Human cognitive needs. Levels of development of cognitive needs and their manifestation in thinking. How does a child fulfill his cognitive needs?

To summarize a large number of empirical data, came to the conclusion that already in the third to fifth week of life the child has a need for external impressions, the appearance

which marks the transition from newborn to infancy. This need will play a decisive role in the entire further development of the child. The new need differs significantly from the simple organic needs that appeared earlier - for food and warmth. If the “engine” of the latter is largely the desire to overcome negative emotions (to get rid of unpleasant sensations, discomfort), then the basis of the new need is a positive emotion - the elementary joy of knowledge. Therefore, this need falls into the category of “unsatisfiable”. If the need for food, as it becomes satiated, loses its motivating power, then new impressions not only cause more and more positive emotions, but also develop curiosity.

The years of preschool and preschool childhood are marked by the rapid development of this need - to know such a complex and at the same time such an attractive world around us.

And now the child approaches the threshold of the school. By this time, his cognitive need reaches a new level, which is expressed in the emergence of interest in solving cognitive problems themselves, acquiring new knowledge and skills in the learning process. This need finds its satisfaction in schooling.

However, some time passes, and a strange, paradoxical situation arises. The child’s mental functions are improved - observation, logical memory, basic mental operations (analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generalization) develop, attention becomes more stable, and at the same time the cognitive need as such in many cases not only does not rise to a higher level, but manifests itself much less clearly than at the previous age stage. Researchers describe groups of children whose "cognitive potential" declines significantly with age. Psychologist Z.I. Kalmykova, having thoroughly studied the thinking characteristics of such children, notes that the older the children are, the greater the gap they have between verbal formulations and the specific reality that they should reflect. These schoolchildren seem to be formulating generalized judgments, but verbal formulations mask the passivity of thought, the desire to escape from intellectual tension. Productive thinking (thinking acting as the ability to acquire new knowledge, the ability to learn) is replaced by a mechanical reproduction of known provisions.

What are the reasons for this phenomenon? Is this not a result of the age characteristics of children? Partly - yes. In modern science

the thesis about the presence of so-called sensitive periods in the mental development of a child is substantiated. The essence of this thesis is that each age period has its own special, unique capabilities.<...>

Upon closer examination, it becomes obvious that in fact we're talking about not about a decrease in cognitive motivation, but about some change in its direction. Thus, a special study has shown that a junior schoolchild who begins systematic education for the first time usually has to begin with mastering the external side of objects and phenomena. This ability develops especially intensively - to absorb external signs, to remember them without any significant comprehension and processing. Psychologists characterize this ability to perceive the external side of reality as an age-related feature of a primary school student. In this regard, primary schoolchildren differ unfavorably from preschool children, whose mental activity, as is known, is aimed at finding out the reasons for what is happening around them (“why?”). But this may be the reason for the predominant development of such ability in junior schoolchildren are the features of organizing the educational process in primary school, which really focuses to a large extent on describing the external signs of objects and memorizing?..

Cognitive need and personal position of a schoolchild

The manifestation of cognitive needs significantly depends on the personal position of the student. In this regard, let us recall the widespread last years problem-based learning. It should be noted that at present there are a number of works on this issue. We want to emphasize only one, but very important, side of it, to which, apparently, insufficient attention is paid: problem-based learning is addressed to the student’s personality.

As is known, problem-based learning presupposes the presence of a problem situation, which is characterized by a mismatch between the knowledge already known to the student and the problem that needs to be solved. In order to do this, you need to find new way complete the task, find the means to achieve the goal. However, what has been said is only the external side of problem-based learning. For us, the changes that occur in the student’s personality are more important.<...>

Problem-based learning does not impose knowledge on the student. It is based on his interests, based on faith in the child’s abilities, in the strength of his intelligence. The true essence of problem-based learning is respect for the child’s personality. Such training

changes his personal position. The student ceases to be a “dependent”, a “consumer” of knowledge, he ceases to be only a student, but in a certain sense becomes an ally of the teacher, solving a problem together with him. This new position also forms a different attitude towards knowledge, which is “appropriated” as if by itself in the process of solving a problem, and most importantly: intellectual activity is activated not thanks to an artificially introduced motive (as was the case, for example, in a special experiment, when the psychologist achieved significant increasing intellectual activity by giving attractive pictures to the child as a reward for correctly solving a problem). Thanks to the new position, the student begins to gain satisfaction from the very process of acquiring knowledge. This means that problem-based learning puts students in a situation somewhat similar to the one in which gifted children find themselves: it contributes to the formation of a propensity for mental work.

However, problem-based learning is only one of the ways to develop cognitive needs. The teacher can use other ways to achieve this goal. It is only important that the method used puts the student in an active position in relation to knowledge.<...>

The highest (and most difficult) stage of development of students' cognitive needs is the development of a position in which they consciously begin to work on developing their educational and cognitive motivation. When organizing such work, it should be taken into account that the motivation for educational activities varies among different groups schoolchildren. Thus, low achievers are characterized by “avoidance motivation.” The strongest motive that encourages such schoolchildren to study their lessons is the desire to avoid bad grades and troubles from teachers and parents. Well-performing schoolchildren have stronger cognitive motivation. As research shows, in order to form educational and cognitive motivation, it is necessary to organize educational activities in such a way that schoolchildren focus not only on the knowledge itself, but also on the method of acquiring knowledge. In this case, the teacher evaluates not only the results of the work, but also the way in which these results were obtained; At the same time, students themselves are involved in the process of such assessment.

Putting the student in an active position in relation to the acquired knowledge is a condition not only for the development of cognitive needs, but also for the effective development of his abilities.

Chudnovsky V.E. Nurturing abilities and formation
personality. - M., 1986. - P. 32-40.

See: Bozhovich L.I. Personality and its formation in childhood: Psychological research. - M., 1968.

See: Productive thinking as the basis of learning ability. - M., 1981.-S. 113. 178

Cognitive need - more precisely - the need for external impressions. As such, as the need to acquire new knowledge, it develops only in situations that promote awareness of the need for this knowledge for life and activity. The development of the need for knowledge is closely related to the general development of the individual, with his ability and skills to find answers to vital questions in the content of the sciences being studied and in external reality.

Levels :

1) the initial level of this need is the need for impressions. At this level, the individual reacts first to the novelty of the stimulus. The need for impressions is the foundation of cognitive needs.

2) the need for knowledge (curiosity). It is expressed in interest in a subject, a propensity to study it, a love of reading books, etc. The cognitive need at the level of curiosity is spontaneously emotional in nature and most often does not have a socially significant product of activity.

3) At the highest level, cognitive need has the character of purposeful activity and leads to socially significant results.

Shapes:

1) The first form of manifestation of the need for knowledge is the assimilation of ready-made knowledge (the assimilation of knowledge, its integration, systematization and, finally, the need for the accumulation of knowledge).

2) Its second form is the study of reality in order to obtain new knowledge, analysis of impressions, interest in problematic situations and, finally, the desire for purposeful creative activity.

