What is happening with the programs to protect Russian nuclear materials? Is it possible to control Minatom and how closed is it from Russian society?

Question: How big is the Russian black market for radioactive materials and what are the latest trends in this illegal business? Who are the sellers and who are the potential buyers in this black market?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Let's first define what we mean by the “black market for radioactive materials.” Very often the concepts nuclear and radioactive materials are used interchangeably, which is incorrect. In fact, radioactive materials are a very broad category that includes fissile materials (used both for military purposes and for the production of nuclear fuel); and radioactive isotopes, mainly used in industry and medicine; and finally, radioactive waste generated during various operations with fissile materials. The first category of materials is usually called nuclear materials. Among them, weapons-grade nuclear materials are especially distinguished, that is, those materials that can be used to produce a nuclear bomb with virtually no additional processing. Such materials include plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium with a uranium-235 content of more than 90 percent. Uranium of lower enrichment, but with a uranium-235 content of at least 20 percent, can also be used to create weapons, but in this case the amount of uranium to create a bomb increases many times. For example, if 90 percent uranium requires only 8 kg, then 20 percent uranium will require at least about 60 kg.

As far as the “black market” is concerned, until recently it was mainly about the “black market” of nuclear materials that can be used to produce weapons. The possibility of leakage of such nuclear materials has been and remains the greatest concern, since it is the complexity of their production that is the main obstacle for countries or terrorist organizations seeking to create nuclear weapons. Possible buyers may include states, terrorists, international organized crime groups, separatist ethnic or religious groups, etc.

Low enriched uranium and other uranium group elements, as well as isotopes, unlike the previous category, are available on the commercial market. Of course, nuclear fuel will not be sold to everyone. On the other hand, none nuclear power plant will not buy nuclear fuel cheaply from an unknown dealer. It's the same story with isotopes. A black market for nuclear waste seems unlikely, although Lately Concerns regarding the creation of the so-called have intensified. "dirty" or radiation bomb, in which ordinary explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. It should be borne in mind, however, that the degree of contamination of the area caused by the use of a “dirty bomb” is significantly exaggerated - the danger to the life and health of the population is many orders of magnitude less, and only a relatively small area can be contaminated.

Therefore, let's limit ourselves to considering the black market for nuclear materials. Like any market, it is determined by the presence of supply and demand and their relationship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was discovered that the system of control and protection of nuclear materials was closely linked to a certain political and economic system, including the absence of private enterprise, the monopoly of foreign trade, strict control of border crossings, etc. The system, designed to counter an external enemy (foreign spies or armies), was not designed for any nuclear employee accustomed to the relative financial well-being and prestige of Soviet time and suddenly finding himself in a depressing financial situation, he can take a couple of kilograms of uranium outside the gates of the enterprise in the hope of selling it. In Soviet times, even if this had happened, such an employee, firstly, would not have found a buyer, and secondly, he would quickly find himself “under the hood” of the KGB. It was necessary to urgently rebuild the system of control over nuclear materials, adapting it to the market and democracy, especially since the market, especially at first, was wild, and democracy was boundless; under such conditions, the existing control systems in the West might not be able to withstand it. Moreover, articles periodically appeared in the press about the fabulous sums that could be earned for nuclear materials. In addition, the Soviet control system was not designed for the emergence of such a threat as nuclear terrorism. Who at that time could have imagined the emergence of the Chechen problem, Al-Qaeda, etc.?

But let's return to supply and demand. 1992-1995 accounts for greatest number known and later confirmed cases of theft of nuclear materials from Russian facilities. The most serious cases include: the theft of 1.5 kg of 90% enriched uranium in Podolsk from the Luch enterprise in 1992, the theft of 1.8 kg of 36% enriched uranium from the naval base in Andreeva Bay in 1993, confiscation in 1995 in Moscow of 1.7 kg of 21% enriched uranium, previously stolen from the Elektrostal plant. In all cases, the theft was carried out by direct employees of the facilities or with their assistance. It is characteristic that the above cases and a number of other less significant incidents lead to the conclusion that most often the materials were stolen from enterprises associated with the production of nuclear fuel, or from naval bases where nuclear submarines are stationed. Moreover, the loss of materials was most often discovered after the criminals were caught. Another characteristic feature In these cases, the thieves did not have a pre-order for the materials and stole them with the hope of finding a buyer on their own. Apparently, finding a buyer was not so easy, and bungled attempts to sell the goods were prevented even before the nuclear materials crossed the border.

What stands out is a whole series of incidents involving highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Western Europe, primarily the so-called “Munich” and “Prague” cases of 1994-1995. Both refer to special operations police, who ordered the material. The West claims that the nuclear materials in both cases were Russian origin. Russia denies these claims. The determination of the source of materials has not yet been completed.

In most black market operations, as it turns out during the investigation, criminals pass off low-enriched uranium or radioactive isotopes, or even substances that have nothing in common with nuclear materials, as weapons-grade materials. This was the case in a very recent case in December 2001, when six members of the Balashikha criminal group were arrested, trying to pass off low-enriched uranium fuel pellets as highly enriched uranium. By the way, this is almost the first case in Russia in which organized crime appears. Apparently, trading in nuclear materials is too dangerous and not very profitable. Atomic Energy Minister Rumyantsev stated in an interview some time after this incident that uranium tablets were stolen from the Elektrostal plant long before the criminals were detained and that the special services had been spying on the Balashikha group for many years. Among those detained was an FSB officer, but whether he was introduced into the group or was part of it on his own initiative remains unclear.

After 1995 and until 2000, there were virtually no reports of theft or loss of nuclear materials in Russia. If any cases arose, they were more likely to concern radioactive materials. A large role in the fact that such cases began to decline was played by the measures taken Russian government with financial and technical assistance from the West to strengthen both the physical protection of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, and to introduce an adequate accounting and control system. However, some attribute the decline in activity on the nuclear black market to criminals becoming more professional, or to tighter restrictions on this type of information. It is difficult to assess the validity of such assessments - the lack of information may support one or the other point of view.

