US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Turkey. Dossier. Russia and the USA: what is hidden behind the threats to use nuclear weapons What nuclear weapons does the USA have

Since 1945, the United States has produced 66.5 thousand. atomic bombs and nuclear warheads. This assessment was made by the director of the nuclear information program at the Federation of American Scientists, Hans Christensen, and his colleague from the Defense Council natural resources Robert Norris, in the pages of the Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists in 2009.

In two government laboratories - in Los Alamos and Livermore. Lawrence - since 1945, a total of about 100 different types of nuclear charges and their modifications have been created.

Story

The very first atomic bombs, which entered service at the end of the 40s of the last century, weighed about 9 tons and could only be delivered to potential targets by heavy bombers.

By the early 1950s, the United States had developed more compact bombs with less weight and diameter, which made it possible to equip US front-line aircraft with them. Somewhat later, nuclear charges for ballistic missiles, artillery shells and mines entered service with the Ground Forces. The Air Force received warheads for surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. A number of warheads were developed for the Navy and Marine Corps. Navy SEAL sabotage units received light nuclear mines for special missions.

Carriers

The composition of US nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and their jurisdiction have changed since the first atomic bombs appeared in service with the US Army Aviation. At various times, the Army (medium-range ballistic missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear infantry ammunition), the Navy (missile-carrying ships and nuclear submarines carrying cruise and ballistic missiles), the Air Force had their own nuclear arsenal and means of delivery. forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles ground-based, silo-based and bunker-based, bottom-based, combat railway missile systems, air-launched cruise missiles, guided and unguided aircraft missiles, strategic bombers and missile-carrying aircraft). As of the beginning of 1983, offensive weapons in the US nuclear arsenal were represented by 54 Titan-2 ICBMs, 450 Minuteman-2 ICBMs, 550 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs, about 350 Stratofortress strategic bombers "and 40 APRCs with various types of SLBMs on board.

Office of Ground and air assets The delivery of nuclear weapons is handled by the US Air Force Global Strike Command. Seaborne delivery vehicles are operated by the Fleet Forces Command (NAS Kings Bay - 16th Submarine Squadron) and the Pacific Fleet (NAS Kitsap - 17th Submarine Squadron). Collectively they report to the Strategic Command.

Megatonnage

Since 1945, the total yield of nuclear warheads has increased many times and reached its peak by 1960 - it amounted to over 20 thousand megatons, which is approximately equivalent to the power of 1.36 million bombs dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945.
The largest number of warheads was in 1967 - about 32 thousand. Subsequently, the Pentagon's arsenal was reduced by almost 30% over the next 20 years.
At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States had 22,217 warheads.

Production

Production of new warheads ceased in 1991, although [ When?] [ ] its resumption is planned. The military continues to modify existing types of charges [ When?] [ ] .

The US Department of Energy is responsible for the entire production cycle - from the development of fissile weapons materials to the development and production of ammunition and their disposal.

Enterprise management is carried out

A secret Cold War-era system that would have automatically launched Soviet missiles in response to a nuclear attack and was known as the Dead Hand is now making a comeback, The National Interest writes. However, now Russia is openly talking about this system, which has become even more deadly, and this gives every reason for concern in the West, the article emphasizes.

Russian "weapon nuclear apocalypse» The Cold War is returning, and it could herald a dangerous new nuclear race, warns Michael Peck in The National Interest. If the United States starts deploying missiles medium range in Europe, Russia may adopt the doctrine of a preemptive nuclear strike, the author explains. Today this is openly discussed in public, so the West has every reason to be concerned, the article notes.

Russia knows how to design and create weapons that "terrifying": for example, nuclear-powered cruise missiles or unmanned submarines with 100 megaton warheads, writes The National Interest. But "the most terrible", according to the author, became a system from the Cold War, which in the event of a nuclear attack was supposed to automatically launch missiles in response without human intervention. Now this is automated Russian system, known as “Perimeter” or “Dead Hand”, is returning to service, and it has become "even more deadly", is emphasized in the article.

This is due to President Donald Trump’s decision to announce the US withdrawal from the 1987 INF Treaty, which eliminated huge arsenals of American and Russian intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the author explains. Trump's claims that Russia "violates" this treaty, developing and adopting new "prohibited" missiles, infuriates Moscow, which seriously fears that America will begin deploying again nuclear missiles in Europe, the article says. After all, if American missiles are deployed, for example, in Germany or Poland, then they will be able to reach Russian territory, even if they do not belong to the extended-range category. While Russia can strike the continental United States only with the help of intercontinental ballistic missiles due to its geographical location, notes The National Interest.

General Viktor Esin, who commanded Russian forces in the 1990s missile forces strategic purpose, in a recent interview confirmed that the legendary Perimeter system still exists. According to him, if the United States begins to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe and thereby reduce the flight time to Russian borders to two or three minutes, then Moscow in response will consider switching to the doctrine of a preemptive nuclear strike. " The Perimeter system is functioning, it has even been improved. But when it works, we will have few resources left - we will be able to launch only those missiles that will survive the first strike of the aggressor.",” The National Interest quotes excerpts from Esin’s interview.

Although it is not entirely clear what the Russian general meant when he said that the system "functioning" And "improved" noted in the article. According to available data, Perimeter launches modified UR-100 ICBMs, which transmit the command to launch conventional nuclear-capable ICBMs hidden in silos.