Cognitive need also differs in the breadth and depth of knowledge, in the intensity (extensiveness) of cognitive activity. The range of activities in which the student is involved is prompted by various needs. During the learning process, it is important for the teacher to support, in particular, the development of the child’s cognitive needs: in the lower grades - his curiosity, in middle and high school - the need for creative activity. Need,<находя>an object capable of satisfying it becomes a motive directing the corresponding activity. Age dynamics of development of cognitive needs. In psychology, the cognitive need did not immediately acquire the rights of citizenship. For a long time scientists believed that this need only serves all others. Interest in knowledge real world- one of the most fundamental and significant in child development. Psychologist L. I. Bozhovich, summarizing a large amount of empirical data, came to the conclusion that already third to fifth week of life The child develops a need for external impressions, the emergence of which marks the transition from newborn to infancy. This need will play a decisive role in the entire further development of the child. The new need differs significantly from the simple organic needs that appeared earlier - for food and warmth. If the “engine” of the latter is largely the desire to overcome negative emotions (to get rid of unpleasant sensations, discomfort), then the basis of the new need is a positive emotion - the elementary joy of knowledge. Therefore, this need falls into the category of “unsatisfiable”. If the need for food, as it becomes satiated, loses its motivating power, then new impressions not only cause more and more positive emotions, but also develop curiosity. Years of preschool and preschool childhood pass under the sign of the rapid development of this need - to know such a complex and at the same time such an attractive world around us. And now the child comes to doorstep of the school. By this time, his cognitive need reaches a new level, which is expressed in the emergence of interest in solving cognitive problems themselves, acquiring new knowledge and skills in the learning process. This need finds its satisfaction in schooling. However, some time passes, and a strange, paradoxical situation arises. The child’s mental functions are improved - observation, logical memory, basic mental operations (analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generalization) develop; attention becomes more stable, and at the same time the cognitive need as such in many cases not only does not rise to a higher level, but manifests itself much less clearly than at the previous age stage. Researchers describe groups of children whose "cognitive potential" declines significantly with age. Psychologist Z.I. Kalmykova, having thoroughly studied the peculiarities of the thinking of such children, notes that the older the children, the greater the gap they have between verbal formulations and the specific reality that they should reflect. These schoolchildren seem to be formulating generalized judgments, but verbal formulations mask the passivity of thought, the desire to escape from intellectual tension. Productive thinking (thinking acting as the ability to acquire new knowledge, the ability to learn) is replaced by a mechanical reproduction of known provisions. The manifestation of cognitive needs significantly depends on the personal position of the student. The manifestation of cognitive needs significantly depends on the personal position of the student. Putting the student in an active position in relation to the acquired knowledge is a condition not only for the development of cognitive needs, but also for the effective development of his abilities.

55. The concept of giftedness by J. Renzulli. Among modern foreign concepts of giftedness, the most popular is the theory of Joseph Renzuli. He believes that the behavior of a gifted person reflects the interaction between three main groups of qualities: these are general or special abilities above average, a high level of involvement in the task and a high level of creativity. A gifted person possesses them or is capable of developing this system of qualities and applying it to any potentially valuable area of ​​human activity. According to the theory of J. Renzulli, giftedness there is a combination of three main characteristics: intellectual ability (above average), creativity and persistence (task-oriented motivation). In addition, in his theoretical model knowledge (erudition) and favorable environment are taken into account(scheme). It is fundamentally important that J. Renzulli proposes to consider gifted not only those who are superior to their peers in all three main parameters, but also those who demonstrate a high level in at least one of them. Thus, the gifted population expands significantly beyond the small percentage of children typically identified through intelligence, creativity, or achievement tests.

Special Need

The previous chapters give an idea of ​​what special need in mental search, in mental stress, it is most typical for gifted children, even those whose unusual abilities are not immediately visible.

The need for mental activity is designated in the scientific literature by various terms that are similar in meaning: mental activity, cognitive need, research need. This is not exactly the same thing, but still about one thing - about the need to “use your brain,” about the pleasure of thinking, the joy of learning. To designate this very common feature For the category of children we are interested in, we will use the expression “cognitive need.”

In psychology, the cognitive need did not immediately acquire the rights of citizenship. For a long time, scientists believed that this need only serves all others. You need to eat, and you need to find food, find out where it is, how to get it - this is where a cognitive need arises. Who are friends, who are enemies, whose territory is again a cognitive need for help. It was believed that hunger, thirst, the instinct of procreation, and protection of offspring were primary - the cognitive need serves only as a means of satisfying them. Therefore, we know less about cognitive needs than about others.

It took a lot of research and debate among scientists to recognize that the need for cognition is not a “handmaiden” of other needs, but an independent, independent need. (Of course, this independence is relative: all needs are closely interconnected, forming a complex system that is sufficiently fixed in the individual.) Yes. there is a special need for impressions, for an influx of new information, for knowledge.

Unsaturation

Cognitive need is characterized primarily by activity: the person himself seeks a change in impressions, new information, feels the need for the very process of cognition.

This need is also distinguished by the following: acquiring new knowledge does not extinguish, but, on the contrary, strengthens it. As knowledge enriches, the desire for knowledge grows. The cognitive need in a developed form becomes indescribable - the more a person learns, the more he wants to know. In this sense, it is fundamentally different from any organic needs. In the latter, you can sharply draw a line - the need is there (the person is hungry, thirsty) or it has disappeared, satisfied (the person is full, not thirsty). A true cognitive need cannot be satisfied. It is limitless, just as knowledge itself is limitless. And here there is no satiety - you cannot “re-know”.

Of course, cognitive activity, like any other, has its own specific goals, an orientation towards a certain result. However, in this case, orientation to the result only sets the direction for the movement of thought. The end result here is impossible. Any knowledge, any result is only a milestone, a stage on the path of knowledge.

The joy of learning

Tireless activity, the desire for the process of cognition itself is possible only thanks to another feature of this need - pleasure from mental exertion. The desire for knowledge develops and strengthens because the mechanism positive emotions. Without emotions there is no need, including cognitive needs.

Joy during intellectual activity (which some people experience more intensely, others less intensely, but which is familiar to many) can now be registered. A number of strictly physiological indicators (electroencephalographic, biochemical) indicate that at the moment of intellectual tension, along with the area of ​​the brain engaged in mental work, as a rule, the center of positive emotions is also excited. For some people, this connection is so strong and strong that deprivation of intellectual activity leads them to a serious condition.

What exactly “includes” the feeling of pleasure during full intellectual activity? Some scientists believe that the point here is mental tone, which becomes optimally high at the moment of mental stress (i.e., high activity in itself is pleasant). Others believe that joy and pleasure are the result of a certain connection between the center of positive emotions and the activity of the brain departments that manage mental work. We turn on one, the other turns on at the same time. Evolution, so to speak, made sure that homo became sapiens, and chose such a mechanism. Still others believe that at the moment of successful intellectual activity, there is a kind of release of searching, problematic tension - this produces a feeling of satisfaction. Whatever point of view is more correct, the fact remains: full-fledged mental activity causes a feeling of joy, pleasure, which intensifies and strengthens in the process of intellectual activity.

So, the cognitive need stands on three “pillars”: activity, the need for the very process of mental activity and pleasure from mental work.

During age-related changes, different stages of development of cognitive need, its qualitatively different levels, clearly appear.

Need for impressions

The first level can be called the level of need for impressions. This is the initial level, a kind of foundation for cognitive aspirations. The biological prerequisite for the need for impressions is the orienting reflex (the “what is it?” reflex). A classic example is an infant turning his head toward a rattle. A very tiny child rejoices at a new sound (not too harsh), a new colored object. This is where mental activity begins. New stimuli have not yet formed into a specific system for the child, but they prepare the basis for his understanding of the environment. In children, the activity of the cognitive need is especially pronounced.

The Belgian scientist Nutten conducted such an experiment.

In the experimental room, two machines were installed - A and B. Machine A was all shiny, with multi-colored lights and bright handles. Machine B looks much simpler and more modest, there is nothing colorful or bright in it, but you can move the handles and, depending on this, turn the light bulbs on and off yourself.

When the five-year-old children participating in the experiment entered the room, then, of course, they first of all paid attention to the elegant machine A. After playing with it, they discovered machine B, and it turned out to be the most interesting for them. The children moved their hands, turned the light bulbs on and off - in a word, they showed cognitive activity.

The experiment was modified in every possible way, but the conclusion each time turned out to be the same: over the most elegant, bright object, children prefer one with which they can actively act (remember which toys children love most).

Psychologists have found that the more varied the stimuli a child receives in the early period, the more intensely his mind develops. Whereas children brought up in a monotonous environment, deprived of attention and wealth of impressions (for example, in some orphanages), not only experience developmental delays, they even get sick. This disease also has a corresponding name - hospitalism. The main reason for governmentism is a lack of incentives, a lack of impression.