The only high-profile case of the period 1995-2000 is related to the report of the head of the FSB Chelyabinsk region in 1998 about the successful suppression of the theft of 18.5 kg of material that could be used to create nuclear weapons by a group of employees of one of the nuclear enterprises in the region. This is the only message that mentions enough material to make a nuclear warhead. In most other cases where weapons-grade nuclear materials are involved, we were talking about grams, a maximum of one or two kilograms. However, this case is not completely clear. Some experts assess it quite skeptically and talk about the desire of the local FSB to curry favor (especially since, at least in the open press, no further information appeared, and the case, apparently, was not transferred to court). Others, on the contrary, argue that the authenticity of this report was confirmed through unofficial channels in the Ministry of Atomic Energy. This case was also cited in a recent CIA report, but for some reason it was already presented not as an attempt, but as an accomplished theft, although with the caveat that the case was not officially confirmed.

In general, assessing all reports related to the theft or illicit trade of nuclear or radioactive materials is not an easy task. The IAEA has been keeping records of such cases since 1993, including sending requests to the countries involved in the reports, asking them to confirm or refute the information. However, there are no mechanisms for forcing such data to be reported or verified. Therefore, even the most complete and official databases of transactions on the black market of nuclear and radioactive materials cannot claim to reliably reflect absolutely all cases. However, general trends in these data can be tracked. Including where the materials came from and where, who the contractor was, who the customer was. Unfortunately, Russia and the former republics of the Union occupy an “honorable” first place in the IAEA database.

One of the trends in recent years is an increase in cases, compared with the early and mid-90s, of illegal trade in nuclear materials or masquerading as nuclear materials in the Asian direction and a decrease in the number of cases in Europe. What is this, a change in the direction of material transfer flows? Strengthening radiation control and the capabilities of intelligence services in Asian countries, which have finally begun to catch dealers in the nuclear business? Moving the market closer to potential buyers, be they countries or terrorist organizations?

As I said above, very often they try to pass off radioactive materials and isotopes as nuclear materials. However, one should not take comfort in the fact that they cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb. Many of them are dangerous in themselves and can cause serious illnesses, or even be fatal. If you remember, in 1995, on Basayev’s instructions, a container with the radioactive isotope cesium-137 was buried in Izmailovsky Park. There was also a case where radioactive substances were used to eliminate business rivals. Recently in Georgia, several hunters found old Soviet-era batteries using a cesium isotope in the forest and received a very high degree of contamination, including skin burns.

Of course, the number of victims will not be comparable to the losses from a nuclear bomb explosion and, as noted above, one can often (especially in the press) find greatly inflated estimates. For example, at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, one company tried to sell the New York City mayor's office a program for calculating damage from a “dirty bomb,” which, according to experts, overestimated the damage by two to three times. Still, it is worth keeping in mind that if the damage is multiplied by the psychological effect, the result can be significant. Even if no one dies from radiation, many people may simply be trampled while fleeing.

Despite the fact that the picture seems to be relatively prosperous, it is worth keeping in mind that we only know of successfully stopped operations or discovered losses. There is no guarantee that any part of the illegal transactions resulted in the transfer of nuclear materials. It is impossible to determine whether such transactions took place and what the ratio between solved and unsolved cases was.

Question: What are the main dangers in the security system around Russian nuclear facilities?

Answer. Elena Sokova: The most urgent measures to ensure the protection of nuclear materials in Russia were taken back in the mid-90s. They mainly concerned those facilities where nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials are stored or produced. Even according to CIA estimates, this category, while not ideal, is quite reliably protected. Still, there is still a lot to do here until the situation is brought to its optimum. Physical protection and accounting and control of remaining nuclear materials remain on the agenda. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the percentage of buildings and businesses that have the required protective systems installed (including even fences) is only 37 percent of the total. total number facilities that need to improve the level of security according to international standards. Much remains to be done before it can be said that the technical and organizational conditions have been provided to prevent the leakage of materials and protect against attacks on nuclear facilities.

Among the most important tasks for the near future is the consolidation of nuclear materials at a limited number of facilities. It is clear that the fewer objects, the faster and more efficiently it is possible to bring the protection of each of them to the required level.

It is also necessary to strive for the speedy introduction and strict implementation of a modern system of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Precisely due to the absence in Soviet times of accurate inventory data on the amount of nuclear materials at enterprises, we cannot say for sure whether all cases of theft were identified and whether the reserves seized in the early and mid-90s are hidden somewhere in the garage.

Unfortunately, violations of the rules for accounting and control of nuclear materials still occur. At the end of last year, a letter from the head of Gosatomnadzor became known, where he describes a case of incorrect indication in the accompanying documents of the amount and condition of spent fuel from submarines sent for reprocessing at Mayak in the Chelyabinsk region. It turned out that the sent nuclear fuel, unlike what was indicated in the documents, was from a damaged reactor; moreover, some elements were missing up to half of the fuel. The Mayak personnel were put at risk, and a search for the “missing” fuel was urgently organized.

There is also concern about the huge amount of accumulated spent nuclear fuel, both from nuclear power plants and submarine reactors. Research institutions conducting experiments with nuclear materials, where controls and protections are often much weaker than in fuel cycle facilities and military production, deserve close attention. And finally, it is necessary to establish strict and strict control over radioactive isotopes in industry and medicine.

It is necessary to put things in order with the intake of metals. Quite often, the target of thefts is precious and non-ferrous metals from nuclear facilities, including submarines. The loss of a small platinum record could jeopardize the safety of the entire crew and cause disaster. The theft of a bucket from a special excavator clearing radioactive rubble not only causes material losses, but also slows down the already slowly ongoing work to clean up radioactive areas. Last fall, in the city of Ozersk, where the Mayak plant is located, enterprising metal assemblers dismantled 100 meters of railway tracks on one of the branches of the access roads to the plant.

Question: Do you agree with the statement that Minatom is much more closed from Russian society than from Western donors (in particular, there is sometimes more classified information on the desks of US Department of Energy officials than in the Russian parliament)?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Minatom is closed both from its own and from strangers. As far as the military program is concerned, secrecy is justified and practiced by all countries possessing nuclear weapons. Another thing is the accountability of the activities of nuclear enterprises and Minatom itself to the government, including the Duma, and to society. The possibilities for independent government control are unjustifiably limited and curtailed. GosAtomnadzor has lost a significant number of its supervisory rights compared to what it had in the early 1990s. Even what remains is not fully used.

