The best tanks of the Second World War. Interesting things on the web! What is the best tank of World War 2
It's hard to say anything new about such a celebrity as the legendary Soviet tank T-34! This article may be purely subjective and does not claim to be the ultimate truth. But still, I would like to look at the T-34 with an impartial look. A glance at dry numbers. Without unnecessary praises and emotions.
The T-34 tank was changed and improved during the war, and by 1945 it was not at all the same as in 1941. And the T-34 of 1941 has significant differences from the T-34 of 1945. Therefore, when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the Soviet T-34 tank, it is necessary to recall that in most feature films about the war we come across the T-34-85 tank, which began to be mass-produced only in 1944. But the T-34-76 tank bore the brunt of the brutal battles, including the Battle of Kursk! And this is exactly what we should talk about in more detail. It was this tank that made the enemy doubt his superiority for the first time! And it was he who started the legend! Soviet tank T-34-76!
Those who grew up in the USSR and were brought up on Soviet films about the war and books of that period know that the best tank of the Second World War was our legendary “thirty-four”. This fact is recognized by most of the countries that took part in that war. What about enemy tanks? For example german tank T-4? Was it worse than the T-34? In what and to what extent?
Let us take the liberty of looking at the T-34 without regard to established opinions and simply compare the Soviet vehicle with the German vehicle that is closest in terms of technical data, the T-4 tank.
But before we look at the equipment, we will have to talk about other things to explain the uneven losses of tanks by the warring parties. And also remind you that a tank is a collective weapon and the success of using a tank is made up of several factors, such as:
- 1- application tactics;
- 2- interaction of tanks on the battlefield;
- 3- crew skill;
- 4- reliability of equipment;
- 5- effectiveness of weapons and protection.
The losses of Soviet tanks in 1941 are astonishing. And if the losses of numerous T-26 or BT-7 can be attributed to their “obsolescence”, which, looking at the German tanks of the 1941 model, seems very doubtful, then the losses of the “invulnerable” T-34 and KV in 1941 cannot be rationally explained. After all, the number of these vehicles alone (more than 1800) made it possible to withstand absolutely all German invasion tanks! Why did all the new cars melt away in the crucible of war with incredible speed? Why did the armada of formidable steel monsters fall under the onslaught of frivolous-looking German boxes T-3, T-4? Obviously on initial stage wars exactly application tactics tank forces and was the decisive factor. Therefore, it is unlikely to be reasonable to correlate tank losses between the parties and draw any far-reaching conclusions about the combat quality of vehicles based only on losses.
The massing of a large number of tanks by the Germans in the main directions reduced the advantage of the new Soviet combat vehicles to nothing. In 1941, not having a tank comparable to the T-34 in terms of firepower and protection (and at the beginning of the war, the T-34 had a serious advantage over any enemy tank in the firing range, allowing it to hit German tanks at a distance of up to 1000 meters, remaining invulnerable to them up to at a distance of no more than 300 meters), nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases, the Germans emerged victorious.
The tactics of using tank forces led the Germans to impressive victories. Rapid raids by a large mass of tanks deep into the Soviet defense led to chaos and confusion in the command and control of the Red Army troops. Concentrated attacks easily breached the defenses of Soviet troops. The maneuver, an unexpected change in the direction of attacks at the beginning of the war, led the Germans to victories, despite the fact that their tanks in 1941 had neither quantitative nor qualitative advantages over the tanks of the Red Army. Having changed the direction of the main attack from the Moscow direction to the Kiev direction, Guderian’s tanks organized the “Kiev cauldron” in which the Red Army lost more than 600 thousand people as prisoners alone! The history of wars does not even know such a number of prisoners in one operation! Let us remember that in 1941 the Wehrmacht had mostly light tanks! And the future main rival of the T-34, the T-4 tank, still had thin armor and a short-barreled gun that was not powerful enough to fight the T-34.
It can be added that the success of the German offensive was also facilitated by the fact that the German tank strike forces were always supported by artillerymen (self-propelled guns are also artillery) and the fight against enemy tanks often fell on them. And after the very first clashes with Soviet T-34 and KB tanks, combat groups of tank divisions in mandatory began to include an 88 mm battery anti-aircraft guns. The assistance of artillery and air defense systems with the advancing tanks was a significant help in countering the Soviet new tanks. In addition, close interaction between mobile tank formations and the Luftwaffe air forces contributed to success.
The counterattacks of the mechanized corps, hastily organized by the Soviet command, without interaction with each other, led and eventually led to the loss of most of their armored vehicles in the first weeks of the war, among which were the brand new "thirty-fours". Moreover, the bulk of the sunken tanks were simply abandoned by the crews due to lack of fuel, breakdowns and lack of means of evacuation. And the forced tactics of “patching holes” with single tanks or small groups, used in 1941 by the Red Army, rather led to an increase in losses of its equipment, rather than to any military successes or victories.
German General von Mellenthin, characterizing that period, noted in particular:
".... Russian tank armies had to pay dearly for their lack of combat experience. Junior and mid-level commanders showed especially poor understanding of the methods of conducting tank battles and insufficient skill. They lacked courage, tactical foresight, and the ability to make quick decisions. The first operations of the tank armies ended a complete failure. The tanks were concentrated in dense masses in front of the front of the German defense, in their movement one felt uncertainty and the absence of any plan. They interfered with each other, collided with our anti-tank guns, and if our positions were broken through, they stopped advancing and stopped, instead of building on their success. During these days, individual German anti-tank guns and 88-mm guns were most effective: sometimes one gun damaged and disabled over 30 tanks in one hour. It seemed to us that the Russians had created an instrument that they would never learn to use..."
We have to admit that the Western Military District, having a considerable number of T-34 tanks, simply lost them. And the T-34, being at that time truly the most powerful tank, did not say its weighty word in 1941.
If we talk about the tactics of using a tank in the later stages of the war, we must also take into account the changing concept of using a tank. So by 1943, most German tanks were used precisely as “anti-tank”, i.e. intended to fight enemy tanks. Lacking numerical superiority, but having long-range guns and good sights, the German Panzerwaffe attacked big damage advancing tanks of the Red Army. And even massive application Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk (and these were mainly T-34s) did not bring the expected success. The German tactics of destroying advancing Soviet tanks by shooting from a standstill and from ambushes fully justified itself. During the day of fighting in the Prokhorovka area, Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army lost more than half of its vehicles. And she lost it precisely from the fire of enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The Germans did not suffer any significant losses of their tanks.
Thus, using inappropriate tactics at certain stages of the war, the effectiveness of using the T-34 tank was low, incomparable with the losses, resources spent and successes achieved. And often it was the choice of the wrong battle tactics that led to the unjustified loss of tanks, and it is obvious that a large number of the lost T-34s can be attributed not to the shortcomings of the vehicle itself, but to the illiterate use of tank forces by the commanders of the Red Army.
It was only in the later stages of the war that the tactics of the Soviet tank armies changed, when the mobility of the tank began to be used to its fullest, that the T-34 turned into a real nightmare for German soldiers. The ubiquitous "thirty-four" penetrated into the depths of the defense, destroyed the enemy's rear lines and communications. In general, they did what the tank was intended for.
Therefore, without even touching on the technical characteristics of the tank itself, we must admit that the method of its use on the battlefield determines and explains both the successes and the increased losses of combat vehicles.
Another important component of a tank’s success in battle is its interaction on the battlefield. Without stable and reliable communication between individual combat vehicles, it is impossible to achieve interaction. Since neither the commander watching from the side, nor a comrade from a neighboring tank can warn about the emerging danger. Not to mention changing the combat mission during the battle or coordinating the efforts of a group of tanks to perform a specific task.
By the beginning of the war, most German tanks were radio-equipped to one degree or another. And most of them had transceivers, i.e. two-way communication. Soviet vehicles, including new types like the T-34, either had receivers (the transmitter was only on the command tank; it stood out from other tanks by the presence of an antenna) or had no radio communications at all. Therefore, usually in battle, each tank fought on its own or acted according to the naval principle of “do as I do,” repeating the maneuver of the commander’s tank. Communication between tanks using signal flags should not be taken seriously, of course. During a battle, it is simply unrealistic to observe the flags from a tank, which already has poor visibility. Things seriously improved with communications only in 1943, when quite modern 9P radio stations and TPU-3bis intercoms began to be installed on 100% of tanks.
The lack of full communication between Soviet vehicles contributed to increased losses and a decrease in the effectiveness of the tank itself. The Soviet military industry, having created an impressive amount armored vehicles, unfortunately, was unable to fully provide them with means of communication, which had a very negative impact on the effectiveness of their use in the initial period of the war.
For 1941, the T-34 tank was truly new. It was new conceptually, because it had anti-ballistic armor and a powerful long-barreled 76mm cannon, which hit all Wehrmacht tanks without exception. There was nothing similar in the German Panzerwaffe of that period, either in the thickness of the armor or in the armament. After all, after the First World War, tanks were called upon to replace the cavalry and its mobility. And bulletproof armor on tanks was the norm! Therefore, the first meetings with the T-34, which has anti-ballistic armor, made an indelible and depressing impression on the Germans.
Here's how one of the best German tank aces Otto Carius wrote about it in his book “Tigers in the Mud”:
“Another event hit us like a ton of bricks: Russian T-34 tanks appeared for the first time! The amazement was complete. How could it be that up there they didn’t know about the existence of this excellent tank? The T-34, with its good armor, perfect shape and magnificent 76.2 mm long-barreled gun, awed everyone, and all German tanks were afraid of it until the end of the war. What could we do with these monsters, thrown against us in great numbers? At that time the 37mm gun was still our strongest anti-tank weapons. If we were lucky, we could hit the T-34 turret ring and jam it. If you are even more lucky, the tank will then not be able to operate effectively in battle. Certainly not a very encouraging situation! The only way out was an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. With its help it was possible to act effectively even against this new Russian tank. Therefore, we began to treat the anti-aircraft gunners with the highest respect, who previously received only condescending smiles from us.”
And here is an excerpt from Paul Karel’s book “Hitler Goes East”:
“But the most formidable enemy was the Soviet T-34 - an armored giant 5.92 m long, 3 m wide and 2.44 m high, which had high speed and maneuverability. It weighed 26 tons, was armed with a 76-mm cannon, had a large turret, wide track tracks and sloping armor. It is not far from the Styr River that the 16th rifle brigade tank division first time I encountered him. The anti-tank fighter unit of the 16th Panzer Division quickly moved its 37 mm anti-tank guns into position. On the enemy tank! Range 100 meters. The Russian tank continued to approach. Fire! Hit. Another and another disappearance. The servants continued the countdown: the 21st, 22nd, 23rd 37-mm shell hit the armor of the steel colossus, bouncing off it like a pea off a wall. The gunners swore loudly. Their commander turned white with tension. The distance was reduced to 20 meters. “Aim for the tower support,” the lieutenant ordered. Finally they got him. The tank turned around and began to roll away. The turret's ball bearing was hit and the turret jammed, but the tank was otherwise undamaged. The anti-tank gun crew breathed a sigh of relief. - Did you see that? - the artillerymen asked each other. From that moment on, the T-34 became their bogeyman, and the 37-mm gun, which had proven itself so well in previous campaigns, received the contemptuous nickname of the “army door knocker.”
Commenting on this passage, you can pay attention to the fact that the T-34, having received so many hits, did not respond even once. This indicates either that the tank commander was never able to detect the German cannon, or did not have shells or cartridges for the machine gun at all.
Thus, the T-34 tank was a tough nut to crack in 1941.
But, as you know, it is not the tank itself that fights, but its crew. And from his training, degree professionalism of the crew The effectiveness of the tank in battle also directly depends. And although a lot of T-34s themselves had already been produced by that time, about 1,200 units, and in the western military districts there were already 832 of them, there were not enough trained crews for the T-34. By the beginning of the war, no more than 150 crews were trained for T-34 tanks. Trying to preserve their service life, the T-34 tanks were mothballed, and the crews were trained on the BT-7 or even on the outdated T-26. Naturally, it was not possible to train for a new vehicle in a short time, and especially in combat conditions. But, according to the recollections of front-line tankers, a lot depended only on the driver. And if we remember the high losses of the T-34, then a considerable percentage of lost tanks are obviously due to the inept actions of the crew.
