History of the tank t 26. Add to favorites. Special purpose fighting vehicles

The T-26 tanks of the 1933 model had one cylindrical turret, and the armament was the same as on the BT-5 tank - a 45-mm cannon and two DT machine guns. Combat weight of such tanks was 9.4 tons, the height of the T-26 increased by 110 mm. The gun ammunition consisted of 130 shells. Such tanks were produced in 2127 units.
In addition, the so-called "radio" tanks T-26RT were produced with cylindrical tower, a characteristic feature of which was the presence of a handrail antenna and a radio station installed in the niche of the tower. The ammunition load of the guns of these tanks was less than that of other T-26 tanks - only 96 shells. Such tanks were made 3938 pieces.

During the fighting in Spain and near Lake Hasan, it turned out that handrail antennas serve as a guide for enemy fire, so in the future they abandoned such antennas, replacing them with whip antennas.
An interesting feature of the T-26 model 1933 was the presence of two searchlights located above the gun. Thanks to their illumination, the tank could fire at enemy positions at night.
Starting from 1935, the armor plates from which the body of the T-26 tanks was made began to be connected by welding (previously they were connected with riveting). The ammunition load was somewhat reduced - up to 122 rounds for the T-26 and up to 82 for the T-26RT. But the capacity of the fuel tanks was increased. As a result of modifications, the mass of the tank increased to 9.6 tons.
In 1937, the T-26 appeared, there was an anti-aircraft machine gun on the roof of the tank turret. Also, these tanks were equipped with an internal intercom. The power of the engine used on the T-26 was increased, and the mass of the T-26 began to be 9.75 tons.

Tanks of the 1937 model had welded turrets that had a conical shape, which increased their bulletproof protection. The capacity of the fuel tanks was again increased and the ammunition load was reduced (to 107 shells on the T-26). Accordingly, the mass of the tank continued to grow - now it was 10.75 tons. Since 1938, the T-26 began to be equipped with a stabilizer for the aiming line of the gun in the vertical plane.
The armor plates of the turret boxes of the T-26 tanks of the 1939 model were located obliquely. In 1939, the rear turret machine gun was no longer installed. The ammunition load of the tank has increased significantly: T-26 - 205 rounds, T-26RT - 165 rounds. The engine power has also been increased.

During the Soviet-Finnish war, about 100 T-26s were equipped with hinged armored screens, as a result of which the thickness of the frontal armor reached 60 mm. In 1941, the release of the T-26 was discontinued.
It should be noted that, in addition to the conventional T-26, chemical, or flamethrower, tanks were also produced in significant numbers. In addition to the flamethrower, these tanks also had the usual machine-gun and cannon armament.
The OT-130 was created in 1936 on the basis of the single-turret T-26. Instead of a cannon, a flamethrower was installed on the tank, the flame throwing range of which reached 50 m. The stock of fire mixture was 400 liters. The crew of the OT-130 consisted of 2 people, the weight of the car reached 10 tons.

	A - engine compartment; B - fighting compartment; B - department of management; 1 - armored body; 2 - tower; 3 - engine; 4 - gearbox; 5 - side clutch; 6 - brakes; 7 - final drive (behind the armor plate); eight - chassis; 9 - partition separating the fighting compartment from the engine compartment; 10- armored shutters above the oil cooler; 11 - air cap; 12-45 mm gun 20K; 13 - battery; 14 - folding frontal shield of the driver; 15- track rollers; 16 - suspension trolley; 17- muffler.

Similar varieties of combat vehicles equipped with flamethrowers and large stocks of fire mixture were OT-131, OT-132 and OT-133, which also had machine guns. On the OT-133, in addition to the flamethrower, there were two machine guns, on the previous versions - a flamethrower and one machine gun. In 1940, the OT-134 was created on the basis of the T-26. The conical turret of this tank was equipped with a 45 mm caliber gun and a machine gun, and a flamethrower, whose flame throwing range reached 50 m, was located in the front upper hull plate. The combat weight of the OT-134 was 10.8 tons, the crew consisted of 2 people.
In 1933, on the basis of the T-26, a bridge tank was designed with a carrying capacity of 14 tons. transportation of infantry soldiers, and TR-4-1, which was intended for the transport of ammunition to tank units. In 1935-1936. on the basis of the T-26, two T-26Ts tankers were made for transporting fuel.

The Soviet Purchasing Commission, headed by I.A. Khalepsky, the head of the newly created Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, on May 28, 1930, signed a contract with the British company Vickers for the production of 15 Vickers double-turret tanks for the USSR 6-ton. The first tank was shipped to the customer on October 22, 1930, and the last on July 4, 1931. Soviet specialists also took part in the assembly of these tanks. In particular, in July 1930, engineer N. Shitikov worked at the Vickers plant. Each combat vehicle made in England cost the Soviet Union 42,000 rubles. (in 1931 prices). For comparison, let's say that the "main escort tank" T-19, made in August of the same year, cost over 96 thousand rubles. In addition, the B-26 tank (this designation was given to British vehicles in the USSR) was easier to manufacture and operate, and also had better mobility. All these circumstances predetermined the choice of the UMM RKKA. Work on the T-19 was curtailed, and all forces were thrown into development series production B-26.

Appendix to the magazine "MODEL CONSTRUCTION"

In March 1932, the 45-mm anti-tank gun was adopted by the Red Army. tank gun 19K, developed at the plant number 8. Following it, they designed the 19K installation in the tank, which was called "45-mm tank gun model 1932." and factory index 20K. Compared to the PS-2, the 20K tank gun had a number of advantages. The armor penetration of armor-piercing projectiles increased slightly, the mass of a fragmentation projectile increased sharply (from 0.645 kg to 2.15 kg), and the mass of explosive in the projectile - from 22 g to 118 g. Finally, the rate of fire was increased due to the introduction of a vertical wedge semi-automatic shutter. True, the debugging of semi-automatic took about four years, and the first series of 20K guns were produced with 1/4 automatics, then with semi-automatics for armor-piercing and 1/4 automatics for high-explosive fragmentation shells, and only in 1935 guns with debugged semi-automatics for all types of ammunition.

In December 1932, the Defense Committee ordered the NKTP to produce T-26 tanks (starting with a vehicle with serial number 1601) with a 45-mm gun. Under this cannon, paired with a DT machine gun, a new turret was designed for the T-26 and BT-2 tanks. Shooting tests showed its complete reliability. The production of turrets for the 45-mm gun began at the end of 1932 at two factories - Izhora and Mariupol. The first produced towers of an improved type (welded with a large niche), and Mariupol made the first 230 towers according to the first version (riveted with a small niche). Most of the riveted turrets were installed on the BT-5 tanks and only a very small number on the T-26.

1 - barrel: 2 - recoil brake cylinder: 3 - lifting mechanism rods: 4 - telescopic sight: 5 - cushion: 6 - sleeve catcher shield; 7 - tarpaulin bag of the gill-lailer: 8 - sector of the lifting mechanism: 9 - bracket of the lifting mechanism: 10 - pedal trigger: 11 - footrest: 12 - bolt wedge: 13 - telescopic sight bracket: 14 - coaxial machine gun ball mount: 15 - lifting mechanism flywheel

The hull of the welded tower had the shape of a cylinder with an outer diameter of 1320 mm with a developed aft niche. The niche had an oval shape and served as a counterweight to the gun and at the same time a place for laying ammunition or placing a radio station. In the aft sheet of the niche there was a hatch with a door for dismantling the gun. In the niches of the riveted towers, the back wall was blank, without a door. In the roof of the tower there was a rectangular hatch for the landing of the crew, which was closed with two covers.

The armament of a single-turret tank consisted of a 45-mm tank gun of the 1932 model and a DT machine gun coaxial with it. The vertical guidance angles were in the range from - 8 ° to + 25 °.

The gun had a semi-automatic shutter of a mechanical type with electromagnetic and manual descents, a trough-shaped cradle, a hydraulic recoil brake, a spring knurler and a sector lifting mechanism. Shooting from a cannon and a machine gun was carried out by foot descents, the pedals of which were located on the footboard under the gunner's right foot.

Sights paired installation consisted of two optical sights, tank telescopic sight TOP arr. 1930 and tank periscopic panoramic sight PT-1 arr. 1932

In addition, the machine gun had its own open sight and could fire independently of the gun. With independent firing from a machine gun, the vertical firing sector was ± 4.5 °.

Ammunition consisted of 136 cannon shots (for tanks with a radio station - 96 shots) and 2898 rounds (46 magazines).

The shots were packed in special boxes located on the floor, on the left side of the fighting compartment. In these boxes, 54 shots were arranged vertically in six rows of 9 shots in individual nests. The top of the boxes were closed with hinged lids. which at the same time were the flooring of the fighting compartment.