Financial transparency of Minatom's activities is minimal. For so many years now they have been trying to achieve transparency from Minatom in the use of funds from the Megatons-to-Megawatts deal with the United States. The case of spent fuel from Kozloduy (Bulgaria), when Minatom was forced to disclose both the amount of the transaction and the price per kilogram, and even provided information on how much funds were transferred Krasnoyarsk region, proves that achieving transparency is, in principle, possible. So far these are isolated cases. The information openness of Minatom in relation to the public, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired. The other day, Minister Rumyantsev himself admitted this at a meeting with environmental organizations.

I don’t think Minatom is any more open to the West. Another thing is that between Russian and American departments there is an exchange of information that, in principle, is not subject to disclosure. Paradoxically, it often happens that governments share information that they hide from their public. This happens quite often - for example, one of the annexes to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms is classified because the data it contains could be used by terrorists. From this point of view, it is true that the United States sometimes knows more about the Russian nuclear industry than Russian citizens.

Question: Russia is increasingly being called in the West, both in official circles and in the press, a large radioactive hole. What do you think?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Hole is probably not the right word. One meaning of the word “hole” is associated with a pit where everything falls. In this sense, such a name is quite applicable, especially if we talk about radioactive waste and even more so about plans for the import of spent nuclear fuel. There are already plenty of such pit-dumps in Russia. A recent report on the construction of a nuclear waste repository, including foreign ones, at one of the Kuril Islands especially alarming.

Another meaning of the word "hole" is an opening through which everything flows out. So far, most of the stolen nuclear materials have been identified and intercepted before they left Russian territory. To ensure both Russian and international security, it is necessary to close even the smallest holes at Russian nuclear facilities and ensure reliable protection nuclear materials, their accounting and control. As reports from recent months show, there are still many holes, including in the barriers of closed cities. One of these holes was freely used by Duma deputy Mitrokhin with a group of environmentalists and cameramen to penetrate the territory of the closed city of Zheleznogorsk. One of the Chechens arrested in Sverdlovsk who was selling weapons and explosives turned out to have a valid pass to the territory of the city of Lesnoy, where nuclear warheads are assembled.

Behind last years According to Minatom reports, the financial condition of the industry has improved. But has funding for work in this area increased? The increased attention to these issues in Russia since 9/11, as well as the renewed cooperation in this area between the United States and Russia, is encouraging. However, the scale of the problem is so great that it will take years and significant amounts of money. It is unlikely to do without constant control at the highest political level and concentration of efforts and resources.

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1. Introduction

5. Strengthening the NPT

7. Iran problem

9. Conclusion

List of sources

1. Introduction

The first prerequisites for the emergence of nuclear weapons appeared in the 19th century, and already in the mid-20th century the first tests were carried out in the USA the latest type weapons - a nuclear bomb. The first bomb was detonated in the United States in July 1945. in testing order. The second and third were dropped by the Americans in August of the same year on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - this is the first and only case of combat use of nuclear weapons in the history of mankind. In 1949, nuclear weapons appeared in the USSR, in 1952 in Great Britain and in 1960 in France. The country's nuclear weapons gave it the status of a superpower and guaranteed a certain military security and stability. In subsequent years, China joined the ranks of countries possessing nuclear weapons. An assessment of the possible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons during an armed conflict led to the fact that UN member countries came to an agreement on the need to prohibit free access to nuclear weapons and the need for international control over nuclear technology and use nuclear energy.

2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The military use of atomic energy began in 1945, when the Americans first tested in the Alamogordo Desert and then used nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From this moment the history of the development of atomic weapons began. In 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant was opened in Obninsk. A balance has emerged between the military use of atomic energy and peaceful use. The international community was faced with the question of how to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since this could cause greater instability in the world, and at the same time open the way to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was from this time that work began on the development of international norms for the limitation of nuclear weapons, which in their final form received the name “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

All countries of the world participate in it, except India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan. Thus, in scope, it represents the most comprehensive arms control agreement yet. The treaty divides states parties into two categories - nuclear and non-nuclear. Countries that have tested a nuclear explosive device by the time the Treaty was signed are classified as nuclear: Russia, USA, China, Great Britain and France. All of them are simultaneously permanent members of the UN Security Council. Non-nuclear countries do not have the right to create nuclear weapons.

The NPT came into force in 1970 and initially had a duration of 25 years. In 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference extended the Treaty indefinitely, making it of unlimited duration.

3. Main provisions of the agreement

The Treaty establishes that a nuclear weapons state is one that produced and detonated such a weapon or device before January 1, 1967 (that is, the USSR, USA, Great Britain, France and China).

Under the Treaty, each of the States Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to transfer to anyone these weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them, either directly or indirectly; nor in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire, or control over, nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertakes not to accept from anyone any nuclear weapons and/or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over them, either directly or indirectly; as well as not to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to accept any assistance in their production.

The Treaty establishes the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the Treaty. The treaty obliges its parties to exchange equipment, materials, scientific and technical information for these purposes, and to help non-nuclear states obtain benefits from any peaceful use of nuclear explosions.

An important addition to the treaty is the UN Security Council resolution of June 19, 1968 and identical statements by the three nuclear powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain on the issue of security guarantees for non-nuclear states parties to the treaty. The resolution stipulates that in the event of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state or the threat of such an attack, the Security Council and, above all, its permanent members possessing nuclear weapons will have to act immediately in accordance with the UN Charter to repel the aggression; it also reaffirms the right of states to individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter until the Security Council takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. The statements made by each of the three powers at the adoption of this resolution indicate that any state that has committed aggression using nuclear weapons or threatens such aggression must know that its actions will be effectively countered by measures taken in accordance with UN Charter; they also proclaim the intention of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain to provide assistance to a non-nuclear party to the treaty that is subject to a nuclear attack.