Insufficient training of T-34 crews in the initial period of the war (and even subsequently, due to high losses, crews were changed frequently, and insufficient time was allocated for training tank crews) determined the low efficiency of this formidable vehicle. Although those crews who mastered the vehicle well and also applied the necessary combat tactics achieved impressive results. Lieutenant D. F. Lavrinenko took part in 28 battles, he himself lost three T-34 tanks during these battles and on the day of his death, December 17, 1941, he knocked out the 52nd enemy tank, becoming the most productive Soviet tankman of the Second World War .
Speaking about enemy tankers, it should be noted that the German crews were well trained. This fact is noted repeatedly in the memoirs of Soviet tank crews. The crews of the German vehicles were well united and even after being wounded they returned from the hospital to their hometown to their tank. In general, having produced five times fewer tanks and self-propelled guns than their main allies, Germany was able to create such tank forces, which throughout all the years of the war, right up to its last days, were able to deliver powerful blows.
Moving on to technical side T-34, first of all, it is necessary to note such drawbacks as the absence of a third crew member in the tank’s turret and the absence of a commander’s cupola. Due to the cramped turret inherited from the BT tank, the commander had to act as a gunner, since there was no room for the latter. Because of this, observation of the battlefield was interrupted while aiming, and it took more time to detect a new target. And this despite the fact that visibility from the T-34 was already unimportant.
In the memoirs of German tank crews, this shortcoming of the T-34 is mentioned quite often, and what it leads to on the battlefield can be understood from the memoirs of R. Ribbentrop (the son of that same German minister Ribbentrop) who fought on the T-4 near Prokhorovka:
“...we noticed the first Russian T-34s. They, apparently, tried to pass us on the left. We stopped and opened fire, knocking out several enemy vehicles. Several Russian tanks were left to burn out. For a good gunner, the range of 800 meters was ideal. While we were waiting to see if more tanks would appear, I looked around, out of habit. What I saw left me speechless. From behind a low hillock 150-200 meters wide, fifteen, then thirty, then forty tanks appeared. Finally I lost count.
T-34s were moving towards us at high speed with infantrymen on their armor. My driver-mechanic Shule said over the intercom: “Commander, on the right! On right! Do you see them? I saw them very well. At that moment the thought flashed: “Now it’s over!” It seemed to the driver that I said: “Leave the tank!”, and he began to open the hatch. I grabbed him rather roughly and dragged him back into the tank. At the same time, I poked the gunner in the right side with my foot - this was the signal to turn the turret to the right. Soon the first shell hit the target, and after hitting the T-34 it burst into flames. He was only 50-70 meters from us. At the same moment, the tank next to mine was hit and caught fire. I saw Unterscharführer Parke leave the car, but we never saw him again. His neighbor on the right was also hit and was soon engulfed in flames. An avalanche of enemy tanks was rolling straight towards us. Tank after tank! Wave after wave!
The number of them was simply incredible, and they were all moving at high speed. We did not have time to take a defensive position. All we could do was shoot. From such a distance, every shot hit the target. When are we destined to receive a direct hit? Somewhere in my subconscious I understood that there was no chance of salvation. As always in such situations, we could only take care of the most urgent matters. And so we knocked out the third, then the fourth T-34 from a distance of less than thirty meters. In our PzIVs, the loader had approximately 18-20 shells at hand, most of which were high-explosive fragmentation and only a portion were armor-piercing. Soon my loader shouted: “The armor-piercing ones are out!” All our ammunition, ready for immediate use, was expended.
Then the gunner, radio operator and driver had to supply the shells to the loader. Remaining motionless at this moment most likely meant discovery and destruction by Russian tanks. Our only hope is to get over the ridge, although the Russians have overcome it. There our chances of salvation were higher than here, where we were in full view.
We turned around in the middle of a mass of Russian tanks and drove back about fifty meters, on the reverse slope of the first ridge. Here, finding ourselves in slightly more reliable cover, we again turned around to face the enemy tanks. And at that moment the T-34 stopped about thirty meters to our right. I saw the tank sway slightly on its suspension and turn its turret in our direction. I was looking straight into the barrel of his gun. We could not fire immediately, because the gunner had just handed the loader a new shell. “Press! Let's!" - I shouted into the microphone. My driver-mechanic Schule was the best in the battalion. He immediately put the car in gear and the clumsy one set off. We passed the T-34 about five meters away. The Russian tried to turn the tower after us, but he didn’t succeed. We stopped ten meters behind the stationary T-34 and turned around. My gunner hit the turret of a Russian tank. The T-34 exploded, and its turret flew three meters into the air, almost hitting the barrel of my gun. All this time, new T-34s with troops on armor were rushing around us one after another. Meanwhile, I tried to drag inside the flag with a swastika, mounted on top in the chrome part of the tank. The flag was needed so that our pilots could see where we were. I only managed to do it halfway, and now the flag was fluttering in the wind. One of the Russian commanders or gunners sooner or later had to pay attention to him. A fatal hit was only a matter of time for us.
We only had one chance: we had to constantly move. A stationary tank was immediately recognized by the enemy as an enemy tank, since all Russian tanks were moving at high speed. On top of that, we could also be hit by our own tanks, dispersed along a wide front below, along the anti-tank ditch near the railway embankment. They opened fire on the advancing enemy tanks. On the battlefield shrouded in smoke and dust, stroking against the sun, our tank could not be distinguished from the Russians. I constantly broadcast our call sign: “Attention everyone! It's Kunibert! We are in the middle of Russian tanks! Don't shoot at us! There was no answer. Meanwhile, the Russians set fire to several vehicles, passing through Peiper's battalion and our artillery division. But by this time the fire from our two remaining tank companies had already begun to take its toll. Peiper's self-propelled gun division and motorized infantry (the latter with melee weapons) also inflicted damage on the tanks and pinned down the Russian infantrymen who jumped off the T-34 and tried to advance on foot. A thick veil of smoke and dust hung over the battlefield.
More and more groups of Russian tanks continued to roll out of this hell. On a wide slope, our tanks shot them. The entire field was a jumble of broken tanks and vehicles. Without a doubt, we partly owe our salvation to this very circumstance - the Russians never noticed us. Suddenly, ahead I saw a dense mass of Russian infantry and ordered the driver: “Move a little to the left!” A few seconds later he noticed them too. Firing from the tribes, we crashed into the mass of infantry from the rear. They didn’t even realize that a German tank was catching up with them.
Our salvation lay in moving to the left, towards the road. There we were supposed to meet our infantry and break away from the Russian tanks. Meanwhile, the rest of the crew - driver, radio operator and gunner - collected armor-piercing shells throughout the tank. As soon as such a shell was located, we immediately knocked out another one of the T-34s that overtook us after we stopped. Incredibly, they haven't fired at us yet. All experts are sure that this happened because the Russians did not have a separate tank commander - the tanks were commanded by gunners who could only look in the direction where their guns were deployed. If not for this, we were doomed.
To our displeasure, the Russians also moved to the left towards the road to cross the anti-tank ditch there. We never understood why the Russians directed their attack through an area blocked by an anti-tank ditch, the existence of which they probably knew. Because of this obstacle, they would inevitably lose momentum in the offensive, having covered only a kilometer. Therefore, the Russians turned left to reach the road and cross the ditch on a bridge. However, a simply incredible scene took place there. At the repaired bridge over the anti-tank ditch, the advancing enemy met fire from our tank and anti-tank guns. I managed to hide my tank behind a damaged T-34. From there we engaged enemy tanks. They were moving towards the bridge from all directions. This made it even easier for our battalion and us to choose targets. Burning T-34s collided with each other. There was fire and smoke, shells and explosions everywhere. The T-34s were on fire, and earlier they tried to crawl to the side. Soon the entire slope was littered with burning enemy tanks. We stopped behind the smoking carcass of an enemy vehicle. And then I heard the voice of my loader: “There are no more armor-piercing ones!” We have used up all of our armor-piercing ammunition. Now we only had fragmentation high explosive shells, useless against well-armored T-34s.
Now we set about destroying the Soviet infantry. This was not easy, since the Russian infantry had reached our positions, and we could accidentally hit one of our own self-propelled guns or an armored personnel carrier from the Peiper battalion. At first I didn't shoot. Then I heard the gunner scream. He moaned, “My eye! My eye!" A stray shell hit the turret precisely in the small hole for the gunner's sight. The shell did not penetrate the armor, but still entered deep enough to drive the sight inside with terrible force. My gunner, who was looking through the sight at that moment, was seriously wounded in the head. Our tank could no longer fight. I decided to leave the battle and, having crossed the bridge over the anti-tank ditch, go to the rear. There I could try to gather those tank troops who managed to get out of this chaos.........The losses of my company turned out to be surprisingly low. Only those two vehicles were completely lost, the destruction of which I saw at the very beginning of the battle. There were no completely lost vehicles in the other two companies. The artillery division and the Peiper battalion also managed to get by with minimal losses... ... There were more than a hundred destroyed Russian tanks in our defense zone. (Of these, 14 were accounted for by von Ribbentrop’s crew)…”
The above is a rather lengthy excerpt from memories German officer shows how the presence of a commander's cupola on the T-4 and its absence on the T-34, coupled with the absence of a third crew member in the tank's turret, allowed the German tank to emerge victorious from a seemingly hopeless situation. The German tank remained undetected by our tank crews, although it was in the thick of Soviet tanks. We can add to this that many German tank commanders leaned out of the hatch during the battle to look around, and this despite the presence of a commander's cupola and more advanced observation devices!
A comparison of the T-4 and T-34 turrets clearly indicates the advantage of the German tank. The spacious T-4 turret could accommodate three crew members. At the rear of the tower roof there was a commander's cupola with five viewing slots with triplex glass. From the outside, the viewing slots were closed with sliding armor flaps, and the hatch in the turret roof, intended for the tank commander to enter and exit, was closed with a double-leaf lid (later - single-leaf). The turret had a dial-hour type device for determining the target location. A second similar device was at the gunner’s disposal and, having received an order, he could quickly turn the turret towards the target. At the driver's seat there was a turret position indicator with two lights (except for Ausf.J tanks), thanks to which he knew what position the turret and gun were in (this is especially important when driving through wooded areas and populated areas).
The commander went about his business - he examined the battlefield, looked for a target, the gunner turned the turret and fired a shot. Thanks to this, both the rate of fire and efficiency of the T-4 turned out to be higher than that of the T-34. The working conditions of the crew are also not in favor of the Soviet tank.
Insufficient visibility is generally one of the significant disadvantages of the T-34. From the quote above we saw what good visibility means. Good visibility is the key to victory. I saw it earlier - you can hit the target before the enemy. If we compare those of the T-34 and the German T-4, then the advantages of the German tank are obvious. The presence of a commander’s cupola (it appeared on the T-34 in the summer of 1943) with all-round visibility and high-quality “Zeiss” optics (the high quality of which could not be compared with the T-34 observation devices), a spacious turret and the presence of a full-fledged tank commander give In this category, the German T-4 has an unconditional advantage.
The T-34 test report at the end of 1940 noted the following shortcomings of the tank: “... the lack of visual communication between tanks when solving a fire mission, due to the fact that the only device that allows all-round visibility - the PT-6 - is used only for aiming... Rotating the turret in any direction is possible only if the head is deviated from the forehead of the PT- device 6, that is, the rotation of the tower is actually carried out blindly ... " The same report on the all-round viewing device concludes that design flaws “make the viewing device unusable.” The T-34's side viewing devices had significant dead space and a small viewing angle. In addition, it was impossible to clean them without leaving the tank. Here's more from the report “..All sighting devices PT-6, TOD-6 installed on the tank and observation devices in the fighting compartment and control compartment are not protected from precipitation, road dust and dirt. In each individual case of loss of visibility, the devices can only be cleaned from the outside of the tank. In conditions of reduced visibility (fog), the PT-6 sight head fogs up after 4-5 minutes until visibility is completely lost..”