Becoming Curiosities

The need for impressions gradually turns into curiosity, which can be considered as the second level of development of cognitive needs. At two or three years old, all children love to learn - ask questions, listen when they are read to; They love to break toys to see what's inside. Even then, the child begins to have endless “whys”: “Why does the sun shine?”, “Why does the wind blow?”, “Why does the car drive itself?” and even “Why does the cat close his eyes when I pet him?” In these “why” questions, there is a desire not only to find out, but often to reflect, not just to receive information, but to set thinking to work. By the time a child enters school, he already has his own, albeit very naive, picture of the world.

At the level of curiosity, interest is shown not in a separate stimulus, but in the object as a whole, in certain activities. Such curiosity is already largely determined by upbringing and is associated with age-related maturation. However, even at this level, cognitive activity is more spontaneous than purposeful.

Curiosity, directed in all directions, reaches its apogee in a teenager (“auto-moto-bicycle-photo-cinema-radio circle”).

Formation of inclinations

And finally, the third level of cognitive need is achieved when it is already mediated by socially significant tasks. Now its manifestations are not spontaneous, but are associated with the development of more stable inclinations, for example, with the intention to determine a future field of activity.

Cognitive striving at this third, highest level takes on a different character than before: no longer so directly emotional as consciously goal-oriented. At the same time, the role of external factors naturally increases (to a greater extent - focus on results, on specific achievements), but still the need for knowledge does not cease to satisfy internal needs, continues to be joyful, giving a feeling of the fullness of life.

It is important that each subsequent level not only absorbs the previous one, but necessarily slows it down and partially cancels it. If this does not happen, then the development of cognitive needs is delayed and remains at a more primitive level, even if clearly expressed. The role of certain manifestations of this need depends on what age stage they are confined to.

1. BASIC CONCEPTS

Each Living being should be guided by environment, otherwise it would not be able to save its life. This orientation may relate to understanding the value of various elements of the individual’s external environment, as well as the value of one’s own actions related to objects representing these elements, and is always the result of previous individual or species experience. Animals correctly orient themselves due to the fact that they recognize the “value”, “meaning” of individual stimuli - the smell of a beggar and the smell of a predator, the call of a female and the movement of grass. Having recognized these signals, they react to them in accordance with their significance for self-regulation - they grab food, listen, become sexually aroused, or run away.

This type of orientation creates the basis for the emergence of species experience, consolidated during phylogenesis with the help of unconditioned reflex mechanisms. It also creates the basis for a differentiated, targeted form of behavior taking into account the situation.

Acquired orientation is the result of previous learning. Conditioned connections are formed when a stimulus preceding an unconditioned stimulus becomes its signal. In this way, the sphere of orientation in the environment gradually expands, and the dynamics of these connections make it possible to reflect changes in the value of environmental objects.

In addition to conditioned reflex orientation, which Pavlov called first-signal, there is another form of orientation, which is based on the processes of conceptual thinking. The individual is not limited to registering the simultaneous occurrence of stimuli, but subjects the information delivered by the stimuli to complex operations: abstraction and generalization, as a result of which concepts arise. The art of operating with concepts without constant reference to a specific subject makes it possible to delve into the meaning of ongoing phenomena, which allows you to foresee their course, deducing it through analysis common dependencies, patterns, and, therefore, create new concepts and operate with them at an increasingly higher level of abstraction. This practically opens up unlimited possibilities of knowledge, since, guided by an understanding of the laws governing the course of the orientation process itself, a person can design machines that increase the accuracy, speed and scope of this process millions of times. Thanks to the use of abstract concepts during orientation activities, a person could, for example, without leaving the room, without any measuring instruments establish the relationship between mass and energy. He was also able to determine the sizes and paths of planets that he had never seen, to discover and use radio waves for which he did not have sensory receptors, to see objects millions of times smaller than those that were accessible to his eye, and, disappointed that science did not brought him closer to happiness, turned out to be capable of creating such myths as the myth of Eve, the thirst for knowledge of which doomed all generations of people to suffering.

Conceptual orientation - it can also be called intellectual orientation - forms the basis not only of individual experience in the sense of contact with certain objects or phenomena (after all, a fact lies at the source of every science), but also the basis of a number of varieties of cognitive (intellectual) activity. Any cognitive activity must be carried out according to certain rules established on the basis of the structure of the brain, from the already existing orientation in the forms of cognition and the resulting experience. The range of cognitive capabilities is enormous: from orientation based on the so-called common sense to complex mental systems in which hypotheses put forward alternately on the basis of facts and theories are subjected to experimental testing and corrected by transferring the conclusions arising from them into practice, which in turn makes it possible to create new hypotheses, etc. In this way, human knowledge approaches an objective reflection of the world that is within us and outside us, from the particle of an atom to the scale of space.

Human thought, not corrected by practice, is also capable of creating curious, often very interesting and beautiful myths, which are not so much a reflection of objective reality as a reflection of human concerns, joys and anxieties. These myths also play a role by filling gaps in a person's knowledge or making this knowledge closer to his desires.

Perhaps it is in the creation of myths, more than in the design for better adaptation of scientific theories, the instrumental nature of which is completely obvious, that some character traits knowledge - his well-known disinterest, apracticalism. The myth of Prometheus did not bring its creators one step closer to understanding the mystery of fire. So the boy who tears the ball apart, trying to understand what “jumps” in it, gets practically nothing. He only achieves what he wanted, losing the ball in the process. This apracticalism of intellectual cognition indicates that cognitive activities are dynamized by forces that are not in direct connection with the adaptive processes of the individual. A person undertakes cognitive activity when he is faced with a problem that requires a solution, and not only when he needs a solution to the problem for something.

The above reasoning allows us to draw three main conclusions.

1. The cognitive process in a person has the nature of a series of operations aimed at achieving a goal, and, therefore, in accordance with the definition of Chapter I, is an activity.

2. Human cognitive activity is characterized by the use of concepts.

3. Human cognitive activity is dynamized by tension that arises as a result of the very fact of the existence of something that requires cognition, and therefore, its source is, as one can assume (in contrast to tensions that dynamize types of self-preservation activities), a change in the external situation, and not the internal state of the body.

2. DYNAMICS OF COGNITION

The structure and course of cognitive activity, which the psychology of thinking deals with, is a well-researched and developed phenomenon. Considering them in this work would take us too far from its topic - human desires. The situation is different with the dynamics of cognition, with the forces that cause and stimulate (often to the detriment of the need for self-preservation) cognitive activity. Interestingly, although active character cognitive activity was established several decades ago, psychologists have to deal with this problem again, since the conclusions from the theory of the “independent activity” of human cognition have not yet found application in public practice - in schools, kindergartens and enterprises.

One of the reasons for many ambiguities in the question of the dynamics of cognition is the confusion of two different problems(perhaps the same difficulty arises when analyzing other aspects of the motivation process), namely, the failure to distinguish between the processes that initiate cognitive activity and the processes that support and dynamize this activity. As the results of many of the studies cited here confirm, these are two completely different processes, apparently based on the functioning of completely different nervous structures.

a) PROCESSES INITIATING COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

The process that initiates orienting activity was discovered by Pavlov during his studies of conditioned reflexes. As is known, Pavlov established that each new stimulus causes a reaction in the animal by adjusting the receptors and called this phenomenon the “orienting reflex”, or the “what is it” reflex. The orienting reflex, according to his view, is an unconditioned reflex, and its biological significance is based on the fact that it protects the body, not allowing it to miss a stimulus that could have any meaning for the body - positive or negative. When it turns out that the stimulus does not entail any consequences important for the individual, the orienting reflex in relation to this stimulus fades away (Pavlov, 1952, pp. 9, 32, 78).