The five states that possess nuclear weapons have committed themselves not to use them against states that do not have such weapons, except in situations where they are responding to a nuclear strike or attack with nuclear weapons. conventional means committed in alliance with a nuclear state. These obligations, however, were not included in the text of the Treaty itself, and specific form such obligations could change over time. The United States, for example, has indicated that it could use nuclear weapons in response to an attack using non-nuclear “weapons of mass destruction,” such as biological or chemical weapons, since the United States could not use either in response. British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon indirectly referred to the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack carried out by any of the “rogue states.”

Article VI and the Preamble of the Treaty specify that nuclear-weapon states will strive to reduce and destroy their nuclear stockpiles. However, in the more than 30 years of the Treaty's existence, little has been done in this direction. Article I commits nuclear-weapon states not to “induce any non-nuclear-weapon State ... to acquire nuclear weapons”—but the adoption by a nuclear-weapon state of a military doctrine based on pre-emptive strike capabilities, as well as other threats to use armed force, may be permitted. in principle considered as this kind of motivation. Article X states that any state has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it feels compelled to do so by some “extraordinary event”—for example, by a perceived threat.

The Treaty itself does not establish a mechanism for verifying its compliance, nor does it establish an international body to monitor its implementation. Such monitoring is carried out by review conferences convened every five years. Typically, review conferences are held in New York in May. In the breaks between them, according to the decision of the 1995 conference, sessions of the preparatory committee meet - two sessions each between conferences.

In practice, the functions of verifying compliance with the NPT are performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with which each party to the Treaty that does not possess nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude an appropriate agreement.

4. International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) was created in 1957 in accordance with the UN decision of December 4, 1954 and is part of the UN system, with which it is linked by a special agreement. It annually submits a report on its activities to the UN General Assembly and, if necessary, to the UN Security Council. The main area of ​​activity is the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA convenes international scientific forums to discuss issues of nuclear energy development, sends various countries specialists to help with research work, provides interstate intermediary services for the transfer of nuclear equipment and materials. Much attention in the activities of the IAEA is paid to the issues of ensuring the safety of nuclear energy, especially after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. However, one of the most important functions is monitoring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, monitoring compliance with the NPT. Each non-nuclear weapon party to the Treaty is required to enter into an appropriate agreement with the IAEA, which is the world's only international inspector for nuclear safeguards and security controls in the field of civil nuclear programs.

According to agreements signed with states, IAEA inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify reports on the location of nuclear materials, check IAEA-installed instruments and monitoring equipment, and inventory nuclear materials. Together, these and other verification measures provide independent international evidence that states are meeting their commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To monitor the implementation of existing safeguards agreements signed by the Agency with 145 IAEA Member States (plus Taiwan), 250 IAEA experts conduct on-site safeguards agreement inspections daily in all parts of the world. The purpose of inspections is to ensure that nuclear materials are being used for legitimate peaceful purposes and are not being used for military purposes. By doing so, the IAEA contributes to international security and strengthens efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons and move towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

Safeguards agreements may be concluded with the IAEA various types, such as the Safeguards Agreement related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These agreements require non-nuclear-weapon states to submit all their activities related to the complete nuclear fuel cycle to the IAEA for verification. Other types of agreements relate to single plant guarantees. IAEA guarantees under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and are indispensable in ensuring the implementation of the Treaty.

Currently there are 146 states in the IAEA. Governing bodies-- the General Conference of all member countries convened annually, the Board of Governors of 35 people, which directs the practical activities of the Agency, and the Secretariat, which carries out the day-to-day work (headed by the Director General). The headquarters of the IAEA is located at the International Vienna Centre. In addition, the IAEA maintains regional offices in Canada, Geneva, New York and Tokyo, laboratories in Austria and Monaco and a research center in Trieste (Italy), managed by UNESCO. Since 2005, the organization has been headed by Mohamed ElBaradei.

Speaking at the 2005 conference, ElBaradei presented proposals to strengthen and tighten the non-proliferation regime. In particular, he proposed toughening the actions of the UN Security Council against any country that withdraws from the NPT; strengthen investigations and prosecutions of any illegal trade in nuclear materials and technologies; accelerate the nuclear disarmament of nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT; take measures to address existing security deficits in regions like the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula.

He explains the tightening of requirements by the fact that currently about 40 countries in the world have the potential to create nuclear weapons. There is a real “black market” for nuclear materials in the world; more and more countries are attempting to acquire technologies for the production of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons. There is also a clear desire of terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

This is the main disadvantage of this mode. The participating countries themselves determined which facilities to place under IAEA guarantees. This opened up the possibility of violating the Treaty, since any state could hide the presence of its infrastructure for the creation of nuclear weapons, and the IAEA had no right to verify it. However, even such limited checks made it possible to uncover some facts of illegal activity. First of all, in the early 1990s, inspections carried out by the IAEA at North Korean sites revealed Pyongyang's secret and very large-scale nuclear program.

This shortcoming of the inspection regime became especially obvious after the first war in the zone Persian Gulf 1990-91 It was discovered that Iraq was very actively pursuing a secret nuclear program. As a result, in 1996, an agreement was reached within the IAEA on a model additional protocol to safeguards agreements. All states, including nuclear ones, were asked to sign such protocols. IAEA inspectors received the right to visit sites not declared by the host country as nuclear. This significantly expanded the Agency's ability to verify compliance with the NPT.

To control the supply of hazardous nuclear materials, member states with nuclear technologies back in the 1970s. created two informal “clubs” - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. Although the decisions of these structures are not legally binding, the participating countries voluntarily undertake to implement them. At meetings of “clubs” that unite several dozen countries, checklists of materials and technologies are agreed upon, the export of which is subject to control by the competent authorities of the participating states. In addition, decisions of a political nature are also considered there. In particular, in 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to ban the transfer of any nuclear technology (including for peaceful purposes) to countries that have not placed all their nuclear facilities under IAEA guarantees, naturally, with the exception of the five nuclear powers included in NPT.