Visibility from the driver's seat of the T-34 was no better. Polished steel prisms, later replaced with plexiglass prisms, gave a distorted, cloudy picture. In addition, the surveillance devices quickly became dirty from the outside and it was not possible to wipe them without leaving the car. On the outside, the driver’s mechanic’s observation devices were protected from dirt by special “eyelashes”, lowering one of which made it possible to keep the observation devices clean for some time. In general, visibility through the instruments was clearly insufficient and most T-34 driver mechanics opened the hatch “into the palm of their hand” to improve visibility. There was no visibility at all from the radio operator's gunner's position, so he was mostly inactive in combat or helped the driver mechanic change gears. It was essentially possible to shoot from a machine gun mounted in a ball mount only at random, since neither the overview nor the firing sector contributed targeted shooting. In general, in the memoirs of our tank crews you can rarely hear a mention of firing from a machine gun, which cannot be said about the memories of German tank crews. The Germans used the machine gun quite intensively, not to mention the fact that sometimes the commander opened the hatch and fired from a machine gun or threw grenades. It is obvious that in terms of visibility the T-34 was inferior to the German tank.
In general, speaking about the technical side of the T-34, one cannot help but note the many shortcomings of this tank. From layout to technical. Let us assume that the lack of purging of the barrel after a shot and insufficient ventilation of the fighting compartment led, after several shots, to filling the turret with powder gases, from which the loader sometimes lost consciousness.
The T-34 also did not have a rotating deck and the loader, when turning the turret, was forced to mince his feet along the ammunition rack. And this must be recognized as a significant drawback that affects the rate of fire of the tank and the ease of operation of the loader.
Mobility. The T-34 had a fairly reliable diesel engine in the future. There wouldn’t be any particular complaints about it, but everything was spoiled by the problem with the build quality, due to the low production culture. The breakdown rate was high. For example, low-quality air filters were a major letdown, significantly reducing engine life. In the fall of 1942, T-34 and KB-1 tanks were sent to the United States for study. Their tests overseas began on November 29 and lasted exactly a year. As a result, the T-34's engine failed after 72.5 hours, and the KB-1's after 66.4 hours. The T-34 traveled only 665 km. The engine worked under load for 58.45 hours, without load - 14.05 hours. In total there were 14 breakdowns. In conclusion, based on the test results, it was noted that the air cleaner is completely unsuitable for this engine, practically does not retain dust, and, on the contrary, accelerates wear and reduces reliability. The problem with engine reliability was to some extent solved by the end of the war with the advent of the T-34-85.
Things were not going well with the transmission either. At first, the gearbox did not have synchronizers and was so stiff when changing gears that it was often necessary to use a sledgehammer to change gears, which was constantly at hand by the driver mechanic. Or resort to the help of a radio operator gunner. Sometimes in combat they did not change gears at all, but gained speed by increasing engine speed.
After joint testing of domestic, captured and Lend-Lease equipment in 1942, this gearbox earned the following assessment from NIBTPolygon officers:
"Gearboxes domestic tanks, especially the T-34 and KB, do not fully satisfy the requirements for modern combat vehicles, being inferior to the gearboxes of both allied and enemy tanks, and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology.” The modernized gearbox will begin to be installed on the T-34 in the spring of 1943, which will significantly facilitate the work of the driver, who on long marches in the “struggle” with the transmission was exhausted like a weightlifter training in the gym.
The main clutch also created its share of problems. Due to rapid wear and tear, as well as due to an unsuccessful design, it almost never turned off completely, it “drove”, and it was difficult to change gear in such conditions. With the main clutch not turned off, only very experienced driver mechanics were able to “stick” the desired gear. During 1943, the main clutch also underwent modernization.
The maneuverability of the tank is significantly influenced by the ratio of the length of the supporting surface to the track width - L/B. For the T-34 it was 1.5 and was close to optimal. For medium German tanks it was less: for the T-3 - 1.2, for the T-4 - 1.43. This means that their agility was better (in parentheses, we note that the “Tiger” also had a better indicator; as for the “Panther”, its L/B ratio was the same as that of the T-34).
To top it off, we can cite the words of P.A. Rotmistrov, commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, from a letter to G.K. Zhukov in August 1943:
"...We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and there were shortcomings on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodations have not been completely eliminated to this day...".
The German T-4 (and other German tanks) had a gasoline engine. For a long time This was considered a disadvantage. In fact, this did not cause any particular inconvenience. Moreover, engineers at the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1943 came to a conclusion that was directly opposite to the everyday assessment of the possibilities of fire various types fuel:
“The Germans’ use of a carburetor engine rather than a diesel engine on the new tank, released in 1942, can be explained by: […] the very significant percentage of fires in tanks with diesel engines in combat conditions and their lack of significant advantages over carburetor engines in this regard, especially with the proper design of the latter and the availability of reliable automatic fire extinguishers".
The T-4 engines were generally reliable and did not cause much trouble. Moreover, gasoline engines were installed on tanks for some time in the post-war period. As for discussions about the high fire hazard or explosiveness of gasoline vapors, as combat operations have shown, diesel vapors explode and burn no worse under the influence of high temperatures that arise when a projectile hits, 70% of the lost T-34s burned out.
Although the T-4 was 7 tons lighter than the Soviet tank, it lacked the power of its 250 horsepower engine for effective maneuvering. In addition, although quite reliable, the stiff suspension could shake the soul out of tankers, especially at high speed. Obviously, the T-4 was not suitable for rapid raids behind enemy lines. Here the Soviet tank has an advantage. Thanks to its high draft, wide tracks, and powerful diesel engine, the T-34 had greater speed and better maneuverability. It was speed and maneuver in the hands of an experienced mechanic-driver that became the T-34’s trump card on the battlefield. By continuously and skillfully maneuvering, experienced crews managed to avoid direct hits from enemy shells.
Thanks to the high mobility of the T-34, our tank armies, during the offensive in 1944, performed rather complex maneuvers in operational depth, while avoiding collisions with enemy counterattack groups in unfavorable conditions, forestalling enemy reserves in occupying pre-prepared intermediate positions. defensive lines or changing the direction of impact in the event of a collision with strong resistance units.
We can say that the operational-tactical mobility of T-34 tanks during this period became the most important type of their protection.
For example, during the Vistula-Oder operation, the tank armies of the 1st Belorussian Front overcame 11 (!) well-prepared intermediate defensive lines and fortified areas in the operational depths of enemy defense.
The powerful diesel engine and wide tracks of the T-34 provided it with superior mobility and maneuverability over the T-4, and over other German tanks.
It also surpassed them in speed, perhaps second only to the T-3, but this was subject to movement on a good highway. Of course, the imperfection of the transmission in the initial period of the war often neutralized this advantage.
One of the most important advantages of the T-34 over almost all Wehrmacht tanks was its low fuel consumption compared to its main opponents. Actually, it turned out to be low precisely because of the use of a diesel engine as a power plant. The fuel consumption of the T-34, depending on driving conditions, was 1.5-2 times less than that of the German T-4. As a result, the T-34 had a range of one and a half times longer on one refueling, 300 km versus 200 km for the T-4.
Armament T-34 for initial period there was quite enough war. The F-34 cannon mounted on the T-34 tank (about 450 T-34 tanks were initially armed with the L-11 cannon, but due to its complexity and high cost, preference was given to the F-34 cannon) at a range of up to 1500m was guaranteed to hit the armor of everyone without exception. German tanks of 1941-1942, including T-4. By itself 76.2 mm tank gun The rabe was not only quite powerful, but also cheap and technologically advanced. There can be no complaints about this gun; it did its job and did it well.
As for the effectiveness of the T-34-76 cannon against the armor of tanks such as the Tiger or Panther, then, of course, the F-34 cannon was weak, because the effective fire range was reduced to 200 meters and did not guarantee reliable destruction of the enemy tank. And this despite the fact that the guns of these German tanks could easily hit the T-34 at a much longer distance. It was quite difficult for such a “thirty-four” to fight these German cars.
Only after the appearance of the modernized T-34-85 in 1944 did our tank finally push back the boundaries of effective fire combat. Although the T-34-85, like the T-34-76, still remained vulnerable to German guns, it could now cause damage itself, and even the Tiger’s armor was no longer an insurmountable obstacle for it! The 85mm gun of the updated T-34 came in very handy in the later stages of the war, because it had good armor penetration. To the point that it pierced the side of the Tiger's armor right through! This added confidence to the Soviet tankers in battle and faith in their vehicle.
What about the Germans? The Germans were looking for ways to solve the problem that had arisen in the form of the T-34, a monster that unexpectedly appeared for them. And already in the spring of 1942, the T-4 received a very decent 75-mm long-barreled gun! This gun reliably hit the T-34 at a distance of 1000 m! This gave the German tank an advantage in direct confrontation at long range. Moreover, the German gun also had a higher rate of fire! And at least twice! If the F-34 gun had a rate of fire 4-8 rounds per minute (the actual rate of fire did not exceed 5 rounds per minute, due to the characteristics of the ammunition), then the German PaK 40(the tank version was designated KwK 40) issued 12-14 shots per minute. In addition, the armor penetration of the German gun also turned out to be higher - from a range of 500 m with a projectile angle of 90 degrees, it penetrated 135 mm(96-120 mm tank version) armor, against 70-78 mm at the Russian cannon. But from one and a half kilometers away there was a German 7.5 cm tank gun KwK 40(L/48) could penetrate the armor 77 mm, A Pak40 installed on anti-tank self-propelled guns - 98mm from a distance even more 1800m!
In general, the armament of the German T-4 tank from 1942 until the appearance of the T-34-85 was more effective (at least for fighting tanks) than the armament of the Soviet T-34 tank.
It must be recalled that in addition to improved weapons, the T-4 also received improved armor! This is what was noted after shelling tests at the test site “... the thickness of the frontal armor of the T-4 and Armshturm-75 tanks (self-propelled guns) is currently 82-85 mm and is virtually invulnerable to the most widely used armor-piercing shells in the Red Army of 45 mm and 76 mm caliber...”
Whatever one may say in the confrontation with the T-34, the German vehicle had a significant superiority in armament and in terms of armament it was actually not inferior even to the T-34-85, taking into account the unchanged armor of the updated Soviet tank.
It must be admitted that the T-34-76, starting from mid-1942, had no superiority over the updated T-4 either in armament or in armor! And this situation did not change until 1944, when, largely thanks to Lend-Lease supplies of machine tools and materials for our tank builders, the situation began to change for the better and the much “killer” T-34-85 came onto the scene.
The help of the allies was very helpful. For example largest producer"thirty-four", Nizhny Tagil plant No. 183, could not switch to producing the T-34-85, since there was nothing to process the turret ring gear with a diameter of 1600 mm. Therefore, new rotary machines were ordered from the UK (Loudon) and the USA (Lodge). And the 10,253 T-34-85 tanks produced by Nizhny Tagil “Vagonka” owe allied assistance. As well as improving the quality of the tank itself. An American engineer who visited the Stalingrad Tractor Plant at the end of 1945 discovered that half of the machine park of this enterprise was supplied under Lend-Lease.
Now let's ask the question posed in the title of the article: was the T-34 tank the best tank of World War II? Could a tank with so many different shortcomings be the “best”? The question is quite interesting and quite complex. In terms of combat qualities, the T-34 may not have been the “best” tank of World War II. Still, low quality and some design flaws do not give us such confidence in this statement. Controlling a tank using tight levers and pedals, observing and shooting accurately, being in a cramped space filled with smoke from powder gases, without communication with the outside world, is a dubious pleasure. All this required great physical and moral stress and considerable dexterity and dedication from the T-34 crews! Incomparable to the comfort and living conditions of the T-4 for German tankers!