Another 30 shots were laid horizontally in the niche of the fighting compartment.

Twelve shots were placed in the tower. The shells were held by special grippers, six pieces to the right and left of the twin installation.

An additional 40 shots for tanks without a radio station were placed in the turret niche.

Machine-gun magazines (disks) were placed in special iron boxes on the floor of the tank hull. From above, the boxes were closed with hinged lids, which, together with the lids of the shell boxes, were the common flooring of the fighting compartment floor. 40 disks were placed in the boxes, 6 more disks were located in a special rack on the wall of the tower on the right side.

In addition to the main machine gun, a spare machine gun was carried in the tank. It was placed on special brackets under the flooring of the fighting compartment near the left side of the tank.

The design of the hull of single-turret tanks of early production remained practically unchanged compared to double-turret ones. The only exception was the turret sheet, on which the turret was installed closer to the port side, and in the rear part on the right there was a vent closed by a lid.

This car has features like early models: a transmission hatch that leans to the right, a headlight without an armor casing, and later ones - a stamped frontal shield of the tower and removable bandages of road wheels. NIBTPolygon, 1940

1 - engine; 2 - main clutch; 3 - cardan shaft; 4 - gearbox; 5 - side clutch; 6 - control lever; 7 - gear lever; 8- driving wheel; 9 - guide wheel; 10-wheel roller; 11 caterpillar; 12 - 45 mm gun; /3 - flywheel of the lifting mechanism of the gun; 14 - gunner's seat; 15 - periscope sight; 16 - ventilation cap; 17 - radio station; 18 - antenna; 19- VKU; 20 - hole with shutters for the inlet of cooling air; 21 - oil cooler: 22 - air outlet; 23 - silencer; 24 front cross tube; 25 - rear transverse pipe; 26 - driver's seat; 27 - telescopic sight

In the autumn of 1933, a transmission access hatch appeared in the upper inclined frontal hull plate. Initially, its lid opened towards the port side, and later - upwards against the course of the tank. At the same time, the dimensions of the hatch increased.

Already in 1933, radio stations 71-TK-1, which had handrail antennas, began to be installed on part of the tanks. And if in the first year of production of single-turret T-26s, the percentage of radio tanks was small (apparently due to the lack of the required number of radio stations). then later it amounted to half, and then exceeded the number of tanks without radios.

In 1934, the suspension was strengthened: the thickness of the spring was increased from 5.5 mm to 6 mm.

The headlight, which was fixedly attached to the vertical frontal sheet of the turret box, was transferred to the upper inclined sheet, made folding and in stowed position covered with an armor cap. The signal was transferred from the left side of the turret box to its front plate.

Since 1935, the tanks were equipped with a 45-mm cannon mod. 1934. On this gun, the semi-automatic mechanical type was replaced by semi-automatic inertial type. The latter worked fully only when firing armor-piercing shells; when firing fragmentation - like a quarter of automation. those. the shutter was opened and the cartridge cases were extracted manually, and when the next cartridge was inserted into the chamber, the shutter closed automatically. This is explained by various initial speeds armor-piercing and fragmentation shells.

In addition, the gun mod. 1934 differed from the previous design of the recoil device and lifting mechanism, the wedge of the shutter was reinforced. the wire of the foot descent was replaced with a cable, the attachment of the cradle with the mask was strengthened, and a number of small improvements were made.

1 - armor cap: 2 - bracket: 3 - fastening bolt in the stowed position: 4 - fastening bolt in the combat position: 5 - slotted bar: 6 - rubber gasket

Since 1935, tank hulls and turrets have been manufactured using electric welding. The ammunition load of the gun was reduced to 122 shots (for vehicles with a radio station - 82). the capacity of the fuel tank has been increased. The mass of the tank increased to 9.6 tons.

In 1936, a removable rubber bandage was introduced on the road wheels, the tensioning mechanism was changed, and a second DT machine gun was installed in the turret niche. At the same time, the ammunition load of the gun was reduced from 136 to 102 shots (on tanks without a radio station), and the mass of the tank increased to 9.65 tons. In 1937, they began to mount anti-aircraft guns DT on P-40 turrets, and later on more advanced 56-U322B. Two searchlights of the so-called "combat light" were placed on the cannon, a new VKU-3 and a TPU-3 intercom were introduced. The engine was boosted, and its maximum power increased from 90 to 95 hp. In 1937, only radio tanks were produced, and with radio stations 71-TK-Z.

The ammunition load of tanks with a radio station reached 147 shots (107 for tanks without a walkie-talkie) and 3087 rounds.

The mass of the tank was 9.75 tons.

Already in 1929, the command of the Red Army came to the conclusion that the tank armament of the Red Army did not meet modern requirements. It was not possible to solve this problem on our own, because the Soviet designers did not have enough experience, and the production base of the Soviet Union was still in an undeveloped state. It was possible to get out of the situation only by turning to foreign experience.

In 1930, a delegation from the Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, led by Innokenty Khalepsky, purchased a number of models of equipment abroad, including tanks. Among the vehicles purchased were British Vickers Mk. E, better known as "Six Ton Vickers".

This tank model is interesting in that none of its modifications interested the British army. And not because the car was bad. It’s just that the military of Foggy Albion, correctly speaking, was distinguished by an overly creative approach to the formation of armored forces. And they considered that the Vickers six-ton ​​tank did not fit into the concept. So the developers had to focus on external consumers.

For the USSR, two-tower modifications of the tank, armed with machine guns, were purchased. They were assigned the conditional index B-26. At first, the tanks received rather restrained reviews from specialists. However, on January 8, 1931, the Vickers were shown to the command of the Red Army and the Moscow Military District. Seeing how famously the tanks rushed around the range, jumped over the trenches and almost turned in place, the distinguished guests were delighted. Literally the next day, K. E. Voroshilov gave the order to immediately resolve the issue of the advisability of organizing mass production of the B-26 in the USSR. The conclusions of the commission led by S. Ginzburg stated that it would be optimal to produce the car not in its original, but in a “hybrid” form - using structural elements of the T-19 tank being developed at that time in the USSR. However, in the end, it was decided to start production without changes, because, according to intelligence, Poland was already going to mass-produce and put into service six-ton ​​Vickers. These data did not correspond too much to the truth, but the verdict of the command had to be executed. "Vickers" went into the series, having received an index.

The task for the production of the T-26 was received by the Leningrad plant "Bolshevik". He was heavily loaded with other orders, but there was still no alternative: the Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk plants were still under construction. All work on production, and later on modernization, was led by S. A. Ginzburg.

In the best traditions of the command-administrative system, the plant was given a completely unrealistic order to produce 500 T-26 tanks by the end of 1931. Almost immediately, the plan had to be reduced to 300 pieces, which was also pure utopia. The entire first half of 1931 was spent only on translating the drawings of the tank into metric units, prepare the production base and produce reference samples. At the first stage of work, any attempts to make changes to the design were severely suppressed, even if they were aimed at simplifying production and improving technology.

Soviet manufacturers managed to copy the elements of the machine. It was not possible to make them work when assembled. Therefore, those 10 tanks that left the assembly lines before the end of the summer could be called working models at most. Their motors broke constantly and in a variety of ways. It was considered the norm that the motor defect did not exceed 65%. In the engines, the cylinders and pistons did not fit together, the valves broke, it was not possible to make a normal hardening of the crankshaft. The armored hulls produced by the Izhora plant had through cracks in the armor plates. And the quality of the steel was so low that 10-mm armor was pierced by an armor-piercing rifle bullet from 100-150 meters, although this was considered fundamentally impossible. Only by 1934 was it possible to ensure the acceptable quality of the machines produced.

The first T-26 models were produced with two machine-gun turrets, which were located on the hull next to each other. This design made it possible to fire in different directions at the same time. This was considered a very good option for an infantry support tank. As an alternative to the machine gun, an option was considered with the installation of a 37-mm gun in one of the towers.

In 1933 there was a very important change in the design of the T-26. Instead of two turrets, the tank received one - circular rotation. It was planned to install a 45-mm gun in it due to its unambiguous superiority in striking ability over the 37-mm one. All new tanks wanted to be rearmed, but due to a shortage in the supply of new guns, both single-turret and double-turret tanks were produced until the end of 1933. The new turret and gun made the vehicle heavier, so a new engine had to be developed and the suspension strengthened. Here great success designers did not reach. The T-26 has become much more clumsy and less passable.

By the beginning of 1936, tank builders finally put an end to the concept of wheeled-tracked vehicles. And the tank that had appeared by that time turned out to be too expensive and complicated. Work on the improvement of the T-26, which had already been curtailed, had to be resumed. The former riveted hulls were replaced with welded ones, which increased their strength. We changed the design of the gun mantlet, improved the fuel supply scheme. The design of the undercarriage was changed, and thanks to the new technology of hardening with high-frequency currents, it was possible to achieve exceptional strength of the track pins.