5. Strengthening the NPT

non-proliferation nuclear weapons Iranian

Recently, discussions about revising or strengthening a number of provisions of the NPT have intensified. However, the document reflects a carefully calibrated global balance of interests and compromises between almost two hundred countries of the world. Under these conditions, introducing changes and additions to it carries the risk that the “opening” of the package could lead to an avalanche-like increase in proposals and demands from many states. As a result, the existing Treaty itself may be buried under the weight of these requests. Therefore, most states have not yet shown readiness to “open” the document for new negotiations on its improvement.

Nevertheless, discussions are ongoing. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 2004 and its subsequent nuclear test drew attention to Article 10 of the document governing withdrawal. This article allows any state party to withdraw from the NPT if higher interests his national security are at risk. Such a state must send a notice of withdrawal to the depositary states and the UN, and after 6 months. it may consider itself free from obligations under the Treaty.

The DPRK used this right twice - in 1994 and 2004. The precedent created by Pyongyang showed that states can be within the framework of the NPT, develop nuclear technology quite legally (hiding the military components of nuclear programs), and, if necessary, withdraw from the Treaty and not suffer any punishment for this. The understanding of the unacceptability of such a situation began to grow.

A number of proposals were put forward. First, completely prohibit withdrawal from the NPT. This radical idea has not met with any serious support, since it contradicts the sovereignty of states and runs counter to the established general international legal practice. Another proposal is to require states withdrawing from the NPT to give up the benefits they have received as a result of membership in the Treaty. They would have to return nuclear equipment, materials and technology to suppliers. They would also be deprived of the right to continue such supplies. But this proposal, which does not require mandatory amendments to the document itself, was negatively received by the majority of developing countries. These states pointed out that, in practice, it would be extremely difficult to return materials and technology obtained by the withdrawing state through peaceful means and, indirectly, such a provision would actually legitimize the use of military force against countries that left the Treaty.

A lively debate is also taking place around Article 4, which recognizes the right of all member states to the peaceful use of atomic energy and obliges states that have nuclear technology to provide assistance in this to those countries that do not have such technology. At the same time, there are technological similarities between peaceful and military nuclear programs. Thus, if a state acquires technology for enriching uranium to the levels required for the production of fuel for nuclear power plants (several percent of the content of the uranium-235 isotope), it will, in principle, have almost all the necessary knowledge and technologies for its further enrichment to weapons-grade levels (over 80 % for uranium-235). In addition, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plant reactors is the raw material for the production of another weapons-grade material - plutonium. Of course, the production of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel requires the creation of radiochemical enterprises, but the very presence of high-tech raw materials for such production represents an important stage in the implementation of a possible weapons program. Under these conditions, the production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium suitable for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device becomes only a matter of time and political will.

Since there is no direct ban on the creation of national facilities for uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing in the Treaty, a number of countries have put forward the following proposal. Countries that do not yet have such production could voluntarily abandon it. In exchange for this, states that already have these technologies would guarantee them supplies of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants and research reactors at a fair price. To make such guarantees more reliable, international production centers, joint ventures with the participation of interested states, and a “fuel bank” under the auspices of the IAEA could be created for the production of reactor fuel. Of course, suppliers would repatriate the spent fuel, which would alleviate concerns about its possible use to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

This initiative also did not arouse enthusiasm among developing countries. They fear that if it is adopted, the countries of the world will be divided into those who have the right to high-tech production of nuclear materials and those who are deprived of such a right. There is also concern that failure to expand such capacity geographically would put existing producers in a privileged position and allow them to monopolize the fast-growing peaceful nuclear energy market. As a result, prices will rise even further, which will hit least developed countries. It is not an exception that producing countries will be able to manipulate supplies to achieve political goals and put pressure on recipient countries.

In general, the issue of the discriminatory nature of the NPT is very acute. As mentioned above, this document divides the countries of the world into those who have the right to possess nuclear weapons (nuclear “five”) and those who do not have such a right (all others - more than 180 countries). During the NPT negotiations, non-nuclear weapons countries agreed to such a solution in exchange for two conditions: first, the acquisition of access to nuclear energy (enshrined in Article 4, see above) and, second, the promise of nuclear powers to strive for nuclear disarmament (Article 6).

According to many non-nuclear states, and not only developing ones, nuclear powers do not fulfill their obligations under Article 6. The main dissatisfaction is caused by the fact that four of them (the USA, Russia, Great Britain and France) are in principle not ready to talk about universal and complete nuclear disarmament. Some nuclear powers are trying to respond to such criticism. Thus, the British government conducted a study of the conditions under which we can talk about complete nuclear disarmament. China declares its commitment to general and complete nuclear disarmament, but refuses to take any disarmament steps until other nuclear powers disarm to China's comparatively low level. nuclear potential. It would probably be useful for Russia, which bears the main burden of nuclear disarmament, to put forward some positive initiative regarding general and complete nuclear disarmament.

The refusal of the same four nuclear powers to commit to not being the first to use nuclear weapons is causing criticism. China claims to be committed to this principle, although this promise cannot be verified and is clearly propaganda. Non-nuclear countries are also dissatisfied with the reluctance of nuclear powers to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in their national security concepts.

Many non-nuclear countries, primarily developing ones, demand the conclusion of a Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, similar to the already signed conventions banning other types of WMD - chemical and biological. Although it is obvious that such a Convention has no prospects in the foreseeable future, this issue is constantly raised at the review conferences of the States Parties to the NPT and meetings of the preparatory committees.

Recently, the United States and Great Britain have been criticized for embarking on programs to modernize their nuclear forces. Concerns are being expressed about the fate of the Russian-American process of reducing strategic offensive weapons after the expiration of the START Treaty in 2009 and the Russian-American Moscow Treaty (START Treaty) in 2012. Demands are regularly put forward, primarily to Russia and the United States, to begin the negotiation process to reduce tactical nuclear weapons. In particular, they are required to submit a report on the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992, according to which a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States was removed from combat duty, and subsequently either liquidated or placed in central storage facilities. As far as can be judged from available public information, Russia has not fully complied with these decisions, which are not legally binding.