The author of the book dedicated to “Perimeter”, David Hoffman, who called this system “Dead Hand”, describes the mechanism of its action as follows: “In the event of a likely nuclear attack, the political leadership had to give 'consent to access.' In this case, the officers on duty should have gone down to the “balls” ( underground bunkers) deep underground. If permission was given on time, if the system received seismic confirmation nuclear explosions on the ground, and if contact with the center was lost, those on duty in the bunkers had to launch command missiles. They would take off, transmitting the order to the ballistic missiles. And they would carry out the mission of retaliation.”

Periodically they came to light "implicit signs" that the Perimeter system still exists, the article says. “This points to the oddities of the Soviet government, which kept the existence of the Perimeter a secret even from the American enemy, whom this system was supposed to contain and intimidate,”- notes the author. In his opinion, main principle actions " Dead hand"is initially based on fear: "On the fear of American first a blow that will decapitate Russian leadership before it orders a retaliatory strike. And also on the fear that some Russian leader will become cowardly and not give this order.”

But the fact that today in Russia they began to discuss “Perimeter” openly also gives the West "every reason for concern" concludes The National Interest.

By 1998, at least $759 million had been paid to the Marshall Islands as compensation for their exposure to US nuclear testing. In February 2006, more than $1.2 billion in compensation was paid to US citizens exposed to nuclear hazards as a result of the US nuclear weapons program.

Russia and the United States have comparable numbers of nuclear warheads; together, these two countries possess more than 90% of the world's nuclear warheads. As of 2019, the United States has an inventory of 6,185 nuclear warheads; of these, 2,385 are retired and awaiting dismantlement and +3,800 are part of the US arsenal. Of the warhead stockpiles, the US declared in the March 2019 START declaration, 1,365 are deployed on 656 ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.

History of development

Manhattan Project

The United States first began developing nuclear weapons during World War II on orders from President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939, motivated by fears that they were engaged in a race with Nazi Germany to develop such weapons. After a slow start under the leadership of British scientists and American administrators, the program was put under the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and in 1942 it was officially transferred under the auspices of the United States Army and became known as the Manhattan Project, in the American, British and Canadian joint venture. Under the leadership of General Leslie Groves, more than thirty different sites were built to research, produce, and test components related to bomb making. These included the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, under the direction of physicist Robert Oppenheimer, the Hanford Plutonium Plant in Washington, and the Homeland Security Y-12 complex in Tennessee.

By investing heavily in plutonium breeding in early nuclear reactors and in electromagnetic and gas enrichment processes to produce uranium-235, the United States was able to develop three usable weapons by mid-1945. The Trinity test was a plutonium implosion weapon design tested on July 16, 1945, with a 20-kiloton yield.

Faced with a planned invasion of the Japanese islands scheduled to begin on November 1, 1945, and with Japan not giving up, President Harry S. Truman ordered the atomic raids on Japan. On August 6, 1945, the United States detonated a uranium-cannon bomb design, Little Boy, over the Japanese city of Hiroshima with an energy of about 15 kilotons of TNT, killing about 70,000 people, among them 20,000 Japanese fighters and 20,000 Korean slave labor, and destroying about 50 000 buildings (including the 2nd General Army and the Fifth Division headquarters). Three days later, on August 9, the US attacked Nagasaki using a plutonium implosion bomb design, Fat Man, with an explosion equivalent to about 20 kilotons of TNT, destroying 60% of the city and killing about 35,000 people, among them 23,200–28,200 Japanese munitions workers, 2000 Korean hijacked and 150 Japanese combat.

During the Cold War

Between 1945 and 1990, more than 70,000 total warheads were developed, in more than 65 different varieties, ranging in yield from approximately 0.01 kt (such as the man-portable Davy Crockett shell) to the 25 megaton B41 bomb. Between 1940 and 1996, the US spent at least $9.3 trillion today developing nuclear weapons. More than half was spent on creating delivery mechanisms for weapons. $583 billion in terms today was spent on nuclear waste management and environmental remediation.

Throughout the Cold War, the US and USSR were threatened with all-out nuclear attack in the event of war, regardless of whether it was a conventional or nuclear confrontation. US nuclear doctrine called for mutually assured destruction (MAD), which entailed massive nuclear attack against strategic targets and main population centers Soviet Union and his allies. The term "mutually assured destruction" was coined in 1962 by American strategist Donald Brennan. MAD was implemented by deploying nuclear weapons simultaneously on three different types of weapons platforms.

After the Cold War

A few notable US nuclear tests include:

• The Trinity test on July 16, 1945, was the world's first nuclear weapons test (yield about 20 thousand).
• The Operation Crossroads series, in July 1946, was the first post-war test series and one of the largest military operations in US history.
• Operation Greenhouse shots of May 1951 included the first enhanced fission weapon test ("Item") and a scientific test that proved feasibility thermonuclear weapons("George").
• The Ivy Mike shot on November 1, 1952 was the first full test of the Teller-Ulam "delivered" hydrogen bomb design, with a yield of 10 megatons. It was a non-deployable weapon, however, with its full cryogenic equipment, it weighed about 82 tons.
• Castle Bravo shot on March 1, 1954 was the first test of a deployable (solid fuel) thermonuclear weapon, and was also (incidentally) the largest weapon ever tested by the United States (15 megatons). It was also the largest radiation accident in the United States due to nuclear testing. An unexpected exit, and a change in weather resulting from the fall radioactive fallout spread east to the inhabited Rongelap and Rongerik atolls, which were soon evacuated. Many of the Marshallese have since suffered from birth defects and have received some compensation from the federal government. Japanese fishing boat fukurit-mara, also came into contact with precipitation, which caused many of the crew to grow ill; one eventually died.
• The Argus I shot from Operation Argus, on August 27, 1958, was the first nuclear weapon detonation in outer space when a 1.7-kiloton warhead was detonated at an altitude of 200 kilometers (120 mi) during a series of high-altitude nuclear explosions.
• The frigate's firing of Operation Dominic I on May 6, 1962, was the only US test of an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a live nuclear warhead (yield 600 kilotons), at Christmas Island. Generally, missile systems were tested without live warheads and the warheads were tested separately for safety reasons. In the early 1960s, however, technical issues about how the systems would perform under combat conditions (when they were "coupled", in military jargon), and this test was intended to allay those concerns. However, the warhead had to be modified somewhat before use, and the missile was an SLBM (not an ICBM), so on its own it did not solve all the problems.
• The Sedan shot from Operation Styrax on July 6, 1962 (yield 104 kilotons), was an attempt to show the possibility of using nuclear weapons for "civilian" and "peaceful" purposes, as part of Operation Plowshare. In this example, a 1,280 ft (390 m) diameter 320 ft (98 m) deep crater was created at the Nevada Proving Ground.