But all these improvements could not affect the fact that by the end of the 30s, the T-26 was no longer even the slightest outstanding combat vehicle among its counterparts in terms of mass. Different countries already had tanks in service that were comparable, if not superior. An attempt was made to arm the tank with a 76-mm cannon, but due to a defect in the gun, powder gases burst into the fighting compartment, so the work was curtailed.

For the first time, T-26s were used in combat during civil war in Spain. Tanks delivered to the Republicans Soviet Union, took part in almost all operations and proved themselves very well. Although a significant role in the fact that the T-26 was a formidable opponent was played by the fact that it was opposed by German and Italian tanks armed with machine guns. At the same time, due to weak armor, Soviet tanks were easily destroyed by enemy guns. After evaluating the results of the use of the T-26 by the Spaniards, Soviet designers installed additional armor screens on it.

Soviet tankers tested the T-26 during the battles near Lake Khasan. As a result of inept command, the tanks suffered big losses. So, during the assault on the Zaozernaya hill, the vehicles collided with well-prepared anti-tank defenses. Taking into account the weak armor of the Soviet tank, a frontal assault simply could not but end in heavy losses. And so it happened: 85 cars were hit, 9 of them were burned. As a result of this forced test by shelling, the commanders of the Red Army noted in the reports the high survivability of the tank. The T-26 could withstand five or six hits from Japanese shells. One can only regret that this quality was determined not in training ground conditions, but in a real battle.

In all conflicts where the T-26 was used, the traditional problem of Soviet tanks manifested itself in all its glory - low reliability. A large number of vehicles failed without taking part in the battle. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, the Red Army lost 3178 tanks on the Karelian Isthmus, 1275 of them due to technical reasons. In general, this war was very difficult for tanks, since the fighting was carried out in terrain that was not very suitable for armored heavy vehicles.

By June 22, 1941, there were about 10 thousand tanks of this type in the troops. Their use in the initial period of the war can be safely called a failure. The first reason for the huge losses and extremely low efficiency of the T-26 is the technical weakness and backwardness of the machine. Even in the thirties, this tank was ordinary and did not stand out in any way. By 1941, he had become frankly weak. His armor provided only bulletproof protection. Due to the low-powered engine, the tank was characterized by very low mobility. In addition, he was unreliable. A large percentage of T-26 losses are accounted for by vehicles abandoned by crews due to breakdowns, for the elimination of which there were no material resources or time.

The second reason is the human factor. Objectively speaking, the level of the commanders of the Red Army at that time was very low. Often they simply had no idea how to properly use armored vehicles. Frontal attacks on the enemy were used, which were suicidal for the "cardboard" T-26. Instead of using tanks in large masses, the units were split up down to individual vehicles. There was practically no coordination between the units, because the troops had very few walkie-talkies, and even those that were available were often not able to use. With the commander's cards, the situation was also catastrophic. Often I had to navigate according to a diagram drawn somehow by hand. But even if the commander had a map, this did not mean that he knew how to handle it (many such cases were recorded in memoirs and reports).

This weight led to the fact that most of the T-26 tanks were lost in the first six months of World War II.

The last battle in which these machines took part was the defeat of the Kwantung Army on Far East in 1945.

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On May 28, 1930, the Soviet procurement commission, headed by I. A. Khalepsky, head of the newly created Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, signed a contract with the British company Vickers for the production of 15 Vickers Mk.E mod.A twin-turret tanks for the USSR. The first tank was shipped to the customer on October 22, 1930, and the last on July 4, 1931. Soviet specialists also took part in the assembly of these tanks. Each combat vehicle purchased in England cost the Soviet Union 42,000 rubles. (in 1931 prices). For comparison, let's say that the "main escort tank" T-19, manufactured in the USSR in August of the same year, cost over 96 thousand rubles. In addition, the B-26 tank (this designation was given to British vehicles in the USSR) was easier to manufacture and operate, and also had better mobility. All these circumstances predetermined the choice of the UMM RKKA. Work on the T-19 was curtailed, and all forces were thrown into mastering the mass production of the B-26.

On February 13, 1931, by a decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the Vickers-26 tank was adopted by the Red Army under the symbol T-26. Its production was supposed to be deployed at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant under construction, then at the Stalingrad (also under construction), and at the latter it was planned to create a special workshop capable of producing up to 10 thousand tanks a year in wartime. But in the end they settled on the Bolshevik plant in Leningrad, which already had experience in tank building. Design work in preparation for mass production, as, indeed, all further work on the modernization of the tank, was carried out under the leadership of S. A. Ginzburg.

Light tank T-26 mod. 1931 with machine gun armament

In August 1931, the Defense Committee adopted a resolution on a tank building program in wartime conditions. In accordance with it, during the first year of the war, the factories were to produce 13,800 T-26 tanks. Of course, it was an obvious utopia, as, indeed, was the production plan for 1931, launched by the Bolshevik plant, - 500 units. Already in February, it was reduced to 300 units, with the condition that the first tank be delivered no later than May 1. But this turned out to be unrealistic. In the spring of 1931, there was only preparation for the serial production of the T-26 using a temporary, or, as they say today, bypass technology. In parallel, the assembly of two reference machines was carried out. Working drawings were mostly completed by May 1, and on June 16 the technological process was approved. The plant began manufacturing tools and equipment for mass production.

The assembly of the first ten serial T-26s, the so-called "installation batch", with non-armored steel hulls was completed in the summer of 1931. In the fall, full-fledged production cars began to leave the factory buildings. In February 1932 at the base tank production At the Bolshevik plant, a new plant No. 174 was organized. K. K. Sirken was appointed its director, and S. A. Ginzburg was appointed its chief designer.

Despite all these measures, the plan of 1932 could not be fulfilled. Back in April, K. K. Sirken reported that the delay in the tank assembly schedule was mainly due to the fault of subcontractors, who delayed the delivery of components and assemblies. In addition, the latter were extremely Low quality. For engines, the share of defects reached 88%, and for armored hulls - up to 41%. In 1932, plant No. 174 produced 1410 tanks, presented 1361 for delivery, and the troops accepted only 950. A similar picture was observed in the future. Nevertheless, by the second half of 1941, 11,218 tanks left the factory shops. T-26 became the most massive combat vehicle of the Red Army in the pre-war period.

Produced since 1931, the twin-turret version differed little from the British prototype. The riveted hull of the tank had a box section. On a turret box with a vertical frontal sheet on ball bearings, there were two cylindrical turrets. Each of them provided space for one crew member. The driver was located in front of the hull on the right. Perhaps the only difference between the first production T-26s and British vehicles was that their turrets were adapted for mounting DT machine guns, and Vickers tanks had round embrasures instead of rectangular ones. From the autumn of 1931, tanks of the so-called "second series" began to install towers of increased height with a viewing window. A viewing slot was cut in the driver's hatch cover, but without the triplex glass block. On March 1, 1932, a special casing was installed on the T-26 over the air outlet box, which protected it from precipitation, primarily snow. A month later, this casing began to be made as a single unit with the air outlet box.

The tank was equipped with a carburetor, 4-cylinder air-cooled T-26 engine with a power of 90 hp, which was a copy of the English Armstrong Siddeley engine. The mechanical transmission consisted of a single-disk main clutch of dry friction, a cardan shaft, a five-speed gearbox, final clutches, final drives and band brakes located on the housings of the onboard clutches.

The undercarriage for one side included eight double rubber-coated road wheels with a diameter of 300 mm, interlocked in pairs in four balance bogies suspended on leaf quarter elliptical springs, four rubber-coated support rollers with a diameter of 254 mm, a steering wheel with a crank tensioner and a front drive wheel with removable gear rims (lantern engagement). Caterpillars 260 mm wide were made of nickel-chromium or manganese steel.

There were no means of external communication on line tanks. For communication between the commander and the driver, a "sound pipe" was initially installed, later replaced by a light signaling device.