6. Unrecognized nuclear states

Another difficult issue is making the NPT universal. Four states remain outside it - India, Israel, Pakistan and the DPRK. All of these countries are nuclear, although this is not recognized by the Treaty, since three of them carried out nuclear tests after the document entered into force, and Israel does not admit (but does not deny) the presence of nuclear weapons. The accession of these states to the NPT is possible only as non-nuclear states, i.e. in the event that, following the example of South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they agree to destroy their nuclear potential. Otherwise, the relevant provisions of the document would have to be revised, which the participating states are clearly not ready to do.

North Korea agreed in 2006 to eliminate its nuclear program in exchange for assistance from the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, as well as in response to political concessions from Washington. Currently, Pyongyang is beginning to implement its obligations. Therefore, in the future, the DPRK's return to the NPT cannot be ruled out.

Israel officially supports the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, but only after achieving sustainable peace in the region. Given the uncertainty of the prospects for a lasting Arab-Israeli settlement, the prospects for the denuclearization of Israel also remain vague. Israel has also not officially tested nuclear weapons. At the same time, there is reason to believe that he carried out such a test together with South Africa in the late 1970s.

Unlike Israel, India and Pakistan are ready to return to a nuclear-free status only together with recognized nuclear powers. India first tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974, saying it was for “peaceful” purposes. After this, it refrained from conducting such tests until 1997, although it had the necessary technologies and materials. Such restraint was most likely due to a reluctance to provoke Islamabad. In terms of conventional weapons and armed forces, India is substantially superior to Pakistan and hence has no need for nuclear deterrence.

However, in 1997, Delhi finally decided to conduct nuclear tests. This provoked Pakistan to retaliate. As a result, India lost much of its military advantages. Most likely, Delhi decided to conduct nuclear tests in order to test several types of nuclear warheads created after 1974 before the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came into force.

Currently, the international community has actually come to terms with the nuclear status of India and Pakistan. The sanctions imposed by a number of countries against these states after they conducted nuclear tests in 1997 have largely been lifted. The emphasis is on ensuring that Delhi and Islamabad do not become sources of proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. They are not members of either the NSG or the Zangger Committee and therefore have no export control obligations.

At the same time, Pakistan poses a particular danger. While India unilaterally created an effective national export control mechanism, Pakistan, on the contrary, has become the main source of illegal supplies of nuclear materials and technologies. At the beginning of this decade, the activities of an underground international network led by the “father” of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, A.K. Khan. There is reason to believe that this network supplied technology and materials for the implementation of the nuclear programs of the DPRK, Iran and Libya. Of particular concern is that A.K. Khan apparently had a “cover” in the Pakistani government. In the conditions of this country, it is extremely unlikely that such deliveries were carried out bypassing the security forces. This information is indirectly confirmed by the fact that after the disclosure of the underground network of A.K. Khan was pardoned by the President of Pakistan and is under house arrest. However, there is no guarantee that Khan's associates and backers in the Pakistani security establishment will not continue to supply the emerging international nuclear black market.

In addition, there are concerns about the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons storage and the possibility of their unauthorized use. It is believed that for security reasons they are undocked from their delivery vehicles and are located at one of the most guarded military bases, where the actual residence of President Musharraf is located. However, there remains a risk that they could end up in the wrong hands as a result of a coup. It has been reported that tracking Pakistani nuclear warheads is a priority for US and Israeli intelligence agencies. The United States is also behind the scenes helping Islamabad implement some technical measures to strengthen nuclear security.

With regard to India, a course was taken towards its gradual withdrawal from international “nuclear” isolation. According to the NSG decision of 1992, the supply of any nuclear materials and technologies to this country is prohibited. This creates serious problems to develop Indian nuclear power as Delhi cannot import nuclear reactors and fuel for them. Russia built the reactor for the Kudankulam nuclear power plant, citing the fact that the relevant agreement was reached even before the NSG decision (the completion of existing contracts was allowed in 1992). However, the Russian Federation and India encountered serious problems in supplying fuel for this nuclear power plant, which the NSG refused to resolve. According to available information, fuel was nevertheless supplied.

In 2005, India and the US entered into a nuclear deal. In accordance with it, Washington is lifting restrictions on the supply of materials and technologies to India in exchange for a number of concessions from the Indian side. Among them is the separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities and placing the former under IAEA guarantees. According to the Americans, such a decision will fix the size of the Indian nuclear military complex and limit the build-up of the country's nuclear potential. When concluding the nuclear deal, Washington took into account the fact that India is responsible in the fight against the illegal export of nuclear materials and technologies and has never been a source of supplies to the nuclear “black market.”

The implementation of the deal requires sanction from the NSG, since it contradicts its decision of 1992. The United States officially appealed to this organization with a request to grant India a special status “as an exception.” This request caused dissatisfaction with a number of non-nuclear states, primarily those that have the technical capabilities to create nuclear weapons, but made a political decision to refuse to acquire nuclear status. Among such countries are Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Norway. At one time, they refused to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a number of privileges, including those related to gaining unhindered access to the international market for peaceful nuclear technologies. Therefore, from their point of view, granting similar privileges to India, which has not signed the NPT and has developed nuclear weapons, undermines their status and creates an incentive for other countries to follow the Indian example in violation of their non-proliferation obligations. Opposition within the NSG turned out to be unexpectedly strong, and so far the US request has not been satisfied.

Thus, through various measures of pressure and cooperation, the international community encourages unrecognized nuclear weapons states to voluntarily take measures at the national level to effectively control the export of nuclear materials and technologies. At the same time, they are drawn into international regimes that can limit their nuclear capabilities. Thus, joining the CTBT or at least observing a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests prevents the modernization of the nuclear forces of unrecognized nuclear powers, which do not have effective means of computer simulation of such tests. If the Fissile Material Test Ban Treaty is concluded, they will also not be able to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials and, therefore, increase their nuclear capabilities.

7. Iran problem

The shortcomings of the NPT regime are very clearly demonstrated by the situation around the Iranian nuclear program. There are two aspects to highlight in this situation. The first is the Iranian uranium enrichment program, the second is resolving issues of Tehran's compliance with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which was signed back in 1974. Doubts that Iran is fulfilling its obligations under the agreement have arisen for a long time. However, it was only in 2002 that data from satellite images showing nuclear objects were published. Contrary to its obligations, Tehran did not inform the IAEA about the creation of these facilities and about its other activities in the nuclear field. The IAEA has demanded the provision of all information on Iran's undeclared activities. However, for several years, the Iranian leadership was unable to meet the Agency's demands.