A summary table of each American operational series can be found in the United States Nuclear Test Series.

delivery systems

On the left are Peacekeeper, Minuteman III and Minuteman I

Original A little boy and Fatman weapons, developed by the United States during the Manhattan Project, were relatively large (Fatman had a diameter of 5 feet (1.5 m)) and heavy (about 5 tons each) and required specially modified bomber aircraft to adapt for their bombing missions against Japan. Each modified bomber could carry only one such weapon and only within a limited range. Since these initial weapons were developed, a significant amount of money and research has been spent towards the goal of standardizing nuclear warheads so that they do not require highly trained specialized experts to assemble them before use, as was the case with wartime special devices and miniaturizations warheads for use in variable delivery systems.

With the help of brains acquired from Operation Paperclip in the tail end of the European theater of World War II, the United States was able to embark on an ambitious program in rocketry. One of the first products of this was the development of missiles capable of holding nuclear warheads. The MGR-1 Honest John was the first such weapon, developed in 1953 as a surface-to-surface missile with a radius of no more than 15 miles (24 km). Due to their limited range, their potential use was greatly limited (they could not, for example, threaten Moscow with an immediate strike).

B-36 Peacekeeper in flight

The development of long-range bombers, such as the B-29 Superfortress during World War II, continued during the Cold War period. In 1946, the Convair B-36 Peacemaker became the first purpose-built nuclear bomber; It served in the US Air Force until 1959. The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress was able by the mid-1950s to carry a wide arsenal of nuclear bombs, each with different capabilities and potential use situations. Beginning in 1946, the United States, based on its initial deterrent force at the Strategic Air Command, which, in the late 1950s, maintained a number of nuclear-armed bombers in the skies at all times, was ready to receive orders to attack the USSR when necessary. This system was, however, extremely expensive, both in terms of natural and human resources, and also raised the question of the possibility of random nuclear war.

In the 1950s and 1960s, computerized early warning systems such as Defense Support Programs were developed to detect incoming Soviet attacks and coordinate response strategies. During this same period, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems were developed that could deliver nuclear warheads over vast distances, allowing the US to deploy nuclear forces capable of hitting the Soviet Union in the American Midwest. Shorter range weapons, including small tactical weapons, have been deployed in Europe as well, including nuclear artillery and man-portable special nuclear land mines. The development of submarine-launched ballistic missile systems allowed stealth nuclear submarines to covertly launch missiles at long-range targets as well, making it virtually impossible for the Soviet Union to successfully launch a first strike attack against the United States without receiving a lethal response.

Improvements in warhead miniaturization in the 1970s and 1980s allowed for the development of MIRVed missiles that could carry warheads, each of which could be separately targeted. The question is whether these missiles should be based on constantly rotating railway tracks (to avoid being easily targeted against Soviet missiles) or based in heavily fortified bunkers (to possibly withstand Soviet attacks) was a major political controversy in the 1980s (eventually, the bunker deployment method was chosen). The MIRV system allowed the US to render Soviet missile defense systems economically unfeasible, since each offensive missile required three to ten counter defensive missiles.

Additional changes to the weapons supply included missile cruise systems, which allowed the aircraft to fire long-distance, low-flying nuclear warhead missiles toward a target from a relatively comfortable distance.

Existing US delivery systems bring virtually any part of the earth's surface within range of its nuclear arsenal. Although its land-based missile systems have a maximum range of 10,000 km (6,200 mi) (less than the entire world), its submarine-based force extends its reach from coastline 12,000 km (7,500 miles) inland. In addition, in-flight refueling of long-range bombers and the use of aircraft carriers expands the possible range almost infinitely.

Management and control

If the United States is in fact under attack by a nuclear-capable adversary, the President can order nuclear strikes only as a member of the two-person National Command Authority, the other member of which is the Secretary of Defense. Their joint decision shall be conveyed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will direct the National Military Command Center to issue Emergency Action messages to those in possession nuclear capabilities strength

The President can order a nuclear launch using his or her nuclear briefcase (nicknamed the nuclear football), or command centers such as the White House Situation Room can be used. The command would be carried out by a nuclear and missile operations officer (a member of the missile combat crew, also called a "missileer") at the missile launch control center. The two-person rule applies to rocket launches, meaning that two employees must turn the keys at the same time (far enough apart that this cannot be done by one person).