Light tank T-26. Double-turret modification with cannon-machine gun armament. A handrail antenna is installed along the perimeter of the case

At the beginning of 1932, the question arose of strengthening the armament of the T-26, since machine-gun vehicles could not "hit the enemy's firing points at a great distance and defend themselves against the attack of enemy destroyer tanks." In March 1932, the T-26 tank arrived at ANIOP, instead of the right turret of which a small gun turret of an experienced heavy tank T-35-1 armed with a 37 mm PS-2 cannon. In April of the same year, such towers were tested on two more T-26 tanks. The PS-2 gun had a very good performance, but it was not adopted by the Red Army, since the GAU preferred the German 37-mm Rheinmetall gun. On the basis of the latter, the B-3 (5K) gun was created and put into service. Compared to the PS-2, the B-3 had a smaller recoil and breech size, which made it possible to install it in a regular T-26 machine gun turret with almost no alterations. However, plant number 8 named after. Kalinina was unable to arrange the production of B-3 guns in the required quantities. In addition, since the summer of 1932, all available B-3 guns were transferred to arm the BT-2 tanks. Therefore, in the right machine-gun turret of the T-26, a 37-mm PS-1 gun (or Hotchkiss-PS), well mastered by industry, was installed. True, the production of these guns was curtailed, and their stock in warehouses was not as large as expected. Therefore, it was necessary to dismantle the guns from the T-18 and even Renault tanks transferred to SOAVIAKHIM or decommissioned. According to the re-equipment plan, guns were to be installed on every fifth tank. In fact, a few more such vehicles were made: out of 1627 double-turreted tanks produced in 1931–1933, about 450 vehicles were armed with the PS-1 gun.

In March 1932, the 45-mm anti-tank gun 19K, developed at the plant number 8, was adopted by the Red Army. 1932" and factory index 20K. Compared to the PS-2, the 20K tank gun had a number of advantages. Armor penetration increased slightly, the mass of the fragmentation projectile increased sharply (from 0.645 kg to 2.15 kg), and the mass of explosive in the projectile - from 22 g to 118 g. Finally, the rate of fire was increased due to the introduction of a vertical wedge semi-automatic shutter. True, the debugging of semi-automatic took about four years, and only in 1935 were guns sent to arrive with debugged semi-automatic on all types of ammunition.

Flamethrower tank XT-130

In December 1932, the Defense Committee ordered the production of T-26 tanks with a 45-mm gun. Under this cannon, paired with a DT machine gun, a new turret was designed for the T-26 and BT-2 tanks. Shooting tests showed its complete reliability.

Since 1935, the tanks were equipped with a 45-mm cannon mod. 1934. On this gun, the semi-automatic mechanical type was replaced by semi-automatic inertial type. The latter worked fully only when firing armor-piercing shells; when firing fragmentation - like a quarter of automatics, i.e., the shutter was opened and the cartridges were extracted manually, and when the next cartridge was inserted into the chamber, the shutter closed automatically. This is due to the different initial speeds of armor-piercing and fragmentation shells.

Since 1935, tank hulls and turrets have been manufactured using electric welding. The ammunition load of the gun was reduced to 122 rounds (for vehicles with a radio station - 82), the capacity of the fuel tank was increased. The mass of the tank increased to 9.6 tons. In 1936, a removable rubber band was introduced on the road wheels, the tensioning mechanism was changed, and a second DT machine gun was installed in the turret niche. At the same time, the ammunition load of the gun was reduced from 136 to 102 shots (on tanks without a radio station), and the mass of the tank increased to 9.65 tons. In 1937, DT anti-aircraft machine guns on turrets began to be mounted on some vehicles. Two searchlights of the so-called "combat light" were placed on the cannon, a new VKU-3 and a TPU-3 intercom were introduced. The engine was boosted, and its maximum power increased from 90 to 95 hp. In 1937, only radio tanks were produced, and with radio stations 71-GK-3. The ammunition load of tanks with a radio station reached 147 shots (107 for tanks without a walkie-talkie) and 3087 rounds. The mass of the tank was 9.75 tons.

Light tank T-26 mod. 1938 with conical turret. Searchlights of "combat light" are installed on the mask of the gun

In 1938, instead of a cylindrical one, a conical turret with a 45-mm gun mod. 1934. In the guns of the release of 1937 and 1938, an electric shutter appeared, which ensured the production of a shot by shock and with the help of electric current. Electric shutter guns were equipped with a TOP-1 telescopic sight (since 1938 - TOS), stabilized in a vertical plane. Unlike the tanks of previous releases, which had one 182-liter fuel tank, two such tanks with a capacity of 110 and 180 liters were installed on the machine. which increased the power reserve. The combat weight was 10.28 tons.

T-26 tanks with a conical turret and a straight turret box were distinguished by the presence or absence of a 71-TK-3 radio station with a handrail antenna, a DT aft turret machine gun, an anti-aircraft machine gun mount and “combat light” searchlights. In addition, there were two types of conical towers - with welded and stamped frontal shields. On the part of the tanks, mainly with radio stations, the commander's panorama of the PTK was installed.

In 1939, another modernization of the tank took place, during which a turret box with inclined armor plates was introduced, a stern machine gun was removed from some of the vehicles, and an additional ammunition rack for 32 rounds was mounted instead. As a result, the ammunition load on tanks without a radio station increased to 205 rounds and 3654 (58 disks) cartridges. On tanks with a walkie-talkie, it was 165 shots and 3213 rounds. Intercom TPU-3 was replaced by TPU-2. The engine underwent some changes (the compression ratio was raised), after which its power reached 97 hp. The chassis has also undergone changes, mainly in the direction of strengthening the suspension. From the T-26 tanks of the previous modification, the vehicles with an inclined turret box also differed in the external stowage of spare parts.

In 1940, the last cycle of changes in the design of the T-26 tank was carried out. Screens were installed on some of the machines during the war with Finland. The cemented armor of the turret box with a thickness of 15 mm was replaced with a homogeneous one with a thickness of 20 mm. In addition, they introduced a unified viewing device, a new shoulder strap of the tower and bakelite fuel tanks. The mass of the T-26 with screens exceeded 12 tons.

On the basis of the T-26 produced a large number of special-purpose combat vehicles: KhT-26, KhT-130 and KhT-133 flamethrower tanks, ST-26 bridgelayers, TT-26 and TU-26 telemechanical tanks, SU-5-2 self-propelled artillery mounts, artillery tractors, armored personnel carriers, etc. .

The first tank unit to receive the T-26 was the 1st mechanized brigade named after K. B. Kalinovsky (MVO). The vehicles that entered the troops before the end of 1931 had no weapons and were intended mainly for training. Their more or less normal operation began only in 1932. At the same time, a new staff of the mechanized brigade was approved, according to which it should have included 178 T-26 tanks. In this state, the formation of other mechanized brigades began.

The study and generalization of the experience of the exercises conducted in 1931–1932 revealed the need to create even larger formations. After a preliminary study of this issue, the Headquarters of the Red Army (as it was called in those years General base) developed the organizational structure of the mechanized corps. Their formation began in the autumn of 1932 in the Moscow, Ukrainian and Leningrad military districts. The corps included two mechanized brigades, one of which was armed with T-26 tanks, and the other with BT. Since 1935, the mechanized corps began to be armed only with BT tanks.

Since entering the troops T-26 arr. In 1933, for some time, a mixed platoon, consisting of one single-turret and two double-turret tanks, became typical in mechanized brigades. However, as the troops were saturated with single-turret tanks, the double-turret vehicles were mainly transferred to combat training parks, as well as to tank and tank battalions of rifle divisions. By the beginning of 1935, the tank battalion of the rifle division consisted of three tank companies of 15 T-26s each.

Light tank T-26 mod. 1938 with conical turret and sloped turret box armor

In August 1938, mechanized corps, brigades and regiments were converted into tank ones. By the end of 1938, the Red Army had 17 light tank brigades with 267 T-26 tanks each and three chemical tank brigades, also equipped with chemical tanks based on the T-26.

The T-26 received its baptism of fire in Spain. On July 18, 1936, a rebellion began in this country against the government of the republic, led by General Francisco Franco. The rebellion was supported by most of the army of the civil guard and the police. After landing the Army of Africa in continental Spain, Franco captured half of the country's territory within a few weeks. But in the major industrial centers of the north - Madrid, Barcelona, ​​Valencia, Bilbao and others - the rebellion failed. A civil war broke out in Spain.

Yielding to the request of the republican government, the government of the USSR decided to sell military equipment to the Spaniards and send military advisers to Spain, including tankers.

On September 26, 1936, the first batch of 15 T-26 tanks arrived at the port of Cartagena, which were supposed to be used to train Spanish tankers. But the situation became more complicated, and these tanks went to the formation of a tank company, the command of which was taken by the captain of the Red Army P. Arman. Already on October 29, the company entered the battle.

On November 1, Colonel S. Krivoshein's tank group, which included 23 T-26s and nine armored vehicles, struck at the Francoists. At the same time, Spanish crews were on part of the cars.