While the situation surrounding the 1974 agreement represents a violation of the international nonproliferation regime, the issue of Iran's uranium program is more complex. In accordance with Article 4 of the NPT, Iran, like any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty, has the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Tehran claims that it is seeking to acquire the technical capabilities to enrich uranium solely in order to establish its own production of fuel for nuclear power plants. So far, there is no reason to believe that Iran has managed to produce highly enriched uranium, let alone weapons-grade uranium. However, once it has the capacity to enrich uranium to a level that allows it to be used as fuel, it will be able to use the same technology to further enrich it to weapons-grade levels. But these are only fears, and they are not codified in any way in the text of the NPT and other international legal documents.

The US and its allies insist Iran must end its uranium program. In their opinion, he can exercise his rights arising from Article 4 of the NPT only if all other provisions of the Treaty are fulfilled. This argument is controversial. Therefore, Washington has made serious international efforts to delegitimize the Iranian program. At the same time, he took full advantage of Tehran’s reluctance to adequately resolve issues with the IAEA. Endless delays in providing the necessary documentation, constant problems with the admission of international inspectors, and aggressive rhetoric forced all the major powers to agree that the issue of Iran should be brought before the UN Security Council. But even then, the Iranian leadership did not make concessions, which opened the way to the adoption of several Security Council resolutions demanding that Tehran resolve issues with the IAEA and stop the uranium enrichment program. Iran defiantly rejected these resolutions, thereby violating its obligations as a UN member. This allowed the Americans to legally support their position.

At the same time, the texts of the UN Security Council resolutions included demands on Iran's uranium program, which are unlikely to be consistent with the current international legal non-proliferation regime. It is unclear why the Russian Federation and China agreed to this. This position greatly assisted Washington and made it difficult to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. Even if Iran settles issues with the IAEA, which it has finally promised to do, Moscow and Beijing will still be subject to intense pressure from the West to impose new, tougher sanctions against Tehran at the UN Security Council level.

8. Other elements of the international legal regime that complement the NPT

There are a number of international legal instruments that complement the NPT. Some of them were signed even before the conclusion of this Treaty. These documents prohibit or limit the deployment of nuclear weapons in certain geographical areas and spatial environments, and also impose limits on individual species weapons nuclear activities. International legal instruments are supplemented by voluntary measures taken unilaterally by states.

There are four regional treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits such deployment in Latin America and Caribbean countries, Treaty of Rarotonga - in the Southern part Pacific Ocean, Treaty of Pelindaba - in Africa and Treaty of Bangkok - in South-East Asia. Back in the late 1950s. Antarctica was declared nuclear-free. In addition, Mongolia declared itself a nuclear-free zone. Discussions are underway about the creation of such a zone and Central Asia, however, this idea has not yet been implemented. The initiative to create a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe was rejected by the Central European states. They feared that the creation of such a zone would prevent their admission to NATO.

As a result, the entire Southern Hemisphere and a small part of the Northern Hemisphere were declared formally free of nuclear weapons. However, the jurisdiction of these documents is limited national territory signatory countries, as well as their territorial waters. International waters remain open to ships from nuclear-weapon states carrying nuclear weapons. A number of states do not prevent ships possibly carrying nuclear weapons from entering their territorial waters and ports, as well as the flight of military aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons through their airspace.

Two documents prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in two natural environments - on the seabed and in outer space, including Luna and others celestial bodies. But these documents are also not free from shortcomings. First of all, they do not contain a verification mode, which allows for covert deployment there.

In 1963, the USSR, USA and Great Britain signed the Treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments - in the atmosphere, on the surface and under water. Other nuclear powers have not joined this treaty. France continued to carry out underwater nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll, China - land-based nuclear tests at the Lop Nor test site in Xinjiang province. South Africa, probably jointly with Israel, conducted a nuclear test underwater.

In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature. It was supposed to come into force after its ratification by 44 states with nuclear technology. Among them are all unrecognized nuclear powers. Most of the 44 countries, including Russia, France and the UK, have already ratified this Agreement. China and the US signed it but did not ratify it. However, the prospects for the entry into force of this document remain uncertain due to the obstructionist policy of the US administration, which has stated that it will not submit this treaty for ratification.

Nevertheless, all official nuclear powers have so far voluntarily refrained from conducting nuclear tests: Russia, the United States and Great Britain since the late 1980s, and France and China since the mid-1990s. India, Pakistan and North Korea have conducted nuclear tests underground in an apparent effort to limit international criticism of their actions. Moreover, since 1997, India and Pakistan have also adhered to a voluntary moratorium. The CTBT Organization, designed to ensure compliance with this Treaty, also continues to function. It is interesting that the United States also makes contributions to this organization.

Within the framework of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, multilateral preliminary negotiations are underway to conclude an international Convention banning the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. Such a Convention would become an additional barrier to the emergence of new nuclear states, and would also limit the material base for increasing the nuclear potential of countries that have nuclear weapons. However, these negotiations have stalled. Initially, they were blocked by China, demanding that the United States agree to a treaty banning the deployment of weapons in space. Washington then announced that he saw no point in such a treaty, since, from his point of view, its compliance was not verifiable.

The current international legal regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has developed around the NPT, has managed to slow down the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. More than a dozen states that have the technical capabilities to create nuclear weapons have voluntarily renounced acquiring nuclear status. There is a precedent when one of the countries, South Africa, decided to eliminate the already created nuclear potential. This regime also had a deterrent effect on states that have not acceded to the NPT. They were forced to impose self-restraints when conducting nuclear tests, as well as take measures to prevent leaks of their nuclear technologies. Even the most problematic case of the DPRK, which developed nuclear weapons in violation of its obligations under the Treaty, still indicates that the fact of violation mobilized the international community to take active action aimed at eliminating the nuclear program of this country and its return to the NPT. At the same time, the inspection regime created within the IAEA revealed violations and was again used to monitor the denuclearization of this country.