In addition, the inclined armor of the T-34, about which there is so much talk, was penetrated by all Wehrmacht guns, with the exception of the 37 mm anti-tank gun and the 50 mm 42-caliber tank gun. The tankers joked bitterly about this, paraphrasing the famous song - “The armor is crap, but our tanks are fast!” However, the much-vaunted diesel engine, on which this very “speed” depended, generally did not develop full power and did not use up even half of the already small engine resource, causing, in conjunction with the transmission, numerous troubles for the crew.
And yet this is a winning tank! He came to Berlin! Quantity has won over quality. The Soviet military industry managed to produce so many tanks that the Germans did not have enough shells for them. Turning a blind eye to the number of T-34s lost on the battlefields and burned-out crews, we can say that based on the realities of those days, the T-34 tank was truly the best. But the best for Soviet generals and Soviet industry. After all, in terms of combat qualities, it did not stand out in any way compared to either the T-4 or the American Sherman. But its design made it possible to produce tanks at a faster pace and in large quantities. The numbers of produced "thirty-fours" exceed the number of German T-4s by an order of magnitude! In total, more than 61 thousand were produced until 1946 inclusive! And during the war period there were no less 50 thousand, while all modifications of the T-4, before the end of the war, were collected 8696 pieces, which is almost half the number of “thirty-fours” produced in 1943 alone ( 15821 pieces)! And it is precisely this criterion that should probably be considered decisive.
The T-34 tank itself was quite simple. Easy not only to manufacture, but also to service. It did not require highly qualified operating personnel. It was very repairable. After all, more tanks failed due to breakdowns and malfunctions at the beginning of the war than due to enemy influence. Only with the advent of the T-34-85 did the quality of the tank somehow improve. Apparently, it is precisely in the extreme simplicity of the design that lies the popularity of this combat vehicle among both tankers and production workers.
Summarizing the above, we must admit that the legendary Soviet T-34 tank, with all its shortcomings, turned out to be most suitable in all respects for the Soviet army, Soviet industry, Soviet realities, as well as for the Russian mentality. Soviet designers managed to create such a lifesaver, which, in terms of the totality of characteristics, as well as manufacturability of production, turned out to be the most suitable for that period and that reality for our Motherland. In difficult wartime conditions, devastation and other hardships, the production of T-34 tanks only increased. The troops received the tank in increasing quantities and a positive result was achieved! This tank brought victory and glory to the Soviet army. And his fame is well deserved! As well as the glory to its creators and millions Soviet people who created it for their country! And we quite reasonably call it the best tank in that war!
It was a Russian tank, for the Russian army and Russian industry, maximally adapted to our conditions of production and operation. And only Russians could fight on it! It is not for nothing that they say: “What is good for a Russian is death for a German.”
Since then, we have lived with this clear understanding that we were making the best tank in the world. In general, as winners, we did our best. The best weapons, the best American Lend-Lease, the best American planes and so on, and, of course, a tank.
But today, with my guests, we will once again raise this very dangerous and controversial topic, with the same question: so, after all, which tank is the best, well, not that it showed itself in the Second World War, but at least it was appreciated by the users themselves as the most suitable for the assigned tasks.
Vyacheslav Len, collector, publisher, antique dealer, historian, passionate person, reviving and returning its history to our country.
Yuri Pasholok, historian armored vehicles, an encyclopedist, a person who knows the answer to the very question about which the three of us have gathered here. Hello.
S. Aslanyan: Well, now I will listen to you. So which tank is the best?
Yu. Pasholok: Well, the T-34 was still recognized as the best tank of World War II.
S. Aslanyan: Shugurov, may he rest in heaven, graduated from Baumanka, and also understood something about tanks, every time he came to this maxim, he carefully remarked: “Well, he has a transmission tunnel, suspension, sighting devices... Well, in general, yes , overall, not bad".
I asked those people who fought on the T-34 what they thought about this, they said different things, but most often they named the German T-4 (PzKpfw IV Ausf H), after modernization since 1943.
They considered it the best, although, in general, they fought with it directly, and since they won, they probably still had some kind of talent and survivability, because if the German tank was the best, and we won, then there remains question.
Yu. Pasholok: Well, on this matter it is interesting to learn this information from the Germans. I can say that the modernization of the T-4 essentially ended at the end of 1942. Because it turned out that it was generally useless to further load it with armor, since then he would have to redo the chassis. Therefore, the German T-4 tank, it has 80 millimeters of armor in the forehead, on the hull, but in the turret - the same 50.
V. Len: But its advantage is that it was not as complex in production as the T-3 (Pz.Kpfw.III). The T-3 had torsion bar suspension, but this one has a completely different one. The body was welded separately, there were no torsion bars,
it had completely different levers, so to speak, and therefore it was easier to manufacture. They could have been done much more, which was more than important for the Germans in the second half. Although the Germans themselves say that at the beginning of the war the T-3 was more convenient for them. Well, this is in practice.
S. Aslanyan: Did the T-34 have any disadvantages?
Yu. Pasholok: Yes of course. I’ll tell you more, the T-34 that we know did not suit our military already at the beginning of 1941. Firstly, they were not happy with the fact that, in essence, he was aiming for a two-seater car. Well, to be honest, the T-34 is a development of the BT tank. Very, very deep, but still it’s BT. Well, with your cockroaches, with your shortcomings. Initially, a 17-18-ton vehicle began to weigh 27 tons, and by the end of 1941, all 30.
S. Aslanyan: But what a motor.
Yu. Pasholok: Well, the engine is not bad, but there is a problem, for example, with the gearbox. The suspension was already considered a failure. Moreover, initially the BT-20 tank, which is known as the A-20, the prototype of the T-34, for its development they already initially said: “Guys, shouldn’t we make a torsion bar, otherwise we have a little goat back and forth when we accelerate , we brake sharply.
S. Aslanyan: Well, yes. The problem of those who fought on the T-34, including in their description, was that before firing they had to wait until the tank had settled down, until it swung in all directions, and this was, in general, not that time, which one could afford to spend waiting under enemy fire.
V. Len: They also shot on the move, but very rarely, and very few people could do it. Of course, I had to stop. As a rule, the signal to stop was given to the mechanic by foot. The tank commander hit him in the back. It meant stop. Short stop. And indeed the tank stopped rocking, and a shot was fired immediately. But, as a rule, they took this buildup into account.
S. Aslanyan: Of course, those who fought on it already knew all the features of the machine, and took this into account, among other things, but here is the episode reproduced in the film, quite honestly, “In war as in war,” when our unit is being redeployed self-propelled guns, and they come out into a clearing where there are three damaged T-34s and one Tiger. This is the ratio of one to three, in order to kill one German, you had to spend three of your own...
V. Len: For "Tiger" much more was needed. At least a company to surround him. This was absolutely necessary... All our tankers tell us that it was necessary for six or seven tanks to circle around him at once so that he would not have time. The main thing was to blind him, it was necessary to knock out all his viewing devices.
He told me this German tankman, by the way. It was scary. Of course, when the viewing devices were all knocked out, then they simply stopped, it was useless - where to shoot.
Yu. Pasholok: But, in fact, in the case of the “Tiger”, I can say that when we captured the “Tiger” near Leningrad and fired at it, it turned out that the 76 mm projectile did not penetrate the frontal armor (and the sides, in general, too) from a distance 200 meters. Well, we can assume that almost only at point blank range.
V. Len: Point blank.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes. And only if they had caliber shells, which they already had in service in 1943, then yes, something could be done.
S. Aslanyan: And our KV-1? Maybe he is the best tank?
Yu. Pasholok: No, the point is that the KV-1 is a case where the tank was overweight. The original tank that was there weighed 40 tons. The tank that went into production was the very first, 42.5. It already weighed 45 tons in 1941, at the beginning, and they kept loading it and loading it, and it already weighed 47.5 tons in the summer. But it’s realistic that it has a cast turret, we already get almost 50 tons of mass.
As a result, his final drives were flying, his clutches were burning, and they were already burning at the beginning of 1941. His box kept falling out. And, in fact, this was the reason why the KV-1 was taken out of production. They lightened it to 42.5 tons, resulting in the KV-1S.
V. Len: But, main drawback– this is its barrel, a 76-mm gun. In my opinion, it was a very good tank; it would have had a stronger barrel. But again, increasing the barrel means increasing the weight, which is what Yura was talking about. And significantly.
S. Aslanyan: The complexity of operating this tank was such that it was one of the few tanks that had two officer positions on board the crew. The driver was a junior lieutenant, an officer. This speaks volumes about what incredible equipment they could entrust to such a qualified specialist.
V. Len: Everything is correct.
Yu. Pasholok: Well, of course, this is a breakthrough tank. There must be an officer on the crew.
S. Aslanyan: But the officer was the commander, and the officer was the mechanic. Two officers on board one tank. Amazing absolutely staffing.
Total. Does all of the above give reason to believe that the best tank could have been, among other things, the T-34, but none of them was an ideal tank?
Yu. Pasholok: The best tank of war, the one that is produced in large quantities, more or less corresponds to its function on the battlefield, has a fairly simple design that allows it to be used in combat conditions, and has room for modernization. For example, the T-34 actually had a reserve of modernization until the end of the war. T-4, in fact, ceased, as I already said, at the end of 1942. An English tank, for example, “Matilda”, it ceased to be capable of modernization already, in fact, in 1941.
S. Aslanyan: Total. From these, for example, mentioned names, is a portrait of the best tank already emerging? Or should we still go through all our armed forces and mention the Americans who also fought with us.
V. Len: The Americans with their Sherman, of course, are a good tank, comfortable, our tankers say that it was a cool tank, but very often they say that they burned them themselves.
S. Aslanyan: Sabotage?
V. Len: Yes exactly. It is one and a half times taller than the T-34, and with a small 76-mm cannon. It was very unsuccessful, in my opinion, in order to compare it with the T-34. The T-34 is much better.
Yu. Pasholok: But in the case of the Americans, I can say this. The most important task when making the M4 medium tank was... We already have an M3 medium tank in production, which is known as “Lee”, we need to unify the new vehicle with it as much as possible, so as not to radically overhaul production. Therefore, the M4 is such a compromise tank. Moreover, its replacement began already in 1942, but in the end the Pershing tank was created at the end of 1944.
S. Aslanyan: Which one was how successful and successful?
Yu. Pasholok: Well, it so happened that, in general, the medium tank turned into actually like... Well, 2 tons lighter than the Lee tank.
S. Aslanyan: Vyacheslav Len, collector, publisher and specialist in military equipment, returns to our country the pages of its history, including in a living, embodied form, bringing from abroad at his own expense a lot of equipment that we for some reason lost. Yuri Pasholok, a historian of armored vehicles, an encyclopedist, and, above all, a master who, with his own hands, is able to revive and put a tank on the move. We are trying to find an answer to a question that is not an axiom, it is precisely a reason for discussion: which tank was the best in World War II? We had so many things in our arsenal, because in this regard we had, to put it mildly, a variety of brands.
Yu. Pasholok: Well, we can say that the same Germans had the same thing.
V. Len: If not more.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, if not more. We must proceed from the following: the tank, in fact, becomes obsolete at the time it is put into service. Namely, the end of the 30s, when the T-34 was born... By the way, it’s a small, interesting fact that the Germans were not satisfied with the T-3 and T-4 already in 1938. The tanks that we know, “Tiger” and “Panther”, are very, very beefy tanks in terms of armament and weight, which were originally supposed to replace the T-3 and T-4. As a result, the T-3 was replaced by the Panther, which was twice as heavy.
S. Aslanyan: How ineffective is it?
V. Len: Panther is very effective.
S. Aslanyan: The fact of the matter is that the increase in mass, it cannot be said that as with a woman, greatly spoiled her figure, and everyone turned away from her.
V. Len: It had an excellent barrel and excellent driving characteristics. On it you feel like driving a car, the handling is simply crazy on this tank. You can shoot on the move with complete peace of mind. It simply absorbs bumps, stones, everything imaginable and unimaginable. The tank was so successful.