In general, these institutions served to coordinate scientific research and create sites. Typically, they ran their sites with the help of contractors, however, both private and public (for example, Union Carbide, a private company, ran Oak Ridge National Laboratory for many decades, and the University of California, a public educational institution, ran in Los Angeles Alamos and Lawrence Livermore laboratories from their inception, and will also jointly manage Los Alamos with the private company Bechtel as their next contract). Funding was received both through these agencies directly, but also from additional external agencies such as the Department of Defense. Each branch of the military also maintains its own nuclear-related research facilities (usually related to delivery systems).

production complex Weapons

This table is not exhaustive, as numerous facilities throughout the United States contributed to its nuclear weapons program. It includes the main sites associated with the US weapons program (past and present), their main site functions, and their current status of activity. Not on the list are numerous bases and facilities where they were deployed nuclear weapon. Apart from stationing weapons on its own soil, during the Cold War, the United States also stationed nuclear weapons in 27 foreign countries and territories, including Okinawa (which was under US control until 1971), Japan (during the occupation immediately after World War II), Greenland, Germany, Taiwan, and French Morocco then independent Morocco.

Name of the site	Location	function	Status
Los Alamos National Laboratory	Los Alamos, New Mexico	Research, Design, Pit Production	active
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	Livermore, California	Research and development	active
Sandia National Laboratories	Livermore, California; Albuquerque, New Mexico	Research and development	active
Hanford site	Richland, Washington	Material of manufacture (plutonium)	Not active in rehabilitation
Oak Ridge National Laboratory	Oak Ridge, Tennessee	Material production (uranium-235, fused fuel), research	Active to some extent
Y-12 Homeland Security Complex	Oak Ridge, Tennessee	Component manufacturing, strategic management reserves, uranium storage	active
Nevada Test Site	Near Las Vegas, Nevada	Nuclear testing and nuclear waste disposal	Active; no tests since 1992, currently engaged in waste disposal
Yucca Mountain	Nevada Test Site	Waste disposal (primarily power reactor)	Pending
Waste separation pilot plant	East of Carlsbad, New Mexico	Radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production	active
Pacific polygons	Marshall Islands	Nuclear tests	Inactive, last tested in 1962
Rocky Flats plant	Near Denver, Colorado	Manufacturing components	Not active in rehabilitation
Pantex	Amarillo, Texas	Weapons assembly, disassembly, pit storage	Active, esp. disassembly
Fernald site	Near Cincinnati, Ohio	Material of manufacture (uranium-238)	Not active in rehabilitation
Paducah plant	Paducah, Kentucky	Material production (uranium-235)	Active (commercial use)
Portsmouth plant	Near Portsmouth, Ohio	Material of manufacture (uranium-235)	Active (centrifuge), but not for weapons production
Kansas City plant	Kansas City, Missouri	Production Component	active
Embankment plant	Miamisburg, Ohio	Research, component production, tritium purification	Not active in rehabilitation
Pinellas plant	Largo, Florida	Manufacturing of electrical components	Active, but not for weapons production
Savannah River Site	Aiken Row, South Carolina	Manufacturing material (plutonium, tritium)	Active (limited mode), in rehabilitation

proliferation

Early in the development of its nuclear weapons, the United States relied in part on information sharing with both Britain and Canada, codified in the Quebec Agreement of 1943. The three parties agreed not to exchange nuclear weapons information with other countries without the others' consent, an early attempt at non-proliferation. Following the development of the first nuclear weapon during World War II, however, there was much controversy within political circles and public life United States about whether or not the country should try to maintain a monopoly on nuclear technology, or whether it should pursue an information-sharing program with other countries (especially its former ally and likely competitor, the Soviet Union), or submit control of its weapons to some kind of an international organization (such as the UN) that will use them to try to maintain world peace. Although fears of a nuclear arms race spurred many politicians and scientists to advocate for some degree of international control or sharing of nuclear weapons and information, many politicians and military personnel believed that it was best in the short term to maintain high standards of nuclear secrecy and prevent a Soviet bomb for as long as possible ( and they do not believe that the USSR actually represents international control in good faith).

Since this path was chosen, the United States, in its early days, essentially advocated preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, although primarily for reasons of self-preservation. A few years after the USSR detonated its first weapon in 1949, though, the US, under the leadership of President Dwight Eisenhower, sought to encourage nuclear information exchange programs related to civil nuclear power and nuclear physics in general. The Atoms of Peace program, begun in 1953, was also partly political: the US was better prepared to commit various scarce resources, such as enriched uranium, to these peace efforts and to ask for a similar contribution from the Soviet Union, which had far fewer resources in these areas ; Thus, the program had a strategic rationale, and, as it later turned out, internal memos. This overall goal of promoting the civilian use of nuclear energy in other countries, as well as preventing the proliferation of weapons, has been called by many critics as controversial and has led to loose standards for a number of decades, allowing a number of other countries, such as China and India, to profit from dual-use technologies (acquired from nations other than the United States).

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Cooperative Threat Reduction program was created after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to provide assistance former countries the Soviet bloc in inventory and the destruction of their sites for the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the methods for delivering them (silo launchers for ICBMs, long-range bombers, etc.). More than $4.4 billion has been spent on this effort to prevent the deliberate or accidental proliferation of weapons from the former Soviet arsenal.

The new US nuclear doctrine, published in April 2010, declares that “ The primary purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack on the US, its allies and partners. This purpose will remain so as long as nuclear weapons exist" United States " will consider the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to protect the vital interests of the United States, its allies and partners».

However, the United States are not prepared today to endorse a universal policy recognizing that deterring a nuclear attack is the sole function of nuclear weapons" With regard to nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states that, in Washington’s assessment, are not fulfilling their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “ There remains a small set of additional contingencies in which nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or chemical and biological attack against the United States and its allies and partners.».