At the same time, developed back in the 1960s. the document needs to be adapted to new realities. The dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge allows more and more countries to develop nuclear technologies and, taking advantage of loopholes in the Treaty, come close to creating nuclear weapons. Another problem is the risk of nuclear proliferation among non-state groups, which the current regime practically does not regulate.

All this requires international community intensive efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime - both within the existing set of measures and through the development of new solutions.

9. Conclusion

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is aimed at ensuring stability and security in the world. In 1963, when only four states had nuclear arsenals, the United States government projected that there would be 15 to 25 nuclear-weapon states within the coming decade; other states predicted that this number could even rise to 50. Concerns about the emergence of nuclear weapons in a politically unstable state led to the formation of a closed “Nuclear Club” of the five early nuclear weapons developers. Other countries could only use “peaceful atoms” under international control. These initiatives did not cause any controversy in the world community; most countries signed the Treaty, voluntarily renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons; moreover, in subsequent years, treaties were concluded banning the use of nuclear weapons in a number of regions of the world. These regions received the status of nuclear-free zones. A number of conventions prohibited any testing of nuclear weapons, not only on earth, but also in space.

However, now a number of countries are expressing a desire to join “ Nuclear Club", stipulating that their possession of nuclear weapons is due to the requirements of their national security. Such countries include India and Pakistan. However, their official recognition as nuclear powers is hampered not only by the opposition of the Treaty member countries, but also by the very nature of the Treaty. Israel does not officially confirm that it has nuclear weapons, but it does not accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon country. A completely special situation is developing with North Korea. Having ratified the NPT, North Korea developed peaceful nuclear programs under the supervision of the IAEA, but in 2003 North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT and denied IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear laboratories. Later, the first successful tests were officially announced. The international community, led by the UN, made a number of attempts to persuade North Korea to curtail its nuclear program, but this came to nothing. As a result, it was decided to convene the UN Security Council to resolve the issue of sanctions for North Korea. Iran is also suspected of secretly developing nuclear weapons.

The North Korean case sets a dangerous precedent when nuclear weapons development escapes international control. There is a danger of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. To prevent these dangers, the IAEA demands tougher sanctions against countries violating the treaty, strengthening control over nuclear fuel and equipment.

All these issues were raised at the next conference in 2005, but then the countries could not come to a consensus on these issues.

Among the most striking trends in the area under consideration are the following. The world lacks the necessary conditions to ensure the maintenance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: individual states are actively preventing the creation of an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence based on generally accepted principles and norms of international law; there has been no progress in disarmament forums and negotiations for many years; Attempts are being made to replace legal non-proliferation measures with unilateral actions and various political initiatives.

The UN General Assembly is concerned about the state of affairs in the field of education on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. In its resolution adopted at the 55th session in 2000, this main body The UN asked the Secretary-General to prepare a study on the essence of modern education in the designated area, its current state and methods of development and promotion. The resulting study was highly praised by the General Assembly, which in 2002 expressed its belief that “the need for education on these issues is greater than ever before.”

Issues of restricting the import of materials and sensitive technologies should not only be resolved by a limited number of importing countries. It is preferable that decisions on such issues be made within the framework of coordinating the positions of all interested states, including and especially states exporting peaceful nuclear energy products.

This position is based, firstly, on the conciliatory nature of international law, the main regulator of international relations. Secondly, for the successful functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole, a stable balance of interests is necessary. On the one hand, the interests of free access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, on the other, the interests of not switching from peaceful to military nuclear programs.

The preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (paragraph 6) enshrines the principle of access to the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear technology to all states. Article IV of the Treaty expressly provides for the right of all its parties to develop research into the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, which reflects the freedom of states to possess, construct, use, etc. nuclear installations for generating electricity and for other non-military needs.

A sufficient basis for the widest access of non-nuclear states to the world achievements of scientific and technical thought in the nuclear field should be the acceptance of maximum obligations in the field of international control.

However, it is necessary to further improve the institution of international control and expand its scope. The existing practice of implementing the norms of this institution requires the resolution of many issues.

For example, there is an urgent need for scientific study in order to create new international legal norms of such an aspect as the responsibility of employees of international organizations and other persons who are responsible for implementing international control measures. Determining the legal nature of such liability, its existence and adequacy is just an example of issues that require scientific consideration.

In order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, incl. For the successful functioning of international control, improvement of the domestic legislation of states is required.

The efforts of states in the field of national rule-making should be focused on the following areas:

1) Recognition of crimes and establishment of criminal liability for acts the consequence of which will be the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Even a superficial analysis of the sources of criminal legislation in individual foreign countries shows that despite the presence in the criminal law of many countries of crimes related to nuclear proliferation, not all possible acts are criminalized. There is no uniformity in fixing the elements of crimes.

The question arises. Is it not advisable to develop and adopt international level a convention that would list in detail the acts that must be recognized as criminal and punished? It seems advisable for a number of reasons, including: the agreement will establish a legal obligation for states to introduce criminal prosecution for specific crimes, a list of which will be formulated; issues of legal cooperation to combat these offenses will be resolved, including issues legal assistance etc.

Recognizing the acts mentioned as crimes will make it possible to use the capabilities of national law enforcement agencies, which will become an additional obstacle to nuclear proliferation.

2) Formation of a reliable export control system. Effective regulation of legislation in the field of export of proliferation-sensitive materials and technologies will eliminate any cross-border movement of export items that could contribute to the creation of nuclear weapons.

There are at least two aspects in this regard. First. International law must establish legal obligations for states to create national systems export controls. Secondly, models of such systems that have been thoroughly developed at the international level will help states create effective export control mechanisms.

3) Regulation of measures to ensure nuclear safety, the content of which today is interpreted more broadly. Along with the task of neutralizing the danger from nuclear materials (preventing a spontaneous chain reaction, protection from radiation contamination, etc.), it is necessary to reliably protect such materials from unlawful seizure, use, etc., i.e. from their illegal trafficking.

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