Yu. Pasholok: But there is a nuance. The problem is that the Panther, in fact, never became the main medium tank, because it was quite difficult to manufacture. Those companies that took up its production were unable to fulfill the plan that was expected. Therefore, the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht remained the “four”.
V. Len: But, nevertheless, about 5,000 “Panthers”, in my opinion, were made.
Yu. Pasholok: Well, actually, at that time the Germans were already thinking not about tanks, but about fighters. The most interesting fact is that the Germans have the most massive armored unit - the Geschutz, a self-propelled anti-tank gun.
V. Len: At first it was not anti-tank, but one might say anti-personnel. They entered Russia with the so-called “cigarette butt”, with a barrel... Well, “fifty dollars” is called in slang, both in German and in Russian. This is a short barrel with a 50-mm... Well, first 50, then 75. The goal was to spit into the trench like a mortar, as they say, there is no other way to call it.
Well, then, by 1942 and at the end of 1941, other goals appeared. Everything that the Germans could achieve through an offensive war, they achieved. Then there were difficult victories for them. Moscow nevertheless set a border for offensive German weapons. It was already more necessary to have defensive and, so to speak, anti-tank. Because Russia and the Soviet Union, it’s correct to say, and our allied countries were already producing such an amount of equipment and tanks that it was necessary to fight with equipment with tanks. Direct purpose of the tank.
S. Aslanyan: And at what stage did it become clear that the infantry had nothing to oppose? Was there a moment in the history of war when it was clear that such equipment could only be stopped by technology? Or is it still heroism and the Mosin rifle to the last?
Yu. Pasholok: 1943 When the Germans acquired Tiger and Panther en masse, this was precisely the episode when German army weapons have appeared that, well, let’s say, if not all are impossible to counter, then at least very difficult. But this stage, in fact, lasted until the end of 1943.
But look what happened in 1943. They lost the Kursk Bulge. We rolled back further. The front very quickly rolled back several hundred kilometers.
V. Len: Resources. A war of resources has already begun, in principle. To put it mildly, the country that is richer in human and material resources, so to speak, resources, well, all the equipment and so on, will win. We have already started to fight... Many people call it “throwing their hats in”, but this is not so. With your own resources. First of all, human.
S. Aslanyan: But, nevertheless, it turns out that before 1943 it was still possible, one way or another, for infantry to resist tanks? After 1943, weapons on the German side had already acquired such a specific focus that a response was needed at the level of comparable technology?
Yu. Pasholok: Not only. Firstly, we now have cumulative grenades in our arsenal. First RPG-43, then RPG-6, which completely penetrated the side of the Panther. Secondly, they changed tactics. The same anti-tank artillery that the infantry always had, had several guns working on one vehicle at a time. As a result, it seems like the tank is intact, but it can no longer drive or shoot.
V. Len: No one.
Yu. Pasholok: No one, yes.
V. Len: As a rule, the artillerymen first tried, if it was a large tank, to immobilize it, shoot down one of the tracks, and then it became an easy target, it could not leave. And as a rule, if a caterpillar was shot down, the tank stood sideways to the artillerymen, and as a rule, the artillerymen did not place one gun at a time. The tactics that Yura is talking about are crowded: there were five guns placed all together and one to the side somewhere, 300 meters away. And five stood next to each other, actually, 20-30 meters from each other. Maybe even at 15.
Yu. Pasholok: Well, our sappers shouldn’t be written off, as it were. The failure of the German offensive on Ponyri, where “Ferdinand” (Sd.Kfz.184) took part, which could not be penetrated by anything...
V. Len: This happened on the Kursk Bulge.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, on the Kursk Bulge. It choked thanks to our sappers. The Germans lost a whole bunch of these Ferdinands there, which were blown up by exposed anti-tank mine barriers.
V. Len: Since "Ferdinand" did not have... Surprisingly, huge self-propelled gun, incredible, the best one might say (it would be), but it did not have basic machine guns for protection against infantry. It just wasn't there. And so our sappers simply burned almost all of them. There were 90 of them at that place, and almost 70 of them were burned there.
Yu. Pasholok: 35 irretrievable losses precisely on the Kursk Bulge.
V. Len: Irrevocable are those torn to shreds. The Germans had a very large system, such a gradation, almost ten scales. A tank, in a word, if it’s torn to shreds, then it’s a tenth scale. And everything else, burned and so on, is treated, repaired, taken away, and the like.
Therefore, when the Germans talk about their losses on the Kursk Bulge, there is no need to listen to this much, the real losses are by our standards... We didn’t repair the T-34: it burned out and burned out. It was cheaper to make it again than to take it to the factory, disassemble it, sort it out, and so on. The Germans had something else: if the tank did not fall to pieces, they restored it. They were dragged to the rear and sent to factories. It was cheaper for them. And we had a conveyor belt.
Yu. Pasholok: In this sense, we can say that we did not pelt them with corpses, we pelted them with iron.
V. Len: Everything is correct.
Yu. Pasholok: And by the way, as for the Tigers and their losses, we must keep in mind that, in general, for every German tank battalion that had Tigers, there was a train with spare parts.
V. Len: Real echelon.
Yu. Pasholok: In reality, the Germans won not because they had better tanks, but because they had much better material support and, by the way, our victories continued, 1943 and beyond, firstly, we learned to fight, we stopped these sketches, “We need to capture this by such and such a date,” operations have already begun competently...
This is clearly visible, for example, in the battles of 1944, when ours literally did not notice the German Tiger battalions: they rolled it out - and, in general, that’s it, no. This is the first thing.
Secondly, thanks, among other things, to Lend-Lease, we now have good material support. American trucks, including... Not just a truck, but also there were repair flights and other vehicles. Thanks to all this, we received good material support, and this greatly affected the results.
V. Len: The flights, by the way, were gorgeous, they were so well equipped. And welding machines, and lathes, and drilling machines, and whatnot was there. In the field, it was actually possible to restore a tank that had been blown up by a mine, and it was combat-ready.
S. Aslanyan: And besides the Lend-Lease flights, what else fought in our army? On the armored topic?
Yu. Pasholok: Well, look, first of all, we took a very serious look at self-propelled guns, already from the end of 1941. And the reason was banal: due to the fact that either the factories were evacuated, or the tractor factories stopped making tractors and began making tanks, a very comical situation turned out: we have guns, but we have nothing to carry them with. Therefore, we launched a program for self-propelled artillery, it worked for about a year, and as a result, already in the winter of 1943, medium, light and heavy self-propelled guns entered the army.
V. Len: Before this, of course, the artillerymen tell something terrible: always on horseback, attach four horses here, six there - and off they go, dragging the cannon. It was, of course, a horse-drawn circus, so to speak. That's how we reached Moscow. And our guns were dragged from Moscow by horse-drawn vehicles.
S. Aslanyan: But after we replaced the horses with self-propelled guns and used Lend-Lease for its intended purpose, purely technically (not to mention tactically) we became unambiguously victorious? Or did the German side, unfortunately, also have quite combat-ready people and equipment?
Yu. Pasholok: Well, the point here is that we need to look at the situation soberly and say that we have learned to fight, and we have received equipment that can really win.
V. Len: By the end of 1942.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes. Here is the same, for example, SU-152, this self-propelled gun, which was originally developed to open enemy pillboxes, turned out, in principle, to be a very good tank destroyer. This is exactly what is called “St. John’s wort”.
V. Len: By the way, ours managed simply because of the hills... If the Tiger could only shoot in a straight line, then the self-propelled artillery installation(well, Yura is talking about 152 mm) it seemed like it could shoot with a canopy. Like a mortar. This is what our tankers made excellent use of. They simply retreated behind the hill if they realized that one or two “34s” were burned in front there, and they beat the “Tiger”, and the “Tiger”, as a rule, was a very arrogant tank, it calmly burned T from 1.5 kilometers -34 ours. Our T-34 could plant him in the side from 500 meters.
S. Aslanyan: Vyacheslav Len - publisher, antique dealer, collector - well, a person, in general, who makes history not a dead paragraph in a textbook, but a living element of our modern life, you can go and see Len’s traces on Poklonnaya Hill, where, among other things, part of him stands collections. Yuri Pasholok is a historian of armored vehicles, an encyclopedist, a man who knows why a tank runs and knows how to breathe life into it.
We just finished on light tanks, I was reading the combat log of one of our tank regiments, this is the end of 1941, the entire regiment was on the Stuart, and it had only one entry: “The regiment entered the battle.”
V. Len: With a 37mm gun against the Germans with 75mm guns, of course, no other record could have been made.
S. Aslanyan: It’s just that the regiment was gone after that, they didn’t make it.
V. Len: Everything is correct.
S. Aslanyan: They couldn't even sneak up, they just came out, and with that the entire regiment was destroyed.
V. Len: 2008 pieces were delivered to us.
Yu. Pasholok: No, there is about a thousand, but, firstly, regarding the M-3 light, and in general, in principle, light American tanks, you can see very well at the site in Kubinka, the tallest tank is the American M5A1 ", light tank.
V. Len: On which they landed, by the way, in large numbers in Normandy, but we must take into account, I’ll say separately about Normandy, only 60 defeated divisions opposed, and how many entered the Soviet Union - 300 units.
Yu. Pasholok: 150 divisions in 1941 alone. As for light tanks, you need to understand that, firstly, we did not really understand about German technology, the same M-3 light tanks ended the war in 1945 as part of regiments, for example, in cavalry divisions, there are such.
S. Aslanyan: Well, we still have cavalry, the Germans no longer had cavalry since 1943, they still had cavalry as a branch of the army, in the form of cavalry reconnaissance companies under each SS regiment, and an element of the cavalry uniform - the famous yellow gap, yellow shoulder straps and yellow buttonholes - it flashed only among those officers who were in the cavalry during the First World War, and the German cavalrymen put the checkers back in the warehouses and caulked them in the chests just at the turn of 1942-1943, as the Germans did not have cavalry as an active branch of the army.
Yu. Pasholok: And our cavalry felt very good until the end of the war. First, a gap is made in us, then cavalry is launched there, which begins to work very effectively in the rear, and each cavalry division had a regiment of at least 10 tanks.
V. Len: Everything is correct, the tanks started first, we have already learned, under machine guns, as it was at the beginning of the war, when regiments fell down to get through the breakthrough, it was useless. One German describes, by the way, also from the cavalry division, which was stationed in Nakhabino, near Moscow, 20 kilometers from Moscow, note that he writes how our cavalrymen tried to break through, they planted two regiments there, just a terrible massacre: they were with machine guns against our cavalry, no one survived. One regiment, and after an hour and a half, in my opinion, the second regiment was laid down.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, and then we have a completely different picture, moreover, we threw everything into the cavalry according to the principle “on you, God, what’s good for us,” therefore, in the same Lvov-Sandomierz operation, one of the cavalry regiments went into battle, having "Matilda"
V. Len: Well, yes, this is the old tank we just talked about, 1941-1942.
Yu. Pasholok: The British stopped using them in Africa, and we calmly used them in offensive operations.
V. Len: But they were designed for Africa, with the sides completely covered with armor.
Yu. Pasholok: And the same “Valentines” that the British stopped actually using in battles in 1943 – we still had them until the end of the war.
V. Len: And moreover, our tankers spoke very well of them due to the fact that they had a low hull, a really very low tank, and a low turret - they could sneak up on the Germans. They have rubberized tracks, a very quiet tank, it has a car engine, it got very close to the “Tiger” and could literally enter from the rear, and such a case was described, in my opinion, in Hungary: two “Valentines” destroyed two “ Tiger" is incredible.
Yu. Pasholok: And in general, if we are talking about the best tanks, then since we mentioned the “Valentine”, there are various debates about which tank is the best of the light ones, but if you look at it soberly, the British released it into the war best easy tank.
V. Len: Not average like the T-34.
Yu. Pasholok: This is, firstly, the most popular English tank, which was produced not only in England, but also in Canada. By the way, the Canadians mainly supplied them to us, they did not produce them for themselves. The tank was very technologically advanced, the tank was very reliable, it used mass-produced diesel, and at first they used their bus diesel engines, and then they began to use American diesel engines from GM, by the way, the same ones that we later produced in Yaroslavl.