From the beginning of December 1936 to Spain in en masse T-26 tanks and other military equipment began to arrive, as well as personnel led by brigade commander D. Pavlov. The commanders and driver-mechanics were regular soldiers sent from the best units and formations of the Red Army: the mechanized brigade named after Volodarsky (Peterhof), the 4th mechanized brigade (Bobruisk), the 1st mechanized corps named after K. B. Kalinovsky (Naro-Fominsk). On the basis of almost 100 units of the arrived equipment and personnel, the formation of the 1st Republican Tank Brigade began. Mainly due to Soviet assistance, by the summer of 1938, the Republican army already had two armored divisions.

In total, until the end of the civil war, the Soviet Union delivered 297 T-26 tanks to Republican Spain (only single-turret vehicles of the 1933 model were supplied). These machines took part in almost all military operations conducted by the army of the Republicans, and showed themselves on the good side. German Pz.I and Italian tankettes CV3 / 33, which had only machine guns, were powerless against the T-26. The latter circumstance can be illustrated by the following example.

During the battle near the village of Esquivias, the T-26 Semyon Osadchy tank rammed an Italian CV3 tankette and dropped it into the gorge. The second tankette was also destroyed, and the other two were damaged. The loss ratio was sometimes even greater. So, during the battle of Guadalajara in one day on March 10, a platoon of two T-26s under the command of the Spaniard E. Ferrer knocked out 25 Italian tankettes!

It should, however, be emphasized that Soviet tankers faced a worthy adversary. The infantry of the rebels, especially the Moroccan, suffering heavy losses from the actions of tanks, did not leave the trenches and did not retreat. The Moroccans threw grenades and bottles of gasoline at the fighting vehicles, and when they were not there, enemy soldiers with rifles at the ready rushed right under the tanks, hit the armor with rifle butts, grabbed the tracks.

fighting in Spain, which, on the one hand, demonstrated the superiority of Soviet tanks over German and Italian ones in armament, on the other hand, revealed their main drawback - weak armor. Even the frontal armor of the T-26 was easily penetrated by German and Italian anti-tank guns.

The first combat operation of the Red Army, in which T-26 tanks took part, was the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict near Lake Khasan in July 1938. To defeat the Japanese group Soviet command attracted the 2nd mechanized brigade, as well as the 32nd and 40th separate tank battalions. The Soviet tank group consisted of 257 T-26 tanks, including 10 KhT-26s, three ST-26 bridgelayers, 81 BT-7s (in the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd mechanized brigade) and 13 SU-5-2 self-propelled guns.

Even before the start of hostilities, the 2nd mechanized brigade suffered significant losses. On July 27, three days before going to the battle area, its brigade commander A.P. Panfilov, the chief of staff, the commissar, the commanders of battalions and a number of other units were arrested. All of them were declared enemies of the people. As a result, 99% of the commanders were newly appointed people, which negatively affected the subsequent actions of the brigade. So, for example, due to the poor organization of the movement of columns and the haste, the brigade completed a march of only 45 km in 11 hours! At the same time, part of the units, due to complete ignorance of the route of movement, wandered around the city of Voroshilov-Ussuriysk for quite a long time.

During the assault on the Bogomolnaya and Zaozernaya hills occupied by the Japanese, our tankers came across a well-organized anti-tank defense. As a result, 85 T-26 tanks were lost, of which 9 were burned. After the end of hostilities, 39 tanks were restored by military units, and the rest were repaired in the factory.

The brunt of the fighting tank units in Mongolia near the river. Khalkhin-Gol "lay on the shoulders" of the BT wheeled-tracked tanks. As of February 1, 1939, the 57th Special Corps had only 33 T-26 tanks, 18 KhT-26 tanks and six tractors based on the T-26. "Beteshek", for comparison, there were 219 units. The situation changed little in the future. So, on July 20, 1939, in parts of the 1st army group there were 10 KhT-26 tanks (in the 11th tank brigade) and 14 T-26 tanks (in the 82nd rifle division). By the August battles, the number of "twenty-sixth", mainly chemical, increased slightly, but still they made up a relatively small percentage of total number tanks involved in the battles. Nevertheless, they were used quite intensively.

Here it will be interesting to quote some excerpts from the documents drawn up in the 1st Army Group on the basis of the results of hostilities, in the part in which they relate to T-26 tanks and vehicles based on them.

“T-26 - showed themselves exclusively on the good side, they walked perfectly on the dunes, the tank's survivability was very high. In the 82nd Rifle Division, there was a case when the T-26 had five hits from a 37-mm gun, the armor was blown, but the tank did not catch fire and after the battle it came to SPAM under its own power ( collection point emergency vehicles. - Note. author)". After such a flattering assessment, a much less flattering conclusion follows, regarding the armor protection of the T-26 (however, our other tanks as well): "the Japanese 37-mm cannon pierces the armor of any of our tanks freely."

The actions of chemical tanks deserve special praise.

“By the start of hostilities, the 57th Special Corps had only 11 chemical tanks (KhT-26) in the company combat support 11th tank brigade (two platoons of 5 tanks and a company commander's tank). The flamethrower mixture had 3 charges in parts and 4 in stock.

On July 20, the 2nd company of chemical tanks from the 2nd tank chemical brigade arrived in the combat area. She had 18 XT-130s and 10 flamethrower charges. However, it turned out that the personnel of the company were very poorly prepared for flamethrowing. Therefore, before the company went directly to the combat area, they were carried out workshops on flamethrowing and studied the combat experience already available to tank chemists of the 11th tank brigade.

In addition, the 6th Tank Brigade, which arrived at the front, had 9 KhT-26s. In total, by the beginning of August, the troops of the 1st Army Group had KhT-26 - 19, LHT-130 - 18.

During the period of the August operation (August 20–29), all chemical tanks took part in the battle. They were especially active in the period of August 23-26, and these days LHT-130 went on the attack 6-11 times.

In total, during the period of the conflict, chemical units spent 32 tons of flamethrower mixture. Losses in people amounted to 19 people (9 killed and 10 wounded), irretrievable losses in tanks - 12 vehicles, of which KhT-26 - 10 (of which the 11th tank brigade - 7 and the 6th tank brigade - 3), KhT -130 - 2.

The weak point in the use of flamethrowing tanks was poor reconnaissance and preparation of vehicles for an attack. As a result, there was a large consumption of fire mixture in secondary areas and unnecessary losses.

During the very first battles, it was found that the Japanese infantry could not withstand flamethrowing and was afraid of a chemical tank. This was shown by the defeat of the Azuma detachment on May 28–29, in which 5 XT-26s were actively used.

In subsequent battles, where flamethrower tanks were used, the Japanese invariably left their shelters without showing stamina. For example, on July 12, a detachment of the Japanese as part of a reinforced company with 4 anti-tank guns penetrated into the depths of our location and, despite repeated attacks, offered stubborn resistance. Introduced only one chemical tank, which gave a stream of fire to the center of resistance, caused panic in the ranks of the enemy, the Japanese fled from the front line of trenches into the depths of the pit and our infantry arrived in time, occupying the crest of the pit, this detachment was finally destroyed.

As soon as the cannonade had died down in the Far East, the guns in the West began to speak. German divisions crossed the Polish border, the Second World War.

On the eve of World War II, the T-26s were mainly in service with separate light tank brigades (256-267 tanks each) and separate tank battalions of rifle divisions (one company - 10-15 tanks). As part of these units and divisions, they took part in the "liberation campaign" in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

In particular, on September 17, 1939, 878 T-26s of the Belorussian Front and 797 T-26s of the Ukrainian Front crossed the Polish border. Losses in the course of hostilities during the Polish campaign were very insignificant: only 15 "twenty-sixths". but due to various kinds of technical malfunctions at the entrance of the marches, 302 combat vehicles failed. The losses of tanks, including the T-26, during the Winter War were much greater.

The Soviet-Finnish, or, as it is often called, the Winter War began on November 30, 1939. The 10th tank corps, the 20th heavy, 34th, 35th, 39th and 40th light tank brigades, 20 separate tank battalions of rifle divisions took part in the war with Finland. Already during the war, the 29th light tank brigade and a significant number of separate tank battalions arrived at the front.

The experience of the war forced changes in the structure of tank units. So, in the conditions of the northern theater of operations, the T-37 and T-38 tanks, which were equipped with two companies in the tank battalions of rifle divisions, turned out to be useless. Therefore, the directive of the Main Military Council of the Red Army of January 1, 1940 provided for each rifle division to have a tank battalion of 54 T-26s (of which 15 were chemical), and in each rifle regiment - a tank company of 17 T-26s. At the same time, the formation of seven tank regiments of 164 T-26 tanks each began. They were intended for motorized rifle and light motorized divisions. However, only two of the latter were formed.