Understood in this way, the orienting reflex can be considered a factor initiating the activity of orientation in the value of objects. It adjusts the individual’s receptors to perceive a new stimulus, thereby making it easier for him to recognize the value that this stimulus may represent for him, but does not in itself determine the type of orienting activity. The study of the functions of the reticular formation, begun by Magoon (1965), contributed to a better understanding of the neurophysiological foundations of the processes that initiate and dynamize cognitive activity. Without dwelling on these issues in detail, it can be argued that each new stimulus causes, in addition to increasing the level of excitation of the analyzer (the so-called path-breaking process), a general excitation of the cortex, preparing it for the beginning of regulatory activity. In the case when it turns out that the stimulus has no biological significance(studies were conducted on animals), there is a decrease in the body's reactivity to this stimulus. This process is associated with the function of the lower part of the reticular formation, localized in the brain stem. In the case when the stimulus is important for the body, the general orienting reaction fades away, the general excitation of the cortex is replaced by excitation of the region locally associated with the current stimulus. A special, specific orienting activity begins, often called exploratory, which occurs in the circuits connecting the hypothalamus, the upper part of the reticular formation, with the corresponding areas of the cortex, and is directed precisely by this structure.

The thesis about the difference between the orienting reflex and the exploratory reflex has been confirmed in many works, although there is also a fairly widespread opinion that the so-called exploratory reflex is only the highest form of development of the orienting reflex. These issues will be discussed in the course of further presentation, however, it may make sense to note here that accepting the orienting reflex (with all the ensuing consequences) as a factor that not only initiates, but also dynamizes cognitive activity would lead to many paradoxes. For example, the orienting reflex in people with brain defects does not fade away after repeated repetition of the same stimulus, from which it would follow that only such people are capable of prolonged cognitive activity. In addition, cognitive activity (in relation to nonspecific activation of the reticular formation of the brainstem) would be directed to stimuli that are as strong and novel as possible, and not to stimuli that have great importance for the individual, which is typical for cases of mental illness of an organic nature.

There remains one more unexplored problem. Undoubtedly, the orienting reflex is a factor initiating cognitive activity in animals and small children. Does it also fulfill this role in adults? Probably not. Of course, this is possible in some situations. A man sits thinking over a ditch and suddenly feels that “something” is happening behind him. The appearance of this “something” and the reflexive reaction to it initiates cognitive activity. A special problem, however, is the question of cognitive activity initiated by motive.

This question is quite complex and requires special research. We do not fully understand the reasons for formulating the motive that initiates cognitive activity. Perhaps, of course, this factor is an orienting reflex to a new unknown phenomenon, and in a person it can be caused not only by a physical stimulus, but also by the content of a concept. Then it would be a two-stage initiation, the course of which we still know nothing about today.

b) PROCESSES DYNAMIZING COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

I outlined hypotheses concerning the neural substrate of processes that dynamize cognitive activity in the previous section. Let's consider another problem. If, as is assumed, the tension that dynamizes cognition comes from the outside, is situationally caused, then the question is what kind of stimuli, after the initiation of cognitive activity, contributes to its continuation. From the assumptions presented in this chapter, it follows that these stimuli must be both new to the individual and at the same time contain something already known to him. Examples confirming this can easily be found in everyday situations. When a person encounters something that has no meaning for him, that is, an object, a phenomenon that he cannot correlate in any of its aspects with what he knows, he passes by indifferently or reacts with fear. “Curiosity” is awakened by paradoxes, contrasts, and incomprehensible connections between things known and unknown. Only such a phenomenon can cause the emergence of a motive for cognition, since it is impossible to program actions in relation to an object that does not remind us of anything and is not associated with anything known. We can run away from this object just in case, but we begin research only after putting forward any hypothesis that connects this object or phenomenon with our experience. Some data from psychological observations indicate that a person often does not notice what he does not know at all, just as he does not notice ordinary things that are too well known: the colors of the house in which he has lived since birth, the window of a store near which he passes every day, he cannot describe a person with whom he has been communicating for many years.

All issues raised above require thorough development and testing. Few researchers study them. However, it is characteristic that, whatever the methodological and theoretical positions of the researchers of this problem, they came to the same conclusions: cognition is an active activity performed by the individual, and not a dispassionate reflection of the situation; this activity is dynamized through factors associated with the very appearance problem requiring knowledge and can therefore be considered, in a certain sense, apractical. Some of the theories also allow us to answer questions that we have so far left open.

To illustrate this issue, I have selected the views of six authors representing different periods development of psychology, different schools and specialties: Levitsky (1960), Mazurkevich (1950), Schumann (1932), Sokolov (1959), Harlow (1954) and Susulovskaya (I960).

Levitsky, in his work devoted to the analysis of orientation in animals and people, set out to analyze the objective definition of the term “cognitive process.” Considering the orientation in the biological value of objects in animals, he refers to the results of Pavlov’s research and states that “Pavlov, in the unconditionally reflex mechanism, identified a control process that increases the animal’s sensitivity to certain stimuli and tunes it to perform one reaction rather than another, and called this the process is “the main tendency of the organism”" (Levitsky, 1960, p. 93). This tendency can arise under the influence of internal motivations, for example, a food or sexual tendency, or (as in the case of a tendency towards aggression) can be caused by external stimuli. According to Pavlov, the corresponding areas of the cortex, under the influence of these factors, are brought into a state of excitation, which increases their sensitivity to a certain category of stimuli - food, sexual, etc. This tendency can, therefore, be defined as “a state of tension of the center, a state of readiness to reflect certain stimuli and to respond to them with a certain action” (ibid., p. 164).

Developing and supplementing this idea, we would come to identify the “tendency” understood in this way with “instinct” (see. this work pp. 68-69). The central, emotional-motivating element of instinct would then be identical to subcortical tension, the cognitive element would be identical to the readiness to display certain stimuli, and the motor element would be identical to the setting for a certain reaction. Taking into account that in man the secondary elements of instinct have undergone an almost complete disappearance, it would be necessary to assume that his tendencies manifest themselves exclusively in the form of undirected tensions, reduced through activity of a certain kind, which in itself, however, does not direct his reaction.

In addition to these “biological needs,” Levitsky distinguishes, when talking about a person’s orientation, a separate “cognitive need” (pp. 189, 208) and speaks, for example, about the “thirst” of scientific truths of a scientist. According to this author, typically human, disinterested cognition also has at its core a dynamizing mechanism that creates tension like the “basic tendency of the organism.” He, however, believes that the physiological basis of this tendency cannot be sought in the cortical-subcortical mechanisms operating during the manifestation of biological tendencies, and postulates for them, following Pavlov, a special physiological basis in the form of a dynamic stereotype formed during the personal life of an individual (ibid., p. 193).

1 Levitsky understands need as a process and identifies it with a tendency (I960, p. 65).

When applied to the cognitive need in humans, Levitsky’s conclusions could (preserving the terminology adopted by him) be somewhat supplemented by showing that this need, like biological needs, apparently has its own innate neurophysiological basis in the existence research reflex, that is, it relies not only on existing dynamic stereotypes. The research reflex should, in turn, be based on a tendency that dynamizes research activity. During individual development, as sensory and motor experience accumulates, the orienting reflex would thus acquire a superstructure in the form of a need for research activities, becoming in turn a kind of unconditional reinforcement, as is observed, for example, in deaf and mute children (see Meshcheryakov, 1960). Regardless, however, of the concept of the basis, the introduction of the concept of individual cognitive tendency is of great importance, because cognition is interpreted here not as a passive reflection of the environment and a combination of reflections, but as mental and motor activity of a person, as a kind of psychophysical activity that requires individual dynamizing processes.

The activity of cognition is also emphasized by Schumann in his work “The Genesis of the Object” (1932). He also proceeds from the fact that in a child observation is always an active process directly related to the motor skills of the body. The author, relying on Sherrington's concept, argues that at least three phases should be distinguished in the activity of the sense organs: the initiation phase, the phase of tuning the receptor to the stimulus, and the finalization phase of observation. These three phases can be noticed already during the manifestation of individual feelings. For example, for mouth irritation infant using the mother's breast nipple or even just a finger (initiation phase), searching movements of the head appear (attuning the mouth to the stimulus), until finally the mouth touches the stimulus (finalization phase), after which sucking movements begin.