V. Len: And to this day they produce, modernized.
Yu. Pasholok: In general, yes, this is the same diesel. And the most interesting thing is that this tank started with a 40-mm cannon, which, by the way, did not have high-explosive fragmentation ammunition, well, the British were like that, very peculiar.
V. Len: Only armor-piercing ones; only armor-piercing ones could be fired against infantry.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, against the infantry - here you go, with machine guns. Real lords consider it wrong to hit infantry with high-explosive fragmentation shells. Then they installed a 57-mm cannon, which also did not have fragmentation shells, and then the “Valentine IX”, which, in fact, came to us in large numbers - they were the ones who worked well against the “Tiger”, they were good tanks, but not infantry, because there was so much space that they really didn’t have enough space for a machine gun on the Valentine IX. The tank works - well, well, it will spit on someone with a blank. “Valentine X” already received a machine gun, but we only had about 60 of them, or something.
On the other hand, we also had people with ingenuity, and they noticed: “So, guys, you are supplying us with 157 installations,” - this was an American 57-mm cannon on the half-truck, “well, this is the same cannon, and to it there is high-explosive fragmentation ammunition. Great, we will solve problems through American supplies itself.” The Australians, who fought in the Pacific with their Matilda and Valentine, solved the problem in a different way, they set up their production, took ammunition from the Bofors anti-aircraft gun and used it, but in our case, in general, they solved the problem with ingenuity.
S. Aslanyan: And it turns out that the best tank of the Second World War is the Valentine, and in relation to the medium tank, which inevitably becomes the most popular on the battlefield, the purpose of this title depends not only on its characteristics, but also on the economic component - on the cost of production , from cost?
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, and in this regard it is worth thinking about the fact that cheap tanks were produced in the Soviet Union. If I'm not mistaken, the ruble to Reichsmark exchange rate in 1940 was 2.1 rubles to 1 Reichsmark.
For reference, the T-3 cost approximately 120 thousand Reichsmarks, this is without weapons, well, about 130-135 thousand Reichsmarks for one tank. And now, attention, according to the agreements between the Main Armored Directorate and the Kharkov Locomotive Plant, also known as Plant No. 183, one T-34 cost 400 thousand rubles. So it turns out that our tanks, in general, are relatively cheap.
But peacetime is one thing, and war is another thing. Already by February 1, 1942, a T-34 without a walkie-talkie cost 240 thousand rubles. The T-34-85, at the start of production, cost, in my opinion, 190 thousand rubles, then the price dropped to 170 thousand rubles.
S. Aslanyan: Due to what?
Yu. Pasholok: Simplification of the design, because, in general, let’s be honest, it is much more profitable for the manufacturer for the tank to be as labor-intensive as possible, so that he can raise the price. There were very serious battles about this; if anyone thinks that money was not counted in the Soviet Union, he is very deeply mistaken.
V. Len: That the Germans, in principle, had not decided until the end of the war, everything there was commercial, all the factories belonged to private individuals, so Hitler could not change their price tags for tanks and so on, everything that I saw German is like a work of art , accordingly, a work of art costs the same. These tanks were so expensive, incredibly expensive to produce, and not only tanks - cars, and everything related to the war, respectively, we were talking about resources
– German tanks could not be produced in such massive quantities because they were extremely expensive during the war.
S. Aslanyan: Now it’s clear why you became an antique dealer.
Yu. Pasholok: Regarding, by the way, German tanks. When at one time there was a great interview with the late collector Jacques Littlefield, who, in general, started with 1 to 5 modeling, and ended up with the world's largest private collection...
V. Len: Which, unfortunately, is now sold out.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, he said, “I looked at the Sherman, and it has four types of tubes. Then I looked at Panther and it has 20 types of tubes.”
V. Len: 26.
Yu. Pasholok:“And after that I understood why the Germans lost the war.”
S. Aslanyan: Due to technical complexity.
V. Len: Everything is correct. This Yura means pipes to remove the engine. On the Sherman, four pipes were unscrewed, and that’s it, on the Panther – 26.
S. Aslanyan: Unrepairable.
V. Len: No, it’s suitable, but it must be a specialist of the highest level in order to change it; on a “Sherman” any machine operator from the village who drove a tractor will easily transfer this engine, but on a “Panther” - only a specialist of the highest level, whom they have trained for years .
S. Aslanyan: But if you still leave it as a dry residue performance characteristics tanks, T-34 on a pedestal?
Yu. Pasholok: In general - yes, because the fact that
The T-34 was officially withdrawn from service in 1997, which says something.
V. Len: And our tankers, mind you, who won the Second World War, I believe that they are completely Soviet Union the back of fascism was broken, all the landings in Normandy and so on - these were all easy walks compared to what happened with the Soviet Union, we must remember and respect our ancestors.
So, literally this Saturday I spoke on Poklonka with the commander of the T-34-85 tank, Georgy Egorovich Kuzmin, and so he said that the T-34-85 was the best tank, and he started the war in the motorized battalion on July 15, 1941 year, the tank was received at Stalingrad. So, this man went through the whole war, and he said: “The T-34 was the best tank.” I respect him, low bow to all the tankers who fought on these tanks, they were the ones who defeated the great Germany, and the myth about them was broken here on Soviet soil.
Yu. Pasholok: Well, and, by the way, as for English tanks, the British had such an excellent tank industry that the most popular English tank during the war was the Sherman tank.
S. Aslanyan: In total, the economy assigned its own idea of which tank is the best, because it is the most affordable in production, and for all that, the T-34 is still really the best tank of the Second World War, because the economic component behind it is a massive tank, especially the T-34-85 worth 190 thousand rubles, and tactical and technical characteristics.
I read from the Germans in their memoirs their enthusiastic reviews about our T-34, when in the village they knocked it out, approached the already destroyed tank, ammunition was burning in the tank, and none of the Germans retreated, knowing full well and being besotted by this legend - they They said that, of course, the ammunition would explode, but “we know that its armor is so strong that nothing will hit us.”
V. Len: And when the turret flew away along with these Germans, when the high-explosive shells exploded, then they no longer thought about anything, and the turret, especially on the early T-34s, was one-two-three. God forbid, there was a direct hit, or diesel fuel began to burn after hitting the tanks - that’s it, the tower - the first thing that flew away within a few minutes flew 50 meters away.
Yu. Pasholok: In this case, it makes sense to raise the issue of the shortcomings of the T-34, of which there were a sufficient number.
S. Aslanyan: Having made a remark that this is rightfully the best tank.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes. This means, firstly, this tank had tanks inside the fighting compartment with all the ensuing consequences for the crew. Actually, it is believed that a gasoline engine is more dangerous - not entirely true. The fact is that if it hits a half-empty fuel tank, it detonates no worse than ammunition; not only can the tank’s turret fly off, but the front plate can also fly forward.
V. Len: The sides are widened - this is just a tank. The shells are when the tower flies away.
Yu. Pasholok: Secondly, there was a big problem: T-34 is really “blind”. The Germans had a bunch of inspection hatches - this is both a disadvantage, since anything can fly through any of these hatches, and at the same time an advantage, because the commander sitting in the commander’s turret sees everything. We simply didn’t have time to make the commander’s cupola. It was supposed to be a tank with a torsion bar suspension, with tanks stored in the rear engine compartment, there was supposed to be a three-man turret with a commander’s cupola, reinforced with armor, but, unfortunately, they didn’t make it all. In fact, we received such a tank only at the end of 1944, it was called T-44. And the T-34 is, in fact, the vehicle on which we had to fight, just as the Germans had to fight instead of their “VK-2001” and “VK-3001”...
V. Len: Predecessors of "Tiger".
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, and Panther. They had to fight with what they had, with the machine...
V. Len: Which was established in production.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, the T-3, which went into production in 1936, the T-4, which also went into production in 1936. What other disadvantages does the T-34 have? Actually, the suspension is spark plug, “swinging” - by the way, the British did not have these problems. Why? Actually, the British, like us, bought a license from Christie, but somehow we stopped monitoring Christie in the mid-1930s, and they did it in vain, because Christie introduced into the design of his tank in 1936 parallel shock absorber, which solved the problem of goatskin once and for all. And by the way, when they say that the Christie suspension is for light tanks, there is such a very light tank as the Merkava, it has 70 tons of combat weight.
V. Len: Officially - but a 10-ton mine plate is installed on the bottom.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, so, this tank has a Christie suspension, they just introduced a second shock absorber.
S. Aslanyan: Which is what they still use to this day. But the problem of visibility and sighting devices decided on the T-34...
V. Len: On early problem was.
Yu. Pasholok: This means that there were no problems with the sights. The fact is that even dug TMFD sights are quite normal.
V. Len: This is the commander and gunner.
Yu. Pasholok: And by the way, the Americans recognized them as much better than their own. The main problem was precisely the observation devices. Firstly, we had a structure made of stalinite, two pieces of iron, polished to a shine. The tank will fire - it may burst. Then they changed it with big fights, the plant was very reluctant to change the stalinite for something else - they installed prisms. But there was a problem: due to a violation of technology, they turned yellow very quickly. For example, these prisms were made in Gorky, but the coal did not arrive in the boiler room - as a result, they had a defect.
V. Len: But at the beginning of the war, tankers very often describe how the mechanics said that the viewing devices were enough for exactly 10 minutes. What they were doing? Before the battle, the hatch is always open to the palm of your hand. And so, they go into battle - as a rule, at first they did this, and later they did not do this. One viewing device is opened, they look into it for 5-10 minutes, then the second one. It’s very easy - you lean back with your hands, these two viewing devices are right in front of the driver, but after 15-20 minutes of battle you just need to open the hatch, and because of this, a lot of driver mechanics died.
Both tank commanders and radio operator gunners describe this situation - very often driver mechanics died precisely because the hatch was open, the tank commander very often says that they are simply without a head - they drive, drive, the tank has stopped, they cannot understand , what is it, they lower their head down - the mechanic has no head. This very often happened due to the fact that the hatch was slightly open to the palm of your hand.
The radio operator himself could not shoot in this tank; the viewing slot was literally 10 millimeters - through this hole it was impossible to observe the battlefield. All he did at the beginning of the war was help the driver shift the three-speed gearbox, which was outdated, and roll the cigarettes for the driver; he acted as an assistant to the driver. The walkie-talkie, in principle, did not need it; it was possible to switch to internal communication without it.
Yu. Pasholok: Another problem there is that he, in general, could, of course, hit somewhere with his course machine gun, but it was problematic because he did not have a sight as such - he had a hole in the ball mount.
V. Len: The hole is small.
Yu. Pasholok: Only in 1943 did they begin to introduce the PPO-8 device, which is a “PO” sight for a sniper rifle adapted for a ball mount. This sight has actually been installed since 1944, and not on all vehicles, but it only went to the T-34-85. As for surveillance devices, our armored vehicles still have a device such as the MK-4. It is believed that this is, in fact, an English device that was developed by the Polish engineer Gundlach, but the name “Wickers MK-4” and our name MK-4 have slightly different origins.
In this case, it is not a device, but a tank, a device similar to the device installed on the MK-4 tank, “Churchill”. This is a prism, which consists of two parts; in the event of some kind of fragment, this upper prism was broken - it was possible to open this prism, remove the top and install a new one. In addition, it can rotate 360 degrees - this is very convenient. Thanks to this, in fact, we stopped having a “blind” tank. Ideally, on the T-34-85, each crew member had an MK-4 sight in the turret, and the same is true on our heavy tanks.
V. Len: About the T-34-85, modified T-34-76. It already had a five-speed gearbox installed, which tankers already rated as very good. I drove both the T-34-76 and the T-34-85. Very often, tankers write that on the T-34-76 they turned on second gear immediately before the attack, because on the battlefield they might not have turned on third gear, and accordingly, the tank was immobilized and became a target. As for the second period of the war, the T-34-85 had a good gearbox, and this problem for tankers has already gone away.