On the front road - T-26 tanks arr. 1933 and 1939 Karelian Isthmus, December 1939

The fleet of T-26 tanks used during the "winter" war was very colorful. In the brigades that were armed with combat vehicles of this type, one could meet both double-turret and single-turret tanks. different years issue, from 1931 to 1939. In the tank battalions of rifle divisions, the equipment, as a rule, was old, manufactured in 1931-1936. But some parts were completed with brand new T-26s, straight from the factory. In total, by the beginning of hostilities in the tank units of the Leningrad Front, there were 848 T-26 tanks.

Like combat vehicles of other brands, the "twenty-sixths" were used as the main striking force in breaking through the "Mannerheim Line". I am mainly involved in the destruction of fortifications: from shooting anti-tank gouges to direct fire at the embrasures of Finnish pillboxes.

Of greatest interest are the actions of the 35th light tank brigade, since it was this formation that carried out the largest and almost the only battle with Finnish tanks.

The first days of the fighting, the brigade operated in the direction of Kiviniemi, and then was transferred to the Hottinen area - height 65.5. Until the end of December, the tanks of the brigade, suffering heavy losses, attacked the enemy, supporting the 123rd and 138th rifle divisions, and then were withdrawn to the reserve. In January, tankers were engaged in the evacuation and repair of materiel, conducted classes to work out interaction with infantry, sappers and artillery. Taking into account the experience of previous battles, wooden fascines were made. They were laid on a sled hitched to the rear of the tank. Fashins were intended to fill ditches and passages between gouges. At the suggestion of the fighters, a wooden bridge was made to overcome the ditches. It was assumed that it could be pushed in front of the T-26 on skids. However, the design turned out to be very cumbersome and heavy, which excluded the movement of the bridge in rough terrain.

By the beginning of the breakthrough of the main line of defense - the "Mannerheim Line" - the tanks of the brigade battalion-by-battalion gave the 100th, 113th and 123rd rifle divisions, with which they operated until the end of the war.

At the end of February 1940, the 4th Finnish tank company was advanced into the offensive zone of the 35th light tank brigade, numbering 13 Vickers 6-ton tanks, of which 10 were armed with a 37-mm Bofors cannon. Finnish tanks received the task of supporting the infantry attack of the 23rd Finnish infantry division.

At 06:15 on February 26, eight Vickers (with Bofors guns) moved into battle. Due to breakdowns, two vehicles stopped, and only six tanks came out to the positions of the Soviet troops. However, the Finnish tankers were not lucky - the infantry did not follow them, and due to poor reconnaissance, the Vickers ran into the tanks of the 35th tank brigade. Judging by Finnish documents, the fate of the Vickers was as follows.

The tank with the number R-648 was hit by the fire of several Soviet tanks and burned down. The tank commander was wounded, but managed to get out to his own. The other three crew members were killed. "Vickers" R-655, having crossed the railway, was hit and left by the crew. The Finns were able to evacuate this tank, but it was not subject to restoration and was subsequently dismantled. "Vickers" R-664 and R-667 received several hits and lost their course. For some time they fired from a place, and then were abandoned by the crews. "Vickers" R-668 stuck trying to knock down a tree. Of the entire crew, only one person survived, the rest died. Vickers R-670 was also hit.

In the operational summary of the 35th brigade for February 26, the details of this battle are said very succinctly: “Two Vickers tanks with infantry reached the right flank of the 245th rifle regiment but were shot down. Four "Vickers" came to the aid of their infantry and were destroyed by the fire of three tanks of the company commanders, who were going on reconnaissance.

An even shorter entry in the “Journal of Military Operations” of the 35th Brigade: “On February 26, the 112th Tank Battalion, together with units of the 123rd Infantry Division, went to the Honkaniemi area, where the enemy offered stubborn resistance, repeatedly turning into counterattacks. Here, two Renault tanks and six Vickers were knocked out, of which one Renault and three Vickers were evacuated and handed over to the headquarters of the 7th Army.

The only thing known about the further fate of the captured "Vickers" is that one tank was exhibited at the "Rout of the White Finns" exhibitions in Moscow and Leningrad. One entered the 377th separate tank battalion, and one (R-668) went to the Kubinka training ground, where it was tested in the spring and summer of 1940.

Shoots tank XT-130 from the 210th separate chemical tank battalion. Karelian Isthmus, February 1940

T-26 tanks of the 35th light tank brigade are preparing for an attack. February 1940

It should be noted that the battle with enemy tanks was described in much more detail and emotionally by its direct participant V. S. Arkhipov, at that time the company commander of the 112th tank battalion of the 35th light tank brigade. Here is what he writes:

“On February 25, the vanguard of the 245th regiment - the 1st rifle battalion of Captain A. Makarov with our tank company attached to it, - moving along railway to Vyborg, took possession of the Kamarya station, and by the end of the day - the Khonkaniemi station and the nearby village of Urhala.

The infantrymen dug trenches in the snow and rested in shifts. We spent the night right in the tanks, in the forest. They were on duty by platoon, disguising cars in the clearing. The night passed quietly, and when the tank platoon of Lieutenant I. I. Sachkov went on duty and it began to get light, drowsiness fell upon me. I am sitting in the car, in my usual place, by the cannon, and I don’t understand, whether in a dream, or in reality, I think that we have pulled far ahead, there is no connection with the neighbor on the right. What is there? There is good position: on the left is a lowland - a swamp under snow or a swampy lake, and on the right - an embankment of the railway and a few behind us, near the half-station, a crossing. The rear of the battalion was there - the medical unit, the field kitchen ... The tank engine was running at low speeds, suddenly I stopped hearing it. Fell asleep! With an effort I open my eyes, and the roar of a tank engine bursts into my ears. No, not ours. It's nearby. And at that moment our tank twitched strongly ...

So, with the incident, the first and last battle with enemy tanks began. Remembering him today, I come to the conclusion that he was equally unexpected for us and for the enemy. For us, because until that day, until February 26, we did not meet enemy tanks and did not even hear about them. This is the first. And secondly, tanks appeared in our rear, from the side of the crossing, and Lieutenant Sachkov mistook them for his own, for Kulabukhov's company. Yes, and it was not surprising to be confused, since the light English Vickers tank was outwardly similar to the T-26, like a twin. Only the gun we have is stronger - 45 mm, and the Vickers - 37 mm.

Well, as for the enemy, as it turned out soon, intelligence did not work well for him. The enemy command, of course, knew that yesterday we had captured the station. Not only did they know, it was preparing a counterattack at the station and, as a starting position, outlined a grove between the lowland and the embankment of the railway, that is, the place where we, tankers and Captain Makarov’s shooters, spent that night. Enemy reconnaissance overlooked the fact that after the capture of Honkaniemi, having planted the battalion headquarters and up to a hundred infantrymen on the armor, we advanced another kilometer and a half north of Honkaniemi at dusk.

So, our tank was yanked by a blow from the outside. I opened the hatch and leaned out of it. Downstairs, they hear Sergeant Korobka expressing his opinion aloud about the driver of the tank that hit us:

Here is the hat! Well, I told him!

Not our company car! No, not ours! - confidently said radio operator Dmitriev.

The tank, which had hit our caterpillar with its own (our car was standing on the side of the clearing, disguised by a spruce forest), was moving away. And although I knew that it could only be a tank from Kulabukhov's company, anxiety seemed to prick my heart. Why - I figured it out later. And then I saw a morning grove around, frost was falling, and, as always, when it suddenly gets warmer, the trees stood in snowy lace - in a jacket, as they say in the Urals. And further, at the crossing, in the morning mist, a group of infantrymen could be seen. In single file, dressed in sheepskin coats and felt boots, they walked towards the forest with bowlers in their hands. “Kulabukhov!” I thought, looking at the tanks that appeared at the crossing and began to slowly overtake the infantrymen. One of the shooters, contrived, put the bowler hat on the armor of the tank, on the engine, and hurried along, shouting something to his comrades. Peaceful morning picture. And suddenly I understood the reason for my alarm: there was a blue stripe on the turret of the tank moving away from us. Soviet tanks did not have such identification marks. And the guns on the tanks were different - shorter and thinner.

Sachkov, enemy tanks! I shouted into the microphone. - On tanks - fire! Armor-piercing! - I ordered Dmitriev and heard the click of the closed shutter of the gun.

The turret of the tank, which was the first to overtake our infantrymen, slightly turned around, the machine-gun fire passed through the forest, through the nearby bushes, and hit the roof of my turret hatch. Small fragments cut my hands and face, but at that moment I did not feel it. Diving down, fell to the sight. In the optics I see foot soldiers. Tearing off their rifles from behind, they rush into the snow. They figured out on whose motors the pots of porridge were heated. I catch the starboard side of the Vickers in the crosshairs. Shot, another shot!

Burning! shouts Box.