Similar phenomena occur when grasping, after the impact of an object on the hand begins (initiation phase). At this time, searching movements appear until the palm touches the object (finalization phase). Similar facts can be noticed during multisensory observation, for example, visual-tactile observation. The telereceptor stimulus here plays the usual role of an initiating stimulus; the child reaches out to it or even approaches an object noticed by vision and grabs it. Touch finalizes the motor cycle. With polysensory observation, connections arise between sensations coming from different senses. They are not, however (as the associationists thought, for example), a “combination” of two impressions, that is, a passive process of their mechanical addition, but a complex of types of activity of the child, which is based on difficult relationships initiation and finalization of cognitive reflex acts. It is interesting that Schumann considers reflexive cognitive activity caused by initiating stimuli to be a kind of prototype of aspiration to the goal, proposing to study it as a simple model of aspirations in general (ibid., p. 13).

Soviet scientists came to similar conclusions regarding the activity of cognition in their studies of the orienting reflex. Sokolov (1959), who summarized these studies, argues that “receptor tuning is one of the essential characteristics of the orienting reflex” (p. 11), that is, here too attention is drawn to the motor side of cognitive activity: Pavlov, who already in 1910 established empirically in in his studies of the existence of the orienting reflex (the very concept of the orienting reflex was put forward, in fact, by Sechenov in 1852), he emphasized that the essence of this reflex is the tuning of receptors to every, even the slightest, change in the environment, while all other reactions of the body are inhibited. Thanks to this, the animal is able to respond correctly to a new situation. The results of Pavlov’s research were confirmed in his experiments by Anokhin, who noted that the “exploratory reaction” (indicative) always appears when the experimental conditions change.

Podkopaev and Narbutovich went further in their conclusions. Their studies showed (cited from: Sokolov, 1959, p. 7) that the orientation reflex is a necessary prerequisite and condition for the emergence of a temporary connection between two foci of excitation. For example, in a dog, a conditioned food reflex to a given stimulus is formed only when this stimulus evokes an orienting reflex in it.

In connection with these studies, Asratyan (1953) put forward an interesting hypothesis regarding the arc of the conditioned reflex. Based on a number of his own experiments, he came to the conclusion that the conditioned reflex is, in fact, a synthesis of two unconditioned ones. One of them is an orienting reflex to an “indifferent stimulus”, and the other is, for example, an unconditioned food or acid reflex. It follows that the orienting reflex, necessary for the beginning of active exploration of the conditioned stimulus, is also necessary for the emergence of a temporary connection. Let me mention that a similar point of view is also held by American researchers of conditioned reflexes (see, for example, Woodworth, Schlosberg, 1954, pp. 547-549).

Further, Sokolov emphasizes that with repeated exposure to a stimulus that causes an orienting reflex, without reinforcing it with any unconditioned one, the reflex fades away, but can, however, resume after a break if another stimulus is connected and caffeine is given, which increases the excitability of the nervous system. Sokolov also dwells on the issue of localization of the orientation reflex in the brain and cites the views of a number of researchers who connect it with the functions of the reticular formation. Excitation of this area results in general excitation of the cerebral cortex, as well as activation of motor functions and the receptor apparatus (Magun, 1965).

According to Sokolov, the orientation reflex manifests itself in two forms: passive and active. The passive form is based on inhibition of the body's activity and is more primitive; in the course of individual development, it becomes active, the essence of which is based on the initiation of certain research activities. Observations by Polikanina and Probatova (1955) showed that premature babies born ahead of schedule for 3-3.5 months, the indicative reflex to sound stimuli first manifests itself as a general inhibition of respiratory movements and sucking activity or, on the contrary, is expressed in motor restlessness, activity of the facial muscles and nystagmus, and only gradually in the process of development these primitive indicative reactions are replaced ( One should, perhaps, say develop, are supplemented) by turning the head and eyes towards the source of sound. Research by Dashkovskaya (1953) showed that the passive form of the orienting reflex does not become active in children who received mechanical brain damage at birth. This primitive, passive form of the orienting reaction is also established in clinical studies in oligophrenics (Vinogradova, 1956), in infectious psychoses (Lichko, 1952) and in schizophrenics (Narbutovich and Svetlov, 1934, cited in: Sokolov, 1959, p. 49), that is, in all those cases in which serious cognitive impairment.

Concluding the review, Sokolov emphasizes that the development of the orientation reflex is especially characteristic of the higher regions of the brain that are more formed during evolution. In the most developed animals, namely anthropoids, it turns into a kind of cognitive reflex, which represents a special form of behavior of the organism, aimed at studying an object and based on prolonged manipulation of objects that do not have biological, for example food, value for the animal. The existence of a cognitive reflex in apes was proven by the experiments of Pavlov, Voitonis, Ladygina-Kote and Vatsuro. It should be noted that Sokolov does not separate the function that initiates the orientation reflex from the function that dynamizes the cognitive reflex when he writes about the “degeneration” of one reflex into another in representatives of higher evolutionary forms.

Jan Mazurkiewicz in his work “Introduction to Normal Psychophysiology” also emphasizes the active nature of cognition. While Schumann relied mainly on observations of infants, and Levitsky and Soviet scientists - on data obtained in experimental studies of animals and partly people, Mazurkevich made primarily clinical observations on humans, interpreting them in the light evolutionary theory Jackson. Mazurkevich believes that “cognitive striving” is a phenomenon that is, in principle, similar to the Pavlovian orienting reflex and appears for the first time when a child begins to be interested in objects that have no biological value for him. He also argues that cognition is an active process, a product of the psychophysical activity of the organism; this activity actively leads to the knowledge of objects and to the emergence of individual experience. “All his personal judgments,” writes Mazurkevich, “are a product of the child’s own activity, and therefore, psychologically, a product of the work of attention, the function of interest” (1950, p. 63).

Particularly interesting in connection with the ideas developed in this chapter are the views of Harlow (1954), who argues that psychology links human motivation too closely with the energizing role of homeostatic drives such as hunger. Attempts to connect human motivation with feelings of pain or fear (Maurer, Brown, Horney) cannot be considered, according to Harlow, to be completely justified. After all, a person studies and lives for years, months and weeks without encountering any difficulties in satisfying homeostatic needs, moreover, “common sense teaches us that our energy for the most part stimulated by positive goals rather than by the desire to escape under the influence of fear or danger” (p. 38).

In this regard, the author draws attention to the role that externally elicited motives play in motivation and related learning. He understands these factors as inducing action, believing that their activity is not associated with either homeostatic or sexual needs, but with certain external situations that are not related to the normal functioning of the body. The author defines one of these factors as “the desire to imitate.” It manifests itself especially strongly in monkeys (“monkey sees, monkey does”), but to a certain extent it also exists in humans. This is also evidenced by the work of Keller and other authors, who showed that differences in environmental lighting can serve as reinforcement when training rats. The most interesting points, however, include the "desire to explore the environment", manifested in the fact that, for example, a monkey can put a lot of effort into disassembling simple and complex puzzle mechanisms, without receiving any reinforcement other than the opportunity to disassemble the mechanism, or it can also learn to open complex locks without receiving any reward other than the opportunity to look out of the room in which it is located through a window opened in this way (the so-called visual research apparatus). This phenomenon can also be observed in rats placed in a maze. A rat that has not had food for 23 hours will often run through a tunnel and “explore” its surroundings, paying no attention to food until the entire maze has been explored. Finally, researchers who have been working with rats for a long time have noticed that a rat can significantly increase its maze skill without food reinforcement. Harlow also tries to interpret "playing" with food, a favorite pastime of young children, as being motivated by external factors.

A child, even being hungry for 14 hours, sitting down at the table, often instead of eating, begins to “put peas in the milk... throw spoons on the floor, use the puree as a material for drawing on it with your finger.”

It can be concluded that Harlow explains all human or animal behavior caused by an external situation by the action of a motivational system caused by external factors, which is “as basic and innate as the hunger-appetite and thirst-appetite systems” (p. 52). Stimuli that activate this system can play the role of reinforcement in the creation of conditioned reflexes, which is confirmed by data from numerous experiments. This type of reinforcement has a number of advantages that homeostatic type reinforcements do not have. They are more persistent, do not change their strength due to frequent repetition and give stronger effects in the process of forming reflexes.