S. Aslanyan: What kind of crew did the T-34 have, how many people? After all, its composition was constantly changing.
Yu. Pasholok: Four people in the T-34, five people in the T-34-85.
V. Len: Very often, the early T-34-76 did not take a radio operator with them, because he was a useless crew member; in fact, as for the second period of the war, the crews were almost always full.
S. Aslanyan: What did the five people do - positions?
Yu. Pasholok: This means a driver-mechanic, a gunner-radio operator, but then - just a gunner, because the T-34-85 radio moved to the turret, respectively, the commander - he also became a radio operator, gunner and loader.
S. Aslanyan: After all, is a shell handler a position you can’t live without?
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, sure.
V. Len: Absolutely. And, by the way, on early vehicles this was such a position - I’ll tell you the episodes that the tankers told. During the battle, inexperienced loaders lost consciousness after the first shots, the powder gases had nowhere to go, and, as a rule, T-34s went into battle with open hatches: so that the loader, after firing the cartridge case, would throw them into this hatch , because the cartridge case lies at the bottom, and there is an ammunition rack there, and continues to smoke, so the loaders tried to simply throw these cartridges overboard through the hatches during the battle.
Yu. Pasholok: This, in fact, is a continuation of the shortcomings of the T-34. Based on the experience of Khalkhin Gol and the battles for Lake Khasan, it was decided that the tank should have one large hatch so that the commander could shoot back, he opened the hatch in front and could shoot from his personal weapon.
V. Len: Like behind a shield.
Yu. Pasholok: Yes, but in fact this is a trap for the crew, because if the crew is wounded, they will not lift this hatch.
V. Len: Oh, and by the way, no one closed the hatch - they tried to just tie the hatch to a string. The commander did this without fail. And they tried not to hold belts, sword belts, etc. on themselves, so as not to get caught during evacuation from the tank. And there was an even bigger problem: the intercom device, which is in the helmet, has a very powerful plug, and many wounded tankers did not jump out of the tank only because they could not snatch this device.
Yu. Pasholok: By the way, the Germans have the same thing. When there were some legends that a German was chained in a tank, in fact, he could not get out in the same way, he could get caught...
V. Len: And back, it flies into the tank.
Yu. Pasholok: His entire set became his grave.
S. Aslanyan: These were Vyacheslav Len and Yuri Pasholok. We answered the question, which tank of World War II is the best? The answer is still the same - T-34.
Yu. Pasholok: Absolutely right.
Introduction
To understand which tank is the best, you must first understand what it is intended for. The illiterate majority believes that the main purpose of a tank is to meet an enemy combat vehicle in an open field and defeat it. In this case, the main characteristics of the tank naturally become the thickness of the armor and the initial velocity of the projectile. At the same time, the caliber of the projectile and, accordingly, the gun should not be very much inferior to the caliber of the battleship. This is what amateurs and fans of electronic games think ideal tanks look like.
In fact, the main task of a tank is to enter a hole in the enemy’s defense (which was provided by artillery or competent reconnaissance) and surround, defeat, and scare. To perform this task, completely different qualities are needed - mobility, reliability of the chassis and engine, a large supply of transportable fuel and shells. They may object to me. The enemy will throw his tank troops into the breakthrough area and a direct clash is inevitable.
The answer to this question was found by German troops in the summer of forty-one. If there is a threat of a frontal tank attack, you must run away behind anti-tank weapons. It is from these positions that we will try to determine the best tank of the Second World War.
Required armor thickness
Ideal armor consists of several layers - a hard layer, plastic (to dampen a cumulative jet), a layer of medium hardness, a substrate, a lining. In total it turns out to be twelve meters. What I mean is that it is simply not possible to protect a tank one hundred percent. Now I will express a not very complex but very important idea for subsequent understanding. The tank’s armor must be SUCH THICK that the enemy would have to use fairly powerful and, accordingly, HEAVY AND EXPENSIVE anti-tank guns to penetrate it. Concepts that are difficult and expensive for each historical period will be determined by the level of industrial development. For the period of World War II, an anti-tank gun with a high initial velocity of an armor-piercing projectile with a caliber of 76.2 millimeters and above was both heavy and expensive. The most striking example is our ZIS-2 and BS-3 anti-tank guns. The ZIS-2 was not much heavier than a forty-five-millimeter anti-tank gun, but ten thousand of them were produced in three years. And seventeen thousand anti-tank guns of forty-five millimeter caliber were produced in 1943 alone. With BS-3 it’s even worse. They pierced anything, but the weight of three thousand six hundred kilograms made maneuvering difficult. And the high cost made it possible to produce only one and a half thousand guns. Another very significant example. In 1944 they tried to strengthen the armor of the T-34-85. The thickness of the front sheet was increased to seventy-five millimeters. The driver's hatch was made one hundred millimeters thick. But as it turned out, a German tank gun of eighty-eight millimeter caliber still penetrates the frontal armor. Therefore, they decided not to overload the suspension and transmission and leave the armor with a thickness of forty-five millimeters, although in 1944 such armor only protected against shrapnel.
Powerful and heavy anti-tank guns have low maneuverability and low rate of fire. They are difficult to disguise and in general there are simply few of them. Therefore, it is not possible to reliably cover the ENTIRE front with them.
Knowing the criteria for an ideal tank - optimal armor, large ammunition load, mobility, reliability and range, let's analyze the most popular tanks of the Second World War.
M-4 Sherman
The American T-4 Sherman tank was a real misunderstanding made on the knee. He was very tall and had a very funny "tractor" suspension. The power of the gun and its armor protection were mediocre. Due to the lack of a planetary rotation mechanism, its transmission can be called primitive. But this primitive transmission was made in America and had amplifiers and synchronizers where needed. Therefore, controlling the tank was easy, and the design itself was quite reliable. The ammunition load was quite large, the radio station was the best in the world. The shells did not detonate when hitting the tank. And most importantly, it was produced in huge quantities. In an open field against the Tiger, Sherman had no chance. But as an INSTRUMENT of global war, it was much more useful than the Tiger. I highly recommend reading the memoirs of a veteran who fought almost the entire war on foreign tanks. The book is on the Internet, it’s called “Tank Driver in a Foreign Car.” Reading these memoirs, I came to the conclusion that in 1944 and 1945 our command used tank forces basically CORRECTLY.
German tanks
I'll start from the end, with the Panther and the Tiger. Both tanks were typical. They had a very modern and efficient suspension. But from the point of view of production and combat operation, this suspension was the height of idiocy. The weight, especially that of the tiger, was catastrophically overestimated. The fuel supply is minimal. Therefore, there is no need to talk about any mobility. These tanks could operate most effectively only as a mobile firing point.
The T-4 tank had an ancient “tractor” suspension and modern spaced armor. He received a long-barreled 75 mm gun only towards the middle of the war. Due to the muzzle brake that appeared, it was often confused with the Tiger.
The most advanced tank was the German T-3. It had a modern torsion bar suspension, plus oil compensators on the first and last rollers. He had the highest speed - almost seventy kilometers per hour. Moreover, the speed measurements were carried out by our specialists in Kubinka. It’s true that the tank doesn’t understand why this speed is so high. They don’t drive at that speed, not in a convoy or across a battlefield. A legitimate question arises - why was the best combat vehicle removed from service? The answer is the simplest - the narrow hull did not allow the installation of a 75 mm caliber gun.
T-44 is the best fighting machine
I will say right away that the T-44 tank did not have to fight, and it reached its full perfection two years after the end of the war. But using his example we can show what the ideal fighting vehicle of the Second World War should have been like.
The history of the design of the T-44 tank began with the strong desire of Soviet designers to replace it with something, or at least improve it legendary tank T-34. Fundamental changes and improvements to the design accumulated, but Stalin was afraid of cuts serial production, prohibited their implementation. After the liberation of eastern Ukraine, the question arose of what kind of car to launch in Kharkov? And then they decided that it was time for a new model.
The new tank had a simple hull with vertical side plates. This made it possible to erect a tower big size. The driver's hatch and the machine gun nest were missing from the front plate. It has become monolithic and more durable. The suspension has become a modern torsion bar. And most importantly, tank designers severely beat diesel engine designers. They, in turn, removed to other places all the auxiliary mechanisms of the engine that protruded beyond its dimensions. As a result, the tank's hull was three hundred millimeters lower. In the transmission, the gear ratios of the gears were changed, thereby reducing the operating loads and increasing reliability. Almost all fuel tanks were located in the engine compartment. I say practically because in the bow of the hull to the right of the driver’s mechanic they still placed one fuel tank. The only thing that kept the new car from a bright future was the onboard clutches inherited from the T-34.
The new car was fired at at the training ground from German guns of seventy-five and eighty-eight millimeter calibers. Then they added armor thickness and fired again. As a result of the increased weight, the suspension and transmission stopped "pulling". We urgently strengthened the suspension and replaced the side clutches with planetary turning mechanisms. The result was the T-54. It turns out the T-44 came very close but did not become the best fighting vehicle of World War II.
Designing the best tank of World War II
Of course, we take the T-44 hull as a basis. We install the planetary transmission. It will make it possible to make a fairly mobile machine weighing thirty-six tons with an engine power of five hundred and twenty horsepower. We remove the fuel tank from the fighting compartment. Instead, we make a vertical tank in the area of the stern sheet. At the same time, the body lengthens by only twenty centimeters, and we get four hundred liters of diesel fuel. Frontal and side armor eighty millimeters thick. It may be objected to me that the frontal armor is usually made thicker than the side armor. But our frontal armor is sloping and its RELIED thickness is one hundred and sixty millimeters. We make the tower welded and with a more developed rear part. This will increase the ammo capacity and improve the balancing of the turret. As for weapons, we will limit ourselves to an eighty-five millimeter caliber gun. Sotka is certainly more powerful, but the ammunition capacity is reduced by almost half. And as we found out during raids behind enemy lines, ammunition is the main thing. So we got the best tank of the Second World War.
HOW TO IDENTIFY A FOOL?
The fool does not read the article (or reads but does not understand the meaning of what he read), but immediately begins to comment. And most importantly, unlike an intelligent person, a fool never doubts.
What am I talking about? I just received another comment on the article.
Quote.
The best among which tanks?
The T-44 was just the logical conclusion of the T-34/85. And just like the T-34/85, it had a weak 85 mm ZIS-S-53 cannon.
For comparison, the main American tanks of those years, the M26 Pershing, were equipped with a powerful 90 mm cannon.
The British A41 Centurion was equipped with a powerful 76 mm QF 17 pounder cannon. And even the lighter A34 Comet (generally light, cruising) was equipped with a powerful 76 mm QF 77 mm HV cannon, next to which the Soviet 85 mm ZIS-S-53 tank gun nervously smoked on the sidelines.
Therefore, the USSR got out of its way and came up with some kind of “medium tanks”. The time of which (medium infantry in general) ended during the SECOND WORLD WAR and the whole world switched to the MAIN BATTLE TANK, PLUS some also had auxiliary light tanks. So these auxiliary light tanks, in terms of technical characteristics, roughly corresponded to the T-44.
Why did the essentially auxiliary BTT suddenly become somehow “better”, taking into account the existing main one (MBT)?
End of quote.
Let's start from the end. I didn't understand the last sentence. There are some strange abbreviations that, when deciphered, break the logic of the Russian language - taking into account the existing MAIN BATTLE TANK.
Apparently the author wanted to say that the T-44 was an auxiliary tank. Just wondering which tank the author considers the main one?
But the author’s main complaint is about the weak gun of the T-44 tank. Why does he need a more powerful gun? Fight the royal tigers?
That is, my entire article, where I explain that a tank IS A COMPLEX OF QUALITIES - mobility, protection, amount of ammunition and much more, did not enter the mind of the author of the comments. It is practically impossible to explain that the T-44 tank was supposed to fight the tigers last.
