzla, located 80 km from the base area of ​​the brigade; with the arrival of the plane, the delivered material was accepted according to act f.4 and delivered to the brigade; After receiving the material, a report f.200 about the received cargo was sent to the Airborne Forces rear headquarters. Subsequently, the first copy of the acceptance certificate f.4 was sent to the Airborne Forces logistics headquarters.

Economic calculations showed that delivery of one 5-ton container to the territory of Yugoslavia costs 50 thousand US dollars, so it was decided to procure part of the material resources locally. Practically, for all rear services, contracts were concluded for the purchase of material resources and implementation certain types services. A peculiarity of the financial support of the peacekeeping operation was that for all material resources and all types of services received locally under contracts it was necessary to pay in foreign currency not through a bank, but in cash immediately as the service was provided. The head of the rear service, as part of the commission, accepted material resources from local suppliers (fuel, food, laundry), upon application for an advance payment, received money from the brigade cash desk (from 2 to 5 thousand US dollars) and, having issued invoices, paid with suppliers. Then he filled out an advance report with attached documents for receiving material resources, and the amount previously received at the brigade cash desk after the report was approved by the brigade commander was written off from the report.

Delivery of materials included a number of sequential activities: obtaining material resources from local suppliers; receiving cargo delivered by military transport aircraft; preparation of materiel for transfer to battalions; loading and delivery of materiel to the base areas of the battalions, transferring them to recipients in the base areas of the battalions or directly to outposts and checkpoints (Milijas, Spasojevici, Čelich, Bare, Vukasavtsi) with subsequent registration of transfer through the battalion. The order of delivery was planned by the deputy brigade commander for logistics in coordination with the brigade chief of staff and depended on the importance of the task being performed or on the direction of concentration of the main efforts, the location of the battalion's base area.

Yes, CP 1 pdb was 30 km from the brigade CP, and CP 2 pdb 70 km away, in addition, the base area of ​​the 2nd battalion, outposts, and checkpoints were entirely located on the territory of an aggressive population (Bosnians), so the first delivery was carried out by 2 pdb. For this purpose, as a rule, transport was used rmo teams, in exceptional cases empty transport WMO battalions. The frequency of delivery and the range of material resources depended on the intensity of their consumption in different situations. The supply of fuel and food was carried out once a week, bread - once every two days, linen was changed - 2 times a week.

The main delivery vehicles in the brigade were all-terrain vehicles of the Ural-4320 type, which were used in the mountainous and wooded areas of the conflict zone. On the flat part, KAMAZ-5310 type vehicles were used. In winter, wheeled tractors of the TK-6M type were included in the rear columns to cross mountain passes. The work of supply transport became especially intense when the situation became more complicated. The consumption of material resources increased, and the departure of rear columns to areas of responsibility was reduced to a minimum in order to prevent the occurrence of provocations and attacks on our military personnel. In such cases, a reliable military guard was created, 2-3 units of BTR-80, R-142 N were included in the automobile columns, and also, in the most difficult situations, Black Hawk helicopters from the 1st MD Squadron of the US Army were involved, which accompanied our convoys to the areas where materiel was transferred.

Features of the organization of rear management During the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, it became clear that in units and subunits, command posts and rear control points were, as a rule, located together. This made it possible to use the command post controls in the interests of the rear, and to increase the reliability of the rear control system, since standard rear communications equipment provided only the minimum required level of control.

Features in organizing the work of rear services brigades in carrying out the tasks of peacekeeping operations became as follows.

1. For food service. Agreements were concluded for the supply of food (bread, meat, vegetables, fruits, mineral water, cookies, dairy products, etc.) from local suppliers; food preparation was carried out in the base area of ​​the brigade in the PAK-200 kitchens and subsequently on stationary equipment in the dining room; in the base areas of battalions and companies, food was prepared in the kitchens of KP-125, KP-130, at outposts and checkpoints - in the kitchens of KP-20, MK-30, KO-75, and therefore the need for spare parts for the above equipment increased due to intensive operation, there was also a need to train freelance cooks-gunners at the rate of 2 cooks per platoon; food provision was carried out in accordance with Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of 1994 No. 395 according to a special norm with the provision of additional food (per day: mineral water - 1.5 l, cookies - 50 g, milk - 100 ml, meat - 100 g, cheese - 30 g , fruits – 100 g). When accepting products from local suppliers Special attention was paid to checking the quality of meat - the task was completed veterinarian brigades; storage of perishable products was carried out in the brigade food warehouse in an ALKA refrigerated trailer; storage of perishable products in battalion food warehouses was organized in adapted premises using refrigeration equipment of the ShKh-0.5 type; storage of perishable products at checkpoints and outposts was carried out in specially adapted rooms and devices.

2. For clothing service. At first, laundry was washed in a brigade laundry station equipped with an MPP-2.0. However, in the future, due to difficulties in maintenance and repair of technical equipment, as well as as a result of assessing the economic feasibility of completing the task, an agreement was concluded with a local laundry company in the suburbs of Bijeljina. Upon replacement, personnel arrived at the brigade fully equipped with clothing; in the brigade, property was not issued according to supply plans, with the exception of the issuance of items that had become unusable. Washing was carried out in the base area of ​​the brigade in a room adapted for washing personnel, using disinfection-shower units DDA-66 and DDP-2, according to a schedule for six days a week. In the base areas of the battalions, washing is carried out in premises adapted for washing personnel using DDP-2 and DDA-66. At outposts and checkpoints, washing was carried out using simple devices equipped in the form of showers. Due to the intensive use of technical means of washing (DDP-2, DDA-66), the wear of equipment (rubber-fabric, Rubber products, nozzles, injectors, boilers), which necessitated the provision of spare parts, as well as increased requirements for the technical training of operating personnel. Some units were housed in standardized tents of the UST-56, USB-56, UZ-68 type (2 pdb, isr, management units 1 pdb) which increases the wear and tear of tents and especially rigging.

3. For fuel service. Fuel was obtained from local suppliers on the basis of a contract. From Hungary through Vojvodina and Serbia, diesel fuel and motor gasoline were supplied to the brigade by the supplier's transport. In the base area of ​​the brigade, after quality control, fuel was pumped from the supplier’s transport into the brigade’s transport; The tanks in the fuel depot were not buried; to increase their protective properties, they were dug in and lined with sandbags.

4. For medical service. The brigade's medical center was staffed by a reduced staff of the division's separate medical battalion and had a full complement of medical specialists capable of providing qualified medical care.

5. For apartment maintenance service. Furniture, equipment and property of the IES were brought in trains at the beginning of the operation for the entire duration of the operation. Firewood was collected from local sources, under agreements with local administration authorities. Payment for electricity, water and others utilities was carried out on the basis of contracts in currency, through a team, in cash.

A feature of the work of the rear was that officials and rear management bodies, commanders of rear units had to make appropriate decisions not only on issues of logistical support, but also on organizing combat, performing peacekeeping functions, planning in detail and providing for measures for protection, defense, protection and camouflage of rear facilities. Logistics officers were required to know the capabilities of the standard weapons of the units entrusted to them, the ability to use them, and to have appropriate operational-tactical and tactical-special training.