However, it is not disclosed what is meant by the above-mentioned unforeseen circumstances. This should be regarded as a serious uncertainty in US nuclear policy, which cannot but influence the defense policies of other leading states of the world.

To carry out the tasks assigned to nuclear forces, the United States has strategic offensive forces (SNF) and non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). According to US State Department data published on May 3, 2010, the United States nuclear arsenal as of September 30, 2009 consisted of 5,113 nuclear warheads. In addition, several thousand obsolete nuclear warheads, removed from stockpiles, were awaiting dismantling or destruction.

1. Strategic offensive forces

The US SNA is a nuclear triad consisting of land, sea and air components. Each component of the triad has its own advantages, so the new US nuclear doctrine recognizes that “preserving all three components of the triad in the best way will ensure strategic stability with acceptable financial costs and at the same time provide insurance in case of problems with technical condition and the vulnerability of existing forces.”

1.1. Ground component

The ground component of the US SNA consists of strategic missile systems, equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). ICBM forces have significant advantages over other components of the SNA due to their highly secure control and management system, calculated in several minutes of combat readiness and relatively low costs for combat and operational training. They can be effectively used in pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes to destroy stationary targets, including highly protected ones.

By expert assessments, at the end of 2010, the ICBM forces had 550 silos at three missile bases launchers (silos), of which for the Minuteman-3 ICBM - 50, for the Minuteman-3M ICBM - 300, for the Minuteman-3S ICBM - 150 and for the MX ICBM - 50 (all silos are impact protected wave 70–140 kg/cm 2):

Currently, ICBM forces are subordinate to the US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), created in August 2009.

All Minuteman ICBMs– three-stage solid-fuel rockets. Each of them carries from one to three nuclear warheads.

ICBM "Minuteman-3" began deployment in 1970. It was equipped with Mk-12 nuclear warheads (W62 warhead with a capacity of 170 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "Minuteman-3M" began deployment in 1979. Equipped with Mk-12A nuclear warheads (335 kt W78 warhead). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "Minuteman-3S" began deployment in 2006. Equipped with one Mk-21 nuclear warhead (300 kt W87 warhead). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "MX"- three-stage solid-fuel rocket. Began deployment in 1986. Equipped with ten Mk-21 nuclear warheads. The maximum firing range is up to 9,000 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time of the entry into force of the START-3 Treaty (Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons) On February 5, 2011, the ground component of the US SNA had about 450 deployed ICBMs with approximately 560 warheads.

1.2. Marine component

The naval component of the US SNA consists of nuclear submarines equipped with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Their established names are SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are the most survivable component of the US SNA. According to current estimates, in the near and medium term there will be no real threat to the survivability of American SSBNs».

According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the naval component of the US strategic nuclear forces included 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, of which 6 SSBNs were based on the Atlantic coast (naval base Kingsbay, Georgia) and 8 SSBNs were based on the Pacific coast (naval base Kitsan, Washington). Each SSBN is equipped with 24 Trident-2 class SLBMs.

SLBM "Trident-2" (D-5)- three-stage solid-fuel rocket. It began to be deployed in 1990. It is equipped with either Mk-4 nuclear warheads and their modification Mk-4A (W76 warhead with a yield of 100 kt), or Mk-5 nuclear warheads (W88 warhead with a yield of 475 kt). The standard configuration is 8 warheads, the actual configuration is 4 warheads. The maximum firing range is over 7,400 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time the New START Treaty entered into force, the US naval component of the SNA had up to 240 deployed SLBMs with approximately 1,000 warheads.

1.3. Aviation component

The aviation component of the US SNA consists of strategic, or heavy, bombers capable of solving nuclear problems. Their advantage over ICBMs and SLBMs, according to the new US nuclear doctrine, is that they “ can be demonstratively deployed in regions to warn potential adversaries in crisis situations about strengthening nuclear deterrence and to reassure allies and partners of American commitments to ensure their security».

All strategic bombers have dual-mission status: they can carry out strikes using both nuclear and conventional weapons. According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the aviation component of the US SNA at five air bases on the continental United States included approximately 230 bombers of three types - B-52N, B-1B and B-2A (of which more than 50 units are in stock reserve ).

Currently strategic air force, like ICBM forces, are subordinate to the US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).

Strategic bomber B-52N- turboprop subsonic aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1961. Currently, only long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) AGM-86B and AGM-129A are intended for its nuclear equipment. The maximum flight range is up to 16,000 km.

B-1B strategic bomber- supersonic jet aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1985. Currently it is intended to perform non-nuclear missions, but has not yet been removed from the count of strategic carriers of nuclear weapons under the START-3 Treaty, since the relevant procedures provided for by this Treaty have not been completed. The maximum flight range is up to 11,000 km (with one in-flight refueling).

- subsonic jet aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1994. Currently, only B61 aerial bombs (modifications 7 and 11) of variable power (from 0.3 to 345 kt) and B83 (with a power of several megatons) are intended for its nuclear equipment. The maximum flight range is up to 11,000 km.

ALCM AGM-86V- subsonic air-launched cruise missile. It began to be deployed in 1981. It is equipped with a W80-1 warhead of variable power (from 3 to 200 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 2,600 km.

ALCM AGM-129A- subsonic cruise missile. Began deployment in 1991. Equipped with the same warhead as the AGM-86B missile. The maximum firing range is up to 4,400 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time of the entry into force of the START-3 Treaty, there were about 200 deployed bombers in the aviation component of the US SNA, which counted the same number of nuclear warheads (according to the rules of the START-3 Treaty, one warhead is conditionally counted for each deployed strategic bomber, since V daily activities all of them do not have nuclear weapons on board).