Now about tanks with good and powerful guns. The American gun had a muzzle brake, that is, after firing for about twenty seconds he did not see anything in the sight and did not understand where his projectile flew off.
By the way, installing a muzzle brake made it possible to install a one hundred millimeter caliber gun on the T-44.
The photo shows a T-44 with a 100 mm cannon. A projectile weighing sixteen kilograms accelerated to a speed of nine hundred meters per second.
Let's compare the power of the guns. American - 3,970,000 joules, ours - 6,400,000 joules. It even became somehow inconvenient for the Americans.
The author also recalls some MEDIUM infantry tanks. So, at the end of the war, the role of infantry tanks was performed by the SU-152 and IS-2. True, they were called breakthrough tanks.
Although World War I saw the introduction of tanks, World War II revealed the true fury of these mechanical monsters. During the fighting, they played an important role, both among the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and among the Axis powers. Both warring sides created a significant number of tanks. Below are ten outstanding tanks of World War II - the most powerful tanks of this period ever built.
10. M4 Sherman (USA)
The second most popular tank of the Second World War. Produced in the USA and some others Western countries anti-Hitler coalition mainly due to American program Lend-Lease, which provided military support for foreign allied powers. Medium tank The Sherman had a standard 75 mm gun with 90 rounds of ammunition and was equipped with relatively thin frontal armor (51 mm) compared to other vehicles of the period.
Developed in 1941, the tank was named after the famous American Civil War general, William T. Sherman. The vehicle took part in numerous battles and campaigns from 1942 to 1945. The relative lack of firepower was compensated by its enormous quantity: about 50 thousand Shermans were produced during the Second World War.
9. "Sherman-Firefly" (UK)
The Sherman Firefly was a British variant of the M4 Sherman tank that was equipped with a devastating 17-pounder anti-tank gun, more powerful than the original Sherman's 75mm gun. The 17 pounder was destructive enough to damage any known tank of the time. The Sherman Firefly was one of those tanks that terrified the Axis countries and was characterized as one of the deadliest fighting vehicles of the Second World War. In total, more than 2,000 units were produced.
8. T-IV (Germany)
PzKpfw IV is one of the most widely used and massive (8,696 units) German tanks during the Second World War. It was armed with a 75 mm cannon, which could destroy the Soviet T-34 at a range of 1200 meters.
Initially, these vehicles were used to support infantry, but eventually took on the role of a tank (T-III), and began to be used in battle as the main combat units.
7. T-34 (Soviet Union)
This legendary tank was the most popular during the War and the second most produced of all time (about 84 thousand vehicles). It is also one of the longest operating tanks ever produced. To this day, many surviving units are found in Asia and Africa.
The popularity of the T-34 is partly due to the sloping 45 mm frontal armor, which was not penetrated German shells. It was a fast, maneuverable and durable vehicle that caused serious concern to the command of the invading German tank units.
6. T-V “Panther” (Germany)
PzKpfw V "Panther" is a German medium tank that appeared on the battlefield in 1943 and remained until the end of the war. A total of 6,334 units were created. The tank reached speeds of up to 55 km/h, had strong 80 mm armor and was armed with a 75 mm gun with ammunition from 79 to 82 high-explosive fragmentation and armor-piercing shells. The T-V was powerful enough to damage any enemy vehicle at that time. It was technically superior to the Tiger and T-IV tanks.
And although the T-V Panther was later surpassed by numerous Soviet T-34s, it remained a serious opponent until the end of the war.
5. “Comet” IA 34 (UK)
One of Britain's most powerful fighting vehicles and probably the best that the country used in World War II. The tank was armed with a powerful 77-mm cannon, which was a shortened version of the 17-pounder gun. Thick armor reached 101 millimeters. However, "Comet" did not provide significant influence on the course of the War due to its late introduction to the battlefields - around 1944, when the Germans were retreating.
But be that as it may, during its short service life this military vehicle has shown its effectiveness and reliability.
4. "Tiger I" (Germany)
Tiger I is a German heavy tank developed in 1942. It had a powerful 88-mm gun with 92-120 rounds of ammunition. It was successfully used against both air and ground targets. The full German name of this beast is Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E, but the Allies simply called this vehicle “Tiger”.
It accelerated to 38 km/h and had non-tilted armor with a thickness of 25 to 125 mm. When it was created in 1942, it suffered from some technical problems, but was soon freed from them, turning into a ruthless mechanical hunter by 1943.
The Tiger was a formidable machine, which forced the Allies to develop more advanced tanks. It symbolized the strength and power of the Nazi war machine, and until mid-war, no Allied tank was strong enough or powerful enough to withstand the Tiger in a direct confrontation. However, during the final stages of World War II, the Tiger's dominance was often challenged by the better armed Sherman Fireflies and Soviet IS-2 tanks.
3. IS-2 “Joseph Stalin” (Soviet Union)
The IS-2 tank belonged to a whole family of heavy tanks of the Joseph Stalin type. It had characteristic sloped armor with a thickness of 120 mm and a large 122 mm gun. The frontal armor was impenetrable to German 88-mm shells anti-tank guns at a distance of more than 1 kilometer. Its production began in 1944, a total of 2,252 tanks of the IS family were built, about half of which were modifications of the IS-2.
During the Battle of Berlin, IS-2 tanks destroyed entire German buildings with high-explosive fragmentation shells. It was a real battering ram of the Red Army as it advanced towards the heart of Berlin.
2. M26 “Pershing” (USA)
The United States created a heavy tank that belatedly took part in World War II. It was developed in 1944, the total number of tanks produced was 2,212 units. The Pershing was a more complex model compared to the Sherman, with a lower profile and larger tracks, which provided the vehicle with better stability.
The main gun had a caliber of 90 millimeters (70 shells were attached to it), powerful enough to penetrate the Tiger's armor. "Pershing" had the strength and power to frontally attack those vehicles that the Germans or Japanese could use. But only 20 tanks took part in combat operations in Europe and very few were sent to Okinawa. After the end of World War II, Pershings took part in the Korean War and continued to be used in American troops. The M26 Pershing could have been a game changer if it had been deployed to the battlefield sooner.
1. "Jagdpanther" (Germany)
Jagdpanther is one of the most powerful fighters tanks in World War II. It was based on the Panther chassis, entered service in 1943, and served until 1945. It was armed with an 88 mm cannon with 57 rounds and had 100 mm frontal armor. The gun maintained accuracy at a distance of up to three kilometers and had a muzzle velocity of over 1000 m/s.
Only 415 tanks were built during the war. The Jagdpanthers received their baptism of fire on July 30, 1944 near Saint Martin De Bois, France, where they destroyed eleven Churchill tanks within two minutes. Technical excellence and advanced firepower had little impact on the course of the war due to the late introduction of these monsters.
When tanks appeared during the First World War, it became clear that it would no longer be possible to fight battles as before. Old-fashioned tactical schemes and tricks completely refused to work against mechanical “animals” equipped with machine guns and cannons. But the “finest hour” of steel monsters came during the next war – World War II. What the Germans and the Allies were well aware of was that the key to success was hidden precisely in powerful tracked vehicles. Therefore, crazy amounts of money were allocated for constant modernization of tanks. Thanks to this, metal “predators” evolved at a rapid pace.
This Soviet tank acquired the status of a legend as soon as it appeared on the battlefield. The metal beast was equipped with a 500-horsepower diesel engine, “advanced” armor, a 76 mm F-34 gun and wide tracks. This configuration allowed the T-34 to become the best tank of its time.
Another advantage of the combat vehicle was the simplicity and manufacturability of its design. Thanks to this, it was possible to establish mass production of the tank in the shortest possible time. By the summer of 1942, about 15 thousand T-34s were produced. In total, during production, the USSR created more than 84 thousand “thirty-fours” in various modifications.
In total, about 84 thousand T-34s were produced
The main problem of the tank was its transmission. The fact is that it, together with the power unit, was located in a special compartment located in the stern. Thanks to this technical solution, the cardan shaft became unnecessary. The dominant role was played by control rods, the length of which was about 5 meters. Accordingly, it was difficult for the driver to handle them. And if a person coped with difficulties, then the metal sometimes gave way - the rods simply broke. Therefore, T-34s often went into battle in one gear, switched on in advance.
The "Tiger" was created with one purpose - to crush any enemy and send him into a stampede. Hitler himself personally ordered to cover new tank frontal armor plate 100 millimeters thick. And the stern and sides of the Tiger were covered with 80 millimeters of armor. The main “trump card” of the combat vehicle was its weapon - the 88 mm KwK 36 cannon, created on the basis of an anti-aircraft gun. The gun was distinguished by its consistency of hits and also a record rate of fire. Even in combat conditions, the KwK 36 could “spit” shells as many as 8 times in a minute.
In addition, "Tiger" was another one of the most fast tanks that time. It was driven by a Maybach power unit with 700 hp. It was kept company by an 8-speed hydromechanical gearbox. And on the chassis the tank could accelerate to 45 km/h.
The Tiger cost 800,000 Reichsmarks
It is curious that the technical manual contained in each Tiger contained the following inscription: “The tank costs 800,000 Reichsmarks. Keep him safe!". Goebbels believed that the tankers would be proud that they were entrusted with such an expensive toy. But in reality it was often different. The soldiers were panicky that something might happen to the tank.
Tank evolution developed rapidly. Opponents constantly brought more and more improved fighters into the “ring”. The IS-2 became a worthy response to the USSR. The heavy breakthrough tank was equipped with a 122 mm howitzer. If a shell from this weapon hit a building, then, in fact, only ruins remained.
In addition to the howitzer, the IS-2's arsenal included a 12.7 mm DShK machine gun located on the turret. Bullets fired from this weapon pierced even the thickest brickwork. Therefore, enemies had practically no chance to hide from the formidable metal monster. Another important advantage of the tank is its armor. It reached 120 mm.
An IS-2 shot turned the building into ruins
There were, of course, some downsides. The main thing is the fuel tanks in the control compartment. If the enemy managed to penetrate the armor, then the crew of the Soviet tank had virtually no chance of escape. The worst thing was for the driver. After all, he did not have his own hatch.
Before facing the Germans, the heavy tank underwent baptism of fire in the war with the Finns. The monster weighing 45 tons was an invincible enemy until the very end of 1941. The tank's protection consisted of 75 millimeters of steel. The frontal armor plates were placed so well that the shell resistance terrified the Germans. Still would! After all, their 37 mm anti-tank guns could not penetrate the KV-1 even from a minimum distance. As for 50 mm guns, the limit is 500 meters. And a Soviet tank, equipped with a long-barreled 76 mm F-34 gun, could knock out the enemy from a distance of about one and a half kilometers.
Weak transmission is the main problem of the KV-1
But, unfortunately, the tank also had disadvantages. The main problem was the “raw” design, which was rushed into production. The real “Achilles heel” of the KV-1 was the transmission. Due to the heavy loads associated with the weight of the combat vehicle, it broke down too often. Therefore, during retreats, tanks had to be abandoned or destroyed. Since it was unrealistic to repair them in combat conditions.
Still, the Germans managed to snatch several KV-1s. But they didn’t let them get involved. Constant breakdowns and lack of necessary spare parts quickly put an end to the captured vehicles.
The German Panther, weighing 44 tons, was superior to the T-34 in mobility. On the highway, this “predator” could accelerate to almost 60 km/h. It was armed with a 75 mm KwK 42 cannon, the barrel length of which was 70 calibers. "Panther" could "spit" armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile, flying a kilometer in the first second. Thanks to this, the German vehicle could knock out almost any enemy tank at a distance exceeding a couple of kilometers.
"Panther" could penetrate tank armor at a distance of over 2 kilometers
If the Panther's forehead was protected by an armor plate with a thickness of 60 to 80 mm, then the armor on the sides was thinner. That's why soviet tanks they tried to hit the “beast” precisely in that weak spot.
In total, Germany managed to create about 6 thousand Panthers. Another curious thing: in March 1945, hundreds of these tanks, equipped with night vision devices, went on an attack on Soviet troops near Balaton. But this technical trick did not help either.