Shots from Sachkov's tanks rumble nearby. Soon others join them. So, Naplavkov's platoon also joined in. The tank that hit us stood up, knocked out. The rest of the enemy vehicles lost formation and seemed to disperse. Of course, it is impossible to say about tanks that they are panicking - the crews are panicking. But we only see cars that rush in one direction or the other. Fire! Fire!

In total, on that day, 14 English-made Finnish tanks were knocked out in the area of ​​the Honkaniemi half-station, and we captured three vehicles in good condition and, by order of the command, sent them by rail to Leningrad. Then I saw them - they stood in the courtyard of the Leningrad Museum of the Revolution as exhibits. And after the Great Patriotic War, I no longer found Vickers there. Museum employees said that in the autumn of 1941, when the fascist blockade of the city began, the tanks were repaired and sent with crews to the front.

It is difficult to say how reliable the last statement is, but V. S. Arkhipov clearly overestimated the number of Finnish tanks destroyed. As follows from the above documents, only 6 enemy combat vehicles were hit. Of course, the actions of the small Finnish tank units had no effect on the course of the battles. But the Finnish anti-tank defense was much more effective. This is eloquently evidenced by the figures of our losses in armored vehicles.

For the entire period of hostilities from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the Red Army lost 3178 on the Karelian Isthmus, of which 1903 were combat losses and 1275 were losses due to technical reasons. According to incomplete data, the losses of T-26 tanks of all variants amounted to about 1000 units, that is, they exceeded the number of “twenty-sixth” at the beginning of the war. However, in the course of hostilities, tanks arrived as replenishment both from factories and as part of new tank units being transferred to the front. In February 1940, for example, the 29th light tank brigade consisting of 256 T-26 tanks arrived on the Karelian Isthmus from Brest.

On June 1, 1941, the tank forces of the Red Army had 10,268 T-26 tanks of all modifications, including special ones, which accounted for 39.5% of the entire tank fleet of the Red Army. Of interest is the number of T-26 tanks in the western military districts.

In total, in the western, or, as they are often called, border, military districts, by June 1, 1941, there were 4875 T-26 tanks of all modifications. Of this number, 709 combat vehicles belonged to the 3rd and 4th categories, that is, they required medium and major repairs. It goes without saying that these tanks were not combat-ready. Formally, tanks of the 1st and 2nd categories were treated as combat-ready vehicles. 828 tanks of the 1st category were equipment that was in storage. After being removed from storage, these tanks were ready for battle. The situation was more complicated with vehicles of the 2nd category (3339 units), which included both fully serviceable and usable tanks, and requiring current repairs. In the concept " Maintenance"Related operations such as replacing batteries, track tracks, track rollers, etc. Given the shortage of spare parts available in the Red Army, it becomes clear that some of the tanks of the 2nd category were not combat-ready. In some units, up to a third of the vehicles stood motionless (especially for the T-26, there were not enough tracks and fingers), although they were listed in the 2nd category. In addition, up to 30% of the tanks were vehicles produced in 1931-1934, which had a limited motor resource.

A German soldier inspects a broken T-26 tank. Army Group Center, June 1941

Thus, in the five western military districts there were approximately 3100-3200 technically serviceable T-26 tanks and vehicles based on them, which is slightly less than the entire German tank fleet intended for the invasion of the USSR, and approximately 40% of the total number of Soviet tanks available in these districts.

During the fighting of the first months of the Great Patriotic War, most of the T-26s were lost mainly from artillery fire and air strikes. Many vehicles were out of order for technical reasons, and the insufficient provision of military units with means of evacuation and the lack of spare parts did not allow them to be repaired. When withdrawing, even tanks with minor breakdowns had to be blown up or set on fire. The dynamics and nature of losses can be illustrated by the example of the 12th mechanized corps, which was stationed in the Baltic Special Military District on the eve of the war. As of June 22, 1941, the corps had 449 T-26 tanks, two chemical tanks and four T-27T tractor-transporters. By July 7, 201 T-26s, both chemical tanks and all transporters were knocked out. Another 186 T-26s were out of action for technical reasons.

During the same period, 66 T-26 tanks were lost in the 125th Tank Regiment of the 202nd Motorized Division, of which 60 were irretrievably lost.

By July 21, 1941, 4 BT-7s, 1 T-26 and 2 BA-20s remained in the 28th Panzer Division of the 12th Mechanized Corps, 4 T-26s in the 23rd Panzer Division, and 4 T-26s in the 202nd Motorized Division. 1 T-26! The corps practically ceased to exist as a formation of tank troops.

Tank T-26 mod. 1939, abandoned by the crew due to the left caterpillar flying off. Southwestern Front, June 1941

Tank T-26, stuck in a swamp and abandoned by the crew on the distant approaches to Leningrad. Northwestern Front, 1941

By the autumn of 1941, the number of “twenty-sixths” in the Red Army had noticeably decreased, but they still continued to make up a significant percentage of the materiel. So, for example, on October 1, 1941, there were 475 tanks in the tank units of the Western Front, 298 of them were T-26s. That was 62%! However, the technical condition of many of them left much to be desired. Here is what was said, for example, in the “From the report on the military operations of the 20th tank brigade”, which received 20 T-26s on the way to the front in early October: “T-26 tanks, which arrived from the rembase, started up with difficulty, from towing, and 14 pieces would not start at all. Apparently, this was the case in many other brigades. In any case, this situation only contributed to the rapid decline of combat vehicles of this type.

A month later, on October 28, 1941, at the height of the German offensive against Moscow, our Western Front had 441 tanks. Only 50 of them were T-26s, with 14 of them under repair.

"Twenty-sixth" took part not only in the defense of Moscow. They were armed, for example, the 86th separate tank battalion of the Leningrad Front. On December 20, 1941, he received the task of supporting the attack of our infantry from the Kolpino area in the direction of Krasny Bor, Tosno. During this combat operation, the platoon commander junior lieutenant M. I. Yakovlev accomplished his feat. Here's what the award sheet says about it:

"Tov. Yakovlev in battles with the fascist invaders proved himself to be a faithful son of the Socialist Motherland, a hero of the Patriotic War. For 6 days, from December 20 to 26, 1941 (in the battles for Krasny Bor), the T-26 tank commander Yakovlev did not get out of the car, mercilessly destroying the enemy's manpower and equipment.

After the capture of the anti-tank ditch by our units, the Germans tried to return the advantageous lines they had lost. They counterattacked our tanks three times.

Tov. Yakovlev, letting the Nazis come within 100 meters, shot them point-blank and went on the attack again.

In just one night from December 22 to 23, he destroyed over 200 enemy soldiers and officers, two bunkers, three anti-tank guns, 4 machine-gun nests, three mortars with servants and an ammunition depot in the village. Krasny Bor.

Yakovlev's tank had 9 holes, but the brave commander managed to take him out of the battlefield.

Junior Lieutenant Yakovlev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

As for the T-26 tanks, they continued to be used in combat throughout the entire length of the Soviet-German front from the Barents to the Black Seas throughout 1942. True, already in much smaller quantities than in 1941.

So, for example, as of May 9, 1942, as of May 9, 1942, as part of the 22nd tank corps of the Southwestern Front, that is, on the eve of the attack on Kharkov, there were 105 tanks. Six of them are T-26s. Unfortunately, there is no complete data on the composition of the tank grouping of the Southwestern Front, so it is impossible to indicate in which other tank units of the front there were combat vehicles of this type. It is known for sure that the six T-26 tanks mentioned were in service with the 13th Tank Brigade.

All brigades of the 22nd Panzer Corps entered into battle with the German tank grouping (combat group of the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions) on May 13, 1942, repelling a counterattack on the flank of the advancing troops of our 38th Army. The German group consisted of more than 130 tanks. As a result of the battle, the 13th tank brigade, as well as the other two brigades of the corps - the 36th and 133rd, lost all their tanks. At the same time, according to the report of the brigade commanders, more than 100 enemy tanks were destroyed.

The last major operations of the Great Patriotic War, in which T-26 tanks took part in more or less noticeable quantities, were Battle of Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus.

As of July 15, 1942, only the 63rd Tank Brigade (8 units) and the 62nd Separate Tank Battalion (17 units) of the Southern Front had "twenty-sixth" units. During the fighting, by the end of July, 15 T-26 tanks were lost. The 126th separate tank battalion (36 T-26 tanks) operated as part of the troops of the Primorsky Group of the North Caucasian Front.

On August 10, 1942, the 126th battalion was redeployed to the Abinskaya-Krymskaya area with the task, together with the 103rd Red Banner Rifle Brigade, "to stubbornly defend the mountain passes to Novorossiysk, using tanks as fixed firing points, burying them in the ground."