1.4. Combat control of strategic offensive forces

System combat control(SBU) The US SNA is a set of primary and reserve systems, including primary and reserve stationary and mobile (air and ground) controls, communications and automated data processing systems. The SBU provides automated collection, processing and transmission of data on the situation, development of orders, plans and calculations, bringing them to the executors and control of implementation.

Main combat control system is designed for the timely response of the SNS to a tactical warning about the beginning of nuclear missile strike across the USA. Its main bodies are the stationary main and reserve command centers of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, the command and reserve command centers of the Joint strategic command US armed forces, command posts of air armies, missile and air wings.

It is believed that in any scenario of the outbreak of a nuclear war, the combat crews of these control points will be able to organize measures to increase the combat readiness of the SNS and transmit the order to begin their combat use.

Backup combat control and communications system in emergency situations unites a number of systems, the main of which are reserve control systems for the US armed forces using air and ground mobile command posts.

1.5. Prospects for the development of strategic offensive forces

The current development program of the US SNA does not provide for the construction of new ICBMs, SSBNs and strategic bombers in the foreseeable period. At the same time, by reducing the total reserve of strategic nuclear weapons during the implementation of the START-3 Treaty, “ The United States will maintain the ability to “reload” a number of nuclear warheads as a technical hedge against any future problems with delivery systems and warheads, as well as in the event of a significant deterioration in the security environment" Thus, the so-called “return potential” is formed by “demiring” ICBMs and reducing the number of warheads on SLBMs by half.

As follows from the report of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, presented to the US Congress in May 2010, after the terms of the START-3 Treaty are fulfilled (February 2018), the US SNA will have 420 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 14 SSBNs "Ohio" with 240 Trident-2 SLBMs and up to 60 B-52N and B-2A bombers.

The multi-year, $7 billion improvement of the Minuteman-3 ICBM under the Minuteman-3 Life Cycle Extension program with the goal of keeping these missiles in service until 2030 is almost complete.

As noted in the new US nuclear doctrine, " Although there is no need to make a decision in the next few years on any subsequent ICBM, exploratory studies on this issue should begin today. In this regard, in 2011–2012. The Department of Defense will begin studies to analyze alternatives. This study will examine a range of different ICBM development options with the goal of identifying a cost-effective approach that will support further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while ensuring sustainable deterrence.».

In 2008, production of a modified version of the Trident-2 D-5 LE (Life Extension) SLBM began. In total, by 2012, 108 of these missiles will be purchased for more than $4 billion. The Ohio-class SSBNs will be equipped with modified SLBMs for the remainder of their service life, which has been extended from 30 to 44 years. The first in the Ohio series of SSBNs is scheduled to be withdrawn from the fleet in 2027.

Since it takes a long time to design, build, test and deploy new SSBNs, the US Navy will begin exploratory studies to replace existing SSBNs starting in 2012. Depending on the results of the study, as noted in the new US nuclear doctrine, the feasibility of reducing the number of SSBNs from 14 to 12 units in the future may be considered.

As for the aviation component of the US SNA, the US Air Force is studying the possibility of creating strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which from 2018 should replace the current bombers. Moreover, as proclaimed in the new US nuclear doctrine, “ air Force will evaluate alternatives to inform decisions in the 2012 Budget on whether and how to replace existing long-range air-launched cruise missiles that will expire at the end of the next decade».

In the field of nuclear development combat equipment The main efforts in the United States in the coming years will be aimed at improving existing nuclear warheads. The development of a highly reliable nuclear warhead, begun in 2005 by the Department of Energy as part of the RRW (Reliable Replacement Warhead) project, has now been suspended.

As part of the implementation of the non-nuclear prompt global strike strategy, the United States continues to develop technologies for guided warheads and non-nuclear warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs. This work is being carried out under the leadership of the Office of the Minister of Defense (Office of Advanced Research), which makes it possible to eliminate duplication of research conducted by the branches of the armed forces and to spend more efficiently cash and ultimately accelerate the development of precision warheads for strategic ballistic missiles.

Since 2009, a number of demonstration launches of prototypes of intercontinental-range delivery vehicles being created have been carried out, but no significant achievements have been achieved yet. According to expert estimates, the creation and deployment of high-precision ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear equipment can hardly be expected before 2020.

2. Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced its NSNW (non-strategic nuclear weapons) arsenal. As emphasized in the new US nuclear doctrine, today the United States maintains only a limited number of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, and a small number in stockpiles in the United States, ready for global deployment in support of extended deterrence for allies and partners».

As of January 2011, the United States had approximately 500 operational non-strategic nuclear warheads. Among them are 400 B61 free-fall bombs of several modifications with variable power (from 0.3 to 345 kt) and 100 W80-O warheads of variable power (from 3 to 200 kt) for long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) (up to 2,600 km) "Tomahawk" (TLAM/N), adopted for service in 1984.

About half of the above air bombs are deployed at six US air bases in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. In addition, about 800 non-strategic nuclear warheads, including 190 W80-O warheads, are inactive in reserve.

American F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers certified to perform nuclear missions, as well as aircraft of US NATO allies, can be used as carriers of nuclear bombs. Among the latter are Belgian and Dutch F-16 aircraft and German and Italian Tornado aircraft.