Thus, the data presented suggest that the appearance of a new object, the opportunity to examine it and manipulate it also serves as reinforcement during learning as a substitute for the food of classical Pavlovian experiments. (The reinforcement itself in these experiments is, obviously, as, for example, in Thorndike, the effectiveness of the reaction, the opening of a lock or window, allowing one to look out of the cage. Harlow taught not a signal, but the development of the correct response.) Thus, we can assume that frustrations in cognition (exploration) of a new situation is accompanied by tension of the same kind as the frustration of any other need, only the release of this tension is not associated with the receipt of various substances that directly restore the internal balance of the body (Ronzweig levels 1 and 2, see p. 65 of this work) , but with an influx of certain information (level 3). In conclusion, Harlow emphasizes, “There is no reason to believe that the externally activated motivational system can be derived from any homeostatic system, nor that there are any dependencies between them” (p. 52).

Harlow's research was limited to asserting the existence of tensions associated with environmental exploration and its role in animal learning. Complementing these studies, although unintended, are studies by Maria Susulovskaya (1960) on cognitive responses to novel stimuli in preschool children. The author, examining children under seven years old, showed them a series of stimuli of varying degrees of “novelty” - from a whistle to a complex “apparatus”, which is a complex of visual and auditory stimuli. Having clearly established the distinction between a “simple indicative reaction”, the indicator of which in behavior is the adjustment of the senses to a new stimulus, sometimes accompanied by an emotional reaction, and a “complex exploratory reaction”, manifested in the active manipulation of an object, and sometimes in verbal questions leading to a more complete understanding, Susulovskaya came to a number of interesting generalizations. Among other things, she pointed out the fact that the orienting reaction always represents the first phase of cognition, preceding the exploratory reaction, and the very appearance of the exploratory reaction and its structure are determined not only by the child’s age and mental level, but also by the characteristics of the object itself (p. 48 ). The subject determines the “strength of the desire for cognitive inquiry” (as Harlow would say). Susulovskaya also established which features of the subject influence the quality of the research response. “The more opportunities an object provides for manipulations and activities that lead to changes in it, the more entertaining it is, the more exploratory responses associated with it, and the more interest it generates” (p. 30). To avoid misunderstandings, it should be added that for the emergence of an exploratory reaction, not only a new subject is necessary, but also the ability to have an exploratory reaction. As follows from the data presented by Susulovskaya, children with severe mental retardation do not have this ability. These children did not always have an orienting reaction, and never a single object evoked “exploratory reactions, which already appear very early in children of normally mentally developed children” (p. 29). True, when analyzing this problem, Susulovskaya does not write about the lower cognitive capabilities of these children, but simply emphasizes that not a single stimulus could evoke an exploratory reaction in them. The mentally retarded child never tried to understand the meaning (Levitsky would say - values) of any new stimulus. We can say that a simple orienting reaction completely relieved his tension associated with the cognitive need, while the cognitive activity of a normal child continued until he reached the level of understanding the meaning of the stimulus. The influence of tension caused by fear on the implementation of the exploratory reaction is also worthy of mention. It can be assumed that in children who are “subject to fear,” that is, clearly demonstrating a constant readiness to respond to every new stimulus with fear, this tension should act in accordance with the principle of nervous dominance, namely, extinguish the tensions that dynamize the development of the exploratory reaction. And indeed, as Susulovskaya established, exploratory reactions in children susceptible to fear proceed with greater difficulty and are weaker, which serves as indirect evidence of the existence of tension associated with cognitive need.

This concludes the description of the hypotheses and research results concerning the stresses discharged through cognition of the environment. True, in none of the concepts presented here, the authors did not use the term “need” in the meaning adopted in this work, and the term “tension” was used in different meanings, not to mention the fact that the terms “tendency” and “aspirations” were used. , “reflexes”, “reactions” - the essence of the matter is not in the names. Directly or indirectly, all these points of view (as opposed to the classical views of associationists) emphasize the activity of cognition both in the rudimentary form that precedes research (orienting reflex) and in its higher forms (exploratory reflex). From these views it also undoubtedly follows that for a better understanding of cognitive activity we can assume the existence of a special mechanism that dynamizes orienting activity. This, in turn, confirms the thesis of this work, according to which in humans, as well as in higher animals, along with the need for self-preservation, a separate cognitive need that exists on equal terms appears, expressed in peculiar tensions that are discharged through research activities.

In the search for factors associated with cognitive activity, the existence of which is a necessary condition for the normal functioning of the individual, we can go further without reducing the problem to the individual’s research activity aimed at what he does not know. After all, we have already established that the study of the unknown is not only a condition for maintaining the external balance of an individual in a given situation. This research occurs as if just in case, as an activity undertaken in each new situation, even when nothing is yet known about whether cognitive activity will have any practical significance. We called this “apracticalism of knowledge.” Davis's experiment, described earlier (p. 88), showing that the very receipt of information is one of the conditions for the correct regulatory functioning of the brain, allows us to pose the question even more radically. Not only the study of the unknown, but the very receipt of information from the outside relates to the conditions for the normal functioning of the individual, and it directly affects the internal balance. It is clear that the effects of failure to fulfill each of these two conditions are different: in the first case, tension arises, inhibiting activity that does not lead to the exploration of the unknown, in the other, disorganization of the regulatory function of the brain occurs - nevertheless, both phenomena require consideration in the same plane of satisfaction mechanisms cognitive needs.

It turns out that the organization of functions that regulate the complex of processes occurring in the human body is more complex than it might seem in the light of the classical concept of self-regulation.

These are preliminary remarks, which, however, do not cover the entire range of problems of both cognitive activity and its role in adaptation, since this task is extremely broad. We have provided the data necessary to formulate a definition of cognitive need. This definition, like its object, is much more complex than the definition of physiological needs.

Cognitive need is a property of an individual, which determines the fact that without receiving a certain amount of information in any situation and without the ability to carry out cognitive activity with the help of concepts in partially new situations, the individual cannot function normally.

3. COGNITIVE NEED AND CLARITY OF MIND

The introduction of the concept of cognitive need, considered as a property of a person, which is associated with processes that dynamize cognition, as well as the balance of regulatory functions of the brain, allows us to take a fresh look at both the problems of the psychology of orientation in the environment and the phenomena associated with violations of this orientation: psychotic disorders, manifested in the form of schizophrenic, depressive syndromes and in the form of mental retardation.

One can, for example, interpret the mental changes that occur in schizophrenia differently, taking into account the results of studies of information deprivation. The hypothesis that states that the most significant disorder for schizophrenia is blocking the correct delivery of information to the higher parts of the brain seems quite plausible. The blockade, which (as can be judged on the basis of neurophysiological data) is carried out at the level of the thalamic reticular formation, can be caused by the most diverse factors: chemical, physical, both endo- and exogenous, and the effect depends not on the quality of the factor, but on its role in blockade. The limitation in the flow of information is manifested, in particular, in a general decrease in the number of elements that guide schizophrenics in the creation of a concept. This means that entire classes of heterogeneous information transmitted to the brain are accepted as one type of information. The concepts are becoming too general. It is often observed that information does not reach the sensory areas of the cortex at all or is recognized as information of a completely different type. The individual in this case does not react to certain stimuli, but reacts to others as if they were completely different, for example, opposite to what was recommended or in accordance with the preset he had accepted, or without any regularity at all, chaotically. In such a situation, phenomena of disorganization of brain activity, such as depersonalization, hallucinations, delusions, chaotic thinking divorced from the situation, emotional reactions unrelated to the situation, etc., become quite understandable.

These phenomena are identical to those obtained in a situation of experimentally induced information deprivation. The brain is an ultrastable system. It follows that in the event of such a change in conditions that causes a disruption in its balance, all brain functions are rebuilt, ensuring stability in the new conditions. Therefore, after a certain stage in the course of psychosis, when the blockage of information becomes a permanent state, the regulatory functions of the brain undergo changes, adapting to the reduced influx of information. In this regard, the phenomena of psychosis are reduced, and instead of them, the phenomena of a schizophrenic defect arise - rigidity of thinking, limited range of interests, decreased criticality, and in cases of difficulties, a stereotypical reaction is activated, which undoubtedly has greater instrumental value than a psychotic reaction. For example, one of the patients, in response to every difficulty in life, whether professional or personal, sent postcards with vulgar curses to the press.