On the morning of August 17, the enemy, with up to 18 Pz.IV Ausf.F1 tanks with two companies of machine gunners, supported by 2-3 artillery and mortar batteries, went on the offensive from st. Akhtyrskaya in the direction of Art. Abinskaya.

This settlement was defended by the 1st company of the 126th separate tank battalion, consisting of 11 T-26 tanks. For two hours, she fought with enemy tanks, and then retreated to spare positions, from which the tanks fired from a place. On the western outskirts of Abinskaya, a street battle began with enemy tanks. By the end of the day, the company lost from artillery fire and tank battle 7 tanks. Another 3 damaged vehicles were blown up by order of the company's political instructor. The wrecked tanks were not evacuated due to the lack of evacuation means.

Attack of T-26 tanks. Western Front, October 1941

On August 18, the 2nd tank horn entered the battle with the enemy. Up to 30 German tanks and 20 vehicles with infantry moved in the direction of the Crimean village. As a result of three days of positional battles with enemy tanks and infantry, the company lost two tanks. German losses - 4 tanks and several dozen infantrymen.

The 3rd tank company, together with the battalion of the 103rd, attacked the enemy several times from the eastern outskirts of the Crimean rifle brigade and until the end of the day on August 19 did not give the Germans the opportunity to capture the station. However, the very next day the Germans, having pulled up their reserves, captured Krymskaya. All tanks of the 3rd company of the 126th separate tank battalion were surrounded and killed. The enemy in this battle lost 5 tanks, a mortar battery and up to an infantry company.

By August 22, 1942, the battalion had lost 30 tanks. At the same time, from air strikes - 5 tanks, from artillery fire and enemy tanks - 21, from flamethrower fire - 1. In addition, 3 tanks were blown up by crews.

The remaining 6 "twenty-sixths" were used as fixed firing points for the defense of mountain passes 25 km north of Novorossiysk.

The battalion suffered heavy losses due to the misuse of tanks, which, without the support of infantry and artillery, led defensive battles at the front with a length of 20 km in groups of 3-5 vehicles.

Tanks T-26 in the Vyazemsky direction. 1941

The personnel of the 126th separate tank battalion fought heroically. On August 20, 1942, the commander of the 2nd company, Lieutenant Meleshko, personally destroyed 4 German medium tanks on his T-26.

Another unit that was armed with a significant number of T-26 tanks was the 207th tank brigade. At the beginning of December 1942, it included 52 tanks: 46 T-26s and 6 T-60s.

At the end of December, the 207th tank brigade fought the most intense battles with the enemy (compared to other tank units of the Transcaucasian Front), trying to destroy the tank battalion of the Viking SS motorized division in the Surkh-Digor region. During December 27 and 28, due to the poor organization of hostilities, the brigade lost 37 T-26 and T-60 tanks, while knocking out 14 enemy tanks (10 of them were evacuated by the Germans from the battlefield).

It should be noted that in almost all cases, after the loss of T-26 tanks, the brigades and battalions that had them received as replenishment combat vehicles of other types that are in mass production or received under lend-lease. In particular, the T-60 and T-70 vehicles entered service with the light tank battalions of tank brigades.

In 1943, T-26 tanks were no longer used in most sectors of the Soviet-German front. Basically, they were preserved where the front was fairly stable, where there was no active hostilities for a long time, as well as in some rear units.

In this regard, it will be interesting to mention the 151st Tank Brigade (45th Army, Transcaucasian Front). A brigade consisting of 24 T-26s and 19 British light tanks Mk. VII "Tetrarch" guarded state border USSR with Iran. In January 1943, the brigade was transferred to Tuapse at the disposal of the 47th Army.

Repair of the T-26 tank at one of the enterprises of Leningrad. 1941

For quite a long time, the "twenty-sixth" remained in the troops of the Leningrad Front. In particular, by the beginning of the operation to lift the blockade in January 1944, the 1st and 220th tank brigades of the Leningrad Front had 32 T-26 tanks each.

On another stable sector of the Soviet-German front - in Karelia and in the Murmansk direction - T-26s were in service even longer - until the summer of 1944.

The last combat operation of the Soviet Armed Forces, in which the T-26 took part, was the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in August 1945. In the Far East, by 1945, quite a few tanks of old brands were preserved, primarily the T-26 and BT-7. They were equipped with several tank brigades, which throughout the Great Patriotic War were on the Manchurian border and did not participate in hostilities. In order to increase their combat capabilities in the summer of 1945, 670 T-34-85 tanks arrived from the factories, which equipped the first battalions in these tank brigades. The T-26 or BT-7 tanks remained in service with the second and third battalions. In this composition, these units took part in the battles with the Japanese.

Setting the task of the tank unit. Sevastopol, January 1942

Before assessing the T-26, it is necessary to decide on the classification. In most modern reference books, this machine is referred to as light tanks. This is not entirely true. In fact, the T-26 is a light infantry tank, or a light infantry escort tank.

However, to be absolutely accurate, the classic escort tank is a machine gun version of the T-26. So to speak, a complete analogue of the British "Vickers" model A, which was purchased by the Soviet Union. The post of equipping the T-26 in 1933 with a 45-mm cannon received something like a fighter tank. Only a limited speed of movement remained from the infantry tank.

However, regardless of the nuances of the classification, it should be recognized that the Vickers 6-ton model A and its Soviet version T-20 mod. 1931 fully corresponded to the tasks assigned to them. Their maneuverability and armament fit perfectly into the concept of a light infantry tank. Bulletproof armor protection at that time cannot be considered a disadvantage. At the end of the 1920s, no army in the world had specialized anti-tank guns. The theoretical (and practical) basis of the anti-tank defense system was also missing. The tank almost completely dominated the battlefield.

Tank T-26 near Nevskaya Dubrovka. Leningrad Front, 1942

Tank T-26 in ambush. Western Front, 1942

By the time the T-26 mod. In 1933, the situation changed dramatically. From 1930 to 1933, first 37-mm and then 45-mm anti-tank guns were adopted by the Red Army. The T-26 was armed with a tank version of the latter. When evaluating the armor protection of a tank, there is the following criterion: its armor must "hold" the shells of its own cannon. The armor of the T-26 absolutely did not meet this criterion. She did not "hold" the shells of anti-tank guns of a smaller caliber, which had appeared abroad by that time. So already in 1933, the T-26 should be considered obsolete. However, this understanding came only after the war in Spain, and even then not to all the military leaders of the country. In any case, work on the creation of tanks with anti-cannon armor went neither shaky nor rolls. The final verdict on the "twenty-sixth" was delivered by Khalkhin-Gol and winter war.

However, it cannot be said that no steps were taken to strengthen the armor of the T-26. The introduction of the conical turret, and then the sloping armor of the turret box, certainly contributed to the increase in the bullet resistance of the armor. But only bulletproof! She still did not save from shells. A cardinal increase in armor protection was impossible. Neither the chassis, nor the engine, nor the transmission would have sustained the inevitable increase in mass. The mass of the T-26 by the end of serial production had already increased to 12 tons, which had the most negative impact on its technical reliability.

In a good way, it was required to remove the T-26 from production as early as 1936-1937. But it was hopelessly outdated and conceptually (by this time infantry tanks with powerful armor protection had already been created - R-35 and H-35 in France and Matilda I in Great Britain), and technically the car continued to be produced until 1941. It was not possible to start mass production of the T-50 escort tank, which had armor at the level of the average T-34.

However, the reader is most often concerned not with the question of how outdated the T-26 was in 1941, but with its real capabilities when meeting with German tanks. When answering this question, it is necessary to analyze in comparison three main evaluation parameters: mobility, security and firepower.

The mobility of the T-26 was rather poor - it was inferior to all Wehrmacht tanks, with the exception of the Czechoslovak 35 (t). The latter was generally close in its performance characteristics to the T-26, since it was created within the framework of the same concept and in the image and likeness of the 6-ton Vickers.

The security of the T-26 was even worse - even the German Pz.I (essentially a tankette with a rotating turret) had thicker armor than the T-26. All other light German tanks of 1941 were protected by frontal armor of 25–30 mm, and medium and heavy (we remind the reader that until 1942 the Germans divided tanks into classes not by combat weight, but by gun caliber) - up to 50 mm.

"The order is to cross the border!" A rally in one of the tank units before the start of the war with Japan. August 1945

Perhaps, only with the weapons of the T-26 was everything in order. The powerful (for 1941) 45-mm cannon to some extent compensated for the lack of armor protection of the T-26 and equalized the chances in a fire duel with German tanks.

However, it was by no means the shortcomings of this combat vehicle that caused the high losses of 1941. A number of combat examples cited above convincingly prove that, with proper use, the T-26 could effectively withstand both Pz.III and Pz.IV, and not only in 1941, but also in 1942.