Tomahawk nuclear SLCMs are designed to arm multi-purpose nuclear submarines (NPS) and some types of surface ships. At the beginning of 2011, the US Navy had 320 missiles of this type in service. All of them are stored in the arsenals of naval bases on the continental United States in 24-36 hour readiness for loading onto nuclear submarines and surface ships, as well as special ammunition transports, including transport aircraft.

As for the prospects for American NSNW, the new US nuclear doctrine concludes that it is necessary to take the following measures:

— the Air Force must maintain a “dual-mission” fighter-bomber (that is, capable of using both conventional and nuclear weapons) after replacing the existing F-15 and F-16 aircraft with the F-35 all-purpose strike aircraft;

— continue to fully implement the Life Extension Program nuclear bomb B61 to ensure its compatibility with the F-35 aircraft and improve its operational safety, security against unauthorized access and control of use to increase confidence in it;

— remove the Tomahawk nuclear SLCM from service (this system is considered redundant in the US nuclear arsenal, and moreover, it has not been deployed since 1992).

3. Nuclear cuts in the future

The new US nuclear doctrine states that the President of the United States has directed a review of possible future reductions in US strategic nuclear weapons below the levels established by the START III Treaty. It is emphasized that the scale and pace of subsequent reductions in US nuclear arsenals will be influenced by several factors.

Firstly, “Any future reductions should strengthen deterrence against potential regional adversaries, strategic stability with Russia and China, and reaffirm American security assurances to allies and partners.”

Secondly, “the implementation of the program “Maintaining the Readiness of the Nuclear Arsenal” and the funding of nuclear infrastructure recommended by the US Congress (over 80 billion dollars are allocated for this - V.E.) will allow the United States to abandon the practice of maintaining a large number of undeployed nuclear warheads in reserve in case of technical or geopolitical surprises and thereby significantly reduce the nuclear arsenal.”

Third, “Russia’s nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how quickly the United States is willing to further reduce its nuclear forces.”

Given the above, the US administration will seek discussions with Russia on further reductions in nuclear arsenals and increased transparency. As stated, “this could be achieved through formal agreements and/or through parallel voluntary measures. Subsequent reductions must be larger in scale than provided for in previous bilateral agreements, covering all nuclear weapons of both states, and not just deployed strategic nuclear weapons.”

Assessing these intentions of Washington, it should be noted that they practically do not take into account Moscow’s concerns caused by:

— the deployment of the American global missile defense system, which could in the future weaken the deterrence potential of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces;

— the enormous superiority of the United States and its allies in conventional armed forces, which may increase even further with the adoption of the developed American long-range precision weapon systems;

— the reluctance of the United States to support the draft treaty banning the deployment of any types of weapons in space, submitted by Russia and China to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 2008.

Without finding mutually acceptable solutions to these problems, Washington is unlikely to be able to persuade Moscow to enter into new negotiations on further reductions in nuclear arsenals.

/V.I. Esin, Ph.D., leading researcher at the Center for Problems of Military-Industrial Policy, Institute of the USA and Canada Russian Academy Sciences, www.rusus.ru/

The Yankees themselves never produced nuclear materials, but purchased them from the Union. Then these traders stopped updating the means of delivering nuclear weapons. And now the United States is not a formidable nuclear power, but a horde of screamers...

The truth about US nuclear weapons

Despite the fact that scientific and technological progress makes its own adjustments to our lives, and to the tactics of warfare, and life itself does not stand still, the factor nuclear deterrence no one has canceled it - and it is unlikely to be canceled in the coming decades. It was nuclear weapons, despite their power and irreversible consequences, that throughout the Cold War served as the final red line beyond which a compromise between the USSR and the USA lay.

And now, when we see tensions growing again along the West-Russia line, the factor of nuclear deterrence is once again gaining key value. And of course, we are interested in knowing what condition America’s nuclear forces are in, how their condition corresponds to that deliberately ostentatious role superpowers, which senior US officials have never been shy about declaring.

Despite the declared Lately statements by American officials about “reducing reliance on nuclear weapons”, it is still, as evidenced by the “Report on the Strategy for the Use of Nuclear Weapons of the United States of America” sent to the American Congress in June 2013 by the US Secretary of Defense. critical role in “ensuring the national security of the United States, its allies and partners.”

And in a special fact sheet from the White House accompanying the above report, it is noted that US President Barack Obama has pledged to provide significant investments to modernize the US nuclear arsenal.

According to the State Department, the United States is currently deploying 809 nuclear weapons carriers out of 1015 available. Are in combat readiness 1688 combat blocks. For comparison, in Russia there are 473 carriers out of 894 available, which carry 1400 warheads. In accordance with the current START-3 agreement, by 2018 both countries must reduce their nuclear forces to the following indicators: 800 nuclear weapons carriers must be in service, 700 of which can be deployed at a time, and the total number of nuclear warheads ready for use. should not exceed 1550 units.

So, over the next few years, the United States will have to write off and dispose of a fairly large number of nuclear warheads, aircraft and missiles. Moreover, such a reduction should hit hard on delivery vehicles: by 2018, the United States will be forced to decommission about 20% available carriers of nuclear weapons. The reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, in turn, will occur on a smaller scale.

At the time of the beginning of the transformation, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States had sufficient big amount warheads and their carriers. In accordance with the agreement in force at that time START-1(signed in 1991), in US service were 1238 carriers and almost 6000 nuclear charges.

Current agreement START-3 has much more rigid boundaries. Thus, the permissible number of deployed warheads is approximately 4 times less than what was allowed by the START-1 treaty. In this regard, over the past 12 years, the American command has had to decide how exactly and at the expense of which component of the nuclear triad to carry out the reduction.