It is of interest to interpret mental disorders in depression from these positions. The development of inhibition in this case can be explained by the fact that strong emotional stress of a uniform color causes a blocking of the flow of information from the outside to the higher parts of the brain. When depression intensifies, the same information deprivation syndrome appears, only with a strong emotional connotation, which disappears after the depression decreases or during psychotherapeutic intervention based on diverting the patient’s attention with some simple manual work or physical exercise.

Thus, testing the hypotheses arising from the deprivation theory of psychosis, even if they were not fully confirmed, might be useful in light of the ongoing controversy about the causes of psychosis.

As for oligophrenia, as is known, the manifestations of the limitations of cognitive abilities that come to the fore here tend to be explained by mental defects, weakness of memory, thinking, etc., completely ignoring the fact that correct thinking should also depend on the good development of mechanisms dynamizing the satisfaction of cognitive needs, which, being actualized under certain stresses, would ensure the person’s effective performance of research activities. If we take everything that has been said into account, this would entail a change in hypotheses about the localization of some disorders that cause the phenomena of oligophrenia, and could become the basis for the classification of disorders of cognitive activity.

This is precisely what Mazurkiewicz means, emphasizing that in cases where there are no “anatomical changes in the cerebral cortex that can explain mental underdevelopment,” the facts of a decrease in intellectual activity cannot be attributed to weakening abilities, for example, weak memory. “The previous view,” writes Mazurkevich, “when the causes of dementia were seen in the weakness of the activity of memorization, which was considered some special type of mental activity, turned out to be completely erroneous” (Mazurkevich, 1958, p. 67). The author apparently adheres to the view that the correct emergence of images in memory depends on the proper functioning of the orienting reflex, in other words, on the interest and attunement of the senses to this phenomenon. It follows that the low level mental abilities, when the cerebral cortex is normal, can in some cases be attributed to deficiencies in the functioning of the mechanism of cognitive striving, which dynamizes mental processes.

The above explains the phenomena encountered in children's homes, nurseries and many children's hospitals. It is known that in civilized societies, where, due to the employment of both parents, the care of young children is increasingly entrusted to public institutions, there is still no complete understanding of what important role plays a cognitive need in the mental development of a child and how important it is to take care of its proper formation. Educational methods in institutions entrusted with the care of young children are characterized by monotony and paucity of stimuli imposed by stereotypical rules, which, in essence, should lead to a limitation of the cognitive activity of pupils. In other words, typical situations in the lives of such children are carefully “cleansed” of any factors that could cause an orienting reflex in them, which is the main element of satisfying cognitive needs and, as it were, the embryo from which only the human mind can develop. Many studies indicate that it develops in exactly this way. For example, studies of deaf-blind children by the already mentioned Meshcheryakov (1960), during which the author noticed that a child deprived of all sensory sensations does not develop mentally at all, does not spontaneously undertake any activity and does not show the slightest trace of a cognitive reaction. He reacts to the approach of a person with general excitement. He releases the object placed in his hand. It was enough, however, to reinforce the indifferent stimulus with an unconditioned one, for example, putting a spoon in the child’s hand, scooping up food with it and putting it in the mouth, in order to awaken the child’s mechanisms of cognitive activity. The child, after many years of mental stagnation as a result of pedagogical intervention that enriched his world with sensory sensations, began to develop mentally at a rapid pace, over time showing great interest in the environment (Meshcheryakov, 1960; Sokolyansky, 1959).

By the way, a correct interpretation of these observations might make it possible to better understand the still not entirely clear connection between homeostatic accumulations and the development of the exploratory reflex. Another act indicating a connection between the scarcity of stimuli and the course of mental development is the so-called “swinging,” which takes on a stereotypical form and can last for hours. This phenomenon was given special attention by Wanda Schumann (1935-1936), who argues that it arises as a result of depriving the child of heterogeneous stimuli and the possibility of movement. One can, perhaps, assume that rocking provides the child with certain proprioceptive irritations, which should somehow diversify an extremely poor situation, but this method in itself is poor and very stereotypical and sooner or later will lead to the weakening and disappearance of cognitive stress. The paucity of external stimuli can also explain the persistent nature of the rocking. In the absence of stimulation coming from extrareceptors, the tone of the child’s cerebral cortex turns out to be too weak to break through vicious circle kinesthetic irritations that each time turn into movement. We observe here a phenomenon close to those that occur in cases of decreased excitability after removal of certain areas of the cerebral cortex or under the influence of pharmacological agents. Studies on animals carried out in this area by Zeleny, Popov and Musyashchikova (see Sokolov 1959, pp. 6-7) showed that the orienting reflex that occurs under conditions of decreased excitability of the cerebral cortex is extremely persistent, which means that the same stimulus constantly again evokes an indicative reaction, while in animals in a state of normal excitability of the cerebral cortex this reaction quickly fades away. It can be assumed that a decrease in the tension of the cerebral cortex, associated with the absence of external stimulation, gives the same inertial result, which results in endless swaying.

If we take into account that these "swaying" children are completely normal from an anatomical point of view, it can be argued that the mental retardation that may appear in them in a later period will be entirely a product of the environment, directly related to the insufficient development of cognitive needs and only indirectly with insufficient activity of the mechanisms of cognition, which is the result of insufficient cognitive dynamics.

Perhaps it should be noted that authentic oligophrenics also exhibit deficiencies in this area. I mentioned this when talking about Susulovskaya's research (p. 146). This is also indicated by the experiments of Paramonova (1959), who studied the role of the orienting reflex in the formation of conditioned connections in oligophrenics and established pronounced disturbances in the functioning of this reflex, which complicate the formation of full-fledged conditioned reflexes. Similar results were also obtained by Vinogradova (1956). This indicates that in oligophrenics, the main mechanism that initiates the emergence of the exploratory reflex, namely the orienting reflex, is impaired, which is apparently associated with other defects, for example, difficulties in creating new temporary connections, in transferring excitation from the first to the second signal system etc. (see Freyerov, 1954).

The most interesting results obtained by Paramonova include the identification of two types of violations of the orienting reflex in oligophrenics. In some of the subjects, the orientation reflex was characterized by inertia, similar to that established by Zeleny, Popov and Musyashchikova (see p. 154) in the case of removal of certain sections of the cerebral cortex. This can be considered a violation of the orientation reflex, typical of a state of organic damage to the cortex. Clinically, these lesions correspond to symptoms such as weakened attention, a tendency to perseveration, and a narrowing of the field of action. In another group of subjects, the orientation reflex was generally difficult to evoke (in Susulovskaya’s studies, some oligophrenics also did not exhibit an orientation reflex). Only after repeated exposure to the stimulus did a very unstable reflex develop. Simply put, in the first group it was difficult to distract attention from the stimulus, and in the second group it was difficult to draw the attention of the subjects to the stimulus. Perhaps these facts could be interpreted by formulating a thesis that requires verification, that in the first case we are dealing with an incorrect function of the instrument of cognition, which is the cerebral cortex, and in the other, with a defective function of the structure that activates orienting processes (the reticular formation).

This is all the more justified because, apparently, something similar follows from a preliminary analysis of the data I collected (the research is not yet completed). Among oligophrenics, especially the elderly, two groups can be distinguished, which are definitely different from a clinical point of view. Some exhibit disturbances close to those observed in patients with organic damage after trauma, with a predominance of perseveration phenomena, impaired coordination and a critical attitude towards their own defects; For others, such features as lack of interest in the essence of ongoing phenomena, difficulty attracting attention, indifference to all social situations that are incomprehensible to them, and other features that come down to the lack of proper cognitive dynamics come to the fore. Observation of the behavior of representatives of both of these groups suggests an analogy with a person who would like to understand the world around him, but has faulty tools of cognition, and with a person whose interest in the world around him lingers at the level of a simple indicative reaction. The follow-up data of the first group contains numerous information about skull injuries, intoxications, cases of encephalitis, while in the other group hereditary disorders predominate.