Using its right to independently decide quantitative and qualitative issues regarding the state of its nuclear forces, the United States has already determined what its nuclear shield by 2018. According to available data, the main means of delivery will remain ballistic missiles located in silo launchers.

By the specified date, the United States intends to keep on duty 400 product models LGM-30G Minuteman-III. 12 type strategic submarines Ohio will carry 240 UGM-133A Trident-II missiles. It is planned to reduce their ammunition load from 24 missiles to 20. Finally, the aviation part of the nuclear triad will remain 44 a B-52H bomber and 16 B-2s. As a result, about 700 media will be deployed simultaneously.

And everything seems to be fine. If not for one “but”. Nuclear weapons in the USA, everything down to the last warhead, were produced... back during the Cold War, that is before 1991 when the Soviet Union existed!

According to available information, over the past 25 years, the United States has not produced a single (!) new nuclear warhead, which cannot but have a corresponding impact on the capabilities of the nuclear triad, since such products can lose their quality during long-term storage.

It is also necessary to remember that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the American military and designers, believing that the United States would henceforth never have an adversary equal to the USSR, and that Russia had forever left the orbit of a superpower, did not pay due attention to the development of new nuclear weapons carriers .

Moreover, the production of the main strategic bombers of the US Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress ended half a century ago, and the latest generation bombers Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit were built in a series of only 21 units, which, of course, cannot be considered a striking force.

So: last nuclear warhead was manufactured in the USA back in 1991. And that’s all, in America they decided that from now on nuclear weapons are a thing of the past, and now the “nuclear club”, created as a counterbalance to the USSR, is no longer needed...

By the way, it is also worth noting that the latest nuclear tests in the USA were produced in 1992 year. And this despite the fact that the average age of an American nuclear warhead is more than 30 years, that is, many of them were produced and deployed before Reagan’s presidency. Who can guarantee that these warheads are still capable of doing what they were designed to do? No one can give such a guarantee for the current US nuclear triad...

A nuclear or thermonuclear “bomb” is an extremely complex product that requires careful and constant maintenance. In the warhead of a nuclear charge, radioactive fissile materials constantly decay, as a result of which the content of active material decreases. Even worse, the radiation released during this process (in the hard spectrum) leads to serious degradation of the remaining components of the system, from fuses to electronics.

In the US nuclear industry there is another serious problem, which they prefer not to talk about. Scientists nuclear weapons specialists are aging and retiring at a rate that alarms the Pentagon. Already by 2008, more than half of nuclear specialists in the US national nuclear laboratories were over 50 years old (in 2015 - 75%, and more than 50% were over 60 years old), and among those under fifty, there were very few competent specialists. And where will they come from if nuclear charges and warheads have not been produced for more than 25 years - and new ones have not been designed for more than three decades?!

Recently, the government was forced to remove all fissionable materials from the Los Alamos laboratory - they were stored there in unsuitable conditions, and some of the materials disappeared altogether in an unknown direction. And recently, a Congressional commission unveiled another most unpleasant fact for the Pentagon: the United States no longer has the technological capabilities, as well as the factory capacity, to produce some elements for warheads. It has gotten to the point where older charges serve as a source of spare parts to keep others in some working condition.

American nuclear weapons delivery systems are also far from young. The last B-52 to form the backbone strategic aviation The USA, funny to say, was put into service during Cuban missile crisis(!), more 50 years(!) back. They no longer produce engines or spare parts - to maintain at least some of the machines in good condition, aviation technicians dismantle decommissioned bombers for spare parts. There was even a project to convert the B-52 to fit the engines and part of the avionics from the civilian Boeing 747 - but this too was eventually written off as “scrap”; connecting the civilian and military platforms together turned out to be an unsolvable matter.

The United States was counting heavily on the B-1B supersonic bomber - but the development of air defense systems made it a pointless target even before deployment in Air Force units, and now they, for the most part, rust uselessly in parking lots.

Then the United States decided to rely on a stealth bomber B-2 Spirit- however, their price (more than $2 billion per unit) turned out to be unaffordable even for the US military budget. And most importantly, after the collapse of the USSR, the then newest MiG-29 fighters with the N-019 radar were delivered to the United States from the former GDR, and during tests it turned out that their radars normally detect “invisible” B-2s even against the background of the ground. This allowed us to assume that the newer MiG-31 and Su-27 radars are also capable of selecting such a target, and at a much greater range and with greater accuracy. In other words, “invisibility” turned out to be nothing more than that, and the Pentagon became unclear: why pay 2.5 billion for such aircraft. As a result, the Spirit project was closed, and now only American propaganda has plans for this machine, still trying to present it as one of the pinnacles of American achievements and the overseas military-industrial complex.

What we have as a result: nuclear triad, despite the cheerful and optimistic statements of high-ranking officials of the Pentagon and the White House, the United States is in a deplorable state - and there is a tendency to exclusively deteriorate. Nuclear warheads and the charges are becoming obsolete morally and physically, scientists and engineers are retiring, and no equivalent replacement is coming for them; the means of delivering the charges, this applies to the entire nuclear “triad,” no longer meet modern requirements - and more and more every year. The funding included in the military budget is not enough even to maintain the current, very deplorable state of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. What can we say about new ones? technical solutions ahead of their time - this has not been discussed for a long time. How much longer in this situation can America remain in reality, and not on paper, nuclear power? Ten years? Twenty? Hardly that long...

Real condition armed forces USA. NuclearweaponAndtechnique

Daily Show "US Nuclear Arsenal"

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