This, of course, is only preliminary data, to confirm which it is necessary to conduct big number studies, however, they indicate the possibility of resolving the question of whether mental retardation is always only a very early acquired dementia, that is, a consequence various diseases brain, or it is necessary to distinguish early dementia with different etiologies (even if the disease occurs in the first year or first months of life) from oligophrenia, understood as an independent clinical unit. There are two types of mental retardation and early dementia, classified until now only according to different degrees of mental retardation. A criterion that makes it possible for a more accurate classification could in this case be the type of violation of the orientation-exploratory dynamics. Such a classification, only based on other criteria, already exists. The author of one of the most comprehensive monographs on mental retardation, Sarason (1953), distinguishes between primary oligophrenia and secondary oligophrenia. The significance of this classification is that the difference between the clinical and test signs of these two forms of oligophrenia predetermines the choice of means of restoring working capacity.

One should also take into account the fact that in mentally normally developed individuals one can observe a low level of “mental clarity” associated with a lack of interest in a given task or with other shortcomings of “motivation.” Levitsky draws attention to this, establishing that “the source of errors in orientation in the environment can be insufficient “motivation” and in many cases they can be corrected by increasing the value of the situation or reducing the risk associated with it for the person being studied” (1960, p. 216). In the author's opinion, this point of view should be taken into account both when assessing test results and the results obtained by students at school.

To summarize, we note that the mechanisms that dynamize the satisfaction of cognitive needs as a later stage in the development of reactions associated with the orienting reflex are a factor that dynamizes the processes of cognition. Their correct functioning is a condition for the normal development of human mental abilities, a necessary tool for obtaining information that ensures adequate adaptation to the environment. Therefore, the analysis of cognitive processes from the point of view of their dynamics is also an important task of modern psychology.

Notes:

By algorithm we mean, according to Trakhtenbrot, “... an exact prescription for the execution in a certain order of a certain system of operations to solve all problems of a certain type” (B. A. Trakhtenbrot, Algorithms and machine problem solving, M., 1957, p. 7).

We call every plan, even the most general, for achieving some intended state - a goal - a program. This distinction is so convenient that it allows one to distinguish precisely and comprehensively developed programs from plans typical in everyday life, outlined only in general, leaving the possibility of improvisation.

The following words of Pavlov are especially interesting: “The biological meaning of this reflex is enormous. If the animal did not have this reaction, then its life would, one might say, hang by a thread every minute. And with us this reflex goes extremely far, finally manifesting itself in the form of that curiosity that creates science, which gives and promises us the highest, limitless orientation in the world around us” (1952, p. 9).

Levitsky understands need as a process and identifies it with tendency (I960, p. 65).

E. N. Sokolov in one of his later works (“On the modeling properties of the nervous system”, in the collection: “Cybernetics, thinking and life”, M., 1964) describes the “nervous model of the stimulus”, which is built on the basis of previous influences, providing active adaptation to the environment and anticipating the future meaning of the stimulus (extrapolation effect). The new signal is compared with the existing model, and in the event of a discrepancy between them, an indicative reflex to the uncertainty of the situation arises. In this way, the body provides probabilistic forecasting. - Note ed.

The author presents only one of the hypotheses for the emergence of so-called “endogenous” psychoses: schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis. There are many other hypotheses relating, for example, the development of schizophrenia (or, more precisely, the circle of schizophrenia, since geneticists suggest the presence of a whole group mental illness, united by this name) with the action of special toxic substances (X-toxin), disruption of the activity of neurohormones (substances involved in the transmission of excitation from one nerve cell to another), etc. As for the psychological interpretation of schizophrenic disorders, a whole a number of contradictory theories: the meaning of “hypotonia of consciousness”, “destructuration of consciousness” (Hey), “splitting (schisis) of the Self”, “disorder of the Self” (Kronfeld), the “breakthrough of the unconscious” (Jung), the role of a special “way of mental existence" (Jaspers), the withdrawal of the individual into a psychotic position as a result of a violation of interpersonal relationships (Sullivan, Benedetti), etc. Many works are devoted to the violation of gnostic functions in schizophrenia. The problem of the emergence and course of manic-depressive psychosis remains equally complex and unresolved. - Note ed.

The author presents these issues in a simplified manner. There are a number of forms of organic dementias characterized by either a low level of generalization, or slowness of thinking, or a lack of motivation to act, or a violation of criticality and purposefulness of thinking. These features and criteria for distinguishing organic dementias from various variants of mental retardation have been carefully studied by Soviet psychiatrists (see, for example: G. E. Sukhareva, “Clinical lectures on childhood psychiatry,” M., 1965). - Note ed.

According to the most popular scheme human needs– Maslow’s pyramid – a pronounced desire to understand the world around us (cognitive need) is characteristic of a very limited number of individuals. However, let’s immediately make a reservation that Maslow built his diagram to illustrate the needs and motivations of adults. Paradoxically, for the vast majority of children in the first years of life (even for those who later grow into very indifferent adults), curiosity is a very noticeable trait.

How does a child fulfill his cognitive needs?

To understand this, it is necessary to take into account how a child’s thinking develops and at what age his basic skills are formed. Conventionally, we can distinguish several stages at which his cognitive activity changes (naturally, at each subsequent stage he continues to actively use the tools that he mastered at the previous stage).

Gaining direct experience (from birth to approximately 2 years of age)

At this stage, the child collects and, to some extent, structures the information he received directly with the help of his senses. In the first months of life, the leading “channels” for him are touch, smell and taste (he receives 80% of information about the world around him with their help). By about two months, the baby's hearing is almost completely formed - some children at this age already enjoy listening to music, even demonstrating certain preferences. After 4 months it begins - and now he happily begins to explore his surroundings, grabbing all available objects. At the same time, he learns to control his body: he turns over, tries to sit down. By 8 months, he develops vision close to that of an adult; after 9 months he is able to independently move around the room and explore the object environment.

At this stage, children certainly already demonstrate a preference different types activity, different types information (auditory, visual, tactile, etc.). But in general, all kids are very curious and enjoy exploring the limits of their body and the properties of the objects around them.

Cognition through language (approximately 2-2.5 years)

At about 2-2.5 years, the child masters speech so much that he begins to use this skill “to its full potential” to replenish his knowledge about the world around him. Thanks to this, he receives information not only about those objects that surround him, or about phenomena with which he directly dealt, but also about some objects unfamiliar to him or even about abstract concepts. It turns out that you are giving him a new tool to satisfy his cognitive needs.

Cognition through analysis and synthesis (after 5-6 years)

By the age of 6-7, children master the first techniques of analysis and synthesis. They can trace cause-and-effect relationships between events, correlate the particular and the general - in other words, using the capabilities of their own thinking, the child can begin to form their own idea of ​​the world (the previous stage boiled down to the fact that the baby simply assimilated the information “encoded” in the language, which those around him informed him). With these abilities a person can become a brilliant thinker.

Why does this not always happen, and, as statistics show, after reaching a certain age (usually late adolescence - 16-17 years old) for many people, cognitive activity ceases to be of any interest? Is it possible to choose an educational approach in which a child, both in childhood and at an older age, will strive to realize his desire to understand the world around him?

Of course, such a possibility exists. It is possible and necessary to encourage a child’s cognitive needs; here are some recommendations on how to do this effectively.

So, in order to encourage a child’s cognitive activity:

1. Be sure to fully satisfy and. A sense of trust in the world to be explored is the most important “foundation” for further development. If this is not the case, then even children with the most brilliant potential will not be able to realize it fully, perceiving new opportunities as a source of potential threat.
2. Try to stimulate the harmonious, in other words, train all channels of perception: touch, smell, hearing, vision, taste. Perhaps some of them will help you with this. In the first months of a child’s life, it is better to refuse swaddling and use a pacifier as little as possible: while sucking, the child focuses mainly on the sensations received during this process and pays less attention to the world around him.
3. Give your little one the opportunity to gain experience himself, including negative ones. When you